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iPreface
Fishing for Jonah (anew) is the culmination of longstanding discussions between the authors of 
this book on biblical interpretation that began with our ﬁ rst joint project in 1995, Fishing for 
Jonah. Th at work was a response to our awareness that there is a scarcity of introductions to 
exegetical methodology in the ﬁ eld of biblical studies, especially on the African continent. With 
this volume we want to contribute to biblical scholarship in general, but especially to scholarship 
in our own context.
Th is project was made possible by the co-operation of a number of our colleagues. We have 
used, with or without changes, earlier contributions by Ernst Conradie and Roger Arendse, and 
have also included new sections by Ernst Conradie, Elna Mouton, Franziska Andrag-Meyer and 
Gerald West. We thank all these colleagues for making their scholarship available for this project. 
Th e contributions of each of these colleagues are acknowledged in the Table of Contents below.
We, the editors, took responsibility for writing chapters 1 and 8, namely the introduction and 
the conclusion to the book. In the conclusion we ask the question “Where does this leave us?” 
aft er we have been introduced to the multitude of interpretation strategies. We argue that the 
best interpretive practice involves a particular attitude towards reading, rather than a narrow 
adherence to a single methodology. Th is attitude is one that is constantly alert to the diﬃ  culties 
of interpretation, but is also aware of the full range of knowledge and interpretive approaches 
that can be brought to bear on our understanding of a biblical text. For this reason, we regard 
the diversity and complexity of approaches presented in this book as all being integral to the 
development of a strong reading practice.
Because diﬀ erent authors contributed to this volume, the reader will encounter diﬀ erent styles 
of writing. In order to preserve the uniqueness of each contribution we intentionally have not 
ironed out all diﬀ erences. Th e editors, however, take responsibility for the project as a whole. Our 
intention was that the text should be fairly free-ﬂ owing, unburdened by footnotes and a host of 
bibliographical references. We have, however, included a bibliography and reading list at the end 
to provide the interested reader with the bibliographical details of authors that we refer to, as well 
as further reading suggestions on the book of Jonah and the speciﬁ c strategies discussed in the 
diﬀ erent chapters.
A few practical exercises are included at the end of the book (although not on every strategy we 
have discussed), to enable the reader to digest some of the content that is discussed in the various 
chapters.
We want to express our gratitude towards our institutions, the University of Stellenbosch and 
the University of the Western Cape, which supported us and made ﬁ nancial contributions to 
this project. Lannie Birch and Fiona Moolla worked hard to correct our grammar and style. 
Th ey certainly made a huge contribution towards the quality of this book, and we want to thank 
them for that. Justa Niemand and Wikus van Zyl of AFRICAN SUN MeDIA, who were actively 
involved in this project, provided us with a professional and eﬃ  cient publishing service. Th ey too 
have earned our gratitude.
Louis Jonker  Douglas Lawrie
University of Stellenbosch University of the Western Cape
November 2004
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1CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Th e purpose of this book
Th is book builds on the introduction to biblical interpretation oﬀ ered in Angling for Interpretation
(Conradie & Jonker 2001). Th e aim of the ﬁ rst book was to oﬀ er a basic introduction to biblical 
interpretation. Its argument runs as follows:
When we read the Bible, we oft en feel that we do not understand what the text says or that we 
are not sure whether we have understood the text fully and correctly. Among the problems that 
give rise to this are the following: 1) our lack of background information, 2) the possibility that 
the text may contain various layers of meaning, 3) the existence of diverse, mutually exclusive 
interpretations, and 4) the possibility that pervasive ideologies (either our own or those in the 
text) may colour our interpretation. In our eﬀ ort to understand the Bible better, we then start to 
reﬂ ect on the complex process of interpretation, thereby engaging in hermeneutics (the systematic 
study of interpretation).
Angling for Interpretation identiﬁ es seven factors that may inﬂ uence biblical interpretations: 1) 
the literary features of the text, 2) knowledge of the historical and social background of the text, 
3) the tradition of interpretation, 4) the contemporary context, 5) the interpretative strategies 
chosen by the reader, 6) the rhetorical context, and 7) hidden ideologies that may operate in 
the text or the reader. It also oﬀ ers a model of the interpretation process itself. According to 
this model, the search for the most satisfactory interpretation of a biblical text involves three 
steps: 1) the articulation of the understanding of the text we already have, 2) the critical testing 
and revision of this existing interpretation, and 3) the articulation of new, revised interpretation, 
which also includes the appropriation of the text as meaningful for us.
Th e aim of this book, Fishing for Jonah (anew), is to explore in more detail the ways in which 
we may “test and revise” our existing biblical interpretations, drawing on the insights developed 
in various schools of biblical hermeneutics. Over the centuries, the seven factors identiﬁ ed in 
Angling for Interpretation have been scrutinized in various schools of biblical hermeneutics, 
leading to distinct approaches to biblical interpretation that oft en stand in opposition to one 
another. Th e diﬀ erent chapters in this book investigate these schools and approaches in more 
detail. Th e theoretical assumptions of each approach are brieﬂ y discussed (referring to the work 
of leading scholars in the particular ﬁ eld) and in most cases the theories are illustrated by means 
of examples taken from the book of Jonah. Since this book deals with approaches developed 
by specialists, it is aimed primarily at trained readers of the Bible, those who are studying or 
have studied theology at a tertiary level or who have acquired some background in theological 
studies.
An envisaged third volume, Hooked on Hermeneutics (to appear in 2005), will focus more 
speciﬁ cally on theological hermeneutics. Th e Bible is not read and studied by specialists only; 
it is read and used all over the world by Christian communities and by individual Christians in 
their everyday lives. Hooked on Hermeneutics asks how such people may read and understand the 
Bible in a responsible way that draws on the insights of biblical scholarship and that is relevant 
to Christian praxis. Or, to rephrase the question, what is distinctly Christian about biblical 
interpretation?
Fishing for Jonah (Anew)
2
1.2 Th e spiral of interpretation
Unless we recognize that various specialist approaches to biblical hermeneutics are rooted in the 
practice of interpreting the Bible in everyday life, “ordinary” readers and “trained” or “specialist” 
readers of the Bible will increasingly be alienated from one another. Unfor tunately, such alienation 
has already become quite widespread. Christians who are introduced to the work of (critical) 
Biblical scholarship oft en ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to recognize the Bible that they are familiar with and 
therefore experience critical scholarship as a threat to their faith. Biblical scholars, on the other 
hand, are sometimes scornful of the “unsophisticated” way in which the Bible is read by pastors 
and “ordinary” believers.
Nevertheless, the totally untrained “ordinary reader” uses, usually unconsciously, certain 
strategies of interpretation, and the highly learned scholar enters the interpretative process as an 
“ordinary reader”. Th e well-known notion of a “spiral of interpretation” illustrates this. Th e spiral 
of interpretation may be represented as follows:
��� ����������������������������
� �����������������
��� ��������������������������
� �����������������������
��� ��������������������������������
� �����������������������������������
Simple as this model is, it represents a complex process.
1.2.1 We are always already interpreting
It may be possible for a person to say when she picked up a Bible for the ﬁ rst time and started 
reading it, but it is not possible to say when she started interpreting. Every new interpretation 
is always based on a prior interpretation; therefore we never approach any text “with a clean 
slate”. We make sense of a “new” text because it is in some ways similar to that of which we have 
already made sense. For instance, words in the text convey meaning to us because we have already 
assimilated their meaning in previous acts of interpretation. We have, in brief, a framework of 
interpretations that enables us to make new interpretations.
When we begin reading the Bible “for the ﬁ rst time”, we have in some senses already read it. 
Perhaps we were told Bible stories by our parents; perhaps we went to Sunday school. At the very 
least we were socialized in a society permeated with biblical language, imagery and values. Our 
reading will therefore always bear traces of the tradition of biblical interpretation to which we are 
heirs.
Although the negative inﬂ uence of mere tradition on biblical interpretation is oft en emphasized, 
the tradition also plays a positive role by providing us with interpretative tools and a framework 
of meanings. Tradition provides the spectacles without which we would simply not make sense 
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of any text. One of the fallacies of modernity is that it (sometimes) assumes that we can view 
anything objectively, without any presuppositions. Th is assumption oft en leads to the further 
assumption that we can, by applying such an objective view, attain knowledge that true in a 
neutral way, irrespective of its relationship to our lives.
Today most hermeneutical theorists acknowledge that we interpret the world around us primarily 
to orient ourselves in it. Interpretation is not at the start a means of gaining objective knowledge, 
but a way of interacting with people and things around us. When we meet obstacles in this 
process, we try to overcome them by acquiring more knowledge of whatever we are dealing with. 
Interpretation as a way of relating to our world is thus primary and the search for knowledge 
secondary.
Before we begin studying the Bible, we have already appropriated it in a positive or negative 
way. Th at is, we have responded to it, given it a place in our frame of reference and applied it to 
our context in some way. Even the rejection of a command in the Bible is a response involving 
a categorization and a way of acting. In our everyday lives we do not separate an understanding 
of the message of the Bible from a response to that message. It is when interpretative problems 
intervene to disturb the ﬂ ow that we feel the need to suspend appropriation until we checked on 
our understanding. 
When this happens in our reading of the Bible, the ﬁ rst step in the search for better interpretation 
is to articulate the understanding of the text that we already have. Th ough this has to be done 
for the sake of honesty and clarity, it does not imply that the “pre-understanding” we articulate 
is necessarily adequate. We articulate our provisional understanding precisely in order to test it 
critically.
1.2.2 We need to test and develop our existing interpretations in order to improve them
We feel a need for critical testing when we doubt whether our existing interpretations are 
adequate. We have to remember, however, that adequacy in biblical interpretation necessarily 
remains relative. In the narrower quest for knowledge one may (at least in principle) be able 
to distinguish truth from falsehood, but when we seek to understand the message of the Bible 
for today, we cannot reach absolute closure. If our understanding is to include appropriation, 
a plurality of legitimate interpretations of the Bible has to be accepted. Th e biblical text itself is 
complex and layered, but more important is the fact that we respond to the biblical messages in 
diﬀ erent ways, depending on diﬀ ering and changing contexts of interpretation. 
While interpretations may diﬀ er from one another and still be legitimate, not all interpretations 
are equally adequate. Some interpretations have to be rejected as inadequate and mistaken. Of 
course, the rejection should not be random and uncritical, hence the need for reasoned criteria. 
Scholarly debates on interpretation have long centred on the appropriate criteria for critical 
testing; a section in Angling for Interpretation brieﬂ y discusses some of the criteria that have been 
identiﬁ ed in these debates. Th ese criteria cannot, however, be used in a rigid, instrumentalist way 
to evaluate or “measure” the relative adequacy of any given interpretation. Instead of providing us 
with set “methods”, they set an agenda for a discussion that will never yield ﬁ nal answers.
Th is volume examines the various approaches to critical testing in greater detail, drawing on 
the theories and insights of recognized experts in the ﬁ eld. Moreover, it shows that the criteria 
used in these approaches are themselves debatable and open to interpretation. Th e theoretical 
assumptions that underpin the various approaches are oft en contested amongst biblical scholars.
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When the focus is on critical testing, it is easy to forget that critical testing does not stand at the 
start of the interpretation process. Th e way in which the Bible is read, used and appropriated, 
especially in Christian communities, is primary. Th e task of the specialists who develop critical 
approaches is the secondary one of testing and developing existing interpretations. Interpretation 
of the Bible is not a relay race in which the baton is passed from experts in Hebrew and Greek to 
Old Testament and New Testament scholars, then to Systematic Th eologians, then to Practical 
Th eologians, then to pastors, elders and deacons and ﬁ nally to ordinary Christians. In the context 
of the Christian tradition, biblical scholarship is rooted in the life of Christian communities, which 
it assists by testing and developing the corpus of existing interpretations. Obviously this process 
will sometimes yield new interpretations, but even then the purpose of biblical scholarship is to 
enrich the existing interpretations of the Bible in Christian communities.
1.2.3 We are constantly reviewing and revising our existing interpretations
Interpretation of the Bible does not begin with critical testing, nor does it end there. Th ere is 
an ongoing movement from a partic ular pre-understanding, through the critical testing of the 
existing interpreta tion based on this pre-understanding, to the appropriation of a new, revised 
interpretation. Th ese three “phases” of interpretation form part of a single process. Th e process 
of critical testing leads naturally, and oft en subconsciously, to new interpretations or to new 
perspectives on old interpretations. Th is does not mean that all later interpretations will necessarily 
be “better” than earlier ones, as if interpretation naturally evolved to ever higher forms. In the third 
phase of the continuing process of interpretation we do indeed revise previous interpretations 
and thus formulate new ones. Th is revision (re-vision!) does not, however, inevitably constitute 
“improvement”; therefore it too has to be subjected to critical testing.
1.3 Th e structure of Fishing for Jonah (anew)
In this volume we have arranged in diﬀ erent exegetical approaches in a roughly chronological 
order. We start with the approaches that ﬂ ourished early in the Christian era - in the early church 
and in Jewish circles (chapter 2). We then indicate brieﬂ y how interpreters in the modern era 
increasingly turned to reason as the ultimate criterion in biblical interpretation (chapter 3). We 
show how early modern strategies developed into highly formalized methods of interpretation 
from the eighteenth century onward. Initially historical approaches, involving a study of the 
context of origin of the biblical texts, predominated (chapter 4). During the ﬁ rst half of the 
twentieth century, many scholars shift ed their attention to texts themselves and studied these 
as literary works of art (chapter 5). During the second half of the twentieth century, scholars 
discovered the role of readers in the creation of meaning and started to focus on the reception 
of texts (chapter 6). Finally, we deal with a number of approaches that adopt a “hermeneutics of 
suspicion” and oﬀ er a critique of speciﬁ c ideological distortions (chapter 7). Th e approaches dealt 
with in chapter 7 are not fully comparable to those dealt with in the other chapters, because they 
seldom oﬀ er a formalized “method” of interpretation. Instead, they seek to criticize prevailing 
ideologies and oﬀ er constructive alternatives. In this process they oft en make use of theoretical 
insights and strategies derived from other approaches and disciplines.
Our chronological presentation may be misleading in two ways. We do not wish to imply any 
qualitative evaluation of the various approaches by our ordering (although each discussion 
ends with a sub-section entitled “Observations and Evaluation”). In other words, we do not 
suggest that the history of biblical interpretation follows a line from “weaker, more primitive” 
approaches to “better, more sophisticated” ones. Nor should the order be seen as absolute. 
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“Newer” approaches have not completely replaced “older” ones and traces of supposedly modern 
strategies may be found at an early stage. History is not as neat as scholars would like it to be! 
Although our chronological order marks distinct shift s in emphasis, it cannot be denied that both 
complementary and contradictory approaches have co-existed alongside one another in the past 
and continue to do so.
Moreover, the diﬀ erent approaches discussed in the various chapters of this book are not merely 
diﬀ erent “methods”. As we shall indicate, diﬀ erent interpretative approaches imply diﬀ erent 
understandings of how texts acquire meaning. We may also say, diﬀ erent approaches look for 
meaning in diﬀ erent places. We shall review these diﬀ erences of understanding in Chapter 8.
We have deliberately drawn our illustrations predominantly from the Old Testament book 
of Jonah. Th is little book contains both prose narrative and poetry, it has been interpreted in 
diverse ways over the centuries, it lends itself to creative interpretations, and it is oft en cited in 
controversies about the historicity and authority of Scripture. Readers should, however, note that 
the illustrations of exegetical strategies we draw from it, are oft en forced or somewhat creative. In 
some cases, we do not illustrate how a particular approach would inﬂ uence the interpretation of 
Jonah, either because the particular approach would yield an interpretation that does not diﬀ er 
signiﬁ cantly from that yielded by other approaches or because the book does not lend itself readily 
to interpretation by means of this approach. Th is illustrates two important points to which we 
shall return in the last chapter. Sometimes diﬀ erent approaches yield the same (or a very similar) 
interpretation when they are applied to a text. On the other hand, not every approach can be 
fruitfully applied to every text: approaches diﬀ er, because texts diﬀ er! 
In Chapter 8, we ask ourselves where our exploration has left  us. How are we to survive the 
bewildering variety of interpretative approaches? Or, to be more practical, how do these 
approaches assist us in our own interpretation of the Bible? We reject the notion that exegetical 
strategies are objective entities that “deliver meaning” when we impose them mechanically on 
texts. Th ese strategies, the products of centuries of Bible interpretation, are rather to be seen as 
formalizations of sensible answers to questions that arise when we read biblical texts. Th ey are 
our formalized experiences with and intuitions about biblical texts (Barton 1996, 245). Th erefore 
we are not faced with a menu from which we have to select “the best” method of interpretation; 
instead, the diﬀ erent strategies alert us to the need for a multidimensional approach, an attitude 
towards interpretation of the Bible that does not systematically exclude from the debate either 
speciﬁ c methods or speciﬁ c interpreters.
Of course, interpreting the Bible is not simply about choosing and applying exegetical strategies. 
For those Christian communities that take the Bible as their point of departure in the life coram 
Deo (before God) biblical interpretation is always also theological interpretation. Th eological 
interpretation involves us in issues of choice and application (or appropriation) at which we can 
barely hint within the limits of this book. But even our bare hints should be enough to remind 
readers that biblical interpretation is not a theoretical or technical enterprise divorced from the 
practice of the Christian life.
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Classical strategies of interpretation
2.1 Introduction
Th e interpretation of the Bible according to deﬁ ned methods is not a recent approach that began 
in the modern era; nor could one even argue that it began only aft er the Bible was written in ﬁ nal 
form and canonized. Interpretation and re-interpretation were, in fact, part of the driving forces 
behind the production of biblical texts. As the biblical writings originated over a period of many 
centuries, older traditions were taken up in the development of the newer literature.
In the early history of the Jewish-Christian tradition, however, a variety of classical methods 
of interpretation also developed in order to adapt authoritative writings for the contemporary 
communities of faith. Th ese methods of interpretation developed (as did all later methods) in 
the context of the epistemological and ontological frames of reference of that era. Th e methods 
therefore reﬂ ect these frames of reference.
Th e classical methods of interpretation include the following:
Allegorical interpretation: Th is approach searches for a “deeper”, ﬁ gurative spiritual meaning 
underpinning the surface aspects of the text.
Typological interpretation: In this approach certain characters and symbols within the text 
(especially in the Old Testament) are seen as pre-ﬁ gurations of events to come. It will only be 
much later, such as in the New Testament, in our contemporary contexts or even towards the “end 
of the world”, that the full meaning of these pre-ﬁ gurations becomes apparent.
Th e Pesher method: Th is method deciphers secret codes which may be used to send conﬁ dential 
messages. Such messages may be needed, for example, in times of political insecurity. A secret 
meaning is attributed to speciﬁ c words and numbers. Th is method is sometimes extended to 
discover a secret meaning behind every single aspect of the text.
Th e rabbinical Midrash methods: Th e rabbinical Midrashim are commentaries which discuss the 
methods and rules which govern the interpretation of the Jewish law in changing circumstances.
Th e fourfold meaning of the Scriptures: Th is approach cannot be described as a formalized strategy 
of interpretation, but should rather be seen as a theory. Th is approach perceives four diﬀ erent 
layers of meaning in a text; namely the literary, allegorical, moral and anagogical meanings of a 
text. In some respects this theory is closely related to the allegorical approach mentioned above.
Th ree of these classical methods will now be discussed in greater detail.
2.2 Allegorical interpretation
2.2.1 Background and theory
Allegories, in common with metaphors, similes, idioms, etc, are ﬁ gures of speech. Th e best 
example of a deliberate allegorical interpretation in the Bible is possibly the parable of the sower 
(Matthew 13). Th is example may provide a preliminary under standing of the way allegorical 
interpretation functions. According to the Gospel Jesus tells the story of a man who went out 
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to sow corn. Some of the seeds fell along the path (where the birds came and ate it), some fell 
on rocky ground (where the sun burnt the young plants), some fell among thorn bushes (which 
choked the plants), and ﬁ nally, some fell in good soil (that produced an abundant harvest).
It is clear from Jesus’ exposition of the parable of the sower that each of the elements of the story 
(the seed, the rocky soil, the thorny soil, the shallow soil, the fertile soil) represents a less tangible 
idea. Each element has both a literal and a ﬁ gurative, or symbolic, meaning. One can under stand 
the parable only if one understands each symbolic meaning. Th e literal features of the parable 
function as didactic instruments that gradually lead the original audience to a spiritual insight, 
one that cannot be directly named or described
Allegory may be a literary genre, or it can be used as a strategy of interpretation. Texts deliberately 
written in the genre of allegory (such as the parable of the sower) are usually also interpreted in 
an allegorical way. Allegorical interpretation is, however, oft en used to interpret texts in the Bible 
not written in the genre of allegory.
Allegory as a strategy for interpretation was developed in the city of Alexandria. Alexandria, 
situated at the Nile delta, was founded by Alexander the Great in 331 BCE, and became a prosperous 
centre for Hellenistic culture, philosophy and trade during the Roman Empire. Th e philosophy 
of Plato dominated the world of thought in Alexandria. According to Plato, the ﬂ eeting world of 
the senses, in all its variety and transience, can never provide a point of departure to determine 
the good and the true. Th e world of the senses is merely a dim reﬂ ection - a shadow - of another, 
invisible world of ideas which is pure, eternal, perfect, infallible and true. Th e world of the senses 
is not the “real” world; it only directs us to the world of ideas.
In Alexandria, the philosophy of Plato eventually also inﬂ uenced the scholars’ approach to the 
interpretation of texts. Th e words and sentences in a text, and their literal, overt meanings, can 
never be regarded as the truth of the text. Each text also has a deeper, “true” signiﬁ cance. Th e task 
of allegorical interpretation is to uncover this  bedrock of “truth” which lies beneath the surface 
meaning of the text.
Th e allegorical approach was soon applied to the interpretation of biblical texts. Th e Jewish 
scholar Philo, the church father Origin (185/6-254 AD) and Clemens of Alexandria (?-215 AD) 
played an important role in this development. In this new approach, God’s revelation in the Holy 
Scriptures was seen as a profound mystery. Th e Bible portrays this in symbolic language. Th e 
objective of interpretation is to perceive this mystery in the text. Th is is possible only through 
God’s grace, and more speciﬁ cally through the enlightenment of one’s intellect. Only an initiated 
group of elites is really competent to discern this deeper meaning of Scripture.
Th e allegorical approach was constantly reﬁ ned. Origin distinguished, for example, between 
three levels of meaning based on the distinction between a human being’s body, soul and spirit. A 
text therefore has a literal, or “bodily”, meaning, a moral meaning, linked to the human soul, and 
a pneumatic or allegorical meaning, which addresses the spirit. Th e true meaning of the text is 
captured only if one is able to discern the spiritual meaning, through biblical interpretation. 
Th is allegorical approach to the interpretation of texts remained popular throughout the Middle 
Ages and it is also oft en used today. Th e method was later developed further into a theory 
distinguishing between four diﬀ erent levels of meaning: 
the literal meaning (which describes what happened);
the allegorical meaning (which describes the content of what should be believed);
the moral meaning (which describes how one should act from day to day);
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the anagogical meaning (which indicates the goal towards which we should strive).
According to this theory, the word “Jerusalem”, for example, indicates: (i) literally, the physical 
historical city, (ii) allegorically, the Church, (iii) morally, the human soul, and (iv) anagogically, 
the heavenly city towards which we should strive.
2.2.2 Jonah in the light of an allegorical approach
Th e book of Jonah can be interpreted allegorically in a rather dramatic way. Each aspect of the 
story has a particular “hidden” meaning attributed to it. Allegorical interpretations of the book of 
Jonah are usually based on the following comparisons.
Jonah is a symbol for Israel (and also for the church). Th e following similarities are identiﬁ ed 
in the relationship between Jonah and Israel:
Both Jonah and Israel were called to be a witness to the nations. Jonah was called to 
Nineveh and Israel was called to be a “light to the nations”.
Both Jonah and Israel were oft en disobedient to this calling.
Both Jonah and Israel were punished for this disobedience. Jonah was thrown overboard a 
ship and almost died of sunstroke. Israel was punished in the time of the Babylonian exile 
aft er the fall of Jerusalem in 587 BCE.
Both Jonah and Israel were saved by God. Th e big ﬁ sh that swallowed Jonah, spat him out 
onto dry land and God sent him a green plant to protect him from the sun. Th e people 
of Israel were liberated from their slavery in Egypt and were oft en saved from military 
predicaments during the time of the judges and the kings, and again during their return 
from exile. 
God’s grace is greater than both Jonah and Israel imagined.
Th e meaning of Jonah’s name in biblical Hebrew is “dove”. Th e prophet Hosea (a 
contemporary of the Jonah of 2 Kings 14:25) once said: “Ephraim (Israel) is like a stupid 
and mindless yônâ (dove)” (Hosea 7:11). Both Jonah and Israel are like a dove: stupid and 
mindless.
Jonah’s name (Jonah-ben-Amitai = son of truth, faithfulness) may be seen as a symbol for 
rigid Jewish orthodoxy.
Th e big ﬁ sh is a symbol for the Babylonian exile. Th e ﬁ sh swallowed Jonah the way king 
Nebuchadnezzar swallowed the northern kingdom of Israel. Jonah found a refuge in the ﬁ sh; 
likewise, a small remnant of the southern kingdom of Judah was saved during the exile.
Th e fact that Jonah was spat out by the ﬁ sh symbolizes the return from exile, and later came to 
represent the necessity of being born again, to begin a new life in the Spirit.
Th e ship to Tarshish is seen as a symbol of the Jewish synagogue or any form of legalistic 
religion.
Th e sailors are a symbol of the priesthood or the Pharisees.
Th e wood of the ship is a symbol of the wood of the cross of Jesus Christ.
Th e green plant that gave some temporary shade to Jonah is a symbol for the return from 
exile under Zerubabel. Aft er a while the returned exiles were getting disappointed, because 
everything did not go according to their expectation of a glorious return. 
Th e worm that chewed the plant so that it withered and died is a symbol of Christ who 
liberated us from the strictures of the law. 
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2.2.3 Observations and evaluation
A positive aspect of the allegorical method is that it makes the text accessible for people in 
their own contexts. Notice the way in which each of the speciﬁ c elements of the allegorical 
narrative in the book of Jonah refers to an abstract idea that can be easily transferred to the 
immediate context of later readers. For example, the city of Nineveh does not refer simply to 
the empirical city (which is geographically far removed from our South African context) or to 
the enmity between Israel and Assyria (which is historically far removed from our context). 
Th e city of Nineveh is brought closer to home by attributing an allegorical meaning to it (e.g. 
as a symbol for the “distant mission ﬁ elds”, which is oft en romanticized in some missionary 
approaches). Allegorical interpretation therefore does provide a strategy to make the message 
of Jonah relevant to diverse historical contexts. It succeeds in bridging the divide between text 
and contemporary context.
Allegorical interpretation is subject to the dangers of elitism. It is only the initiated few who 
are competent to appreciate the hidden, “deeper” meaning of the text. In the Catholic Middle 
Ages, this safeguarded the power and doctrinal authority of the church. Ordinary people 
could comprehend these deeper mysteries only by accepting the doctrinal authority of the 
church or, by participating in the sacramental ministry of the church.
Allegorical interpretation is oft en the product of a hermeneutic embarrassment. It oft en gains 
popularity during times when the original meaning and message of the Bible (especially the 
Old Testament) become unintelligible. It provides a strategy to make the text immediately 
relevant within the symbolic world of a diﬀ erent context from that of its origin. Th e deeper 
meaning of the text therefore provides the necessary escape mechanism from the hermeneutic 
embarrassment through illustrating the immediate and direct relevance of the text in the 
contemporary context. 
Sometimes the more literal meaning of a text not only becomes incomprehensible, but also (for 
particular groups) crude, unacceptable or even repulsive. If one wishes to uphold the authority 
of the biblical texts, allegorical interpretation provides an excellent tool. Allegory enables one 
to resolve all these annoying problems. A good example is the allegorical interpretation of 
the love songs in the Song of Songs, which are apparently erotic. Th e sexual connotations 
of these erotic songs are understood allegorically as a description of the covenant between 
God and Israel or God and the church. Th is reading aﬀ ords the text a deeper, more spiritual 
meaning, and shows how the allegorical approach oft en leads to a far-reaching spiritualizing 
of the meaning of biblical texts. Th is approach emerged from the Platonic conviction that the 
spiritual meaning is superior to the literal.
It should be clear that allegorical interpretation can easily lead to far-fetched speculation. 
Almost anything can be read into the text. A good example is the allegorical expositions of 
the ﬁ ve stones David picked up to kill Goliath. Th ese ﬁ ve stones may refer allegorically to 
almost anything (for example, diﬀ erent spiritual virtues, fruit of the Spirit, etc.). Th e danger 
of arbitrary selectiveness is therefore looming. An allegorical strategy of interpretation 
works reasonably well only if there are suﬃ  cient similarities between the two entities that are 
compared (e.g. Jonah and Israel). Th ere is, however, no clear indication in the text of Jonah 
that the text should be interpreted allegorically (unlike the parable of the sower where an 
allegorical exposition is provided in the Gospel text).
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2.3 Typological interpretation
2.3.1 Background and theory
Th e strategy of typology is especially used to show how the Old Testament is relevant to an 
understanding of the New Testament. As it explains the relationship between the Old Testament 
and the message concerning Jesus Christ, this method of interpretation is sometimes known as 
“Christological” interpretation.
Th is approach is based on the idea that the Bible is primarily about the person and work of Jesus 
Christ, and that the message of the Old Testament should therefore also be concerned with Jesus 
Christ. However, this is diﬃ  cult to maintain because it contains no explicit references to Jesus 
Christ. Th e typological strategy provides one possible answer to this problem. Some ﬁ gures in the 
Old Testament (especially Abraham, Joseph, Moses, David, Elijah and Jeremiah) are interpreted 
as “types” of Jesus Christ, or “Christ-like ﬁ gures”. Th is implies that certain similarities between 
these ﬁ gures and the person and work of Jesus Christ are identiﬁ ed. Th ey therefore provide a 
prophetic shadow image, a pre-ﬁ guration of Christ. In this way it is possible to argue that the 
person of Jesus Christ is also at the centre of the Old Testament. At the same time, these “types” 
may also help us to appreciate the message concerning Jesus Christ.
Th ese “types” can also function as a pre-ﬁ guration of the message about Jesus Christ in terms of 
the diﬀ erences between them and Jesus. Th e contrasts between these ﬁ gures or “anti-types” and 
Jesus Christ provide a negative pre-ﬁ guration of Jesus. Th ey help us to understand Jesus simply 
because they are the opposite of who Jesus Christ is. Characters such as Adam, Samson and Jonah 
are oft en regarded as examples of these “anti-types”.
In Romans 5:12-17, Paul uses a typological interpretation of the ﬁ gure of Adam, as an “anti-type” 
of Christ. Th ere is, according to Paul, a possible comparison (typos) between Adam and the one 
who was to come (Romans 5:14). Th rough his disobedience Adam was the cause of death for the 
whole of humanity. Jesus Christ is, on the other hand, the origin of a new life for the whole of 
humanity.
It is also possible to relate many other objects, themes and events in the Old Testament to New 
Testament data. Th e New Testament is in each case considered to be the fulﬁ lment of the “true” 
meaning of the Old Testament. Th e crossing through the Red Sea symbolizes the baptism in 
Christ; manna depicts the bread of the Eucharist; the water from the rock (Exodus 17) symbolizes 
the wine of the Eucharist (1 Corinthians 10:1-4); the ark of Noah refers to the baptism of believers 
(1 Peter 3:20-21); Isaac carrying the ﬁ re-wood for his own sacriﬁ ce symbolizes Jesus carrying his 
own cross; the ﬂ ood depicts the last judgment; the priests in the Old Testament preﬁ gure Christ’s 
own priesthood (Hebrews 9:24); the temple symbolizes the church (2 Corinthians 6:16) and so 
forth. Th e full meanings of these Old Testament events and symbols become clear only when 
illuminated by the New Testament.
To summarize: a ﬁ gure in the Old Testament (e.g. Jonah) may function as a shadow image or 
(anti- ) type of a ﬁ gure in the New Testament (e.g. Jesus). On the one hand, the character of 
Jonah may help us to understand the work of Jesus - Jonah provides an inverse image of the 
person of Jesus Christ. On the other hand, our knowledge of the life of Jesus Christ also helps 
us to understand the true meaning of the book of Jonah. It is, of course, true that, in typological 
interpretation, Christians cannot read the book of Jonah without remembering what they have 
read in the New Testament. Th eir knowledge of Christ then determines their interpretation of 
Jonah.
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2.3.2 Jonah in the light of a typological approach
In typological interpretations of the book of Jonah the following analogies between Jonah and Jesus 
are usually discussed. Th ese similarities between Jonah and Jesus are indeed quite remarkable:
Jonah and Jesus came from the same geographical district. Th e towns of Gath-Hefer and 
Nazareth are both in Galilee. Within this context the comment about Jesus (reported in the 
New Testament gospels) “Can a prophet come from Galilee?” becomes signiﬁ cant! 
Th e captain of the ship says to the rather sleepy Jonah: “Keep watch and pray to your god”. 
Compare this with Jesus’ similar command to his disciples in Gethsemane “Keep watch and 
pray that you will not fall into temptation” (Matthew 26:41).
Th e contrast between the sleeping Jonah (1:5) and the sleeping Jesus in a boat during a storm 
(Mark 4) is also striking. Th e sea calmed down aft er Jonah was taken from the ship’s hold 
where he lay asleep, and thrown into the sea by the scared crew members. In contrast, Jesus 
commands the sea to calm down aft er he was woken by his scared disciples.
Jonah is the real “scapegoat” (the lot was cast and it fell on Jonah, because he was guilty of 
causing the storm). By contrast, Jesus is innocently cruciﬁ ed as scapegoat. 
Th e sailors argue that it is better that one man, i.e. Jonah, should die instead of the whole 
crew (1:14). Th is is the very same argument used by Caiaphas in the plot against Jesus (John 
11:50).
Th e sailors ask that Jonah’s death should not be attributed to them (1:14). Th e crowd, however, 
asks Pilate to attribute Jesus’ blood to them and their children (Matthew 27:25).
Jonah receives a crown of seaweed (2:5); Jesus receives a crown of thorns. 
Th e three days that Jonah spent in the belly of the big ﬁ sh may be regarded as a pre-ﬁ guration 
of the death, burial and resurrection of Christ over the course of three days. Jesus himself 
refers to this comparison (Matthew 12:40).
2.3.3 Observations and evaluation
Th e dangers related to typological interpretation are similar to those related to allegorical 
interpretation. Th e most important problem is that the texts of the Old Testament do not 
contain any explicit reference to Jesus Christ. Th is strategy therefore reads a particular message 
concerning Jesus Christ into the text of the Old Testament. Th is is obviously dangerous, 
irresponsible and subject to far-fetched speculation. 
Furthermore, this strategy reﬂ ects no interest in the meaning that the story of Jonah had 
in the historical context in which it was told, and takes insuﬃ  cient account of this context. 
It remains important to try to reconstruct this message (at least to some extent) to restrain 
a far-reaching speculation in the interpretation and application of the book of Jonah in 
contemporary contexts.
Despite these dangers, from the point of view of the Christian tradition, it is scarcely possible 
to do without the typological approach. Th e German theologian, Gerhard von Rad, led the 
way towards a new appreciation of typological interpretation. According to Von Rad, there 
remains a theological continuity between the Old Testament and the New Testament. It is, he 
argues, the same God who was revealed in Jesus Christ who was also present in the historical 
events narrated in the Old Testament. Th e witnesses to God described in the Old Testament 
provide a pre-ﬁ guration of the God revealed to us more clearly in Jesus Christ. Th e Old 
Testament does remain provisional and incomplete: God’s promises of land, rest and cosmic 
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salvation in the old covenant reach their fulﬁ llment in the new dispensation under the Spirit 
of Christ.
Typological interpretation in this form takes the historical character of the revelation of 
God seriously. Interestingly, it also allows for the role of the Holy Spirit to be expressed in 
contemporary typological applications. It is, in fact, the same God who was present in the 
Old Testament, who was revealed in the person and ministry of Jesus Christ and who is still 
present through the work of the Holy Spirit in our contemporary contexts.
2.4 Rabbinical (midrash) interpretation
2.4.1 Background and theory
Long before the New Testament era, the Jewish rabbis had already developed methods to make 
the Torah (the Law) relevant to ever-changing circumstances. 
Th e Pentateuch, (the ﬁ rst ﬁ ve books of the Old Testament), was more or less completed shortly 
aft er the Babylonian exile which ended in 538 BCE. Th e Law could not, however, make suﬃ  cient 
provision for new questions in changing circumstances. Th ese texts oft en lost their immediate 
relevance and the rabbis therefore felt it necessary to extend the stipulations of the Law. Th ese 
extensions were subject to particular rules to prevent arbitrary applications. Hillel, a rabbi from 
the time of King Herod the Great, identiﬁ ed seven such rules. Th ese were expanded to thirteen 
rules by Rabbi Ishmael and still later to thirty-two rules by Rabbi Eliezer. Th e methods used by 
these rabbis to explain the consequences of the Law are known as midrashim (expositions). Th ese 
midrash methods can be deﬁ ned as a rabbinical mode of instruction which used scriptural texts 
as pegs upon which to hang certain moral observations in a fanciful manner.
Th ere were various kinds of rabbinical expansions of the Law. Some expansions contained 
further stipulations of the Law (for example, of laws pertaining to the Sabbath). Others contained 
theological arguments. Th ese theological arguments could be supported by a string of texts in 
which the same key term appears. For example, in Romans 4:1-12, Paul ﬁ nds references to the 
justiﬁ cation of circumcision, and treats these as “proofs”, simply by referring to Genesis 15:6 and 
Psalm 32:1 where the same concept of “justiﬁ cation” is mentioned. Th ese texts may be strung 
together like a string of pearls, and this speciﬁ c method is therefore also referred to as the “pearls-
on-a-string” method. Th ese expansions of the stipulations and implications of the Law were 
generally known as halakah, which means “the rule according to which we should act”.
Further expositions of the Law consisted of literature for instruction and for the purpose of 
preaching. Th ese expositions were known as haggadah or “narration(s)”. Th e rabbis had a habit 
of telling stories to illustrate a point, rather than saying it directly. Th e rabbis told these stories to 
explain something, to convey a moral principle or to give religious instruction. Th e rabbis oft en 
argued with one another about some ﬁ ner theological detail. If someone among them did not 
understand the particular point of view, the rabbis would explain it by telling a story. If it was 
still not understood, the rabbi would not explain it but would simply tell another story, and yet 
another and another (if that still proved necessary). 
An old midrash on Jonah 1:2, for example, asks the question: “To what can this behaviour of 
Jonah be compared?” By way of an answer, the commentary tells the following (ﬁ ctitious) story:
“... to a king of ﬂ esh and blood, whose wife died as she was nursing their son. He looked for 
a wet nurse to nurse his son, so that he would not die. What did the king’s wet nurse do? She 
left  the king’s son lying in bed and ran away. When the king saw that she had run away and 
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had left  his son lying in bed, he wrote a letter, commanding that she be captured and thrown 
into prison, in a place where there were snakes and scorpions. Aft er a few days the king went 
to the pit where she was imprisoned, and she wept and called to the king from the pit. Th en 
the king was moved to have mercy, and he ordered his servants to pull her out and bring her 
before him. So it was also with Jonah. When he ﬂ ed from the Holy One, blessed be He, He put 
him in the belly of the ﬁ sh until he cried to the Holy One, blessed be He, and the ﬁ sh threw 
him out.”
Another ancient midrash discusses Jonah’s prayer and addresses the problem that one oft en 
forgets to pray aft er a crisis has passed:
“Jonah had been three days in the belly of the ﬁ sh and had not prayed. Th en the Holy One, 
blessed be He, spoke: ‘I have made a roomy place for him in the belly of the ﬁ sh, so that he 
does not become anxious, and he is not praying to me. Now I will appoint a pregnant ﬁ sh that 
has 365 000 small ﬁ sh in it so that he will become afraid and pray to me, because I desire the 
prayers of the righteous.’”
It was, however, important to the rabbis to show that their stories were more or less in accordance 
with their authoritative scriptures. Th ey therefore oft en took a particular text as a point of 
departure and built a whole story around that text. Th e text itself usually came from a bygone era 
and its meaning was no longer immediately accessible to the rabbi’s contemporary audience. Th e 
rabbi’s story, however, would illustrate its contemporary relevance. 
Th ese stories might have been based on historical events, but might also have been completely 
ﬁ ctitious. Th e parables of Jesus are excellent examples of stories with no historical basis, but which 
conveyed important messages.
2.4.2 Jonah as a midrash
A midrash (in this speciﬁ ed sense of the word) is a commentary on a particular text consisting of 
illustrations, stories and explanations. Th ere are scholars who argue that the book of Jonah itself 
contains such a story which was once told by a rabbi to make a particular theological point or to 
illustrate a particular moral value. Th e story probably took one of two possible texts as its point 
of departure:
Th e text of 2 Kings 14:25 may have served as the basis for the rabbi’s story. Th is text mentions 
a prophet, Jonah-ben-Amittai, who, many centuries before, had the agreeable duty of telling 
king Jeroboam II that he would expand Israel’s territory. Th e rabbi then told another story 
about this prophet, Jonah-ben-Amittai. It is possible that the rabbi based his story on a legend 
from the oral tradition. It is, however, quite as likely that the rabbi constructed his story freely 
and imaginatively.
It is also possible that the rabbi might have used Jeremiah 18:7-9 as a point of departure for 
his story. In this text Yahweh said: “... if that nation, against whom I have pronounced, turn 
from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them ...”. According to this 
argument, the book of Jonah is a commentary on Jeremiah 18:7-9 to explain how far Yahweh’s 
grace could extend - even to the ancient city of Nineveh (already destroyed by 609 BCE).
According to the theory that Jonah was a midrash based on either 2 Kings 14:25 or Jeremiah 18:7-
9, the historical basis of the story is not at all important. It is, however, extremely important to 
capture the truth the rabbi tried to convey. If one did not understand this truth, the rabbi would 
probably have to construct another story to explain the same point.
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2.4.3 Observations and evaluation
Rabbinical interpretation and teaching still form the scriptural basis of modern-day Jewish 
religion. Th is is thus an important part of a tradition which has been appreciated and valued 
through many centuries. 
Rabbinic midrash interpretation has generated some of the most creative stories about biblical 
events or characters. Th ese complex narratives may be used to illustrate a multiplicity of 
biblical ideas.
It is oft en diﬃ  cult for those interpreters who do not share the reference world of Judaism to 
gather from the midrash what point is being made. To understand a biblical book, such as the 
book of Jonah, as a midrash does not necessarily mean that the point of this midrash is also 
clear. Th is form of interpretation, therefore, illuminates the genre of the text, more than it 
does its meaning.
Th e midrashim oft en link biblical texts together solely on account of one point of similarity 
between these texts. Th is similarity is oft en not central to the meaning of those texts.
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A modern era emerges
3.1 Introduction
During the ﬁ rst more or less four centuries of the Christian era two major schools of interpretation, 
the Alexandrian and the Antiochean, emerged. Th e Alexandrian school propagated an allegorical 
approach, while the Antiochean school was involved with the typological and historical aspects of 
interpretation (see the previous chapter). Gradually the allegorical approach became predominant. 
Th is approach, which remained in vogue for many centuries, was gradually reﬁ ned to determine 
the meaning of biblical texts according to a fourfold distinction (as mentioned in the previous 
chapter). Th e methods which identiﬁ ed a fourfold meaning in the Scriptures were characteristic 
of interpretation up until and during the Middle Ages.
Th e emergence of the European Renaissance and humanism in the ﬁ ft eenth century, however, 
brought about major changes. Th ese broad movements in society, because they represented a 
new appreciation, and consciousness, of history in general, triggered an enormous interest in the 
ancient Greek and Roman civilizations. Th e classical languages were studied anew and the slogan 
ad fontes (“back to the sources”) was increasingly heard. Gradually the demand for exact and 
controllable research became stronger.
From the sixteenth century signiﬁ cant scientiﬁ c developments took place, particularly in the ﬁ eld 
of astronomy. In 1514 the Polish priest, Copernicus, came to the conclusion that the earth is not 
the centre of the universe with the sun circling around it. In fact, his theory was that it is just the 
other way round. Th e earth and all the other heavenly bodies circle around the sun. Because this 
theory posed a threat to the traditional ecclesiastical understanding of the biblical cosmology 
(where a ﬂ at-surfaced earth was seen to be the centre of God’s creation), he initially propagated 
his theory anonymously. However, this idea was developed further by Galileo Galilei aft er 1609. 
Galilei declared that the sun is not even the centre of the universe, but that many other solar 
systems exist. Th ese ideas brought Galilei into conﬂ ict with the church authorities who wanted to 
adhere to the traditional understanding of the biblical cosmology.
Th ese developments in society also impacted signiﬁ cantly on religion and the understanding 
of the Bible. Th e leaders of the Protestant reformation in the sixteenth century shared with 
humanism an interest in history. Soon historical interpretation of the Bible gained ground over 
allegorical interpretation. Allegorical interpretation further lost its popularity because it came to 
be regarded as the institutional church’s way of justifying its authority from Scripture. As products 
of their time, the reformers regarded thorough study of the ancient languages as important, and 
they held the philological and grammatical aspects of biblical interpretation in high esteem. 
Historical-grammatical exegesis gradually emerged.
Several seventeenth century scholars, such as Bonfrère, Morinus, Cappellus, Grotius, Coccejus, 
De la Peyrère, Spinoza, Simon, and Clericus, found the inspiration for their research in the various 
textual, lexicographical and grammatical publications which appeared in the sixteenth century. 
Th ese publications were made possible by the invention of the printing press by Gutenberg in the 
second half of the ﬁ ft eenth century. Th e ideas of the Renaissance and the Reformation could then 
spread quickly over Europe. 
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Th e Enlightenment (or “Aufk lärung”, as this period is oft en called according to the German 
designation) in the seventeenth century initiated a shift  once again. Although the historical 
aspect remained an important category of interpretation, the increasing emphasis on rational 
ability necessitated a reorientation. Th e role of the French philosopher, René Descartes, cannot be 
overestimated in this phase of history. From 1637 he began to circulate his famous phrase Cogito 
ergo sum (“I think, therefore I am”). Th is slogan led to a new appreciation of the intellectual and 
cognitive abilities of human beings, and fostered a new self-conﬁ dence. Descartes distrusted every 
human method of acquiring knowledge but cognitive and logical understanding; he believed that 
only logical thought could lead to true knowledge. Th ese ideas were taken up more than a century 
later by Immanuel Kant when he published his “Critique of pure reason” in 1781. According to 
Kant, one should distinguish between practical rationality, which would include moral values 
and ethical norms, and pure rationality, which uses experiments and rational argumentation. 
Th e church and religious faith can play a major social role as forms of practical rationality, which 
serve to keep society intact. However, only pure rationality can lead to true knowledge.
Th ese philosophical directions brought about major changes in the understanding of the Bible. 
Faith and Scripture were no longer regarded as criteria according to which biblical interpretation 
could be tested. It was no longer the critica sacra (religious precepts), but the critica profana 
(secular ideas) which were regarded as the criteria according to which the Bible should be 
interpreted. Th is more critical attitude towards texts brought factors such as their origin, literary 
form and original purpose into play. Th is critical attitude constituted the basis of historical-
rationalist interpretation.
Th e scholar who brought about the ﬁ nal breach with traditional doctrine was J.S. Semler (born 
in 1725). With his free way of thinking and teaching he brought biblical studies to a decisive 
moment. He demanded the Entdogmatisierung (“getting rid of dogmatic views”) of biblical history 
by means of the principles of the Enlightenment, and advocated the liberation of biblical studies 
from the papal authority of protestant orthodoxy. He distinguished between the divine contents 
and human form of the Bible, and used an historical approach which critically judged the biblical 
concept of history, as well as the idea of the canon. He made a strict distinction between “Word 
of God” and “Scripture”, and as such, between “theology” and “religion”.
Th is new approach towards interpretation soon met with opposition. Various historical 
grammarians reacted strongly to the notion that the interpretation of Scripture should be 
subsidiary to the human intellect. As a result they favoured a literal interpretation of the texts 
which (according to them) described real history. Th is counter-reaction gave rise to historical-
literal interpretation which is still prevalent in modern fundamentalism. 
Historical-rationalist interpretation developed further into what came to be known as historical-
critical exegesis. Th is development will be described in the following chapter. Th e developments 
summarized in this introduction, can now be discussed in greater detail. Although the approaches 
identiﬁ ed and described here cannot be regarded as well-deﬁ ned and generally accepted methods, 
they are distinguished here for didactic purposes.
3.2 Historical-grammatical approach
3.2.1 Background and theory
Th e Protestant reformation of 1517 took place against the background described above, namely of 
the European Renaissance and humanism. Th e Reformation had severe implications for Scriptural 
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interpretation. Because the reformers shared the humanist interest in history, historical exegesis 
gained ground at the expense of allegorical interpretation. Th e reformers regarded allegorical 
interpretation as the means by which the institutional church sought to control people’s ideas on 
the Bible. Th e authority of the pope and the church to determine correct interpretation of the Bible 
was increasingly questioned. Instead, it was proposed that the Bible should be its own norm, and 
not the church tradition. Hence the slogan sacra Scriptura sui ipsius interpres est (“Holy Scripture 
is its own interpreter”) was formulated. Problematic parts of the Bible had to be explained with 
reference to other biblical texts. Th is slogan corresponded to another slogan of the Reformation, 
namely sola scriptura (“Scripture alone”). Th e slogan sola ﬁ de (“by faith alone”), which was also 
heard during the Reformation, demanded that every interpretation of the Bible be brought into 
line with the principles of faith. 
As products of their time, the reformers had a keen interest in the philological and grammatical 
aspects of biblical interpretation. Th e study of the classical languages was popular. Luther and 
Calvin (in common with the humanist Desiderius Erasmus) maintained that the Bible had to be 
studied in the original languages. However, it should also be accessible to ordinary people. Th is 
would free them from the papal authority on interpretation. Luther therefore translated the Bible 
into German.
Th e fundamental principles of the historical-grammatical approach can be summarized as 
follows:
Scripture had to be interpreted historically. It was accepted that the text referred to real events 
in history.
As the Bible was regarded as historiography, no particular attention was paid to the variety of 
literary genres.
Th e text had to be interpreted taking into account the context in which it was written. Th e 
geography and archaeology of Israel were therefore regarded as important.
Th e text was regarded as a unity produced by a single author, and not as a text that resulted 
from a long process of development. Possible contradictions had to be interpreted in order 
to conceal them, and texts were harmonized with one another. Th e historical interest of these 
interpreters therefore lay mainly in their urge to conﬁ rm and to prove the historicity of the 
text, rather than to question it.
With regard to the grammatical aspect of this approach, the emphasis was on words as 
determiners of meaning in sentences, rather than on sentences as a whole. Strong emphasis 
was placed on the “original” meaning of words (etymology).
Although biblical texts were read against their contemporary historical background, these 
scholars were of the opinion that the gap between the context in which the Bible was written, 
and their own contemporary era was insigniﬁ cant. Th e Bible could therefore be seen to have 
universal meaning which would be true for all ages and situations.
With these principles in mind, we can now interpret the book of Jonah from a historical-
grammatical perspective.
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3.2.2 Jonah in the light of a historical-grammatical approach
(a) Historicity
Historical-grammarians do not doubt the historicity of the book of Jonah at all. Th ey advance the 
following arguments:
Th e book represents an historical report of the prophet’s actions.
Early Jews, as well as Christians, accept the historicity of the book (cf. Tobit 14:4ﬀ  and 
Josephus, Ant IX, 12:2).
According to 2 Kings 14:25, we know that Jonah was a historical ﬁ gure.
Christ believed that the book of Jonah was historically true and He referred to it. He even 
compared the three days he had to remain in the grave to the three days Jonah spent inside 
the ﬁ sh (cf. Matthew 12:38-41; 16:4; Luke 11:29-32).
Because the historical veracity of the book of Jonah is never questioned, the episodes with the ﬁ sh 
and the wonder-tree are regarded as real incidents, made possible by the Almighty’s ability to do 
wonders. Th e following quotation from Luther shows that he accepts that the account of events 
in Jonah is historically accurate:
“Jonah must have thought these the longest days and nights ever lived under the sun. It must 
have seemed an interminably long time that he sat there in the dark. Yes, I suppose that he 
occasionally lay down and stood up. He saw neither sun nor moon and was unable to compute 
the passage of time. Nor did he know where in the sea he was travel ing about with the ﬁ sh. 
How oft en lung and liver must have pained him! How strange his abode must have been 
among the intestines and the huge ribs!” 
Because the story was seen to refer to real events, these could only be understood as miraculous. 
Consider Luther’s commentary again:
“But this story of the prophet Jonah is so great that it is almost unbelievable, yes it even sounds 
like a lie, and more full of nonsense than any poet’s fable. If it were not in the Bible, I’d consider 
it a silly lie. Because if one thinks about it, Jonah was three days in the huge belly of the whale, 
where he could have been digested in three hours and changed into the ﬂ esh and blood of 
the whale. He could have died there a hundred times, under the earth, in the sea, inside the 
whale. Isn’t that living in the midst of death? In comparison with this miracle, the wonder at 
the Red Sea was nothing.”
(b) Authorship
Th e historical-grammatical approach treats the question of authorship with reference to the name 
of the book, Jonah. Th e book is part of the Biblical canon, and of the prophetic literature in 
particular. According to ancient witnesses, the book should be regarded as one of the books of the 
Minor Prophets. Each of these books is named aft er the prophet whose prophecies are described 
within it, and who is therefore seen as the author of the book. Th e book of Jonah, therefore, 
would be seen to have been written by Jonah himself. Unlike the other prophetic books, this book 
contains stories about the life of the prophet. However, it does also contain his prophecies, which 
he is seen to have authored.
A further common argument to prove the authorship of Jonah is the reference in 2 Kings 14:25 to 
the historical ﬁ gure, Jonah-ben-Amittai from Gath-Hefer, a prophet who lived during the reign of 
Jeroboam II. Th is scriptural reference supports the notion that Jonah was a real person in history. 
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It then follows that the Jonah who was sent to Nineveh was actually the Jonah-ben-Amittai of 2 
Kings 14:25. As a prophet he wrote down his experiences.
(c) Date
Th e dating of the book of Jonah should be determined by considering the above-mentioned 
reference to the historical ﬁ gure of Jonah-ben-Amittai in 2 Kings 14:25. As this prophet lived 
during the reign of Jeroboam II of Israel (787-747 BCE), it follows that Jonah prophesied during 
the eighth century BCE (approximately 780 BCE). Th e book of Jonah was in all probability written 
during that period.
Th is date of origin is aﬃ  rmed by the position of the book in the Hebrew canon. Jonah ﬁ ts in aft er 
Amos and before Obadiah, both prophets of the eighth century BCE.
(d) Historical and geographical context
During the eighth century BCE Assyria was at the height of its power. King Menahem of Israel 
became subservient to the Assyrian king, according to 2 Kings 15:19, a few years aft er the reign of 
Jeroboam II. It can therefore be assumed that Assyria was already a powerful nation at the time of 
Jeroboam II and Jonah. Various sources indicate that there was frequent contact between Assyria 
and Palestine.
Nineveh was the last capital of the Assyrian Empire. It was situated on the eastern bank of the 
River Tigris. Th e city was destroyed in 612 BCE by the Babylonians. According to Genesis 10:9-
11 Nimrod founded the city, and it became the royal seat from approximately 1100 BCE. Th e 
name Nineveh probably does not refer to the city alone, but also to the small dependent villages 
surrounding it. Secular and archaeological evidence bear witness to the description of the city in 
the book of Jonah.
Instead of going east as Yahweh commanded, Jonah went west to Tarshish. Tarshish refers to the 
city of Tartessos at the mouth of the Guadalquivir in southwestern Spain. Tarshish, according 
to Jeremiah 10:9 and Ezekiel 27:12, was a place where silver, tin, iron, and lead were mined. Th e 
purpose of this reference probably indicated the westernmost point of the then known world.
(e) Original readers
Jonah writes his book to the people of Israel of the eighth century BCE. Th ey had become 
accustomed to the fact that Yahweh had elected them from among the nations. As a result, they 
guarded their identity against other nations. Th e book intends to prepare Israel for the possibility 
that heathen nations, who may repent in future, may be accepted within the community of those 
who share in the blessings and redemption of Yahweh.
(f) Universal relevance
Th e historical-grammatical approach assumes that Scripture has universal relevance for all ages 
and situations. Luther’s explanation of Jonah 1 illustrates this point clearly: 
“All of this is recorded as a warning for us. From it we glean the les son ﬁ rst of all that he who 
will not obey God’s will willingly must, in the end, bow to His will unwillingly ... In the second 
place, we must learn to know God’s mercy well and not depend on our works, whether good 
or bad, but know that sin does not condemn us nor good works save us, but that only God’s 
grace preserves us.” 
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3.2.3 Observations and evaluation
It is clear from the above-mentioned discussion that the reference to Jonah-ben-Amittai in 2 
Kings 14:25 forms the basis of many historical-grammatical arguments. Th is Jonah is identiﬁ ed 
with the Jonah of the prophetic book. Th e only link between these scriptural references is that 
they deﬁ nitely refer to the same historical person. A whole series of arguments is then based 
on this uncritical assumption - authorship, dating, readership, and historical background.
Th e assumption that the book of Jonah and 2 Kings 14:25 refer to the same historical person 
has its origin in the historical-grammatical notion that the Bible as a whole has a historical 
basis. Th is approach is thus insensitive to the literary nature of the book of Jonah. It does not 
make provision for the possibility that the book could possibly be a story or a parable which 
makes use of the reader’s knowledge of 2 Kings 14:25 in order to create a particular eﬀ ect.
Th is approach assumes that the Bible is a historical record, and it thus “forces” all textual 
information into this framework. No provision is made for the interpretation of symbols or 
themes, such as those suggested in the episodes with the ﬁ sh and the wonder tree.
Th e strength of the historical-grammatical approach is that it brings the category of “history” 
into play in the interpretation of texts, but its weakness is that this category tends to be applied 
uncritically.
3.3 Historical-rationalist interpretation
3.3.1 Background and theory
It is questionable whether this phase in the history of biblical interpretation merits an independent 
description as a distinctive approach. In fact, it was a transitional phase between the historical-
grammatical and historical-critical approaches (see next chapter). Th e purpose of describing it 
separately here is to demonstrate the impact that the Enlightenment had on the interpretation of 
Scripture. Th is description also explains the rise of a counter-reaction in the form of historical-
literal interpretation.
Th e Enlightenment of the seventeenth century had major repercussions for interpretive 
approaches. It gave rise to the following characteristics of the historical-rationalistic approach:
Although history remained an important category in the interpretation of texts, the emphasis 
on human reason prompted a reorientation. In their eﬀ orts to reconstruct ancient history 
from the biblical texts, these scholars came to the conclusion that the many contradictions in 
these texts made them “less suitable” for historical reconstruction.
Contradictions were no longer explained away with reference to other texts, but rather 
became, themselves, the object of investigation.
Th e validity of faith as a presupposition in interpretation came to be criticized by those who 
emphasized the human intellect, and who considered faith a “subjective” rather than rational 
basis for analysis. According to them Scripture had to be explained from the “objective” 
position of human rational abilities.
Scripture was no longer regarded as a source to be used in its own exposition.
As a result of this more critical attitude, closer attention was now paid to the origin of texts, 
their literary form and their original function.
Th e historical veracity of texts was no longer accepted at face value. A new question emerged: 
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given all the contradictions and uncertainties within a text, how can we determine what really 
happened?
For Spinoza, one of the leading ﬁ gures in seventeenth century biblical interpretation, scriptural 
interpretation had to be liberated from the oppression of theology. Th e following quotation 
illustrates his view:
“I found nothing taught expressly by scripture which does not agree with our under standing, 
or which is repug nant thereto, and as I saw that the prophets taught nothing which is not very 
simple and easily to be grasped by all, and further, that they clothed their teaching in the style, 
and conﬁ rmed it with the reasons, which would most deeply move the mind of the masses to 
devotion toward God, I became thoroughly convinced that the Bible leaves reason absolutely 
free ...”
3.3.2 Jonah in the light of a historical-rationalist approach
Some aspects of the book of Jonah automatically raise certain questions. Th ree of the most 
prominent questions are discussed here:
(a) Th e ﬁ sh episode
If there is one prominent association people (even small children) have with the book of Jonah, it 
is the episode in which the prophet Jonah is swallowed by a huge ﬁ sh and, aft er three days, is spat 
out on dry land again. Historical-rationalists deny that this event could really have happened. 
Th ey pose critical questions, such as: “Where do you ﬁ nd evidence of a ﬁ sh that has a throat big 
enough to swallow a human adult?” and “How is it possible that a human could stay alive within 
the bowels of a ﬁ sh without oxygen, and with gastric juice all around him?”
(b) Th e huge city of Nineveh
According to Jonah 3:3, Nineveh was a huge city. It took three days just to walk through it. 
Geographical and archaeological sources, however, fail to provide evidence that Nineveh ever 
was this vast at any point in its history. Th ere is, furthermore, no historical evidence for the claim 
that Nineveh’s inhabitants radically repented and were converted to Yahweh of Israel.
(c) Th e wonder-tree
Jonah 4:6-7 refers to a wonder-tree that suddenly appeared, but then vanished overnight as 
worms devoured it. Historical-rationalist scholars would query where such a tree could be found 
that was able to grow enough in a few hours to provide shade for Jonah.
With these critical questions in mind, these scholars concluded that the book of Jonah had no 
value for historical reconstruction. It could reasonably be assumed that these unlikely events in 
the narrative never actually took place as they are portrayed in the Bible.
3.3.3 Observations and evaluation
Th is approach to scriptural interpretation abolished the practice of denying contradictions 
and uncertainties through harmonizing techniques, and is thus much more “honest” and 
realistic about the plausibility of Biblical narrative events. 
It follows the principle that presuppositions of faith should not play any role in scriptural 
interpretation, which suggests that these scholars believe that one can read a text objectively. 
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Modern hermeneutic studies have indicated, however, that it is impossible to read anything 
objectively. Th e reader always interprets from a particular perspective - which may include 
the perspective of faith. Th e reaction of the historical-rationalistic approach should alert us 
to recognize and articulate these presuppositions consciously, but, even with the beneﬁ t of 
human reason, we shall never be without them. 
3.4 Historical-literal interpretation
3.4.1 Background and theory
Th e historical-rationalist developments that have taken place since the Enlightenment did not 
meet everybody’s approval. Some thought the critical questions with regard to the form and 
content of biblical texts rather inappropriate. Th e historical-rationalist approach evolved into 
the historical-critical approach, which will be discussed in the next chapter. In the meantime, 
however, a critical reaction to this type of thinking emerged, and became known as the historical-
literal approach.
Th is approach has two basic premises:
Th e Bible is, aft er all, a literal account of historical facts.
As the God-inspired Word the Bible is infallible, and it cannot contain errors or untrue 
representations.
Th is response thus proposed a return to a pre-critical point of departure. Although it has much in 
common with the historical-grammatical approach, it should be noted that there is an important 
diﬀ erence in emphasis. Th e reformers were quite willing to admit that there were “errors” in the 
Bible. Luther even made critical remarks regarding certain biblical books (such as Kings and 
James) because they did not show clear Christological traits, that is, references that could be 
related to the work of Christ. With “historical” the reformers understood that the meaning of a 
text had to be determined by its historical context. In terms of the historical-literal approach, on 
the other hand, “historical” not only referred to the historical context of texts, but it was also an 
indication that everything described in the Bible, such as a snake that could speak in Genesis 3, 
happened literally. Every other aspect of this approach, such as the emphasis on reading texts in 
their original languages, and the use of archaeological data, served to support this assumption.
Although the historical-literal approach emerged aft er the Enlightenment and before the historical-
critical approach, it is still practised by many modern scholars. It is particularly popular among 
fundamentalist scholars. Most of them formulate their opinions in reaction to critical approaches 
to biblical interpretation.
3.4.2 Jonah in the light of the historical-literal approach
Numerous exegetical studies follow this approach in their analysis of the book of Jonah. Th e 
same questions that were used for the discussion of the historical-rationalistic approach serve 
as examples here. Th e aim is to determine what happens to the ﬁ sh, the city of Nineveh and the 
wonder-tree when they are interpreted according to the historical-literal approach.

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(a) Th e ﬁ sh episode
When the historical correctness and reliability of the book of Jonah must be proven at all costs, it 
is imperative to provide arguments that will be able to explain the ﬁ sh episode satisfactorily. Two 
groups can be distinguished:
It is asserted that it is indeed possible for a human being to be swallowed by a ﬁ sh and to 
survive. Numerous studies are quoted by some writers to show that huge ﬁ sh exist with big 
enough gullets to swallow an adult. Th ere are also examples of ﬁ shermen’s stories that tell 
of people who were swallowed by ﬁ sh, and once the ﬁ sh were caught, were found alive in 
the bellies. It should, furthermore, be kept in mind that everything is possible for God. One 
commentator, Freeman, who pursues a historical-literal approach summarizes the point 
excellently: 
“Th e problem with respect to the ﬁ sh can be resolved by the observation that according to 
the text it is said that ‘Yahweh prepared a great ﬁ sh to swallow up Jonah’ (1:17). Th e whole 
argument must turn upon these words, and the question becomes simply: Is God able to 
prepare providentially a ﬁ sh that could accommo date a man and keep him alive for as long as 
seventy-two hours? Th e answer is obvious.”
Another possibility is that the ﬁ sh episode refers to real events, but that the reference to the 
huge ﬁ sh (or even whale) should be regarded as the name of a ship (“Big Fish”) which saved 
Jonah. Another alternative is that it is the name of an inn (“At the sign of the whale”) where 
Jonah had stayed for three days.
(b) Th e enormous city of Nineveh
Historical-literal exegetes reject the critical notion that there is no evidence that the city of 
Nineveh was ever so large that it would take three days to cover. Th ree possible explanations can 
be mentioned:
Jonah 3:3 does not refer to the diameter of the city, but to its circumference. Th e sentence in 
Jonah 3:3 would then mean that it took three days to travel round the city.
Th e name “Nineveh” does not include only the city, but also the numerous nearby villages that 
were dependent upon the main city. Th e reference would then also include villages such as 
Kuyunjik, Nimrud and Karamles (of which the remains can still be seen today). Th en it would 
naturally take three days to travel through Nineveh.
Th ree days could also be an indication of the time it takes to visit every single part of the 
city.
(c) Th e wonder-tree
Botanists provide evidence of a castor-oil tree that grows luxuriantly in ideal circumstances. On 
the grounds of this botanical evidence, the wonder-tree episode can be accepted as a historical 
possibility. Th ere are, furthermore, recorded examples of cases in which these trees were 
devoured overnight by one particular species of worm. Th is part of the episode can therefore also 
be proven.
3.4.3 Observations and evaluation
Although the historical-literal approach arose in reaction to the critical approaches that 
emerged as a result of the Enlightenment, it fails to escape the presuppositions of the 
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Enlightenment. Th e historical-rationalist approach asserts that it is historically impossible 
that events such as these could ever have taken place. Th e historical-literal approach aims 
to prove (albeit by means of rationalization) that the events (also historically) did indeed 
happen and were thus historically correct and reliable. In both cases historical factuality is 
used as the only criterion to judge the truth value of texts. Th e arguments of the historical-
literal approach are therefore more dependent on rationalistic presuppositions than it would 
perhaps like to admit.
Th e close correlation drawn by the historical-literal approach between the historical correctness 
of the book of Jonah and its faith value should be assessed negatively. Th is correlation suggests 
that if one does not accept the historical correctness of the book of Jonah, one should also 
deny that it has faith value or even that it is the Word of God.

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Approaches focusing on the production of texts
4.1 Introduction
Under the inﬂ uence of the principles of the Enlightenment, the historical-rationalist approach 
developed into a set of formalized methods, known as the historical-critical approaches. 
Although these historical-critical approaches can clearly be distinguished from one another, they 
were never meant to be understood as distinct. Rather, they developed in such a fashion that 
they complemented one another, not ignoring or denying the results of the other approaches. 
Someone once compared this development to the growth rings of a tree – each subsequent ring 
still forms part of the same tree trunk.
Th e historical-critical approaches hold in common the presupposition that (biblical) texts can and 
should be understood only in the light of the historical context within which they originated (or 
the “world-behind-the-texts”). A knowledge of the circumstances in which they were produced 
is essential to understanding them properly. Th e task of the interpreter is therefore to gather the 
pieces of historical evidence behind the texts carefully and to ﬁ t them all together.
Th e category of “history” has therefore become the core around which the rings of the tree trunk 
developed. “History” is, however, understood in more than one way:
“History” may refer to the historical events which are recounted in biblical texts. One of 
the central tasks of the interpreter is to determine, as far as possible, whether the texts are 
accurate accounts of the events of the past, or whether they represent interpretations of the 
events. (Th is question is still the central issue in the “minimalist-maximalist” debate in which 
scholars argue about the value of biblical texts for the reconstruction of the history of Israel).
“History” can, however, also refer to the process of development of the texts themselves. 
Th e task of the interpreter is therefore also to determine how the texts came into being, and 
what the circumstances were in which they originated and were transmitted. Th e processes 
of textual development can to a certain extent be “read oﬀ ” from the texts themselves by 
scrutinizing these texts critically.
In order to perform these tasks, the interpreter should proceed according to a set of critical 
methods. Th ese methods, which are summarized below and will be discussed in this chapter, 
are called “critical”, because they are committed to using unbiased strategies to obtain objective 
knowledge about the historical process of development of these texts. (In later years scholars have, 
of course, realized that objective knowledge is almost impossible, and this notion was criticized in 
further methodological developments. See the next chapters.) 
Text-critical studies: As a result of the consistent interest in its philological and grammatical aspects, 
the ancient manuscripts and translations of the Bible were ardently investigated. Attempts were 
made to reconstruct the original text on the grounds of the many diﬀ erences that exist within the 
manuscripts and translations. Text-critical studies are concerned with the reconstruction of the 
original text.
Literary-critical approaches (in German “Literarkritik”): Scholars gradually learned that the 
authors of the biblical texts had made use of earlier sources in their writing. Much attention 
has been devoted to the reconstruction of these sources, as well as to the allocation of biblical 
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textual material to these sources. Modern applications of literary-critical approaches are less 
concerned with the identiﬁ cation of sources, although they still have the objective of determining 
the smallest literary units in a particular biblical text.
Form-critical approaches: Th ese approaches are particularly interested in the typical literary forms 
(“Gattungen” in German) of biblical texts. Th ey want to determine further in which religious-
historical situations (“Sitz-im-Leben” in German) these literary forms typically functioned.
Tradition-critical approaches: Scholars gradually developed an interest in the theological traditions 
and transmissions (mostly oral) that form the bases of the sources and smaller literary units that 
had been determined by form-critical approaches. Th e point of departure of tradition-critical 
approaches is therefore that biblical stories developed and were transmitted around certain 
theological themes.
Redaction-critical approaches: Th ese approaches analyze the processes used by compositors and 
editors who changed and merged smaller textual units into their ﬁ nal form and composition as 
biblical books. Whereas the previously mentioned approaches analyze texts from their present 
form into their smallest constituent parts, redaction-critical approaches work synthetically in the 
opposite direction – from the smallest constituent parts to the present form.
Th e historical-critical approaches are, however, not the only approaches interested in the 
circumstances of production of biblical texts. Some other modern approaches may also include a 
focus on aspects of the production of the texts. Th ese approaches are formulated and advocated 
by modern-day scholars who are still of the opinion that knowledge of the processes of textual 
production can beneﬁ t our understanding of biblical texts. A number of these approaches are 
summarized here, and some of them are discussed later in this chapter.
Canonical criticism: Th is approach argues that the canonical formation of biblical texts provides 
clues relevant to their interpretation. Analyzing canon formation reveals theological trends 
and decisions which allowed texts to be merged and accepted as authoritative in the ancient 
communities of faith. Th is approach therefore does not deny the process of textual development, 
but would rather focus on the canonical end result of this process.
Social reconstructions: A number of studies simply try to reconstruct the socio-historical context 
within which texts originated. Archaeological material is gathered to gain a picture of the aspects 
of society at that time (houses, architecture, food, roads, clothing, art, monetary systems, manners 
and customs, economic circumstances, social classes, laws, etc). Th ese social reconstructions 
provide the data used in other studies summarized here.
Socio-historical studies: Th ese studies try to understand the broad sweep of change in history. 
Attempts are made to place the texts within the broader historical world within which they were 
written. A socio-historical study of the book Jonah would, for instance, pay attention to the 
various social, political, economic and religious interest groups and relationships of power of that 
time. Th e question is what group’s interests and positions of power were served by the text. How 
do these interests ﬁ t into the broader historical dynamics of the time?
Th e sociology of knowledge approach: How does a text ﬁ t into the broader world-view of the 
society within which it originated? Th e sociology of knowledge is interested in the so-called 
“social construction of reality” within a particular society. It assumes that the daily experiences, 
the customs, habits, symbols, values, rules, reconstructed history, religious convictions and the 
like within a society are organized within a comprehensive unity, called a “symbolic universe”. 
What is accepted as “reality” within the symbolic universe is based on a social construction. Th e 
knowledge people acquire within such a symbolic universe only reﬂ ects the basic assumptions 
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of the speciﬁ c social construction of reality. Children grow up and are socialized within such 
a symbolic universe. Th e basic presuppositions of this symbolic world are usually accepted by 
them and seldom questioned. Its legitimacy is upheld by inﬂ uential leaders, institutions and 
organizations. Religion plays an important role in giving absolute validity and universal scope to 
the symbolic world. A study of the Bible based on the sociology of knowledge approach would 
look at the implicit presuppositions of the symbolic universe within which the particular text 
originated.
Cultural-anthropological approaches: In anthropological studies, the internal dynamics of cultures 
are studied. Certain general cultural features such as kinship systems, rituals, internal rules, 
economic systems, exclusion mechanisms and relationships of power are studied. Th ere are a 
number of anthropological models used in such studies: 
A structural-functional model that assumes that cultural values, customs and forms of social 
organization co-operate to ensure harmony and balance within a particular social system; 
A conﬂ ict model that describes the dynamics within a culture in terms of internal tensions 
and power-struggles; 
A model that looks at the shared symbols of a culture and that studies the symbolic changes 
caused by social interaction within such a culture. 
In social anthropological studies of the Bible these analyses are used to identify the speciﬁ c 
cultural presuppositions within a certain book in the Bible.
Socio-rhetorical criticism: Socio-rhetorical criticism was propagated in the last decades by the 
New Testament scholar, Vernon Robbins. Although this approach also focuses on the production 
of texts, and is therefore described here, this is not its only concern. Robbins describes texts as 
thickly textured tapestries, for, like an intricately woven tapestry, a text contains complex patterns 
and images. Looked at only one way, a text presents a single surface. By changing his or her point 
of view, however, the interpreter may bring the multiple strands of the text into view. Robbins 
therefore argues that socio-rhetorical criticism is an approach that focuses on values, convictions, 
and beliefs both in the texts we read and in the world in which we live. In addition, it moves 
interactively into the world of the people who wrote the texts and into our present world. In 
his view, the strands within a Biblical text would weave themselves into an inner texture, an 
intertexture, social and cultural textures, ideological texture, and sacred texture.
4.2 Historical-critical approaches
4.2.1 History of research
It would be an immense task to provide an extensive description of the history of research in the 
ﬁ eld of historical-critical study of the Bible. Th e aim of this discussion will thus only be to give a 
cursory description of the developments on methodological level. In this section we will focus on 
the history of research with regard to the Old Testament, although New Testament research has 
undergone similar developments.
Th e aims and interests of scholars from previous centuries were oft en not to formulate an 
historical-critical methodology per se. Instead they were exploring new and better ways to 
understand biblical history and society. As their sources for this enquiry were biblical texts, they 
had to develop exegetical methods for the task. Th e various methods of the historical-critical 
methodology can thus only be understood against the historical background from which they 
developed.
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In the previous chapter a description was provided of the emergence of the modern era in biblical 
studies under the inﬂ uence of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Th e overview provided 
here starts at the end of the eighteenth century when the earlier observations with regard to the 
origin of the biblical texts came to be formalized in hypotheses for the ﬁ rst time.
Eichhorn (born 1752) was the most signiﬁ cant scholar at the turn of the eighteenth century. His 
work was a synthesis between the rational-moralistic work of Semler and the aesthetic-romantic 
approach of Herder. In contrast to the orthodox view, he regarded the Old Testament as an 
independent document of the past. He was the ﬁ rst scholar to utilize the concept “mythos” in his 
description of ancient history, and the ﬁ rst to speak of “Gattung” (genre) and “Überlieferung” 
(transmission).
Eichhorn pursued the former source hypothesis (“ältere Urkundenhypothese”) which originated 
from some observations in the Pentateuch made by Witter and Astruc. In 1711, the German 
minister Witter had published a book in which he maintained that, on the grounds of the use of 
two diﬀ erent divine names, two diﬀ erent pre-Mosaic sources could be found in Genesis 1:1-2:3 
and 2:4-3:24. Unfortunately his work did not become known until 1924. As a result, the French 
doctor, Astruc, who published his ﬁ ndings in 1753, came to be regarded as the father of the 
former source hypothesis. Eichhorn did not read Astruc himself, but he learnt of him through the 
critical discussion of the former source hypothesis by Michaelis.
In the subsequent years this hypothesis was repeatedly modiﬁ ed. At the end of the eighteenth 
century an English Catholic theologian, Geddes, proposed his fragment hypothesis 
(“Fragmentenhypothese”). According to his views no continuous sources were present in the 
Pentateuch, but it was composed from various fragments by a redactor. Th is hypothesis appealed 
to De Wette, but he tried to ﬁ nd a middle course between the former source and fragment 
hypotheses. In his supplement hypothesis (“Ergänzungshypothese”), he maintained that a basic 
continuous document had to be assumed, but that this document was then supplemented and 
extended with various fragments by a redactor. Ewald became an advocate of this hypothesis as 
well.
Towards the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth signiﬁ cant 
research was done in the ﬁ elds of textual studies, grammar and history (such as that by Kennicott, 
De Rossi and Gesenius). Th is was the time of revival for critical exegesis. Th e aim of exegesis was 
no longer the intuitive reproduction of the text, but rather a grammatical-historical description 
thereof.
Th e nineteenth century produced some of the ﬁ nest scholars in this ﬁ eld. Th e ﬁ rst to be mentioned 
is Reuß (born 1804) who taught in Straßburg. Together with his student, Graf (born 1815), he 
brought about a new understanding of biblical history. Reuß has the credit for the hypothesis that 
the prophetic literature is older than the law material, and that the Psalms are younger than both. 
Th is understanding of biblical history was later elaborated upon by scholars such as Kuenen and 
Wellhausen. With reference to Hupfeld’s newer source hypothesis (“neuere Urkundenhypothese”), 
Reuß and Graf aﬃ  rmed that the priestly source (called P) was the youngest pentateuchal source. 
Th is hypothesis was formulated in 1853 in a publication by Hupfeld. According to this hypothesis 
an elohistic basic source (“Grundschrift ” in German) was later supplemented by two independent 
sources (“Urkunden”), another elohistic and a jahwistic source. Th ese three works were compiled 
by a redactor. However, this was no haphazard compilation, but was done according to an 
independent and systematic theological concept. Together with Deuteronomy, four sources were 
thus distinguished in the Pentateuch: E1 (the basic source), E2 (younger elohistic material), J 
and D. Th is newer source hypothesis, together with the historical insights of Reuß and Graf, led 
Wellhausen to discover the distinctiveness and historical setting of the priestly writings.
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Another great scholar of the nineteenth century was the Leiden professor Abraham Kuenen
(1828-1891), who tried to explain the theological signiﬁ cance of historical-critical research, not 
only for scholars, but also for laymen and women. Th e aim of the critical methods, according 
to Kuenen, is the discovery and uncovering of the “real history”. Th is “real history” is concealed 
in and behind the historical construction of the biblical canon. Th e literary critic and historian 
should work in close cooperation: Literary criticism is used initially to verify the authenticity of 
the documents. It should be ascertained whether these documents are composed of independent 
sources (or pieces thereof). Historical criticism follows aft er this, and its aim is to verify the 
relationship between the authenticated source utterances and historical reality. Th is concept of 
the critical task had great inﬂ uence in the decades to come.
Th e greatest biblical scholar of the nineteenth century was undoubtedly Julius Wellhausen (born 
1844). He portrayed the religious development of Israel in his masterpiece Introduction to the 
history of Israel (“Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels”) published for the ﬁ rst time in 1878. 
According to Wellhausen, this development can be described in terms of three epochs reﬂ ected 
in the Pentateuchal sources JE, D and P, each of which reﬂ ected a distinct developmental phase 
in the religion and cult of Israel. He therefore commenced his monumental work by presenting a 
description of certain cult elements aft er the analogy of the three epochs. His description portrayed 
the development from centralization (“Zentralisierung”) to ritualization (“Ritualisierung”) and 
denaturalization (“Denaturierung”). It is evident that Hegel’s idealistic philosophy of history 
played an important role in the formulation of his opinion. Th e second part of his study he 
dedicated to the history of traditions. Whereas the ﬁ rst part was mainly concerned with the law 
material in the Pentateuch, here he gave a description of the historical or narrative part of the Old 
Testament. Th e chronistic history (assigned to the P epoch), the books Judges, Samuel and Kings 
(in its ﬁ nal form assigned to the D epoch), and the narratives of the Hexateuch were treated by 
Wellhausen in this part. In the third part of his “Prolegomena” he concentrated on the diﬀ erences 
between Israel and Judaism. In 1894 Wellhausen published another signiﬁ cant study: “Israelitsche 
und jüdische Geschichte” (Israelite and Judean history). Th e main emphasis of this work was on 
the authenticity of the literary sources and on research into the “true history”.
Th e next prominent scholar who should be discussed is Hermann Gunkel (1862-1932). His great 
merit was that he deﬁ ned the literary-historical (“literaturgeschichtliche”) and religious-historical 
(“religionsgeschichtliche”) questions more exactly and brought these ﬁ elds into a harmonious 
relationship. Gunkel argued that the literary history has less to do with the authors of the texts 
than with the typical formats or genres (“Gattungen”) in which these texts are transmitted. Gunkel 
consequently argued that every genre had its origin in a particular typical historical context (or 
“Sitz im Leben”). With this distinction Gunkel introduced a new era in historical-critical research. 
Various scholars would follow him in the years to come.
Especially relevant to this study is Gunkel’s viewpoint on the aims and methods of the interpretation 
of the Old Testament. He summarizes six exegetical steps: (i) philological explanation of the text; 
(ii) Text criticism (“Textkritik”) which deﬁ nes a hypothetic “Urtext” (original text); (iii) study 
of the political history and archaeology; (iv) Literary criticism (“Literarkritik”) which traces the 
original relations in the text; (v) on the basis of the literary criticims, the aesthetic form critical 
(“formkritische”) and literary-historical (“literargeschichtliche”) research follows; (vi) theological 
interpretation. However, with reference to the last point, he warns: (a) Th e exegete should not be 
subservient to any form of ecclesiastical practice; (b) Th e exegete should operate free from any 
dogmatic presuppositions; (c) Th e exegete should not expect to ﬁ nd any theological doctrine 
in the Old Testament; and (d) Any salvation historical way of proceeding should be strongly 
avoided. 
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At the beginning of the twentieth century new directions in the ﬁ eld of pentateuchal criticism 
were explored. New questions were asked on the history of the origin of Old Testament sources, 
and new theories regarding the dating of the J, E, D and P sources were formulated. Fresh interest 
arose in the historical setting of the diﬀ erent sources, and an approach which seeks the holistic 
understanding of the Old Testament canon received renewed attention. 
Th e ﬁ rst half of the twentieth century also witnessed the discovery of some of the most signiﬁ cant 
archaeological ﬁ nds. Aft er the discovery of Ugarit, Mari and Qumran, Old Testament research 
had to deal with the abundant literary material which accentuated the associations Israel had with 
its geographical context (“Umwelt”), and the human and historical nature of the Old Testament 
itself.
Various new introductions to the Old Testament were published in these decades. Eißfeldt’s
“Introduction” (published for the ﬁ rst time in 1934) was the ﬁ rst to concentrate on the smallest 
utterances and textual units, and described these in their pre-literary stage and in their unique 
historical settings. Engnell (published in 1945) and other Scandinavian scholars maintained that 
the Old Testament goes back to an exclusively oral tradition.
Th e ﬁ eld of pentateuchal criticism also experienced new developments. Volz and Rudolph, for 
example, altered traditional opinion on the pentateuchal sources by questioning the existence 
of an independent E source. On a literary-critical level, new answers thus had to be provided. 
Additionally, Von Rad indicated new directions on a form-critical level. His “Th e form-critical 
problem of the Hexateuch” (“Das formgeschichtliche Problem des Hexateuchs”), published in 
1938, had immense methodological implications. He argued that form-critical research had to be 
complemented by concentrating on the history of tradition. Von Rad brought about a signiﬁ cant 
change in the question which had to be asked in exegesis. Th e aim of historical-critical exegesis 
should, according to him, be to establish the real life transmission processes which determined 
the growth and character of the Hexateuch. Th e objective of his research was not so much to 
determine the archaic, pre-Israelitic “Urformen” (as was the case in Gunkel’s work). Rather, Von 
Rad asked which articles of faith constitute the Hexateuch in its present form, and how these 
articles of faith relate to the ﬁ nal form of the text. Von Rad illustrated the implications of such 
an approach for the description of the “Th eology of the Old Testament” in his monumental two-
volume work (ﬁ rst published in 1960).
In recent decades the Old Testament scholarly community has witnessed the emergence of 
sociological and materialistic approaches to exegesis, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
In addition, an increasing number of scholars have started applying insights from other scholarly 
disciplines to Old Testament exegesis. Richter (1971) proposed that exegesis be regarded as a 
branch of the broader subject of literary science. Koch criticizes Richter, and emphasizes that 
exegesis has to move beyond the level of sentences and phrases to the level of texts. He therefore 
advocates the implementation of text-theoretical considerations in Old Testament exegesis. 
Hardmeier has continued along this line of argumentation since the publication of his dissertation 
in 1978, including certain insights from communication theory in his work.
Another signiﬁ cant development in historical-critical research is closely linked to the name of 
Kaiser. He (and Smend) demanded new attention for the neglected ﬁ eld of exegetical proceeding, 
namely that of redaction history. Smend, in his publication “Th e origin of the Old Testament” 
(“Die Entstehung des Alten Testaments”) ﬁ rst published in 1978, implements this direction in 
research.
33
Chapter 4
In 1976 two German scholars published their research which introduced renewed critique 
on the contemporary views in pentateuchal criticism. Th e ﬁ rst of these publications, “Th e so-
called Jahwist. Observations and questions on pentateuchal research” (“Der sogenannte Jahwist. 
Beobachtungen und Fragen zur Pentateuchforschung.”) by H.H. Schmid (1976), critically re-
evaluates the theories held on the origin of the Jahwist. He maintains that the historical work 
(usually designated as “Jahwist”) with its comprehensive interpretation and redaction of the 
pentateuchal material, does not originate from the davidic-solomonic era. Even the pre-exilic 
prophecies cannot be presupposed to be the origin of this work. Rather, it should be placed in 
the era of the deuteronomic-deuteronomistic tradition building. It should thus be understood 
against the background of the literary activity of this era.
Th e second publication worth mentioning in this context is “Th e problem of the history of 
transmission of the Pentateuch” (“Das Überlieferungsgeschichtliche Problem des Pentateuch”) 
by R. Rendtorﬀ (1976). He opts to give up the notion of sources in his research. Rendtorﬀ  
concentrates on larger tradition complexes, which each had its own transmission history. Th ese 
tradition complexes were then reworked and integrated into a bigger whole by a deuteronomic 
redaction in the exilic-postexilic era. Pentateuchal sources thus no longer feature in his argument. 
A scholar of Rendtorﬀ , E. Blum, still continues this line of argumentation in his inﬂ uential 
publications on the patriarchal narratives.
Although only a cursory description of the history of historical-critical research could be provided 
in this section, it should have become clear that the historical-critical methodology had its roots 
in a long process of development. Th e methodology, as it is known at present, is the product of 
a lengthy historical process of reﬁ nement and adaptation. Th e historical-critical methodology 
consists of various separate methods each of which has its origin in a speciﬁ c stage of the historical 
development. It should be clear from the above description that the particular philosophical 
and theological climate in each phase has had a direct impact on exegetical methodology. Th e 
inﬂ uence of the Enlightenment, Hegel’s idealistic view on history and positivism (to mention 
but a few) are good examples which illustrate the point. However, in the development of the 
historical-critical methodology, research results constantly had to withstand the test of time, and 
reﬁ nements and adaptations were made accordingly. Th e developments described here underline 
the necessity of an ongoing evaluation of research results. Methodological implications should be 
derived accordingly.
4.2.2 Text-critical studies
(a) Background and theory
Th e text of the book of Jonah as we ﬁ nd it in our Bible is, of course, a translation of the original 
Hebrew text. Th e translation of texts creates a whole series of unique problems. Translation, as 
such, is already a form of interpretation. In the case of the Bible the problem is even worse, 
because we do not dispose of the original Hebrew manuscripts any more. Text-critical studies are 
concerned with this problem.
We no longer possess any of the original manuscripts of the Bible. Th ey were lost centuries 
ago. Th e earliest available manuscripts are hand-written copies of even earlier copies. Ancient 
manuscripts were meticulously copied out by hand in monasteries for many centuries.
Unfortunately, many smaller errors cropped up during this century-long process. Apart from 
the common errors of writing and hearing, the texts were not provided with vowels, word breaks 
or sentence breaks. All the letters were thus joined. It would then be diﬃ  cult, for example, to 
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determine whether thmnlps is supposed to mean “the man leaps” or “the main laps” or even 
“them nil peas”. Th e meaning of the text had to be derived from the context. Th e monks who did 
the copying of the biblical texts oft en had to do guess work. Furthermore the original meanings 
of certain ancient Hebrew words were lost over time.
Numerous other errors occurred during the process of copying:
Words or lines were inadvertently lost.
Words were accidentally repeated.
Errors were also made as a result of untidy handwriting. An English example would be when 
“w” would be written out as “vv” or even “uu”. Some Hebrew consonants were similarly 
confused.
Errors of hearing occurred because one monk would read out the texts to a group of writers. 
An English example would be when the word “die” would be confused with the word “dye”. 
Likewise, the Hebrew prepositions “‘al” and “’el” were oft en confused.
Sometimes a few words were added parenthetically to explain the meaning of a particular 
word in the text. When this text was copied, these parenthetical words would sometimes be 
regarded as part of the text.
Because of all these minor errors we possess today a whole variety of manuscripts dating from 
the Middle Ages which diﬀ er from one another on various points. Th e task of text-critical studies 
is to reconstruct a text from all these ancient manuscripts which would be as near as possible to 
the original.
For the purpose of text reconstruction, text critics not only make use of all the available ancient 
manuscripts, they also use the various ancient translations of the biblical texts. Th e Old Testament, 
for example, had been translated from Hebrew into Greek (the so-called Septuagint or LXX) and 
Syriac (the so-called Peshitta) at a very early stage. Th ese trans lations, as well as the Latin, Coptic, 
Aramaic and others, are used in a “reversed” recon struction process to determine from which 
Hebrew manuscripts they were translated.
Another important aid in the reconstruction process of biblical texts is the collection of manuscripts 
that were discovered near the Dead Sea in 1947 (the so-called “Dead Sea” or Qumran Scrolls). 
Scholars consider them the oldest known Hebrew manuscripts of the Bible. It is therefore not 
surprising that text critics make extensive use of them today.
(b) Text-critical studies of the book of Jonah
Most modern translations of the book of Jonah are based on the Hebrew text of the Biblica 
Hebraica Stuttgartensia which was published by Elliger in 1970. Th e Hebrew text of Jonah in 
this particular edition is an unaltered version of an ancient manuscript, the Lenin grad Codex 
(or manuscript). Th e Leningrad Codex was recorded in 1008 by Aaron ben Moses ben Asher, a 
famous Tiberian text expert. He was a member of a group of medieval Jewish scholars (called the 
Masoretes) who edited the entire Old Testament text and provided it with vowels.
Apart from the above-mentioned manuscript, various other ancient manuscripts of the book of 
Jonah exist, such as the Cairo Codex (895 AD), the Petersburg Codex (916 AD) and the Aleppo 
Codex (925 AD). An important discovery was made in 1955 when an ancient manuscript was 
excavated in a small cave at Wadi Marubba’at, near the Dead Sea. Th is manuscript contained the 
Hebrew texts of the twelve minor prophets and was copied in about 135 AD. Interestingly, this 
text deviates only slightly from the best available medieval manuscripts. Th is proves that the 
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Hebrew text of Jonah was meticulously transmitted - far better than many other Old Testament 
books.
Th ere are a few minor diﬀ erences between these manuscripts. Th e Biblica Hebraica Stutt garten sia 
highlights these by means of text-critical footnotes. A few deserve discussion:
Codex Sinaiticus and Codex Vaticanus, two very ancient manuscripts of the Greek translation 
(LXX) of Jonah, exclude the words “why we meet with this disaster” in Jonah 1:8. Th e Greek 
translator’s eye probably skipped a line in this case, because the Hebrew word “hemin” is 
repeated in these verses. Th is typical writing error can be illustrated by an English example. 
Suppose that the following sentences had to be copied out by hand: “I do not know when 
my husband will ﬁ nd time to work in the garden. What I do know is that he is an excellent 
gardener.” Th e word “know” is repeated in this short text. When copying, it could easily 
happen that the writer’s eye would “jump” from the ﬁ rst “know” to the second one. Th e result 
would then be that the sentence would be correctly copied until the ﬁ rst “know”, but it would 
then continue aft er the second “know”. Th e resultant sentence would then read: “I do not 
know that he is an excellent gardener.”
Some scholars are of the opinion that the phrase “He had told them so” in Jonah 1:10 is an 
explanatory remark which had been included into the text at a later stage. It is possible, but 
improbable, because the text makes good sense as it is.
(c) Observations and evaluation
Th e above examples illustrate that text-critical studies do not have a profound eﬀ ect on the 
interpretation of the book as a whole. Th e text-critical remarks concern only a few minor issues. 
Th e following can be observed with regard to this method:
Textual criticism is a very much needed strategy to deal with interpretive problems arising 
from the lack of original biblical manuscripts. To base our editions and translations of the 
Bible on diverging copies of manuscripts seems to be a precarious exercise. An attempt at 
reconstructing (as far as possible) the original texts seems to be unavoidable. Textual criticism 
provides well-developed tools for this reconstruction process.
Textual criticism has become a highly technical ﬁ eld of study accessible only to a few specialists. 
It is therefore oft en quite diﬃ  cult for other readers and scholars of the Bible to evaluate the 
decisions taken by textual critics.
Some of the decisions and conclusions of textual critics remain highly speculative. In some 
instances a ﬁ nal answer cannot be provided.
4.2.3 Literary-critical studies
(a) Background and theory
Th e development of literary-critical approaches is strongly related to the critical attitude 
associated with the Enlightenment. Earlier the unity of biblical texts had to be maintained at all 
costs. From the end of the eighteenth century, however, ever more objections were raised against 
this tendency. It was no longer common practice to try to harmonize inherent tensions in the text. 
Th e question was increasingly asked whether the text had its own history of development that 
reﬂ ected various sources and historical periods. 
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Various theories regarding this development process – from the former source hypothesis, through 
the fragment and supplement hypothesis, to the newer source hypothesis - were formulated. Th e 
development of these hypotheses has been discussed above.
Th e dating of these presumed sources was (and still is) a very important aspect of the investiga tion. 
Historical-critical scholars’ primary interest was not the developmental history of the text, but the 
reconstruction of the religious history of Ancient Israel. As a result, they had to pay particular 
attention to the dating of sources. One watershed was when the ﬁ rst scholar maintained that the 
prophetic literature was older than the law material of the Old Testament, and that the Psalms 
were more recent than both the prophetic and the law material (as has been indicated above). Th is 
implied that every biblical text had to be investigated in its original context, not in the context of 
the events mentioned in the text. For example, if a text had its origin during the Exile, but dealt 
with events that happened before the Israelites conquered Palestine, the exilic context should be 
considered in its interpretation.
It was gradually generally accepted that the J and E sources had their origin during the early 
monarchical period (tenth to eighth century BCE), the D source approximately during the reign 
of King Josiah (seventh century BCE), and the P source during the Exile (sixth century BCE). 
A redactor (or redactors) probably combined the sources into one text during the time of Ezra 
(approximately 400 BCE). Th e dating of these presumed sources, as well as their extent, remain 
controversial issues in the historical-critical debate until today. During the last two decades or so 
many scholars started arguing in favour of a later dating for all the presumed sources.
In modern-day literary criticism the main purpose is normally to determine the smallest literary 
units in the ancient biblical texts. Th ese smaller units determined by the literary-critical approach 
serve in turn as the points of departure for form-critical and traditional-critical approaches. Two 
criteria are prominent in the identiﬁ cation of smaller units in texts: (i) Are there any disturbing 
repetitions in the texts that cannot be explained in other ways? (ii) Are there any untenable 
tensions in the texts that cannot be explained in other ways?
(b) Jonah in the light of a literary-critical approach 
Two literary-critical problems in the book of Jonah, which reﬂ ect the main issues of discussion in 
the history of research of this book, will be discussed here:
Th e use of the divine names, Yahweh and ‘Elohim
Th e divine names are clearly distributed in a very deﬁ nite pattern. From this distribu tion one 
could easily assume that two sources had been used to compose the book of Jonah. Compare 
the following summary (“Yahweh” is normally translated as “Lord”, and “’Elohim” as “God”):
1:1-3:4 Yahweh 
3:5-10 ‘Elohim
4:1-5 Yahweh
4:6 Yahweh-’Elohim
4:7-9 ‘Elohim
4:10-11 Yahweh
It should be noted that the name of Yahweh is never used by a Ninevite. In 3:5-10 they 
consistently use the name ‘Elohim to refer to the God of Israel.
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Th e psalm of Jonah in chapter 2
Most scholars (unlike the advocates of the above-mentioned sources theory) accept the unity 
of the book of Jonah. Th e only controversial part is the so-called psalm of Jonah in 2:2-9. Th e 
following arguments are normally forwarded to prove that it was not an original part of the 
book of Jonah:
Without the psalm of Jonah, the wider context forms a chiastic structure: 1:17a corre-
sponds to 2:10 (Yahweh as subject), and 1:17b corresponds to 2:1 (Jonah as subject). Th e 
insertion of verses 2-9 disturbs this structure.
Th e structure of the book of Jonah as a whole is symmetrical. For example, the prayer of 
the seamen in 1:14 is countered by 4:2. Th e insertion of the psalm of Jonah also disturbs 
this overall structure.
Th e language of the psalm of Jonah diﬀ ers radically from that of the remainder of the book 
of Jonah.
Th e psalm of Jonah is a psalm of thanksgiving that is not appropriate to Jonah's distress in 
the belly of the ﬁ sh!
Th e positive image of Jonah projected by the psalm does not correspond with the image 
projected in the rest of the book. With the insertion of the psalm of Jonah, the uniform 
psychological image of the prophet Jonah is disturbed.
On the grounds of these arguments two literary units are oft en distinguished in the book of 
Jonah, namely (a) Jonah 1:1-2:1; 2:10-4:11 and (b) Jonah 2:2-9.
(c) Observations and evaluation
Th e literary-critical approach was, unfortunately, received rather negatively in some circles. 
Some applications of this approach have created the impres sion that it is a “cut-and-paste 
method” by means of which a text can be composed according to one’s own interpretation. 
Furthermore, the impression was sometimes created that only “old” and “original” textual 
material was really worth while. Other textual material was oft en labeled as “later addition” 
(“gloss”) or “secondary material”. While it is true that some applications of the literary-critical 
approach might have created this impression, negative assessment of this method is oft en due 
to the fact that its literary-critical results are evaluated in isolation, and not in relation to the 
results of other historical-critical approaches.
Th e sources theory oft en results in circular argumentation. For example, certain characteristics 
of J material are established from texts that in all probability origi nated from the J source. 
When other texts with these characteristics are encountered, they are assigned to the J source. 
One theory therefore becomes the basis on which another rests.
Great controversy surrounds the exact dating of the sources. Because the manner in which 
the time of origin of texts is determined is such an important factor in interpre tation, the 
uncertainty about the dating of certain biblical texts hampers inter pretation.
Scholars also diﬀ er on the question of whether the authors of the sources should be regarded 
merely as collectors and compositors, or as theologians in their own right. Th e question is 
thus whether the religious or theological presuppositions of the authors played any role in the 
collection, composition, ordering and adding of textual material. Th e nature and identity of 
the Yahwistic author, in particular, is a contentious issue.
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Although there are certain reservations concerning this approach, it demonstrates the fact 
that the ancient biblical texts underwent a long history of develop ment, unlike modern texts, 
which are written by one author at a particular time.
Another positive aspect of this approach is that it foregrounds the signiﬁ cance of the origi nal 
circum stances in which the text was created to its interpretation.
4.2.4 Form-critical studies
(a) Background and theory
Form-critical approaches developed out of the literary-critical approach. Where the purpose of 
the literary-critical approach is to isolate the various smaller units that make up the text, form-
critical approaches take the process one step further. Th eir purpose is to describe the literary 
forms of the smaller textual units. Furthermore, they aim to relate the history of the biblical 
literature to the history of the religious movements that were prevalent during the time of origin 
of these texts. Form-critical scholars make use of two major concepts:
Literary form or genre (“Gattung”)
Th is concept refers to the typical literary forms that inﬂ uence the construction of texts. An 
obituary in the newspaper, for example, diﬀ ers markedly from a news report on the same 
person’s death. Each of these liter ary forms follows certain conventions of construction. 
In the Old Testament, various such literary forms can be identiﬁ ed. Apart from the more 
general categories, such as the song, various sub-categories are evident; for example, songs of 
thanksgiving, songs of praise, and songs of lamentation can be found. Even sub-sub-categories 
are possible, such as indi vidual lamentation or corporate lamentation.
A dilemma arose in form-critical studies because of the divergent criteria that have been 
applied for the identiﬁ cation of various Gattungen. An overwhelming number of names and 
descriptions of literary forms exist, without uniformity in deﬁ nition. Th is scenario gave rise 
to the reaction in recent years whereby Gattungen are identiﬁ ed and described according 
to formal grammatical criteria. Th is ensures that literary forms are investigated within the 
framework of the grammatical and literary sciences.
Typical life setting (“Sitz im Leben”)
Form critics maintain that all typical literary forms (the so-called Gattungen) can be traced 
back to particular religious-historical circumstances or typical life settings in which they were 
created and functioned. Th e Sitz im Leben of every genre should be determined. When one 
reads an obituary, for example, one knows intuitively that the background is the loss of a loved 
one, and an acknowledgement of their life. In the case of ancient texts, however, it is much 
more complicated to reconstruct the Sitz im Leben of a particular genre.
(b) Jonah in the light of a form-critical approach 
In previous sections mention was made of attempts during the history of interpreta tion to typify 
the book of Jonah as allegory, typology, midrash, etc. Today the literary form, or genre of the book 
remains the major point of discussion in its inter pretation.
Genre
Th e literary form of the book of Jonah makes it unique. Th is is illustrated by the fact that 
Jonah is the only book among the Minor Prophets written mainly in a narrative style. Th is 
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gave rise to the question: is the book of Jonah really a prophecy? Why was the narrative of 
Jonah included in the prophetic part of the Hebrew canon?
Although the majority of commentators agree that the book of Jonah consists of a variety of 
literary forms, two main lines of argument can be distinguished:
Th e ﬁ rst group argues for the historical basis of the narrative, which is seen to be a version 
of historical events with a historical ﬁ gure, Jonah, as the main character. Scholars with 
this view refer to Jonah-ben-Amittai who is mentioned in 2 Kings 14:25 to prove that he 
was the historical ﬁ gure in the narrative. Advocates of this opinion argue, furthermore, 
that the narrative refers to a concrete historical and geographical environment. Th e New 
Testament reference in Matthew 12:41 is normally adduced to support this argument. 
Scholars of this opinion argue that Jesus assumed that Jonah really spent three days inside 
the ﬁ sh. If there is no historical basis for the Jonah narrative, these scholars argue, the 
historicity of Jesus' death, funeral and resurrection would also be in question.
For another group the Jonah narrative does not necessarily refer to historical events. In 
this case the narrative is regarded as a form of ﬁ ction that was employed by an author to 
convey a particular message in a didactically acceptable manner. Various suggestions are 
made by this group of scholars as to what sort of literature we encounter in the book of 
Jonah:
a parable 
a legend 
an exemplary narrative
a novel 
a verbal cartoon 
a didactic narrative
a fable.
Th e parables of Jesus do not refer to historical events, but they do convey a particu lar message. 
Likewise, the narrative of Jonah does not oﬀ er an accurate description of histori cal events; 
rather, it is a story told for eﬀ ect. Th e author of the narrative relates Jonah’s story to that of an 
ancient charac ter, Jonah-ben-Amittai, who was known to represent a theology of prosperity. 
Th e author then narrates an almost incredible story about this character (Jonah) with the aim 
of surprising the reader.
Th e identiﬁ cation of the genre is an important factor in the interpretation of the book of Jonah 
(as the following example will illustrate). If it is regarded as a prophecy, the book probably has 
a prophetic-universalistic meaning: in this case the book prophesies that salvation is available 
for nations other than Israel. If it is regarded as a fable (that is, a story with a moral lesson), the 
story could serve as a moral appeal to obey the call of prophecy. If it is regarded as a didactic 
narrative, the message could be that Jonah had to learn to under stand Yahweh’s vision on 
grace, election and righteousness. If the story is seen to impart wisdom, it could indicate how 
incomprehensible Yahweh’s ways are to mankind. It would then be foolishness to resist the 
Lord’s incomprehensible ways.
Th e identiﬁ cation of the genre of a biblical text is thus essential to the interpretation of the 
text’s meaning.
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Typical Life Setting
Th e quest for the Sitz im Leben of the narrative is also an important issue. Although the 
context in which the narrative originated is unknown to the modern reader, we know from 
other sources that the book of Jonah was traditionally read at the annual Jewish religious 
feast, the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur). Th e story, therefore, is known to have formed 
part of a ritual context which is concerned with the themes of repentance, confession of sins, 
forgiveness and reconciliation between God and man. Th e psalm of Jonah in 2:2-9 resembles 
other psalms in the biblical book of Psalms, which are associated with cultic contexts. For this 
reason, we could guess that the psalm of Jonah too, functioned as a part of cultic rituals. 
(c) Observations and evaluation
To read a love poem as an inventory, to interpret a legend as a historical record, or to 
understand an obituary as a joke, would, of course, be a misreading. Any reader needs a good 
understanding of the literary form of a text to be able to interpret it adequately. Th e insight 
that literary forms provide the reader with an entrance to the world-behind-the-text, that is, 
the original context of textual production, cannot be overestimated.
Some genres may not function as records of historical events, but this need not detract from 
the truth value, signiﬁ cance or authority of the text. If, in the case of the book of Jonah, it is 
contended that the book did not necessarily reﬂ ect a particular historical event, it does not 
follow that the book should be rejected as worthless (note again, Jesus’ parables). In fact, form 
criti cism helps to establish the literary form, the circumstances in which it functioned, and 
what rhetorical purpose the literary form wishes to achieve with the reader.
Th e deeper insight into the original context of the text as a result of Sitz im Leben-studies, 
allows for the inclusion of the modern context of the reader into the interpretation process. 
Unfortunately, this is an underdeveloped aspect of form criti cism.
4.2.5 Tradition-critical studies
(a) Background and theory
In a sense, historical-critical interpretation moves even further into the past with the tradi tion-
critical approach. Whereas literary criticism identiﬁ es the smaller units and sources that compose 
biblical texts, and form criticism is concerned with the literary forms and the original world 
(or Sitz im Leben) in which they evolved, the tradition-critical approach focuses on the tradi-
tions and trans missions on which the smaller units and sources had been based. Some biblical 
narratives, for example, were orally transmitted over centuries. In every new set of circumstances 
they were suitably adjusted until they were ﬁ nally written down. Th e following form the premises 
of this approach:
According to the tradition-critical approach, the interpreter not only has to deter mine the 
smaller units composing the text, or the literary forms and their Sitz im Leben, but also the 
transmission processes that contributed to the “creation” of the textual material. It is assumed 
that the biblical texts underwent a long process of development. Diﬀ erent gener ations 
appropriated these texts (oral or written) and they were reworked and understood within the 
framework of new circumstances. Th ese transmission processes were repeated until the texts 
ﬁ nally reached a canonical (authoritative) form.
Tradition-critical scholars believe that these transmission processes were guided in Ancient 
Israel by certain central statements and themes of faith regarding their history. Gradually 
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certain narratives (oral or written) were collected around these statements or themes of faith, 
and these collections of stories were transmitted from generation to gener ation. As they were 
transmitted, they were gradually extended, although the central statements and themes of 
Israel’s faith remained the determining factor. Later these narra tives were “standardized” 
and one could refer to them as a particular tradition. Th e origi nal “authors” of the diﬀ erent 
sources composing the biblical text strongly relied on these ﬁ xed traditions which were 
generally known when they wrote their works. Th e following traditions are some of those that 
are normally distinguished:
Creation tradition
Patriarchal tradition
Exodus tradition
Sinai tradition
Desert tradition
Conquest tradition
Zion tradition.
Th e tradition-critical school of interpretation is further interested to know in which circles 
these traditions were transmitted. Some textual material, for example, had its origin in priestly 
circles. Th e Old Testament material normally associated with the P source in particular, was 
transmitted in these priestly circles. Other material was transmitted in Levitical circles (for 
example, the textual material occurring in the book of Deuteronomy). Th ere are indications 
that certain textual material was trans mitted in wisdom and prophetic circles. Tradition-
criticism investigates the history and characteristics of these historical circles or groups 
because this information can improve understanding of the traditions. By means of tradition-
criticism one can identify better with the thoughts and interests of these groups. Th is leads to 
a better understanding of the motives prevalent when certain traditions were transmitted.
It is also important to determine in which geographical areas certain traditions were 
transmitted. In the past scholars have pointed out that Sichem was central to the transmission 
of covenant traditions, while Jerusalem featured strongly in the transmis sion of Zion and 
Davidic traditions. By determining the experiences and memories associ ated with a particular 
place, new perspectives can be opened on the transmitted textual material.
According to the tradition-critical approach, Israel’s history as it is reﬂ ected in the Bible is 
much more than simple history: salvation history would be a more accurate description. 
Th is means that the historical events were not recounted for their histori cal value, but to 
bear witness to Yahweh’s great redemptive deeds among His people, Israel. Th e purpose of 
the description of history should therefore always be a faith dictum concerning Yahweh’s 
communion with His people.
(b) Jonah in the light of a tradition-critical approach 
Th e three major tradition-critical issues in the book of Jonah are:
Th e motif of the miraculous rescue in the ﬁ sh
Although this motif (or elements thereof) occurs in various cultures throughout the world, 
two par ticular parallels are noteworthy. Th ese are the Heracles narrative from Greek literature 
and the Babylonian cosmology which features Tiamat. Because of geographical and tempo ral 
proximity, it is worthwhile to investigate these parallels.
Th e ancient Greeks narrated the story of Heracles who fought a sea monster, but was 
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devoured in the process. Aft er three days and three nights he managed to free himself by 
ﬁ ghting his way out. Interestingly, the Greeks even speciﬁ ed that it was near the harbour 
of Jaﬀ a that Heracles was swallowed by the ﬁ sh. Jaﬀ a is also Jonah's place of departure for 
Tarshish. Th is Greek story was well known in Asia Minor and Syria and was deﬁ nitely 
also told among the seafaring Phoenicians. Th e book of Jonah makes use of quite a 
few maritime terms most probably borrowed from the Phoenicians, and it can thus be 
assumed that the motif of the ﬁ sh probably found its way into the Jewish narrative under 
Phoenician inﬂ uence.
Some scholars see disguised references to the Babylonian cosmology in the book of Jonah. 
In these terms the ﬁ sh would then be a disguised reference to Tiamat, the chaos monster 
that threatens creation. When Jonah remains in the ﬁ sh for three days and three nights, it 
would then refer to the winter time when Tiamat reigned. Th e swallowing and spitting out 
by the ﬁ sh would then represent the annual death and rebirth of the cosmos. It could even 
allude to the primeval struggle of Marduk, the sun god, with Tiamat. If it is assumed that 
the book of Jonah dates to the period of the Babylonian exile, this parallel could provide 
for interesting interpretation. In that case the book of Jonah could be read even as a protest 
document against the Babylo nian religion from a Yahwistic perspective.
We ﬁ nd an interesting variant to the above-mentioned motif in some Jewish docu ments, 
for example, the Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer (a document from the ninth century). In this 
version it is not only Jonah who is rescued from the primeval monster; the ﬁ sh is also 
rescued from the Leviathan as a result of Jonah's interven tion. As in the case of Tiamat, 
the Leviathan was also regarded as a life-threatening monster. Th e rabbi recounted that 
the huge ﬁ sh told Jonah that the day had arrived that he (the ﬁ sh) would be devoured by 
the Leviathan. Jonah then asked the ﬁ sh to take him to the Leviathan. When Jonah showed 
the covenant seal of Abraham to the Leviathan, the latter ﬂ ed. In this way not only Jonah, 
but also the ﬁ sh, was saved from destruction. On their subsequent underwater journey, 
the ﬁ sh showed Jonah the pillars on which the earth rested (Jonah 2:6), as well as the 
underworld of destruction (Jonah 2:2). Although this Jewish interpretation did not play 
any role in the origin of the book of Jonah, this example illustrates how certain motifs can 
be further developed once the text has come into being.
Possible elements of a creation tradition
An important theme in the psalm of Jonah is that of God as creator, in contrast to the 
destructive power of the primeval waters. Genesis 1:2 refers to the tehom, the unformed and 
threatening primeval waters which existed before creation. By means of a spoken word God 
forced back these waters and established His creation. In Jonah 2:5 (2:6 in the Hebrew text) 
it is the tehom, once again, that surrounds and threatens Jonah. Th e use of this word, as well 
as the elaboration of this theme, reminds us strongly of the creation tradition which was well 
known among the people of Israel. Th is tradition had an unique content in contrast to the 
Babylonian cosmology within which Tiamat (see how similar this name is with the Hebrew 
term used in Genesis 1, namely tehom) functions as the primeval monster.
Th ese elements in the psalm of Jonah are supplemented by a remark in Jonah 1:9 where Jonah 
represents himself as someone who serves “the Lord, the God of the heavens, who created the 
sea and the land”. Th e suspicion that a creation tradition played a role in the book of Jonah is 
conﬁ rmed by this reference.
Possible elements of a Zion tradition
Th e psalm of Jonah has two references to the holy temple of the Lord: in 2:4 (2:5) and 2:7 (2:8). 
Th e holy temple is portrayed here as the place where Yahweh is present and where protection 
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against the threatening forces of chaos is to be found. Th is portrayal of the temple also occurs 
in other Old Testament texts which were probably inﬂ uenced by the Zion tradi tion. Psalm 
46:2, for example, portrays Zion as a shelter and protection “even if the earth is shaken and the 
mountains fall into the ocean depths; even if the seas roar and rage, and the hills are shaken 
by the violence.”
(c) Observations and evaluation
Th e major contribution of the tradition-critical approach lies in the fact that it removed the 
form-critical question from the aesthetic-archaic domain to that of the Old Testament faith 
statements and their transmission history. As such, the interpre tation process is extended 
so that interpreters focus not only on literary forms and their background, but also on the 
relationship between Israel’s faith convictions, and the transmission processes of the material 
from which the Old Testament is composed.
Because tradition-criticism delves into the past in order to go back beyond the earliest written 
form of the text, the speculative element unfortunately increases. Although the identiﬁ cation 
of oral traditions makes a major contribution in the quest for adequate inter pretation, these 
traditions remain nothing more than theoretical constructions.
Geographical and temporal proximity are preconditions for the mutual inﬂ uence found in 
parallel motifs and traditions. Th eories that would attempt to relate a motif from the folklore 
of Latin-American Indians to Jewish literature, which is very much older, should be rejected 
at the outset.
4.2.6 Redaction-critical studies
(a) Background and theory
Whereas the literary-critical, form-critical and tradition-critical approaches function analytically, 
the redaction-critical mode of interpretation has a synthesizing purpose. Although this approach 
is based upon the previous three methods, it is concerned primarily with the redaction processes 
that led gradually to the transformation of smaller literary units into greater components, which 
contributed to the ﬁ nal form and composition of biblical books.
A redaction-critical approach is seriously concerned with the diﬀ erent levels of composi tion 
involved in the description of the growing process of biblical texts. A very deﬁ nite distinction is 
made between, for example,
author(s), who are those who wrote texts from scratch;
compositor(s), who are those who synthesized existing texts to create a larger textual unit; 
and 
redactor(s), who are those who (in the same way as newspaper editors) rearranged these 
synthesized materials, added explanatory notes, made small, but signiﬁ cant corrections, 
placed textual material in other contexts to change their intent, and so forth. 
When the evolution of a text is described, the following questions are normally asked: Was 
this text or text passage written from scratch by an original author, or was it composed from 
already existing textual material? Is there evidence of material that was added at a later stage 
as commentary or interpretation and that has become part of the text? What indications do 
these redactional remarks give of the way in which the text as a whole has grown into its current 
form?






Fishing for Jonah (Anew)
44
In this context the introductory questions of dating and authorship are pertinent. Although these 
aspects could, strictly speaking, also be discussed in terms of other historical-critical methods (such 
as tradition-criticism), the synthesizing method of redaction-criticism serves as an appropriate 
framework for discus sion. Knowledge of the historical period and circum stances of each of the 
transmission stadiums (cf. the form-critical and tradition-critical interest in this background), 
is essential to the dating of a biblical book. However, it is also impor tant to establish the time 
and circumstances of origin of the ﬁ nal phase of the trans mission process, which completes the 
compo sition of the book as a whole. Th e historical, geographic and antiquarian information in 
the text could be utilized for this purpose.
A discussion on authorship would also ﬁ t into the framework of redaction-criticism. Th e diﬀ erent 
“levels” of authorship involved in biblical texts (as mentioned above) illus trate something of the 
complexity of the question of authorship. Th e purpose of the quest for authorship is therefore not 
necessarily to identify an author by name (that is very seldom possible, in any case), but rather to 
elucidate the religious, ideological and social circles within which the author(s) functioned.
(b) Jonah in the light of a redaction-critical approach 
A redaction-critical study of the book of Jonah depends wholly on the literary-critical decisions 
that were made earlier. Th e number and extent of smaller textual units distin guished earlier, are 
critical to the redaction process.
Th e only smaller unit that can with reasonable certainty be regarded as a later addition is the 
psalm of Jonah in chapter 2:2-9.
It seems that the author or compositor of the book of Jonah had made use of existing Psalm 
material (probably an individual’s song of grace) in his/her narrative as if it were Jonah’s prayer. It 
is diﬃ  cult to determine at what stage in the development of the narrative the synthesis of textual 
units took place and what factors determined this synthe sis. Allan, in his commentary on the 
book of Jonah (1976:184), gives the following explanation for the insertion of the psalm: 
“Th e psalm would normally be recited at the sanctu ary before the oﬀ ering of a sacri ﬁ ce of 
thanksgiving. Th is present psalm ﬁ ts perfectly into the pattern of the thanks giving songs 
extant in the Psalter. Th e author evidently selected it from the temple repertoire of cultic 
praise as an apt vehicle for his theme. He exercises in an unusual way every believer’s right of 
re-use, whatever his particular circumstances. But in the setting into which he introduces it 
the metaphor of drowning becomes literal, and the ex-victim celebrates his deliverance not 
in the temple but in a ﬁ sh. Th e psalm was chosen because of its appropri ateness to Jonah’s 
situation.”
Th e dating of the book of Jonah remains controversial; the book did not necessarily originate at 
the time of the prophet Jonah-ben-Amittai who is mentioned in 2 Kings 14:25 (approximately 
780 BCE); it is an anonymous literary work and was not neces sarily written by Jonah (as was 
previously advocated in some circles); it diﬀ ers from other prophetic books in that it does not 
include sayings of a prophet, but rather narratives about a prophet named Jonah; and the author(s) 
of the book remains unknown to us.
Th ere are indications in the text that the book originated at a later stage than the time of Jonah-ben-
Amittai. For some scholars, Jonah 3:3 is an indication that the author had only vague memories of 
the city of Nineveh. Nineveh was destroyed in 612 BCE. Consequently, the book must have a later 
dating. Th e in-depth description of the city’s magnitude reﬂ ects a tradition that was common in 
the fourth century BCE. Th e reference to the King of Nineveh (instead of the King of Assyria) also 
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indicates that the author was no longer acquainted with the original circumstances. Th e reﬂ ection 
of certain Persian practices in the book (for example, the reference to domestic animals taking 
part in mourning ceremonies in 3:8) indicates that the book must have been written some time 
during the Persian period (middle of the sixth century to the middle of the fourth century BCE). 
Th e apparent use of passages from Jeremiah 18 and Joel 2 (both appar ently post-exilic) in the last 
two chapters of the book of Jonah further aﬃ  rms a possible post-exilic dating. Although care 
must be taken not to abuse the grammatical argument, various Aramaic loan words in the book 
also strengthen the argument for a late dating.
If we agree to a late dating, the question still remains: How late can the book be dated? A reference 
in the apocryphal wisdom book, Jesus Sirach 49:10 (which had already been completed by 200 
BCE), unmistakably proves that the book of Jonah already existed in about 200 BCE. Aft er careful 
consideration of all arguments, it seems that the ﬁ ft h or fourth century BCE was the most probable 
period of origin. A more precise dating is at this stage impossible.
Of course one would like to know far more about the background of the book. A part of the 
problem is, however, that we know fairly little about the post-exilic period and the religious 
convictions prevalent at the time. 
(c) Observations and evaluation
Redaction-criticism shows the interpretive value of dismantling texts. As an aspect of the 
historical-critical approach, it aims to explain accurately how the ﬁ nal form of the text came 
into being out of all the separate parts that had earlier been distinguished.
Th e redaction-critical approach is therefore an important part of the historical-critical 
approach. Th e ﬁ nal form of the text is the one that has to be inter preted, aft er all. It is necessary, 
therefore, to provide satisfactory explanations of the way the text reached its ﬁ nal form.
A shortcoming of the redaction-critical approach is that its sole purpose is to provide a 
description of the literary process of development of the text, without adequately taking into 
account the theological motivation behind the process. In this respect the canonical criticism 
(see below) makes a useful contribution.
Although it is diﬃ  cult to provide ﬁ nal answers with regard to dating and author ship, it is 
important to determine as accurately as possible the circumstances that prevailed at the time 
of origin of the book. Once the historical circumstances are known, they avoid an unjustiﬁ ed 
interpretation of the text.
4.3 Canonical criticism
4.3.1 Background and theory
Although the historical-critical approaches to the interpretation of biblical texts were pre dominant 
for the greater part of the twentieth century, criticism has been gradually raised against it over 
the past thirty to forty years. Some approaches aimed at improving on the ﬂ aws of historical-
criticism gradually developed, while some totally new approaches saw the light. Th e canonical-
critical approach, closely associated with the American scholar, Brevard S. Childs, represents one 
of these reactions to historical criticism.
Th e canonical criticism criticized the historical-critical approach for its neglect of the process and 
eﬀ ect of the canonization of biblical writings (particularly of the Old Testa ment). Th e process of 
canonization can be deﬁ ned as follows:
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It was an historical process in Ancient Israel (particularly during the post-exilic period) which 
involved the collection, selection and ordering of texts that would function normatively as Holy 
Scripture in the continuing religious community.
Th e canon (or rather its ﬁ nal phase) reﬂ ects a whole series of “theological” decisions that were 
taken by the early communities of faith. Th e premise is still that the biblical text underwent various 
phases of composition and growth, which is why the school of canonical criticism is discussed 
in this chapter, which deals with approaches focusing on the production of texts. However, the 
emphasis in canonical criticism is not so much on the historical process as such, but rather on 
the text which is ﬁ nal product. By giving serious consideration to the ﬁ nal texts produced by the 
canonization process, the critical function it performed in earlier stages of develop ment is also 
taken seriously. Th e canon, which can be seen as the concentration of a whole series of theological 
decisions expressed in the literature of Ancient Israel, has a nor mative function for the evaluation 
of the early stages of the text. Th is then avoids the problem of the neglect of the unique dynamics 
of the religious literature of Israel which is associated with historical criticism, as a result of its 
exaggerated emphasis on history.
4.3.2 Jonah in the light of a canonical-critical approach
Th e canonical-critical approach addresses the following issues:
Th e position of the psalm of Jonah (Jonah 2)
Th e canonical-critical approach accepts that the psalm of Jonah is probably a later addition to 
the rest of the textual material. However, the purpose of this approach is not only to conﬁ rm 
this fact or to describe the process of textual development, but to establish the particular 
emphasis placed on the canonical or ﬁ nal form of the book.
Th e later addition of the psalm of Jonah in chapter 2 brought about a structural change to the 
book as a whole. Chapter 2 now (in its canonical form) forms a parallel with chapter 4. Th e 
interpretation of chapter 4 was therefore drastically aﬀ ected by this addition. Whereas Jonah’s 
bad temper in chapter 4 was caused (before the insertion of chapter 2) by his anxiety about 
the fulﬁ llment of his prophecy against Nineveh, a notable diﬀ erence in interpretation emerges 
aft er the addition to the narrative. Th e newly-formed structural parallelism between chapters 
2 and 4 re-orientates the narrative. Th e issue of divine grace is now incorporated into the 
story. In chapter 2, Jonah is grateful for God’s grace which rescued him by the timely provision 
of the ﬁ sh. In chapter 4, on the other hand, Jonah is angry that God’s grace (in Jonah’s frame 
of reference meant only for Israel) is extended to the heathen city of Nineveh. Th e insertion 
of chapter 2 thus re-orientates the story from a narrative about true or false prophecy to a 
narrative about the limitlessness of divine grace.
Jonah’s relationship to 2 Kings 14:25
Th e canonical form of the book (in which the prophet Jonah features as the main character) 
involuntarily recalls the reference to Jonah-ben-Amittai and, as such, ensures that the narrative 
is not read only against the background of the post-exilic strict orthodox Jewish nationalism. 
Th e suggestion is deliberately made by the canonical form that the events happened in the 
eighth century BCE. Th is ensures that the message of the book is interpreted in a wider 
context, namely that it is concerned with the theological relationship between Israel and the 
nations. Th e book of Jonah would then serve as a critical-prophetic verdict over Israel - in 
exactly the same way as other prophetic voices of the Old Testament.
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Th e inclusion of Jonah among the Minor Prophets
Th e form of the book of Jonah diﬀ ers considerably from that of all the other books of the Minor 
Prophets. Unlike the others, this book is not biographical by nature. Furthermore, apart from 
the short sermon in Nineveh, the book does not include any of Jonah’s prophecies, although 
the story itself constitutes a prophecy. Th e authority of this book is vested in its prophetic 
function, which was “created” by placing it among the books of the Minor Prophets.
Th e relationship between Nahum and Jonah
Th e whole prophecy of Nahum is an oracle of judgment against the city of Nineveh. In its 
canonical form, these prophecies function as dramatic illustrations of the eschatological 
triumph of God over His adversaries. Every generation of suﬀ ering Jews would be encouraged 
by this confession.
Th is canonical-critical interpretation of the book of Nahum illustrates that the focus is not on 
the city of Nineveh as such, but on Nineveh as a symbol of God’s adversaries. Th is reconﬁ rms 
the fact that the main concern in the canonical form of the book of Jonah is also not Nineveh, 
as an historical city, but rather Nineveh as the symbol of God’s grace to the nations. It is 
thus clear that not only the “internal” canonical form of the Old Testament books should be 
considered, but also the interaction between books.
4.3.3 Observations and evaluation
Th e canonical-critical approach to the interpretation of biblical texts has been widely accepted 
in diﬀ erent scholarly circles. Th e re-orientation of this approach towards the ﬁ nal form of the 
text was widely acclaimed as a necessary correction to the excessive emphasis by the historical 
criticism on the earlier stages of the text.
It is laudable that this approach includes in the interpretation process the communi ties of 
faith within which the text was created, and out of which it developed. Because the ﬁ nal text is 
regarded as the end product of a series of religious decisions taken by earlier faith communities, 
the “direction of interpretation” appropriate to a particular text can be uncovered.
Unfortunately the canonical-critical approach was welcomed by fundamentalists who saw in 
it a legitimization of a-historical and anti-historical reading and interpre tation. However, such 
an application of this method amounts to a misunderstanding of its true dynamics. It should 
be clear that this approach functions completely historically, albeit in a diﬀ erent manner from 
historical criticism. It would therefore be a misconception if this approach is equaled to a text-
immanent approach (see the discussion in chapter 5).
4.4 Cultural-anthropological approaches
In recent years there has been a revival in the interest in the world in which biblical texts were 
produced. However, this interest amounts to more than simply dating the text, identifying the 
author, analyzing the phases of redaction and reconstructing the political, economic, social, 
cultural, literary and religious worlds of the historical context. Th e interest has shift ed to the 
analysis of the interaction between the text and the world within which it was produced.
Th e insight was developed that one can only understand ancient texts like the Bible against the 
background of the “discourse” that was current in the particular historical context. One can 
only come to grips with the nuances of a text if one understands the questions to which the 
text provided answers, in terms of the debates of the time. One needs an understanding of the 
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generally accepted views of the time, as some ideas may have been thought of as self-evident and 
thus not even mentioned (although we are no longer aware of them today). Th e text is formed 
within this discourse, in that it either reﬂ ected these views, or it may have deliberately set out to 
make a new contribution to them.
It is important to understand how the text itself was inﬂ uenced (oft en at the unconscious level) by 
contemporary discourses. Th e text can be understood, even explained, as a product of economic, 
social, political and religious factors and processes that ultimately reﬂ ected the interests of speciﬁ c 
groups in the society of that time. Th e texts might at the same time legitimate these ideological 
interests. Seen from this perspective, the Bible did not only have an impact on its world; it was 
itself a product of this world.
Th ere are a number of academic disciplines that study texts like the Bible in this way, understanding 
them as part of the economic, social, cultural and political dynamics within which they originated. 
All these methods accept the same premise, namely that people cannot be understood in isolation 
from the social context within which they live. Sociological approaches generally apply modern 
sociological methods retrospectively to place, and explain texts in terms of social processes in the 
context of that time.
Th ese approaches employ methods primarily developed for the analysis of present day contexts. 
Th ey were only applied to the study of ancient texts at a later stage. Th ese methods can be used to 
study, on the one hand, the interaction between the text and the present-day readers and, on the 
other hand, that between the text and the social world within which it originated. Th us both text 
and present-day context can be studied using the same types of analysis.
It would be possible to apply any one of the above approaches to the interpretation of the book 
of Jonah. For the purpose of this book, we have restricted ourselves to one example. Th is is partly 
because of the paucity of the historical data bearing on the social world within which the book of 
Jonah originated, and partly because the Marxist and feminist approaches, discussed in chapter 
7, overlap with some aspects of the socio-historical approaches. 
4.4.1 Background and theory
(a) Social-Scientiﬁ c criticism
As a discipline for the modern day study of the Bible, social-scientiﬁ c criticism derives its 
name from its close relationship to the main branches of the social sciences, namely cultural 
anthropology, sociology, psychology, economics, and political science. Th ese branches relate in 
diﬀ erent ways to the institutions and functions of human society as well as to the diversity of 
interpersonal human relations within society. Th e study of Jonah in this section draws solely on 
the insights of one branch of the social sciences, namely cultural anthropology. 
As a method contributing to the academic study of the Bible, social-scientiﬁ c criticism is a 
comparative late-comer. Its historical roots may be traced to the sociological studies of Karl 
Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber. In particular, Weber’s study entitled “Ancient Judaism 
near the end of World War 1”, introduced the insights of social science directly to the ﬁ eld of 
biblical studies. Form criticism (see section 4.1.3 above) was, in its original phase, also explicitly 
understood as a sociological method. For example, in his famous commentary on the book of 
Genesis, Hermann Gunkel introduced the concept of Sitz im Leben. Th is concept speciﬁ ed a 
close connection between the forms of oral tradition behind the written biblical texts in Genesis 
and their actual setting and function in the life of the earliest religious communities for whom 
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the stories were ﬁ rst told. Early 20th century socio-historical studies of the Bible became evident 
in the writings of German biblical scholars such as Adolf Deismann, Ernst Lochmyer, Albrecht 
Alt, Martin Noth and Ernst Troeltsch, and among North American scholars associated with the 
Chicago school of interpretation such as Shirley Jackson Case and Shailer Matthews. Yet, the early 
socio-historical interests of these scholars were largely displaced in later years, partly as a result 
of their rejection by European neo-orthodoxy in the 1920s and 1930s and partly because of the 
inherent limitations of sociological and anthropological data on which such research was based 
at the time. 
However, in the last two decades or so, the social sciences have re-surfaced in the ﬁ eld of biblical 
criticism, albeit in new and innovative ways. Biblical scholars who use the method of social-
scientiﬁ c criticism are no longer satisﬁ ed with the older discoveries and insights which other 
traditional methods of biblical criticism have provided (such as questions of date, authorship, 
audience, historical background, and the structure, form or redaction of texts). Instead, social-
scientiﬁ c criticism stresses the indispensable signiﬁ cance of analyzing the interaction between 
the biblical text and the ancient socio-cultural world in which it was ﬁ rst produced.
While no simple explanation for the rise of the social-scientiﬁ c criticism of the Bible in fact exists, 
some of the following factors have certainly contributed to its emergence in the ﬁ eld of Biblical 
studies during the nineteenth century and since:
Th e period of the eighteenth century was a period of rapid social change throughout most 
of European society. Contributing factors included, for example, the onset of the industrial 
revolution and the rise of the middle class as a decisive force in the political and economic 
aﬀ airs of life. Popular attention became increasingly attuned to social, political and economic 
problems and their possible redress. More and more academics shift ed their interests from 
social theory to the study of living societies in search of solutions to the escalating and 
traumatic events that were being experienced.
Enlightenment philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries asserted the primacy 
of reason over revelation and faith. What was traditionally accepted in the Bible as virtually 
unquestionable in terms of form and content and as an authoritative record of the past was 
now subjected to historical inquiry. Th is new found freedom intensiﬁ ed scholarly frustration 
with more traditional techniques of biblical interpretation and their inability to bring the 
ancient biblical texts to life. Increasingly, biblical research turned towards alternative ﬁ elds of 
research in the natural and social sciences.
Th e intellectual ferment of the nineteenth century also generated strong interdisciplinary 
interests. Most inﬂ uential in this regard were the numerous archaeological discoveries and 
the increasing availability of extra-biblical data for the study of the Bible. In particular, the 
discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls in 1947 led biblical scholars to ask more concrete social 
questions regarding their sources. For example, how was the apocalyptic spirit reﬂ ected 
in these scrolls related to that of late-Jewish prophetic and early Christian literature? Here 
biblical scholars drew increasingly on the social sciences which were already seeking answers 
to a variety of questions involving social relations.
Recent decades have produced a renewed and inescapable rise to prominence of a variety 
of social issues and conﬂ icts in world history. For example, the civil rights movement in the 
USA in the 1960s, and the agenda of oppressed social groups such as women, black people, 
or marginalized classes in societies across the USA and other contexts of the “Two-Th irds 
World” (Latin America, Asia, Africa) drew forth new interest in the social and cultural world 
of biblical history and literature. Th e result has been a veritable explosion of literature in the 
ﬁ eld of biblical scholarship.
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Before we say more about cultural anthropology as a critical method for the interpretation of the 
Bible and apply this method to an interpretation of the book of Jonah, we should recognize that 
the roots of social-scientiﬁ c criticism are closely aligned to historical-critical or those readings of 
the Bible that take their point of departure in the world of production of the texts (see 4.1 above). 
But the question of whether the methods of social-scientiﬁ c criticism are essentially similar to the 
earlier historical-critical methods, or whether they are fundamentally diﬀ erent needs to be asked. 
Th e answer to this question is both “yes” and “no”. 
In the ﬁ rst instance we must say “yes”. Like historical-critical approaches, social-scientiﬁ c criticism 
assumes the strangeness or foreign nature of the biblical world and texts when viewed from the 
perspective of twentieth century readers or interpreters. Th is problem is essentially one which 
confronts modern and post-modern readers of the ancient texts of the Bible. Contemporary 
readers of the Bible no longer share the time, space, customs, values, worldviews, cultural 
knowledge, language, social structures and systems, political order, economy, and mobility of its 
original audience or readers. 
But we must also say “no”. Social-scientiﬁ c criticism is diﬀ erent from historical-critical methods 
in that it insists that biblical texts are not merely historical ideas, but also social and cultural 
productions. We may sum up some further diﬀ erences between historical-criticism and social-
scientiﬁ c criticism as follows:
Historical criticism Social scientiﬁ c criticism
oﬀ ers greater focus on the theological and 
historical ideas of key biblical personalities (for 
example, Moses, David, Jesus, Paul), events 
(for example, the exodus, the monarchy, the 
Jesus movement, the Pauline mission) or 
institutions (such as the Temple, the church)
focuses more intently on the social and 
cultural context in which biblical ideas, 
personalities, events, and institutions arise 
and to which they constitute a response
emphasizes the historical development of ideas 
or doctrines (such as the Law, justiﬁ cation by 
faith)
attends to the social and cultural formation of 
ideas and doctrines
sees conﬂ ict in the realm of explicit ideas 
(such as that between Israelite and Canaanite 
religion, or that between Jesus and his 
opponents)
understands conﬂ ict as a reﬂ ection of, and a 
response to, social and cultural factors (such 
as the socio-economic conditions in Canaan 
or in ﬁ rst century Palestine)
stresses diﬀ erences which occur in human 
societies and the particular changes which take 
place in each society over time
stresses the typical, repeated patterns of social 
interaction of a given group of human beings 
in a speciﬁ c time and place. It considers 
social contexts (such as the family, politics, 
the city, or the countryside), and systems of 
social values (such as honour-shame, purity-
pollution)
tends to conceptualize history in a manner 
that is implicit, arbitrary and unsystematic
tends to conceive of history in an explicit and 
systematic manner
is more interested in asking such questions 
as “when?”, “what?”, “where?” and “who?” 
concerning beliefs, doctrines, and experiences.
is more interested in asking questions such 
as “how?” and “why?” concerning beliefs, 
doctrines, and experiences.
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Th e above comparison is not only meant to accentuate the distinctiveness of each approach, but 
also to show how each approach may complement the other. For example, where the historian 
may have to understand the political and religious history of ancient Israel from the available 
data (which may be, for example, textual and archaeological), the social scientist will provide a 
systematic attempt to sift  through this data and ask speciﬁ c questions about the daily life of human 
beings in that society. Th ese questions would concern their complex interactions, behaviour 
patterns, values, worldview, socio-political and economic relations and structures. 
What is needed, then, is an approach to the Bible which makes possible an imaginative 
reconstruction of the world inhabited by the original audiences and readers of biblical texts. 
But more than this, an approach is also needed to help reconstruct the social and cultural 
structures, processes, and the forces at work in the ancient world in which the biblical texts and 
ideas originated. Social-scientiﬁ c criticism is one approach which helps to make both aspects 
of “historical reconstruction” and “social-cultural reconstruction” possible. And on both these 
counts, the method of cultural anthropology in particular provides descriptions and explanations 
of the ancient world of the Bible (the world of Jonah or Jesus, for example) and oﬀ ers a description 
of appropriate cultural scenarios for interpreting texts from such a society. 
(b) Cultural Anthropology
Culture is that which shapes the way people determine and discover meaning in their lives. 
Cultural anthropologists who study diﬀ erent cultures usually speak of culture in terms of the 
customs, language, values, beliefs, economy, political systems, ethos, and worldview of a group of 
people in a particular time and place. Culture is embodied in symbols (which may take the form 
of words, images, objects or actions) which represent the life experiences of the particular group 
of people. Th ese symbols help people within the culture to make sense of their experiences and 
allow them to communicate meaningfully with one another. 
For example, the South African ﬂ ag has since 1994 become a symbol of a new South Africa and 
testiﬁ es to a new way of life in which the racial discrimination of the old apartheid order can have 
no place. People within the South African context immediately understand the meaning of the 
new South African ﬂ ag, and either accept or reject what it stands for. People from another country 
may not appreciate the signiﬁ cance of this symbol unless someone takes the time to explain the 
meaning it has for South Africans. Cultural anthropology performs a similar function. It helps 
to explain how diﬀ erent cultures work, permitting people from one culture to understand what 
gives meaning to the lives of other people from another culture. 
As an approach to the Bible, the method of cultural anthropology is designed to help contemporary 
readers to hear and understand the meaning of biblical texts in terms of the cultural contexts in 
which they were originally proclaimed or written. Our contemporary cultures are usually quite 
diﬀ erent from the ancient near eastern Mediterranean cultural environment in which the Bible 
ﬁ rst emerged. For example, contemporary readers of the Bible usually share many of the core 
cultural values of modern, Western industrial society such as individualism, freedom of choice, 
progress and competition. However, these cultural values held no meaning for people living in 
the ancient Mediterranean and pre-industrial society in which the Bible was written. Cultural 
anthropology has helped biblical scholars to recognize the relevant core-cultural values. Th ese 
are the values which proponents of the cultural anthropological approach attempt to introduce to 
the process of biblical interpretation. 
A brief contrast between some cultural values of a modern Western society and those of ancient 
near eastern Mediterranean society illustrates some of the diﬀ erences which exist between these 
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two cultural worlds. For example, in contrast to the strong stress on individual freedom in 
modern Western society, people in the ancient Mediterranean world understood their identity 
as derived from group participation and conformity. Where modern society usually stresses the 
unlimited acquisition of economic wealth and goods, ancient society assumed that all goods were 
in short and limited supply. Where modern society builds on values of “getting ahead” in life even 
at the expense of others, most people in ancient peasant cultures would have stressed values of 
honour (see the discussion below) and viewed intense competitiveness as both dishonourable 
and destructive of the social order. But more of this later! 
For the moment, let us try to understand something of how biblical scholars go about using 
cultural anthropology for the critical study of the Bible. How do they make possible a cross-
cultural reading of the Bible? Perhaps the important observation here is how biblical scholars 
make use of models of socio-cultural analysis which they derive from the discipline of cultural 
anthropology. Th e following deﬁ nition of a “model” will demonstrate the sense in which the term 
is oft en used by these biblical scholars: 
Models deal with such matters as kinship systems, power relations, rituals, economics, and so on. 
A model is a simpliﬁ ed description of like events or interactions drawn from the study of many 
cultures and groups. Models are not a tool to research historical information. Rather, they aid in 
the process of interpretation. Models help to overcome ethnocentrism by providing a framework 
diﬀ erent from our own cultural maps with which to organize and assess information. Th e point 
of using a model is not to ﬁ t facts into an abstract paradigm. Rather, a model serves as a heuristic 
device to probe and to question, to notice details we might have ignored, and to see connections 
that explain dynamics and relationships. In short, models of interpretation function as tools of 
analysis which help to bridge the cultural gap between the world of the Bible and the world of the 
modern day interpreter. By virtue of their cross-cultural nature, models help to make possible a 
more truly cross-cultural encounter with the biblical text and its world.
Cultural anthropology provides three main kinds of models for the study of societies or groups. 
Bruce Malina, a leading biblical scholar in the ﬁ eld of the cultural-anthropological approach to 
the New Testament, provides an expanded discussion on these three kinds of models.
Structural-functionalist models focus on the ways in which diﬀ erent societies maintain 
stability and create a balance when new social forces or elements are introduced into the 
cultural system. Th e stress here is on how society preserves the status quo. 
Conﬂ ict models seek to understand the dynamics of internal struggles, tensions and conﬂ icts 
among diﬀ erent parts of a society. 
Symbolic models seek to discern the symbolic meanings that people of a particular society 
share and how these symbols change within the context of social interactions within a 
culture.
A particular biblical scholar may have a preference for one or other of these three major types 
of models. S/he could use a combination of these models when interpreting texts just as easily. 
Th e point to realize here is that each set of models will help the modern interpreter to explore 
the meaning of diﬀ erent elements of the biblical texts within their original cultural context and, 
hopefully, permit for a better sense of their earliest cultural meanings. 
Our study of the book of Jonah will draw on two kinds of symbolic models, namely those of 
honour-shame and purity-pollution. Both models build on core-cultural values which may 
prove helpful for understanding the cultural or symbolic world in which the book of Jonah was 



53
Chapter 4
originally written and proclaimed. Let us describe some main features of each these two models 
before we attempt to use them in our analysis of the book of Jonah.
Th e model of honour-shame
Honour is a claim to worth that is publicly acknowledged by a broader group or community. 
To “have honour” or to “be honoured” in a culture is to be publicly acclaimed. Th e opposite 
of “honour” is “shame”. To “have shame” or to “be shamed” is to be denied worth publicly. 
Although to “be shamed” is always a negative thing, to “have shame” is always positive, for it 
means a deep concern about one’s honour.
Th ere exist two kinds of honour. Th e ﬁ rst is called ascribed honour. Th is is the honour into 
which a person is born and is passively received rather than something which is obtained. Th is 
kind of honour is derived from the social group or family to which the person belongs. Th e 
genealogies within the Bible (as in 1 Chronicles 1-10; Matthew 1 and Luke 3) help to aﬃ  rm 
the honourable status of a person which is inherited from their honoured ancestors. In this 
sense, Israel itself could claim honour, because of its special relationship to God established 
through its covenant with him (Isaiah 43:1-7). Likewise, Israel declared that God was on the 
side of its people and against those who did not belong to this community (Psalm 44:1-8). 
Should Israel experience national defeat in battle, for example, this would bring shame upon 
the nation, indicating that God had abandoned it. In such situations, Israel would experience 
a crisis of identity and would question either its own integrity before God (Psalm 44:17-22), 
or God’s continuing covenant with Israel (Psalm 44:9-16), or both (Isaiah 59:1-19). Very oft en 
prophets pointed out that Israel’s shame is caused by Israel’s sin which incurs God’s displeasure 
(Isaiah 2:6-3:26; Ezekiel 16:36-54; Hosea 2:10; Nahum 3:5). 
Th e second kind of honour is acquired honour. Th is is the honour which a person or group 
in a particular culture achieves or earns by responding to some form of challenge. David, for 
example, acquires great honour among the people of Israel through his defeat of Goliath, the 
Philistine leader (1 Samuel 18:7; 29:5; see also 1 Samuel 17). But David also “loses honour” 
and is shamed when, for example, he is rebuked by Nathan, the prophet of the Lord, for his 
adultery with Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah, and for his plot to have Uriah killed in battle (2 
Samuel 11-12).
Th e model of purity-pollution
“Purity” or “holiness” is another core cultural value of the ancient biblical world which has 
been identiﬁ ed by cultural anthropologists. Especially important in this regard has been the 
work of British social anthropologist, Mary Douglas. Her writings on the subject have been 
adapted and widely used for the purposes of a cultural-anthropological interpretation of 
biblical texts. A basic concept which underscores Douglas’s articulation of the purity-pollution 
system is that of “dirt”. “Dirt” is deﬁ ned “as matter out of place”. She illustrates what she means 
by “dirt” in the following way: 
Shoes are not dirty of themselves, but it is dirty to place them on the dining-room table; food 
is not dirty in itself, but it is dirty to leave cooking utensils in the bedroom, or food bespattered 
on clothing; similarly, it is dirty to place bathroom equipment in the drawing room, to leave 
clothing lying on chairs, to bring out-door things in-doors or upstairs things downstairs, to 
wear under-clothing where over-clothing should be, and so on.
Th e rules which govern how a society deﬁ nes what is or is not “dirt” constitute the purity-
pollution systems of that society. Purity and pollution, therefore, refer to the “boundary 
systems” or “cultural maps” of places, people, things and times that serve to organize the lives 
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of the people in a particular society. Th ey deﬁ ne what or who are clean or unclean, holy or 
unholy, insiders or outsiders within a particular culture.
Within the ancient eastern Mediterranean world, every Israelite or Jew would have been 
familiar with the following cultural map of places which deﬁ ned the boundary lines in 
ascending order of purity or holiness: 
Th e land of Israel is holier than any other land
Th e walled cities of Israel are still more holy
Th e space within the walls of Jerusalem is still more holy 
Th e temple mount is still more holy 
Th e rampart is still more holy 
Th e court of the women is still more holy 
Th e court of the Israelites is still more holy 
Th e court of the priests is still more holy
Between the porch and altar is still more holy
Th e Holy of Holies is still more holy.
Within this classiﬁ cation system, the Holy of Holies is where God resides on earth and 
designates the inner and most sacred sanctuary of the Temple. Jews protected this sanctuary, 
oft en with their own lives. Signiﬁ cantly, the territory of the gentile (non-Jewish) nations 
lie completely outside this cultural map of places, and is considered unholy or unclean. 
Ordinarily, Jews avoided contact with Gentiles because they were considered ritually impure, 
immoral and idolatrous.
In a similar way, a hierarchy of people organized Jewish life in a descending order of holiness 
or “purity”, as follows: 
Th e High priest 
Priests 
Levites 
Israelites 
Converts 
Freed slaves 
Disqualiﬁ ed priests 
Temple slaves 
Bastards 
Eunuchs 
Others with physical deformities.
A close relationship exists between the “purity maps” of places and of people. For example, 
only the high priest is permitted entry into the Holy of Holies, only priests and Levites can 
enter the court of the priests, and so on. However, Gentiles are excluded from any place within 
the Israelite scheme of holiness. Gentiles are outsiders because they are considered impure or 
polluted.
Other cultural maps of purity-pollution also set ﬁ rm boundaries for Israelites or Jews. Th ere 
were those whom they could marry, persons whom they were to avoid contact with to prevent 
being polluted (such as lepers, the corpses of animals or human beings, the demon-possessed), 
and holy times when they were to refrain from certain behaviours, such as work, in order to 
prevent deﬁ lement (as on Sabbath days or the Passover festival). 
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In short, then, purity or holiness was a core-cultural value of the ancient Mediterranean 
society and formed an important basis for the structuring and classifying of everything within 
that society - people, places, things, and times. Within the ancient Israelite or Jewish society 
there would have been various groups who would have understood the meaning of purity and 
pollution in diﬀ erent ways. However, cultural anthropology suggests that they would all have 
agreed on the importance of the purity-pollution system. 
We must now turn to the book of Jonah and attempt to apply some of the insights we have gained 
from our analysis of the two models of cultural anthropology.
4.4.2 Jonah in the light of cultural anthropology
Little direct information regarding the historical, social and cultural world of the book of Jonah 
is available to us today. Th e Old Testament scholar, Norman Gottwald, places Jonah among three 
independent biblical short stories which include Ruth, Jonah and Esther. Th ese three books 
constitute a genre of the novella (or “novellette”) which appears frequently in the literary history 
of biblical Israel. Th ese stories typically invoke fairy tales, legends, myth and heroic ﬁ gures, and 
are decidedly vague, even disinterested, in precise historical and socio-cultural details. In short, 
then, the socio-historical setting of Jonah remains problematic. Its location within the archaic 
setting of Assyrian domination is more closely linked to a literary convention of the writer of 
Jonah (who attempts to give the story a “classical” appeal) than it is a comment on the actual 
socio-historical context of the book. Having said this, the accepted view of most biblical scholars 
that the book of Jonah was written sometime around the sixth to fourth centuries BCE forms the 
basis of the further analysis. 
In the light of the lack of clear socio-historical data which emerges in the story of Jonah, we may 
well ask whether a cultural anthropological reading is at all possible. Clearly, a detailed socio-
historical reconstruction of the book is diﬃ  cult, even impossible. Yet a cultural-anthropological 
approach may be useful if we focus deliberately on the narrative world of the text. In other words, 
we are interested to explore just how valuable cultural anthropology may be as a tool for better 
appreciating the story-world of Jonah from the perspective of its ancient audience. In order to 
illustrate this, we shall limit ourselves to the two models described earlier, namely honour-shame 
and purity-pollution. 
Honour and shame in the book of Jonah
Firstly, then, how may the model of honour-shame illuminate the narrative world of Jonah? 
Underlying the story of Jonah is the dominant national consciousness and assumption that 
the Jewish nation, Israel, alone has been chosen by God and has a place of “ascribed honour”. 
Th e Assyrians and the city of Nineveh, by sharp contrast, are symbolic of “shame” itself which 
were associated with all Gentile nations. And so the narrative begins with the Lord’s word to 
Jonah: “Go at once to Nineveh, that great city, and cry out against it; for their wickedness has 
come up before me” (1:2). 
Th e ascribed honour that the Jewish nation enjoys has world-renown, extending even to 
Gentile sailors on a ship bound for Tarshish. And so Jonah can claim his own identity in terms 
of this honour status: “I am a Hebrew ... I worship the Lord, the God of heaven, who made the 
sea and the dry land” (1:9).
In response, the sailors are described as “even more afraid” when they learn of this (1:10), 
and are described as praying to the Lord (1:14) and even sacriﬁ cing and making vows to the 
Lord (1:16). Both were customary cultural attempts to earn the honour of the gods and to 
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avoid their judgement, although the narrative of Jonah indicates that it is their obedience to 
the Lord’s will by throwing Jonah overboard that actually calms the sea and spares their lives 
(1:15). Later, it is the repentance of the people of Nineveh and their obedience to the Lord’s 
prophet that reverses their status of “shame” and acquires for them an “honoured” state which 
results in their deliverance rather than judgement from the Lord (3:5-10).
Jonah, however, feels “shamed” before the Gentiles and his own Jewish community because 
his prophecy of judgement on Nineveh is not fulﬁ lled. His prophetic word is: “Forty days 
more, and Nineveh shall be overthrown” (3:4).
Jonah would have felt “honoured” if his word of judgement on Nineveh came true. Aft er all, 
one common tradition in the ancient world was that a true prophet was recognized when 
his or her words came true (see Jeremiah 27-28). In view of Nineveh’s deliverance, therefore, 
Jonah felt he had been “shamed”, and made the equal of a false prophet. His response is one of 
extreme displeasure and anger towards the Lord (4:1-4). For him, nothing less than death will 
free him from this shame he feels (4:3), unless, of course, the city is indeed destroyed. And 
so Jonah waits and hopes that the city of Nineveh will be destroyed, for this alone, it seems to 
him, will vindicate his honour as a prophet of the Lord (4:5). 
Perhaps it is more signiﬁ cant how a cultural anthropological reading of Jonah allows us to 
see the manner in which the meaning of “honour” and “shame” is radically redeﬁ ned and 
reinterpreted by the narrative within its ancient setting. Even though this system of value 
was typical of ancient eastern Mediterranean society, its application could not be prejudged 
when God’s grace (“special favour”) was at work in the world. True prophetic understanding 
and mission derived from obedience to God’s will and a full acceptance of God’s mercy and 
love for all peoples, including a Gentile nation as notorious as the Assyrians. Jonah’s narrative 
of “honour” and then “shame” would have cautioned the Jewish nation against a too easy 
presumption on their “ascribed honour” as the only criterion for understanding God’s actions 
of grace and mercy in the world. 
Purity and pollution in the book of Jonah
Th e second model or system of core cultural values which may be applied brieﬂ y to the book 
of Jonah is that of purity-pollution. Th e narrative of Jonah makes striking contrasts between 
places of purity and impurity. For example, “[in] the presence of the Lord” is contrasted to 
“away from the presence of the Lord” (1:3,10). Th e “holy temple” (2:4,7), the symbol of God’s 
holiness is contrasted with “the belly of Sheol” (2:2) or “the Pit” (2:6) which are both places 
which symbolize death and deﬁ lement (e.g. Psalm 9:12; 28:1; Job 33:22). In his desperate 
situation, Jonah wonders if his crossing the boundaries of purity has taken him away from 
God’s holy presence forever. He prays: “I am driven away from your sight; how shall I look 
again upon your holy temple?” (2:4).
Jonah is also in contact with persons who deﬁ le or make him impure, such as the sailors who 
worship other gods and are obviously Gentiles who are excluded from the purity system of 
Jews of the day (2:4-6). Th is, then, raises questions about the narrative. Why does Jonah put 
himself in danger of deﬁ lement, as a member of a Jewish community with values rooted in 
a well-deﬁ ned purity system which would normally have prohibited close contact with non-
Jews. What might the story of Jonah be teaching about the meaning of purity in relation 
to non-Jewish persons within the cultural context in which it was originally written and 
proclaimed? 
From the start, the narrative would have surprised its earliest audience. Notwithstanding the 
normative values of purity or holiness in the Jewish community, the Lord Himself commands 
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Jonah to cross the boundaries into the Gentile territory of the Ninevites (1:2)! In our discussion 
of the values of honour-shame, we already noted how the Ninevites represented all that was 
culturally outside the strict circles of Jewish nationalism. Th e critical question again arises of 
whether or not Jonah will conform to the prescribed behaviour of the orthodox Judaism of 
his day, rather than risk deﬁ lement of contact with Gentiles, even in obedience to God’s word, 
and with an acceptance of God’s grace at work in the world of the day? Th is appears to be the 
central problem with which the narrative wrestles and confronts its earliest audience. 
Th e narrative appears to be a suggestive response to the critical questions which it raises 
itself. Th e challenge is that the one no less than the gracious and merciful God of the Jews 
redraws the boundary lines of what is pure or impure, clean or unclean, holy or unholy. Even 
the notorious Ninevites are now embraced within the circle of God’s love and forgiveness. 
In such a situation, ritual acts take a secondary place, and moral behaviour or right actions 
are more valued by God (3:10). Th e narrative suggests that Jews of the day should reject the 
exclusivity of Jewish nationalism which rivalled God for their allegiance within their cultural 
setting. Th rough the character of Jonah, the critical challenge posed by the narrative shift s 
to the broader Jewish community. Will they restrict themselves to a strict and exclusive 
Jewish nationalism and its prejudices or will they embrace a more open, inclusive approach 
to the world? Th e narrative makes a strong case for the latter, even though it hints at a rather 
ambivalent response within its original context (see 4:1-11). 
4.4.3 Observations and Evaluation
Without doubt, cultural anthropology has contributed much to biblical scholarship in recent 
decades. Despite some of its own limitations, the approach of cultural anthropology has provided 
exciting new questions, methods and models for reading and interpreting the Bible in the context 
of its ancient world. 
A cultural-anthropological approach helps modern interpreters to explore the world in 
which the Bible was produced in more creative and critical ways. It helps biblical scholars 
to reconstruct a fuller picture of the ancient world of the Bible by giving special attention to 
its cultural situation. Instead of falling easy prey to ethnocentric interpretations of the Bible 
which impose modern cultural values on the text, readers are encouraged to see afresh how 
the people of the ancient world could have thought, felt, acted, and communicated. 
Cultural-anthropological approaches do not dispense with, but rather complement and 
deepen the capacity of other approaches to the Bible. For example, traditional theological 
questions (such as those regarding God, Israel, salvation, and repentance) are rooted more 
deeply in the socio-cultural contexts of the ancient writers and audiences, rather than treated 
as abstract “ideas” separated from these contexts. Th erefore, cultural anthropology oﬀ ers a 
more holistic and situated approach to theological interpretation.
Models drawn from cultural anthropology enable scholars to demonstrate how important 
and useful a cross-disciplinary approach can be in the interpretation of the Bible. In this way 
the door opens up for greater conversation and collaboration among exegetes, historians, 
archaeologists, social scientists, classicists and ultimately the contemporary Bible reader.
Cultural-anthropological readings of biblical texts are at risk of becoming too reductionist. 
In other words, the meaning of theological beliefs and ideas in a book such as Jonah can too 
easily be seen as being determined by the socio-cultural systems in which they arose, rather 
than as integral, and determining, elements of these social systems. 
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In its preference for “the world behind the text”, cultural-anthropological approaches to the 
Bible may actually neglect or even ignore the creative meanings which the text itself contains 
and the meanings which are opened up by readings focusing on the reception of texts. Th is 
may be particularly true in the case of Jonah which, as a story, may be more suited to literary 
than historical or socio-cultural analysis. 
Cultural-anthropological methods and models are oft en developed and used to make the 
Bible more intelligible and meaningful to contemporary Western interpreters, especially in 
societies in North America and Europe. Th eir heuristic value and utility for non-Western 
interpreters of the “Two-Th irds World” are less tested in present debates. Consequently, the 
question may well be raised whether traditional African and rural cultures may not be far 
closer to the world of the original biblical writers and audiences, and whether they might not 
provide valuable insights in the process of biblical interpretation.
4.5 Socio-rhetorical criticism
4.5.1 Background and theory
In the summary at the beginning of this chapter it was stated that socio-rhetorical criticism does 
not focus exclusively on those aspects that concern the production of texts. Rather, this approach 
involves a multiplicity of view points on texts in order to integrate these insights, and it could just 
as well have been discussed in chapter 5 (Approaches focusing on the texts themselves) or chapter 
6 (Approaches focusing on the reception of texts) of this guide. 
Th e development of this approach by the New Testament scholar Vernon Robbins can be 
traced back to his reaction against and criticism of the exclusive use of exegetical methods for 
interpretation. According to Robbins, the result is too limited when biblical texts are interpreted 
by means of a single method. Th e “intricately woven tapestry” of texts that contains complex 
patterns and images cannot be viewed properly from only one angle. Diﬀ erent angles are needed 
to enable the interpreter to bring the multiple textures of the texts into view. Th is method 
reﬂ ects the latest development in exegetical scholarship towards holistic or multi-dimensional 
interpretation. Th is development will be discussed again in chapter 8 where the current situation 
in exegetical scholarship will be presented.
Th e preﬁ x “socio-” in the term “socio-rhetorical” indicates that this approach has the intention 
of bringing to the interpretation of biblical texts the rich resources of modern anthropology and 
sociology. As has been indicated in the previous section of this chapter, these resources have been 
used increasingly for biblical interpretation during the last half of the twentieth century. Socio-
rhetorical criticism uses these resources not only for an analysis of the current contexts of textual 
reception, but also for unravelling the contexts of textual production.
Th e term “rhetorical” refers to the way language is a means of communication between people. 
It foregrounds the textual techniques used to present thought, speech, stories, and arguments. In 
the last decades of the twentieth century biblical scholars have shown an increasing interest in 
rhetorical approaches to biblical interpretation. (Th is development will be discussed in chapter 6 
again.) Socio-rhetorical criticism is thus interested in studying the ways people use language to 
construct texts, but also wants to integrate this aspect with an analysis of the ways in which people 
live in the world (both ancient and contemporary).
Texts, including biblical texts, are approached by socio-rhetorical criticism as though they were 
“thickly textured tapestries”. Th is metaphor acknowledges the multifaceted nature of texts. 
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Exegetical strategies are chosen that can highlight these facets or dimensions as clearly as possible. 
Th e presupposition is therefore that diﬀ erent interpretative angles are needed in order to bring 
the multiple textures of the text into view. Socio-rhetorical criticism, as formulated by Robbins, 
therefore considers ﬁ ve diﬀ erent angles from which to explore multiple textures within texts:
(a) Inner texture
Th e analysis of the inner texture of texts focuses on the textual structure itself (or “getting inside 
a text” as Robbins puts it), and could just as well have been discussed in chapter 5. However, 
because it forms part of socio-rhetorical criticism, it is presented here. Inner texture is the texture 
of the medium of communication. With written texts, the inner texture especially resides in 
verbal texture – the texture of the language itself. Th e interpreter who undertakes this aspect of 
textual analysis does not deal with “meaning” or “interpretation” as such, but instead develops an 
intimate knowledge of words, word patterns, voices, structures, devices, and modes in the text. In 
the analysis the following are normally identiﬁ ed:
Repetitive texture: Th e repetition of words or phrases in a text reveals how the text is structured 
to shape its dominant themes and concerns.
Progressive texture: Th is aspect of the text concerns the movements that are created by means 
of sequences of words and phrases throughout the textual unit.
Narrative texture: Th is refers to the way in which the narrative develops and progresses.
Opening-Middle-Closing texture: Th is refers to the structuring or staging of a discourse in 
the text. It normally operates together with the previous three aspects.
Argumentative texture: Th e texture of the argument involves the multiple kinds of reasoning 
present in the in order to establish some eﬀ ect.
Sensory-aesthetic texture: Th is aspect resides in the range of sensory experiences evoked 
by the text (thought, emotion, sight, sound, touch, smell) and the way in which it does so 
(through reason, intuition, imagination, humour, etc).
(b) Intertexture
By examining the intertexture of texts the interpreter enters the interactive world of a text. 
Intertexture is a text’s representation of, reference to, and use of phenomena in the “world” 
outside the text. In other words, the intertexture of a text is the interaction of the language in 
the text with physical “objects”, historical events, texts, customs, values, roles, institutions, and 
systems. Intertexture, therefore, deals with the production of the texts; it examines the interaction 
between textual formation and the world in which this formation takes place. However, one should 
acknowledge that the analysis of the intertexture does not examine the “outside” phenomena itself, 
but rather the conﬁ guration of these phenomena (as Robbins calls it) by the text in a particular 
language environment. A major goal of intertextural analysis is therefore to ascertain the nature 
and result of processes of conﬁ guration and re-conﬁ guration of phenomena in the world outside 
the text.
Intertextural analysis normally deals with the following aspects of texts:
Oral-scribal intertexture: Th is deals with the ways in which texts, either explicitly or implicitly, 
use other texts. Five basic modes in which texts use other texts are distinguished: recitation, 
recontextualization, reconﬁ guration, narrative ampliﬁ cation, and thematic elaboration.
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Cultural intertexture: Texts also have an interactive relation to cultures of various kinds. 
Cultural knowledge, being “insider knowledge” either learnt by being part of a particular 
culture or through some kind of interaction with members of it, is reﬂ ected in various ways 
in texts. Such knowledge appears in word and concept patterns and conﬁ gurations, in values, 
scripts, codes, systems or myths, either by means of reference (a word or phrase points 
explicitly to a tradition known to people on the basis of tradition), allusion (statements that 
presuppose a tradition without directly and explicitly citing it) or echo (subtle and indirect 
references that evoke, or potentially evoke a concept from cultural tradition).
Social intertexture: Social knowledge is commonly held by all persons of a region, no matter 
what their particular cultural location may be. One obtains such knowledge by observing 
the behaviour and material objects produced by other people. Social knowledge includes the 
following: social roles or identities, social institutions, social codes and social relationships. 
Research in social phenomena outside the text therefore sheds important light on the nature 
of the social intertexture of that text.
Historical intertexture: Th is refers to events that have occurred at speciﬁ c times in speciﬁ c 
locations. Because the widely held meaning of the word “historical”, which includes social and 
cultural phenomena, can lead to imprecision, the term is used in socio-rhetorical criticism with 
speciﬁ c reference to events, without denying that these events stood in intimate interaction 
with social, cultural and ideological phenomena. 
(c) Social and cultural texture
Robbins warns that social and cultural texture should not be confused with social and cultural 
intertexture. Social and cultural texture concerns the capacities of the text to support social 
reform, withdrawal, or opposition and to evoke cultural perceptions of dominance, subordinance, 
diﬀ erence, or exclusion. Analysis and interpretation of the social and cultural texture of a text 
explores the range of social orientations and locations in the discourse and the manner in which 
it relates these orientations and locations to one another. Th e following distinctions are normally 
made:
Speciﬁ c social topics: Th ese are themes or arguments within the text that may lead to change 
in social practices, either by challenging and re-creating the social order, or by allowing the 
reader to withdraw from present society in order to create an alternative social world, or by 
transforming his or her perceptions of society as a creative response to its challenges. 
Common social and cultural topics: Th ese topics in the discourse deepen the interpreter’s 
understanding of the range of customary practices, central values, modes of relationship and 
exchange, perceptions about resources for life and well-being, and presuppositions about 
purity and taboo the text embodies.
Final cultural categories: Th ese categories cover the range of values and practices described 
within a text, and the priority it establishes among them. Th e priority certain people give 
to notions of what is right, lawful, expedient, honourable, pleasant, easy, feasible, necessary, 
holy, and so on, produces a particular social and cultural location for them. Th e result of these 
locations is the establishment of dominant, subordinate, oppositional, and marginal cultures 
within any locale or region.
(d) Ideological texture
Th is texture concerns particular alliances and conﬂ icts the language in a text and the language 
in an interpretation evoke and nurture. Ideological texture concerns the way the text itself and 
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interpreters of the text position themselves in relation to other individuals and groups. Ideological 
texture diﬀ ers from social and cultural texture by the manner in which it extends beyond social 
and cultural location into particular ways in which people advance their own interest and well-
being through action, emotion, and thought. Th is can happen on diﬀ erent levels:
Individual locations: It is necessary to examine the individual locations of both the writers of 
texts and the readers of texts.
Relation to groups: Th e ideological goals of interpreters are oft en deﬁ ned by the sort of groups 
they belong to.
Modes of intellectual discourse: An interpreter’s adoption of a mode of theological, historical, 
sociological, anthropological, psychological, or literary discourse for commentary is 
signiﬁ cant, since a mode of intellectual discourse is a particular mode of social production. 
Each intellectual mode of interaction and exchange has a relation to an ideological ﬁ eld in the 
contemporary postmodern world in which we live.
Spheres of ideology: Analysis of the ideological texture of a text would include: (i) Analyzing 
the social and cultural location of the implied author of the text; (ii) Analyzing the ideology 
of power in the discourse of the text; (iii) Analyzing the ideology in the mode of intellectual 
discourse both in the text and in the interpretation of the text.
(e) Sacred texture
Th is is present where texts address the relationship between humans and the divine. Biblical texts 
are certainly good examples, although not the only ones, of texts that contain sacred texture. Th ey 
vary from one another, however, in the kind of sacred texture they possess. Analysis of sacred 
texture involves systematically probing dynamics across a spectrum of relationships between the 
human and the divine. Robbins names a few religious categories that can guide the interpreter’s 
search for sacred aspects of a text, such as the ideas of 
Deity; 
Holy persons;
Spirit beings;
Divine history;
Human redemption;
Human commitment;
Religious community;
Ethics.
No speciﬁ c order of investigation is prescribed in socio-rhetorical criticism. Some people 
interpreting biblical or other explicitly religious texts may wish to begin by analyzing the sacred 
texture of a particular text. Another way would be to begin with the inner texture. 
For two reasons, socio-rhetorical criticism developed by working outwards from inner texture to 
intertexture, then social and cultural texture, ideological texture and ﬁ nally sacred texture. Th e 
logic of this development was that: (i) Beginning with the inner texture of a text the practice of 
“eisegesis” – reading into a text what a person wishes to see there – is avoided; (ii) Th e analysis of 
the inner texture is a way of merging newer literary approaches with an emphasis on “exegesis” 
– that is, the practice of reading “out”, or “unpacking” what is in the text. Commentators with 
a particular interest in the production of texts may wish to start with the intertexture of a text. 
Interpreters who emphasize a sharp diﬀ erence between ancient and modern society may wish 
to begin with the social and cultural texture. Th ose who have the perception that an ideology 
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generates every text and every interpretation may even opt to start with the analysis of the 
ideological texture. Th e starting point is therefore not crucial, as long as other textures are also 
involved. Th e interplay among these textures initiates a dialogue between the multiple ways in 
which a text can be perceived or in which it may function within the lives of people.
Robbins, in his formulation of this approach, admits that no interpreter will ever use all of the 
resources of socio-rhetorical criticism in any one interpretation. Th e purpose is, however, rather 
to build an environment for interpretation that provides interpreters with a basic, overall view of 
life as we know it and language as we use it. Within this environment, interpreters can of course 
decide to work especially energetically on one or two aspects of the text. All the time, however, 
interpreters must consider their own approach in relation to what other interpreters are doing.
4.5.2 Jonah in the light of socio-rhetorical criticism
Because all ﬁ ve textures distinguished in socio-rhetorical criticism deal with aspects of the 
book of Jonah which are also illustrated in other chapters, this section will focus only on the 
intertexture. It has already been indicated above that intertexture is a text’s representation of, 
reference to, and use of phenomena in the “world” outside. Th e interaction between the language 
of the text and the world in which that particular text was produced is the focus of an analysis of 
the intertexture.
(a) Oral-scribal intertexture
When the oral-scribal intertexture of the book of Jonah is investigated, the interpreter has to 
be on the lookout for those features of the text that indicate that other texts were used in the 
production of this book. Th ese may be any other texts – canonical or non-canonical. If any such 
indications are present, the mode of using other texts has to be determined.
In the discussion of literary-critical studies in the section on historical criticism in Th is chapter, 
the following arguments have already been advanced in favour of the view that the so-called 
Jonah psalm in 2:2-9 should be considered to be a later addition:
Without the psalm of Jonah the wider context forms a chiastic structure: 1:17a corre sponds 
to 2:10 (Yahweh as subject), and 1:17b corresponds to 2:1 (Jonah as subject). Th e insertion of 
verses 2-9 disturbs this structure.
Th e structure of the book of Jonah as a whole is symmetrically constructed. One example is 
the prayer of the seamen in 1:14 that is countered by 4:2. Th e insertion of the psalm of Jonah 
also disturbs this overall structure.
Th e language of the psalm of Jonah diﬀ ers radically from that of the remainder of the book 
of Jonah.
Th e psalm of Jonah is a psalm of thanksgiving which is not appropriate to the context of a 
distressed Jonah in the belly of the ﬁ sh!
Th e positive image of Jonah projected by the psalm does not correspond with the image 
projected in the rest of the book. With the insertion of the psalm of Jonah, the uniform 
psychological image of the prophet Jonah is disturbed.
If these arguments are accepted, and the psalm of Jonah is regarded as a later addition, it follows 
that the earliest version of the book of Jonah did not include this part. Th e re-composition of 
the book at a later stage included it, however. Th e canonical approach discussed above indicates 
that a further question should then be asked: What particular emphasis was laid in the canonical 
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(ﬁ nal) form of the book by including the psalm of Jonah? Th e following canonical-critical view 
was presented in section 4.3: Th e later addition of the psalm of Jonah in chapter 2 brought about 
a structural change to the book as a whole. Chapter 2 now (in its canonical form) forms a parallel 
with chapter 4. Th e interpretation of chapter 4 was therefore drastically aﬀ ected by this addition. 
Whereas Jonah’s bad temper in chapter 4 was originally seen to be caused by his anxiety about 
the fulﬁ lment of his prophecy against Nineveh, a notable diﬀ erence in interpretation emerges 
aft er the addition to the narrative. Th e newly-formed structural parallelism between chapters 2 
and 4 re-orientates the narrative. Th e issue of divine grace is now incorporated into the story. In 
chapter 2 Jonah is grateful for God’s grace which rescued him by the timely provision of a ﬁ sh. In 
chapter 4, on the other hand, Jonah is angry that God’s grace (in Jonah’s frame of reference meant 
only for Israel) is extended to the heathen city of Nineveh. Th e insertion of chapter 2 thus alters 
the emphasis of the story from that of a narrative about true or false prophecy to one about the 
limitlessness of divine grace.
It can no longer be determined whether the psalm of Jonah was an independent psalm that was 
reformulated for this particular context, or whether it was composed anew at the stage when the 
canonical form of the book was ﬁ nalized. Although the psalm shows striking similarities in genre 
to some of the individual songs of thanksgiving that we ﬁ nd in the biblical book of Psalms, there 
is no indication that any of the known, canonical, psalms were quoted.
When considering how an outside text was used in the book of Jonah, the above comments have 
to be taken into account. Th e fact that the psalm was included only later in the formation of the 
ﬁ nal book, does not, however, mean that the psalm did not exist earlier. Th is question has to be 
left  open. However, a canonical-critical analysis produces a reading of the psalm in which it could 
be described as inverted reconﬁ guration. Th e psalm itself may have pre-existed, and may have 
been used in the book of Jonah in an unchanged, original form. Its mere presence within the 
book, however, reconﬁ gures it, in that it alters the meaning of the original story signiﬁ cantly.
(b) Cultural intertexture
Cultural understanding is reﬂ ected in texts in various ways. Some examples within the book of 
Jonah would be:
In 1:4 it is said that the sailors were terriﬁ ed when the storm broke out, and each one cried 
out to his own god. Th e sailors were convinced that this was not an ordinary storm, but that 
it betrayed a divine reaction to some grave sin. (Th is remark also could be read as part of the 
sacred texture of the story.) Th eir fear is an uneasy feeling that one of the gods is responsible. 
Th is alludes to a cultural and religious view that there is some relationship between the physical 
world and the divine. Th is relationship seems to be one of punishment and retribution. 
In 1:7 this matter is taken further. Not only did the sailors see a relationship between divine 
wrath and the storm they were experiencing, but they also were of the opinion that someone 
speciﬁ cally had to be blamed for this calamity. To determine who the culprit was, they used 
the sure method, approved by all, of drawing lots. Of course, it fell on Jonah! Again, the views 
expressed in this incident, as well as the practice used to resolve the matter, are allusions to 
cultural customs which are not mentioned explicitly here. 
Many references in chapter 2 (the Jonah psalm) associate the depths of the sea with 
abandonment, threat, absence of God, and death. Th ese references allude to the tradition of 
regarding the deep sea as the realm of death and destruction.
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Th e references to the depths in chapter 2 stand in stark contrast to the realm represented 
by the Holy Temple (2:4,7). Th e Holy Temple symbolizes the opposite domain – that of life, 
abundance, and the presence of God.
Th e reaction to the experience of salvation symbolized by the temple is to oﬀ er a sacriﬁ ce to 
God. Th is ritual reﬂ ects the view that communication with the deity can be done by means of 
sacriﬁ ces of various kinds, and that diﬀ erent emotions can be expressed in this way (such as 
thankfulness, penitence, etc.).
Chapter 3 reﬂ ects the cultural customs of expressing grief and repentance. Th e text says that 
everyone in Nineveh, aft er hearing the one-sentence sermon of Jonah, decided to fast and to 
put on sackcloth. Th e king even got up from his throne, and he sat down in ashes. Th ese seem 
to be direct references to Semitic cultural customs that were held at a certain stage of history.
Another interesting reﬂ ection of culture is the reference in 3:7 to the animals participating in 
mourning practices. In 4:11 it is even stated that Yahweh counts the animals along with the 
innocent children among those that convince him not to destroy the city. Th ese references 
vaguely echo a concept from cultural tradition.
(c) Social intertexture
Social identity and social relationships are reﬂ ected in the almost artistic way in which contrasts 
are built into the Jonah narrative. Jonah, the prophet of Yahweh, is starkly contrasted to the 
sailors on the ship, as well as to the Ninevites. Th e characterization of Jonah as the Israelite, 
who is commanded by Yahweh, identiﬁ es him (within the context of an Israelite audience) as 
the protagonist in the story. Jonah embodies the social role of a Yahweh servant. However, by 
contrasting him with the sailors and the Ninevites, the expectations of the social (and religious) 
role that Jonah would play, are overturned. Sailors and Ninevites were regarded as heathens. 
Nothing should be expected from them. Th eir social role, so the expectations would go, is to be 
the receivers of condemnation. Also these expectations are overturned. Th is artistic shaping of 
the social intertexture results in the conclusions that Yahweh’s prophets can also be disobedient, 
and that Yahweh unexpectedly grants heathens his grace.
(d) Historical intertexture
Th e ﬁ rst question to be asked regarding the historical intertexture is whether the book of Jonah 
refers to historical events or not. Biblical scholars who emphasize the literary form of the book 
(see later in chapter 5) oft en argue that the story is not in the ﬁ rst place meant to be an accurate 
account of historical events. It is rather a parable-like story conveying a (theological) truth. It 
would therefore be inappropriate to ask about the historical events behind the text in the ﬁ rst 
instance.
However, this does not mean that no historical intertexture can be found in the book of Jonah. A 
few references in the text fall into this category, but not as descriptions of events. Th ese references 
give, instead, an indication of the historical circumstances during the time of the story’s origin. 
Th e reader cannot say, therefore, that the events of the story are historically true, but he or she can 
derive information about the events of the time from the story.
Th e following two comments will suﬃ  ce to give an indication of the historical intertexture:
In 1:1 it is said that Yahweh spoke to Jonah ben-Amittai. Th e only other reference to this ﬁ gure 
is found in 2 Kings 14:25. Th is text sets him in the reign of the eighth century King Jeroboam 
II of the Northern Kingdom of Israel. Th ere Jonah is a nationalistic prophet who forecast the 
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extension of the frontiers of the Northern Kingdom. It is rather diﬃ  cult to harmonize the 
reference in the book of Jonah (in which the city of Nineveh plays such an important role) 
with the reference in 2 Kings 14 (situated in the eighth century BCE). Although Nineveh 
was occupied from prehistoric times and rebuilt repeatedly by kings of the Middle Assyrian 
period, it was only since 705 BCE that the city became the capital. At the time of the Jonah 
ben-Amittai of 2 Kings 14:25 the city was still unknown, or at least of no symbolic signiﬁ cance. 
Th e story of Jonah presupposes, however, that Nineveh was the symbol of foreigners and 
enemies. Many commentators therefore suggest that the reference to Jonah ben-Amittai in 
the book of Jonah is not meant to refer to some historical ﬁ gure, but it rather serves to evoke 
the element of nationalism, represented by Jonah ben-Amittai, in the story.
In 3:3 it is mentioned that Nineveh was such a great city that it took three days to walk through 
it. Th e temporal use of the Hebrew verb hyh in this context indicates that the situation came 
to an end before the time of the author’s statement. Th e author’s reference to the size of the 
city therefore comes from tradition. Nineveh had been so completely destroyed in 612 BCE 
that in 401 BCE Xenophon walked past the site without noticing it. However, during the last 
eighty years of its existence it was well-known for its magniﬁ cence. Early in the eighth century 
BCE Sennacherib made it the capital of Assyria. He then embarked on an extensive building 
program, enlarging and beautifying it. From an inscription of Sennacherib it became clear, 
however, that the enlarged city had a much smaller diameter than suggested in the book 
of Jonah. Th e reference to the city’s size therefore seems to be rather an indication of the 
magnitude of the prophet, and not of the physical dimensions of the former capital.
4.5.3 Observations and evaluation
Socio-rhetorical criticism does not only focus on the production of texts in the interpretation 
of the Bible. It has been indicated above that this approach is rather an attempt at providing 
multiple angles for the analysis of texts. Th is multiple approach should be evaluated positively. 
Socio-rhetorical criticism reacts against exclusive exegesis where interpretation strategies 
are applied in an isolated and mono-dimensional fashion. Exclusive approaches ignore the 
multiple dimensions of interpretative approaches as well as of the biblical texts themselves. 
Socio-rhetorical criticism is an attempt at avoiding this danger by integrating the insights of 
diﬀ erent approaches (as has been shown in the socio-rhetorical analysis of the book of Jonah 
above).
Although socio-rhetorical criticism is not only about analyzing the world in which biblical texts 
were produced, this aspect nevertheless forms an integral part of this approach. Th e notion 
of intertexture enables a thorough account of how this aspect inﬂ uences the interpretation 
process.
Th is approach has the advantage that it does not prescribe an order of analytical steps which 
should be followed like a recipe. Th e starting point of the analysis is not so crucial, as long as 
it interacts with other aspects of socio-rhetorical analysis.
In practising socio-rhetorical criticism, the distinction between social and cultural intertexture 
on the one hand, and social and cultural texture on the other hand, is not always very clear. 
Th is distinction demands from the exegete a well-developed knowledge of social-scientiﬁ c 
theory and cultural studies.
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CHAPTER 5
Approaches focusing on the texts themselves
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Objections to historical criticism
In focusing on the production of texts, historical-critical approaches assumed that a text can 
be understood only in the light of the historical context within which it originated. Th e text is 
merely the medium though which the original intentions of the author, which lie behind the text, 
ﬁ nd expression. Th ese intentions were formed against the background of the author’s personal, 
social and historical circumstances. Having carefully gathered the pieces of historical evidence, 
the interpreter ﬁ ts them all together to reach an understanding of the text.
Around 1930 many literary critics started to question this view. Th ey raised the following points 
of criticism:
When we deal with texts from the past, we never have access to all the information we would 
need to reconstruct the original contexts in which they were written. Th e elaborate historical 
reconstructions upon which historical critics based their interpretations of certain texts were 
oft en highly speculative (that is, they depended on guesswork). As a result, diﬀ erent critics 
reached diﬀ erent conclusions and there was no way of telling who was right.
Sometimes we do know quite a lot about a particular historical context, say, Shakespeare's 
England. Th is may help us to interpret certain passages in Shakespeare's plays; it does not tell 
us why these plays remain popular while other plays written in England at the same time are 
nearly completely forgotten. Historical studies do not help us to understand why certain texts 
remain meaningful to readers over many centuries.
In everyday life, we seldom need to engage in historical studies before we reach an understanding 
of a text. Say I receive a letter telling me that I have won a prize in a competition. I tell you 
about my prize (not the letter) and you ask me how I know. Instead of saying "I have studied 
the historical context", I will simply say "It says so in this letter. Look for yourself." In other 
words, I defend my understanding of the text by pointing to the text itself.
Th ose who heeded these criticisms turned to the text itself, paying attention to its literary features 
rather than its historical background. By sticking to the text itself, critics tried to eliminate some 
of the speculations and opposing views typical of historical criticism. Questions such as: “When 
was a particular psalm written?” “Who wrote it and under what circumstances?” “How was the 
psalm used and edited?” could be endlessly debated without reaching consensus. But the text of 
the psalm as it appears in black and white on the page is there for all to see. I can make statements 
about this text without guessing or inviting disagreement. When I state that a particular word is 
repeated four times, I can show you the repetitions in the text. Th us the text provides both a ﬁ xed 
starting point and a point to which I always return in my arguments. I do not have to look into 
the mind of the author (which would be impossible in any case) as long as I look very carefully at 
every feature of the text.
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5.1.2 Autonomous texts and immanent meaning
Th e turn to the world of the text generally involved certain new presuppositions. Critics who 
followed this line generally assumed that texts are (to some extent) autonomous entities and that 
meaning is immanent in texts:
Texts are autonomous in that they communicate meaning according to rules of their own. 
Th ese rules are the rules of language, literary composition, genre, and so on. Th e meaning 
of a text is not bound to the intentions of the author. Say I put up a notice announcing a test 
on Tuesday, although I intended to say that the test would be on Th ursday. My mistake does 
not change the meaning of the text I put on the notice board. Instead, the meaning of the text 
is determined by the rules of language – in this case by the semantic rule that "Tuesday" and 
"Th ursday" are diﬀ erent days of the week.
Th e error of seeking the meaning of a text in the "real intention of the author" is sometimes 
called the intentional fallacy. Th ose who rejected the intentional fallacy did not mean that the 
notion of intention plays no role in interpretation. Certainly, students who read my notice 
should conclude that I intend them to turn up for a test on Tuesday. Th is is the intention 
implied in the text, although it was not my intention as author. Our understanding of a text is 
based on our knowledge of the rules that govern texts, not on our knowledge of what goes on 
in the minds of authors.
Meaning is immanent in texts in that we do not need to refer to events, objects or persons 
outside the text to understand it. Let us say an author has used a real person she knows as a 
model for a character in a story. We do not have to know this person to understand the story. 
We do not even have to know that such a person exists. In the same way we can understand 
and appreciate a love poem describing a love that never existed or a fantasy that requires us 
to enter into an imaginary world. Texts are not mirrors that reﬂ ect a real world outside them; 
they create new worlds of meaning. Th erefore it does not make sense to look for the meaning 
of a text somewhere outside the text. If I had to go and check what the circumstances in the 
real world are or were before I could understand a text, then the text itself would be nearly 
meaningless.
Lastly, some critics rejected the idea that the meaning of a text had anything to do with the 
eﬀ ect it has upon a speciﬁ c reader. Th e meaning of a text is not changed by the reader's reaction 
to it. One reader may ﬁ nd a poem inspiring and another may ﬁ nd it depressing; one reader 
may agree with the conclusion the poem reaches and another may disagree. All of this does 
not tell us what the poem means. Th e mistake of thinking that my reaction, as a reader, to a 
text gives the text meaning has been called the aﬀ ective fallacy (“aﬀ ect” means “feeling”).
5.1.3 Meaning as a function of linguistic relationships
What remains once one has eliminated the intentions of the author, the event, objects and 
persons outside the text and the responses of the reader? What is “the text itself ”? A text is a 
unique linguistic unit, constituted by the relationships of the parts to one another and to the 
whole. Whereas historical criticism regarded meaning as a function of origin, those who turned 
to the text itself regarded meaning as a function of the relationships among the parts of a text. To 
summarize this view:
A text's meaning is a meaning constituted by its internal linguistic relationships. To get to the 
meaning of texts one does not have to study the minds of authors and readers (psychology) 
or events outside the world of the text (history) or social relationships (sociology). One does 
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have to study the various aspects of language (linguistics). Language holds the key to the 
understanding of texts.
In a text, a number of linguistic units are selected and combined in a particular way. Th e 
two sentences "Th e dog bit the man" and "Th e man bit the dog" employ precisely the same 
set of words, but they mean diﬀ erent things, because the words are combined in a diﬀ erent 
way. Here we see clearly that the "shape", form or structure of the sentence determines the 
meaning. No wonder that those who focus on the text oft en call their approach formalism or 
structuralism.
Th e previous example was a very simple one. In a complex text one can identify a whole range 
of relationships among elements at diﬀ erent levels. One metaphor qualiﬁ es another metaphor, 
one character develops in interaction with another, and the beginning of the story forms a 
contrast with the ending. Form or structure is therefore not always something one notices 
immediately. It requires a close reading or a detailed analysis of every single aspect of the text 
to reach an adequate understanding of it. Every aspect contributes to the whole.
A text is a unique, meaningful whole. If one takes away or changes one part, the whole would 
be diﬀ erent. For this reason one cannot really say "Th e meaning of text A is this: …”. Th e “this” 
would always be a new, diﬀ erent text. Th e new text would no longer have the unique form that 
the original had. Critics who analyze the internal structure of the text oft en openly say that 
they do not want to interpret or explain the meaning of texts; they want to describe texts as 
meaningful wholes by showing how the parts ﬁ t together.
5.1.4 New schools
Th ough biblical scholars were among the pioneers of historical criticism, the new literary 
approaches did not have their roots in biblical scholarship. In the Anglo-American world, the 
new perspective surfaced in the study of English literature, in IA Richards’s Practical Criticism 
and the work of FR Leavis in England and in the New Criticism in America. Russian formalism 
and structural linguistics provided the starting points for later schools in Europe. Th ese included 
the Prague Linguistic Circle, French structuralism and semiotics.
Th e idea that understanding depends upon the relationships among the elements in a system 
soon found applications outside literary studies. A social system can also be read as “a text” 
written in a “language”. Th is insight produced the structural anthropology of Levi-Strauss, the 
structural Marxism of Althusser and the psychoanalytical theories of Lacan. In these and other 
cases theories and analytical techniques developed in literary studies and linguistics were turned 
to new uses. Typically, the interest shift ed from questions of cause and origin to questions of 
relationship and function. In addition, the emphasis shift ed from the personal author or originator 
to impersonal structures.
5.1.5 Inﬂ uence on the study of the Bible
Biblical scholars of the historical-critical school, recognizing that the Bible is also a work of 
literature, had always paid some attention to literary aspects of the Bible: grammar, semantics, 
genre, composition, style, imagery and the like. All of this, however, took second place to what 
was regarded as the primary task - namely, to reach an historical understanding of the biblical 
text. Th e new directions in literary criticism suggested that an adequate understanding of a literary 
work requires a far closer examination of the literary features of the text. Th e new questions that 
literary criticism asked led to new and surprising answers. For instance, Jonah’s prayer in the 
second chapter of the book does not seem to ﬁ t well into the context, therefore the majority of 
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historical scholars regard it as a later addition. But if the intention of the text is to portray Jonah 
in an ironic way, then the prayer becomes a meaningful part of the whole. In fact, a close study of 
the structure of the story suggests that something like the prayer is needed at this point.
Since it seemed that the methods of literary analysis had something new to oﬀ er biblical scholars, 
many of them started exploring these new approaches around 1970. Whereas the older generation 
still considered it necessary to identify and date the diﬀ erent sources, later additions and glosses 
in a text before interpretation could start, the new generation tended to focus on the text in 
its ﬁ nal form. Historical questions were either ignored or dealt with very brieﬂ y. Instead, they 
examined the text very carefully, using all the tools of structural analysis and close reading. Th is 
led them to the conclusion that many biblical texts are highly artistic compositions, full of irony, 
tension and ambiguity. Historical criticism had obscured the subtlety and complexity of these 
texts by insisting that all tensions or diﬃ  culties within the text are indications of diﬀ erent sources. 
A better understanding of the compositional techniques used in biblical times undermined the 
view that these ancient texts had to be simple and straightforward.
Biblical scholars who wished to follow these new paths had to borrow much from disciplines 
outside theology: semiotics, linguistics, narratology, the study of folklore and so on. Aft er all, 
the new approaches were not developed by theologians. At the same time, some literary critics 
without a background in theology or biblical studies tried their hand at interpreting biblical texts. 
Th is led to a fruitful interaction between theological and non-theological disciplines.
Th e new emphasis on the world of the text showed itself in a variety of diﬀ erent approaches 
and ﬁ elds of study. In the following chapters we shall take a closer look at the New Criticism, 
structuralism and narratology. In the ﬁ eld of biblical studies, the turn to the world of the text also 
inﬂ uenced the following areas:
Linguistics and the theory of translation: Older works on the grammar of biblical Hebrew and 
Greek had to be revised in the light of the new developments in linguistics. In particular, the 
new theories in semantics (the study of meaning in language) were applied to the study of the 
languages of the Bible (by Barr and others). Previously, it had oft en been assumed that every word 
has a “root meaning”, which remains to some extent present whenever the word is used. Modern 
semantic theory recognizes that the precise meaning of a word can only be determined by looking 
at its function within a context. Th is insight greatly inﬂ uenced the translation of the Bible. One 
cannot produce an adequate translation of any text by simply translating each individual word 
in the one language into the corresponding word in the other language. Sometimes words in one 
language do not have exact equivalents in other languages. Moreover, the function of a word 
within a particular context has to be taken into account. For instance, the Hebrew word for 
“arm” is frequently used to mean “strength”. In such cases, the translation “arm” would create 
the false impression that a physical arm is meant. Since adequate translation depends upon one’s 
understanding of how the words, phrases and sentences of a text function within the whole of 
the particular text, all translation is already interpretation (in an attenuated sense). Th e theory of 
translation as an academic discipline attempts to formulate the rules and methods for reaching 
adequate translations.
Poetics: Poetics is the study of the techniques and rules of composing literary texts (not only 
poems). Th e following are typical questions of poetics: What techniques can be used to 
achieve emphasis? What purposes can repetition in a text serve? What are the typical features 
of descriptive, narrative and argumentative texts respectively? How would a story be changed 
by reversing the order of events? Just as grammar examines the rules for constructing correct 
sentences in a particular language, poetics examines the rules governing the construction of 
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coherent texts. Although certain rules apply generally (a narrative always has a plot of some sort), 
each culture and society has its own conventions regarding composition. For instance, diﬀ erent 
cultural groups may have diﬀ erent views on what “a ﬁ tting end to a story” would be. In recent 
years, a number of scholars (Alter, Berlin, and others) have made a study of the poetics of Old and 
New Testament texts. In the process they have shown that a better understanding of the literary 
techniques and conventions of ancient times can be a powerful aid to interpretation.
Semiotics: Semiotics is the study of sign systems and how they signify, or convey meaning. In 
language, the best-known sign system, the physical signs (sounds or written marks) have meanings 
attached to them. Th ere are, however, also other sign systems. At one level clothing may serve 
to keep people warm and to cover (or strategically uncover!) parts of their bodies. But speciﬁ c 
items of clothing or combinations of such items usually have further “signifying functions”. For 
instance, a military uniform tells us that the wearer is a soldier in the army of a particular country. 
Th e same uniform will also tell us what rank this soldier has within the military hierarchy – if 
we know what signs to look for. If we do not know the codes that govern this particular sign 
system, in this case, the diﬀ erences between diﬀ erent uniforms and the diﬀ erent marks of rank, 
we would not “understand” the uniform. Meanings are not eternally linked to certain signs; signs 
gain meaning, lose meaning or change meaning in an ongoing process of semiosis. Clothing that 
makes one look very fashionable today may make one look very old-fashioned next year. In texts 
we ﬁ nd an interweaving of signs from a variety of sign systems, each with its own code. Some 
signs mark the diﬀ erence between poetry and prose, between literary and non-literary discourse, 
or between ﬁ ction and non-ﬁ ction. Others mark the diﬀ erences between social classes, between 
insiders and outsiders, or between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. For example, Mary 
Douglas has studied the dietary code in the Old Testament, with its list of “clean” and “unclean” 
animals, as a sign system.
Genre studies: Biblical scholars of the past studied genres mainly in order to answer historical 
questions. In German the study of genres was called form history (“Formgeschichte”). Modern 
genre studies have rather diﬀ erent interests. Although there are divergent theories of genre, there 
is general agreement that an adequate understanding of a text requires some knowledge of the 
features that this text has in common with other texts of the same type. For instance, if a modern 
letter starts with the words “Dear Professor X”, it would be a mistake to think that the author likes 
Professor X. Th e form of address belongs to the genre. Similarly, it would be wrong to regard a 
fairy tale as a historical account. To avoid this error, one has to recognize the generic features of 
fairy tales and those of historical accounts. In the study of the Bible, one has to get to grips with 
the conventions that governed the diﬀ erent genres in the ancient world. Th us Paul’s letters have to 
be compared with the typical letters of the Hellenistic world in which he lived.
Stylistics: Stylistics is the study of the style of texts, but it has never been easy to deﬁ ne style. 
Put very simply, style comes into play when (roughly) the same thing can be said in at least two 
diﬀ erent ways. For instance, one person may tell a story using mainly long, complex sentences. 
Another person may tell the same story using mainly short, simple sentences. Th e diﬀ erent 
choices made by the two people result in diﬀ erent styles. A style can be typical of a speciﬁ c literary 
work, of a speciﬁ c author or of a speciﬁ c period. In biblical studies, stylistics studies the speciﬁ c 
features of certain texts (as opposed to the generic features). A psalm may be a typical lament 
(it has the typical features of the lament as a genre), but may also have unique stylistic features. 
Unfortunately, the study of the unique features of a text is also sometimes called rhetorical criticism
– a term used in a diﬀ erent sense in this book.
Fishing for Jonah (Anew)
72
5.2 New Criticism and related approaches
5.2.1 Background and theory
Th e approaches discussed in this section all had their roots in the study of English literature. 
In the early decades of the twentieth century, some teachers of English literature at universities 
in England and America started protesting against two trends in literary criticism. On the one 
hand, many critics concentrated on the historical, social and psychological background to literary 
texts. But, it was said, studies in literary history, for instance, properly belong to the discipline 
of history; such studies cannot justify the existence of literary criticism as a separate discipline. 
On the other hand, loose, vague and badly substantiated statements about literary texts do not 
constitute an academic discipline. Consider the following remarks about a poem:
Th e poem reminds one of a luxurious Persian carpet, replete with rich colours and intricate 
patterns.
Aft er the tension created by the ﬁ rst lines, the blunt ending leaves the reader with a nagging 
sense of disappointment.
Th e author's lyrical style calls to mind the style of the later Wordsworth.
Th ese statements seem to say important things about the poem, but a closer look reveals that 
they merely record the personal impressions of the critic. Although the statements seem to state 
general truths, they contain nothing to convince us that all readers would agree with the particular 
critic. “One” (in the ﬁ rst example) could simply be “me”. Taken in themselves, these statements 
are not critical, academic statements about a literary text.
Nevertheless, a literary critic may wish to reach such conclusions about a text. To do so, the critic 
does not have to study history or sociology. To discover that the author of the poem owned many 
Persian carpets and admired Wordsworth would not help. But one can, by paying attention to 
every detail of the poem itself, reveal the intricate patterns in it. Or, one can show that the ending 
fails because it is in no way consistent with the rest of the poem. Even the comparison with the 
later Wordsworth can be valid. In this case, one has to identify the elements of style in the poem 
and compare them with elements of style in actual poems by Wordsworth. Th us one can make 
valid critical statements about literary texts by referring to the literary texts themselves. Such 
statements would not concern the historical origins of the texts or the eﬀ ect of the texts on the 
reader; they would be about the literary text as literary text.
In America this approach became known as “New Criticism”. In 1941 JC Ransom published 
Th e New Criticism, setting out the aims of the new movement. Th e writings of the “new critics”, 
Ransom, Tate, Warren, Blackmur and especially Cleanth Brooks, inﬂ uenced a whole generation 
of American critics. Even those who did not go along with the New Criticism in all respects 
took much from it. In England the critical approaches of IA Richards and FR Leavis had much 
in common with New Criticism. Richards introduced the practice of giving students poems to 
analyze without providing even the names of the authors. Although Richards did this mainly as 
an experiment, it became a standard practice at many universities (also in this country). Th e idea 
was that additional information would distract students from the poem itself. FR Leavis, together 
with his wife QD Leavis, edited the inﬂ uential literary journal Scrutiny for many years. Leavis also 
defended the idea that the key to the interpretation of a literary text lay in a “close reading” of the 
text itself. Th e “Practical Criticism” of Richards and Leavis is usually mentioned alongside New 
Criticism, although there are points of diﬀ erence. Richards paid much attention to the eﬀ ect of 
the text on the reader – some would see him as one of the earliest reader-response critics. Leavis, a 



73
Chapter 5
trained historian, recognized the value of historical studies and also emphasized the social eﬀ ects 
of literature.
In spite of these and other diﬀ erences, the following views may be regarded as typical of New 
Criticism and its relatives:
(a) Th e poem as poem
New Criticism insisted that the job of literary criticism is to study literature as literature. Certainly, 
some literary texts also express philosophical, theological, moral or social views, but it is not 
these views that make a text a literary text. To study such aspects of texts may be the task of 
philosophers, theologians and other specialists. I may or may not agree with the statements made 
in a poem, but my opinion in this regard is not relevant to my task as a literary critic. In a famous 
essay (“Keats’s Sylvan Historian”, in Th e Well Wrought Urn. London, 1968), Cleanth Brooks took 
the ﬁ nal lines of Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn as an example: 
“Beauty is truth, - truth beauty, - that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.”
Other critics had claimed that these last lines spoiled the whole poem because they express a false 
belief. Surely some lies can be beautiful and some truths ugly. Brooks argues that the lines are 
misunderstood if they are taken in isolation, as statement of a general truth. A careful examination 
of the poem shows that these lines are “dramatically appropriate” as “part of an organic context”. 
Indeed, once the lines have been placed in context, one may argue about the poetic validity “of 
the poem as a whole in terms of its dramatic wholeness”. It would, however, be wrong to let the 
ﬁ nal statement, taken separately and in a literal sense, “compete with scientiﬁ c and philosophical 
generalizations”. Poetry has its own logic and its own “truth”.
Th e same can be said about many passages in the Bible. Th e vision of the kingdom of peace in 
Isaiah 11 would not make sense to a scientist. Lions cannot eat straw like cattle (verse 7), because 
their digestive systems would not cope with it. Others would have other objections. If the word of 
the messianic king slays the wicked (verse 4), what has become of peace? Do we have to share the 
speciﬁ c religious belief of the author to aﬃ  rm the value of this passage? Such questions are not 
necessarily unimportant, but they are not directly relevant to our understanding of the passage 
as a work of literature.
New Criticism tended to focus on poetry and for a good reason. Th e word “poetry” comes from 
the Greek verb “to make”. A poem is not a mirror image of what already exists outside the poem; 
it is “something that has been made” – something new and unique. Th e way in which linguistic 
items (words, sentences, ﬁ gures of speech, and so on) are selected and combined in the poem as 
a whole creates a meaningful “world”, a vision relatively independent of the outside world. In this 
sense all literary works, those in prose included, are poems. To study a poem as a poem is to study 
its “madeness”, that is, how the elements in it are made to ﬁ t together and how these elements 
make up a meaningful whole.
(b) Th e verbal icon
A literary text, then, is a meaningful unit that can and should be understood in its own right. Its 
meaning does not depend upon its relationship to the outside world, its context of origin and the 
context in which it is read. To explain this, some spoke of the literary text as a “verbal icon” (Th e 
Verbal Icon was the title of a collection of essays by WK Wimsatt).
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How does one interpret an icon (a picture or an image)? Say you are looking at a painting 
depicting Mary with the baby Jesus in her arms. You could say that the frame is falling to pieces 
or that the picture does not blend very well with the furniture in the room. But this says nothing 
about the painting – one can always get a new frame or shift  the painting to another room. It may 
be interesting to know that the painter was a drunk or a bachelor, but this also says nothing about 
the painting. You may notice that the Mary of the painting wears clothes that reﬂ ect the fashion 
of seventeenth century Europe and not that of ﬁ rst century Palestine. Or you may learn that the 
artist used the face of a well-known person of his own time for his Mary. Th ese last two points 
would prove that the painting is not an accurate portrait of “the real Mary”, but it would not make 
the painting less valuable as a work of art. Lastly, you do not have to be a Christian to admire the 
artistic qualities of the painting.
Nevertheless, much remains to be said about the painting. You can discuss the use of colour, noting 
that the artist sometimes uses complementary colours and at other times contrasting colours. You 
can talk about the interplay of light and shade, about the relationship between foreground and 
background, about the texture of the brushwork, and so on. You would certainly want to say 
something about the way in which the various ﬁ gures in the painting have been placed in order 
to achieve a balanced whole. Note that in each case you would be talking about what you see in 
the painting itself and that you would be considering relationships between elements. You would 
not, for instance, talk about one shade of red in isolation, but about this shade of red as it appears 
against a dark background. Your assessment of the painting as a work of art would be based on 
a careful description of the elements and aspects of the work in their relationship to one another 
and to the whole.
If a text is seen as a “verbal icon”, a picture in words, the criticism of a text can be handled in the 
same way. You describe what you ﬁ nd in a text as a network of relationships at many diﬀ erent 
levels. Since you deal only with what is internal (or intrinsic) to the text and in that sense present 
for all to see, speculation is more or less eliminated. Such criticism can claim to be objective in a 
double sense. It deals with the object of criticism (the literary text) and it avoids reference to the 
subjective feelings or opinions of the critic. Th e context that matters is not the historical context 
behind the text, nor the context of the reader, but the context created by the text itself.
(c) Close reading and the unity of form and content
Because the aim of such criticism is to examine each text as a unique whole, it is hard to suggest 
a rigid method or a systematic theory that would apply to all texts in the same way. Early on, 
this approach avoided elaborate theoretical constructs and complex technical jargon. Some 
British critics in particular insisted that a “theory of literature” could actually get in the way of 
the practical task of taking each text on its own merits. New Criticism also did not pay much 
attention to literary genre, because a focus on genre implies a focus on features that diﬀ erent texts 
have in common and not on the uniqueness of the speciﬁ c text.
Th e only way to get to grips with the uniqueness of the text is through a close reading of the text 
itself. Although this sounds simple enough, close reading requires a sharp eye for every detail and 
the ability to relate various details to one another. It is not enough, for instance, to understand the 
“meaning” of each individual word. One also has to see how the meaning a word would have in 
isolation is modiﬁ ed (changed) by its place within the whole. In addition, one has to look at the 
theme of the text, its tone, its imagery, its dramatic structure, and so on. If a very serious theme 
(say, death) is treated in a humorous tone, it changes our view of the theme. Even the metre, 
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rhythm and sound patterns in a poem have an inﬂ uence on our understanding of it. “Meaning” 
does not lie in isolated elements, but in the way in which the elements are combined in the text.
If this is true, one cannot regard the content of a text (what is said) and its form (how it is said) as 
separate. A text may be about a certain topic, but what is presented in the text depends on how 
the topic is addressed, that is, on the formal selection and combination of elements. Th e content is 
seen only through the form and never without it. New Criticism claimed that at least great works 
of literature are organic wholes. In other words, such texts are like living creatures, in which each 
separate system contributes to the whole. In a human person, for instance, one cannot separate 
the digestive system, the muscular system, the nervous system and the breathing system without 
killing the person. Th e following example illustrates how form and content can be linked in a 
poem:
In E Robinson’s poem Richard Cory, the main character is a rich, handsome man. All admired 
him and wished that they were in his place. Th e poem is written from the perspective of “a person” 
who worked hard and had little to eat. Th e last two lines come as a shock:
And Richard Cory, one calm summer night
Went home and put a bullet through his head
Th ese two lines stand in contrast to the rest of the poem, which describes all the advantages that 
Richard Cory had. Why did this man kill himself, while the poor people worked on and “waited 
for the light”? In fact, the very last line changes one’s view of the whole poem. But there is also 
a contrast within the last lines themselves. We ﬁ rst hear of a “calm summer night” and then of 
a gunshot. To go home at night suggests rest, but, instead, there is violence. Th e second last line 
still follows the metre (the rhythmical pattern of stressed and unstressed syllables) of the rest of 
the poem, but the last line completely breaks the metrical pattern. Read the line aloud to yourself: 
it does not even sound like poetry. It is as if the whole poem falls apart through this shocking 
event. Note also how the choice of word aﬀ ects the meaning. Th e poet could have said “made an 
end to his life”. “Put a bullet through his head” sounds much more brutal and shocking. What is 
not said is equally important. We are not told why Richard Cory killed himself. Th e poem could 
have explained that rich people have problems of their own, but this is precisely not what the 
poem does. It shows this point implicitly, to be deduced from the contrast between suicide and 
the speakers’ idealized view of the life of the wealthy, and thus the description of Richard Cory’s 
end is the more shocking. .
Th is example shows how various elements within a text interact. Sometimes elements at diﬀ erent 
levels work together: they reinforce, complement or strengthen one another. In other cases 
diﬀ erent elements stand in contrast to one another: they undermine, contradict or weaken one 
another. In a very broad way one can say that the pattern of similarities and diﬀ erences within a 
text makes it a meaningful whole, one which has both tension and balance. Close reading looks 
for these similarities and diﬀ erences or, to use terms oft en used in New Criticism, it seeks to 
compare and contrast elements.
When one reads in this way, one discovers the richness of literary texts. A word, for instance, can 
be ambiguous. In the example we use above, the words “calm” and “summer” both suggest that 
all is well. Th e word “night” can reinforce this idea if we think of night as a time of peaceful sleep. 
But “night” can also suggest the time of darkness and the “sleep of death”. Th ere is an ambiguity (a 
double meaning) about the notion of “night”. Irony also adds to the richness of a text by showing 
the diﬀ erences between points of view. In our example, the speaker in the poem wished to be in 
the place of Richard Cory, but Richard Cory himself did not even wish to live. Lastly, paradox
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can heighten the tension in a text. A paradox places two apparently opposite elements together in 
the same setting. For instance, a lover can be said to suﬀ er “sweet pain”. New Criticism tended to 
value texts rich in ambiguity, irony and paradox.
(d) Th e “heresy of paraphrase” and autotelic texts
If a literary text is a unique organic unity of form and content, it makes little sense to talk about 
its meaning as something that can be abstracted from the text itself. When people interpret a 
text, they usually end up with two texts: the original and the interpretation they give of it. Th e 
interpretation is supposed to make the meaning of the original text clearer, but it does so by using 
diﬀ erent terms. It may oﬀ er a paraphrase of the original, that is, it tries to say the same thing in 
a diﬀ erent way. We have seen, however, that New Criticism argued that every word, every image 
and every sound matter. Th at means that what is said “in a diﬀ erent way” can never be “the same 
thing”.
For this reason many New Critics avoided the term “interpretation” and spoke of the “heresy of 
paraphrase”, that is, the false idea that the meaning of a text can be made clearer by putting the 
content in some new form. Th e task of literary criticism, according to Brooks, is not to uncover 
a hidden meaning in a text but to describe and evaluate the text as a meaningful whole. Th e 
“meaning of the text” is indeed in the text itself, but not as one part that can be separated from the 
rest; it is in every aspect of the text. Some even rejected the term “meaning” and quoted the poet 
Archibald MacLeish, who said (in one of his poems) that a poem should not mean; it should be. 
A text that “means” points away from itself to the message (information) it carries or the lesson it 
teaches. A literary text, however, points to itself. It is like a symbol. A symbol may set you thinking 
about many things, but those things are not “the meaning of the symbol”.
Th is led to views that are, at least to my mind, extreme. According to many later critics, a literary 
text (if it is viewed as a literary text) stands completely isolated from anything else in the world. 
Its origin is irrelevant (the intentional fallacy); its eﬀ ect is equally irrelevant (the aﬀ ective fallacy). 
It is autonomous because it obeys only its own rules, and self-referential because it creates its 
own world. Meaning is not only immanent in the text itself, but it is the text itself. Lastly, the text 
has no purpose outside itself. It does not “carry” anything (a message or teaching) to a reader. It 
is autotelic, that is, it is its own purpose (telos). You could also say that its only purpose is to be 
what it is. Note that this view makes a sharp distinction between literary texts and all other texts, 
because other texts obviously do have purposes outside themselves. A textbook, for instance, 
intends to convey information. But is it really possible to say which texts are literary and which 
are not?
(e) New Criticism and the interpretation of the Bible
New Criticism did not inﬂ uence the interpretation of the Bible immediately. Aft er all, most 
academic interpreters of the Bible were theologians, not literary critics. Although everybody 
recognized that the Bible contains some literary jewels, it is also true that not all parts of the Bible 
are “literary” in the sense in which the term was used in New Criticism. Many passages in the 
Bible clearly intend to teach, persuade, warn, proclaim, and so on. Moreover, since the Bible is a 
collection of ancient texts, it is hard to ignore historical questions completely.
Even so, biblical interpreters came to see that one could not deal with all aspects of the biblical text 
without introducing some of the categories of literary criticism. Terms such as irony, ambiguity 
and tension are obviously useful when one reads passages from the Bible. A biblical story can be 
a carefully constructed whole in which characterization, dramatic structure, theme and tone are 
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carefully balanced. When “literary readings of the Bible” became popular, theologians frequently 
borrowed much from New Criticism, although this was seldom made explicit. Jan Fokkelman’s 
work, for instance, is clearly in the tradition of New Criticism. In general the application of close 
reading techniques to biblical texts has proved fruitful.
Unfortunately the inﬂ uence of New Criticism has not always been good. In some cases the 
methods of New Criticism were applied without taking contextual diﬀ erences into account. New 
Criticism dealt with texts as units complete in themselves, because there was good reason to believe 
that these texts were written as complete units. Th is does not mean that one has to read all texts, 
even ones that were not composed as units, in this way. One can read the book of Genesis as a 
unit, but close reading may also convince one that this is not the best course to follow. In other 
cases biblical scholars adopted the more dubious aspects of New Criticism, for instance, the view 
that a literary text is an autonomous, autotelic entity with practically no connection to the world 
outside it.
5.2.2 Observations and evaluation
New Criticism is no longer new. Having been too popular for too long (in Britain and America), it 
is now thoroughly unpopular. Nothing is quite as unfashionable as last year’s fashion. Th is makes 
it hard to place it in perspective.
It is wise to remember that New Criticism was born as a reaction against excessive emphasis on 
the historical background of texts and uncritical expressions of personal opinions about them. At 
the time, the reaction was probably a healthy one. It reminded interpreters that neither impressive 
background knowledge nor strong personal views should stand in the way of a careful, detailed 
reading of the text. Th e practical task of close reading is, as the “New Critics” showed in their 
works, not necessarily easy but oft en highly rewarding. Th ey taught students how to read and 
how to enjoy reading.
Secondly, the literary criticism of the “New Critics” did not require an elaborate technical 
terminology. One did not need a doctorate in literary theory to understand what they had to say 
about some poem. Many of their works of practical criticism, having survived many editions, 
are still in print – and on the shelves of non-specialists. Although this is not what they primarily 
intended, they “explained” literary texts to a wide audience who would not otherwise have been 
very interested.
As a literary theory New Criticism had much less to contribute. Some of the views that are regarded 
as typical of New Criticism have some value, as long as they are not exaggerated. For instance, 
form and content are indeed closely connected, but they can be separated to some extent. A 
paraphrase is not always simply “another text”. A literary text is in some ways a unique unit, yet 
in other important ways it may be one example of a general type. As some critics admitted, one 
cannot always banish background information or the response of the reader completely. One 
cannot really use the typical terminology of New Criticism without involving the response of 
the reader. Irony and tension are not “in” a text in the way that words are. Where one reader 
experiences tension, another may not.
New Criticism presented itself as a way of dealing with literature as literature in a critical, academic 
way. It failed, however, to establish any formal distinction between literary and non-literary texts. 
Th is left  an impression of snobbery: literary texts, being texts of a higher class, can be recognized 
only by people of a higher class. Moreover, New Criticism could not explain how the literary 
perspective relates to other valid perspectives. If a poem is a piece of social criticism, it does it 
stop being a poem because of that. To take the poem as a whole seriously one has to take the social 
Fishing for Jonah (Anew)
78
criticism in it seriously, even though that directs one to the world outside the poem. “Inside” and 
“outside” become entangled in such a way that one cannot regard the poem a literature without 
also regarding it in a number of other ways. 
New Criticism presented itself as a way of dealing with literature as literature in a critical, academic 
way. It failed, however, to establish any formal distinction between literary and non-literary texts. 
Th is left  an impression of snobbery: literary texts, being texts of a higher class, can be recognized 
only by people of a higher class. Moreover, New Criticism could not explain how the literary 
perspective relates to other valid perspectives. A poem may be a piece of social criticism. It is not 
a poem because it is social criticism, nor does it stop being a poem because it is social criticism. 
To take the poem as a whole seriously one has to take the social criticism in it seriously, even 
though that directs one to the world outside the poem. “Inside” and “outside” become entangled 
in such a way that one cannot regard the poem as literature without also regarding it in a number 
of other ways. 
As a theoretical basis for literary criticism, New Criticism had many failings. However, the ﬁ ne 
pieces of practical criticism produced within the movement remind us that our practice is oft en 
better than our theories.
5.3 Structuralist approaches
5.3.1 Background and theory
Th e diﬀ erence between American New Criticism and British Practical Criticism, on the one 
hand, and European forms of formalism (of which structuralism is one), on the other hand, 
partly reﬂ ects two academic styles. Th e typically Anglo-American style is commonsensical and 
practical, without complicated theory, terminology or method. Th e European style emphasizes 
theoretical insight and seeks to apply the theory, with appropriate scientiﬁ c terminology and 
method, to practical cases. In the long run, these diﬀ erences of style had deep implications.
Th e early Formalist schools in Europe (the Russian Formalists and the Prague structuralists) 
shared many of the concerns of the New Critics. Th ey too sought ways of analyzing literary texts 
objectively, without depending on personal impressions. Th ey too wished to study literature as 
literature (and not as history, sociology, etc) and found the key in relations between the various 
linguistic elements. Indeed, in later structuralism the focus on the formal relationships among the 
elements was carried to its limit. Th is became the distinguishing feature of structuralism.
Most interpreters of texts – certainly the New Critics – knew that individual words and sentences 
have to be placed “in context”. Although the word “rose” can be a noun (the ﬂ ower) or a verb 
(past tense of “to rise”), the context in which the word appears in a sentence usually tells one 
which meaning is appropriate. Similarly, one should understand sentences in their context in 
paragraphs, paragraphs in their context in chapters, and so on. In short, one has to comprehend 
the part in terms of the whole. Th is basic insight is taken further and radicalized by structuralists. 
According to them, the meaning of a sign is fully determined solely by its place in the context 
of the system of which it is part. Each sign is part of a system of signs and its meaning is not 
determined by anything outside the system. It is determined by the internal relationships among the 
signs within the same system of signs.
If this is so, one cannot, in interpreting a text, rely on a few loose comparisons and contrasts; one 
has to examine systematically the entire network of relationships in the text. At the root of this 
view lies the linguistic theory worked out by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure in his Cours 
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de Linguistique Générale (“Course in General Linguistics”). Th is was ﬁ rst published in 1916, aft er 
Saussure’s death, but it did not immediately have an inﬂ uence outside the circle of professional 
linguists. Later, mainly through the eﬀ orts of Roman Jakobson, it became one of the most 
inﬂ uential books of the twentieth century. Structuralism cannot be understood without a grasp of 
Saussure’s views. Th e following discussion draws on the work of Jonathan Culler (1976:18-52).
(a) Th e arbitrary character of a sign
According to a naive view of language, there is a direct relationship between language and reality. 
Dogs, rivers and tables, for instance, exist in reality. We have a clear concept or impression (a 
mental picture, as it were) of what a dog, a river or a table is. Next, this concept is connected to 
certain material sounds or letters and in this way meaning is conferred on signs. Although the 
material sounds or letters diﬀ er in the diﬀ erent languages, the same basic concepts exist in them 
all. Having seen a dog, for instance, we form the concept “dog”, and then attach to the concept 
a linguistic sign. Th e signs diﬀ er, being “dog” in English, “hond” in Afrikaans, “chien” in French 
and “inja” in isiXhosa, for instance, but the concept and its relationship to the real species of 
animal remains the same. Th is naive view is based on the idea of direct naming: people give 
names to things existing in reality.
According to Saussure, the sign itself consists of two aspects, namely (1) a signiﬁ er (the material 
aspect, the physical sounds or visible letters) and (2) a signiﬁ ed (the conceptual aspect, the 
notions at the level of ideas attached to the sign). He further states that there is no intrinsic 
relationship between a speciﬁ c signiﬁ er and the signiﬁ ed that goes with it. Th e relationship is 
arbitrary. On the face of it, this is not a particularly startling view: we have noted that diﬀ erent 
languages use diﬀ erent words to denote the same concept. Th ere is no reason in logic or in nature 
why a particular signiﬁ er should go with a particular signiﬁ ed. But one has to remember that for 
Saussure the sign is an inseparable unity of signiﬁ er (material aspect) and signiﬁ ed (conceptual 
aspect). It is not simply the “name” that is arbitrarily attached to a “natural” concept; the sign itself 
is arbitrary.
Th us Saussure questions the direct relationship between reality and signs (signiﬁ eds and signiﬁ ers). 
One can compare his view to the naive one in the following way:
Naïve view: (Natural categories intrinsically linked to concepts in the mind) → linguistic “names”
(arbitrarily attached)
Saussure's view: (Signs as arbitrary unity of material signiﬁ ers and conceptual signiﬁ eds) → 
referents in the natural world articulated by the signs
Note that the naïve view brackets concepts with the natural categories outside language, while 
Saussure’s view brackets concepts with the material aspect of signs within language. Furthermore, 
in the naïve view the categories outside language appear ﬁ rst and are subsequently named; in 
Saussure’s view the signs in language come ﬁ rst and make the referents appear by articulating the 
world outside language. Some structuralists and poststructuralists conclude from this that there 
is no connection between language and the extra-linguistic world, that there is an unbridgeable 
gap between words and things. Signs refer to concepts within language, not to anything outside 
language. Critics of this view point out that this is not what Saussure said or suggested. His 
argument was that the study of language as a system should not take categories outside language 
as its starting point, because there is no direct and unambiguous relationship between linguistic 
categories and extra-linguistic ones.
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Th e word “articulate” means, among other things, “to separate into connected sections” or “to 
express in language”. In this case both meanings apply. We can talk about the world only in so 
far as we have separated it into sections or categories and noted the connections among the 
categories. In at least some cases it is clear that we have no categories until our language creates 
them. For instance, we say that a day is made up of 24 hours, each with 60 minutes. But this is an 
arbitrary way of dividing up the day. We could also have said that a day is made up of 10 “huros”, 
each of 50 “nimutes”.
But are days themselves not natural units, determined by the revolving of the earth around its 
axis? To some extent this is true, but note the following: In our system a day starts just aft er 
midnight and runs till the next midnight. According to the system used in the Bible, a day starts 
at sunset and runs till the next sunset.
But is this view plausible? A brief glance at diﬀ erent languages suggests that the languages use 
diﬀ erent words, but apply them to the same list of concepts. Saussure is, however, able to give 
examples to show that no ﬁ xed, stable list of concepts exists in all human brains. Th ese are a few 
of the possible examples:
In British philosophical debates the sentence "Th e cat is on the mat" has been used as an 
example of a perfectly clear, unambiguous statement of fact. Strangely enough, this sentence 
cannot be translated into French without adding a "meaning" that is absent in the English. 
Because French has no gender-neutral word cat, one ﬁ rst has to decide to make the cat either 
male or female (le chat or la chatte). In French, there are two signiﬁ ers, each with a gender 
concept attached to it; in English there is one signiﬁ er without a speciﬁ c gender connotation.
Th e signiﬁ er mouton in French and the signiﬁ er mutton in English both have as signiﬁ ed the 
meat of a sheep. But mouton also refers to the animal itself (a second signiﬁ ed), while English 
uses a diﬀ erent signiﬁ er, sheep, for the animal itself.
In English, light blue and dark blue are marked as two shades of the same colour: a qualiﬁ cation 
is added to the signiﬁ er blue to distinguish between them. In Russian two completely separate 
words (signiﬁ ers) are used for light blue and dark blue, as if they were two independent 
colours. But in Welsh a single word (or signiﬁ er) denotes both shades of blue and shades of 
green.
Furthermore, certain words simply do not have any exact equivalent in any other language. 
Religious concepts, in particular, are nearly impossible to translate, indicating that each 
religious tradition has its own conceptual world. 
Saussure concludes from this that there are no stable signs, ﬁ xed in a set of concepts shared by 
all people. Each language articulates meaning by assigning signiﬁ eds to signiﬁ ers in a unique 
and arbitrary way. Th e connection between a signiﬁ er and a signiﬁ ed is entirely coincidental and 
conventional. It is based on an incidental link between an unlimited stream of signiﬁ ers and a 
similarly undiﬀ erentiated stream of possible meanings.
(b) Th e meaning of signs is deﬁ ned diﬀ erentially 
If the concept (signiﬁ ed) is internal to the sign, how is the meaning of a sign established? As we 
have seen, we cannot look outside language (to the referent) to establish the meaning, because 
the referent itself is established by the sign. According to Saussure, the meaning of a speciﬁ c sign 
depends on the diﬀ erences between this sign and other signs. Saussure used some interesting 
examples to explain this.
In English, the diﬀ erent meanings of the signiﬁ ers river and stream depend on size: the ﬂ ow 
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of water in a river is larger than that in a stream. But the diﬀ erence between the French ﬂ euve
and rivière, however, is that the one ﬂ ows into the sea while the other does not. In some other 
languages this diﬀ erence may depend on the navigability of a ﬂ ow of water, or even on the 
direction or tempo of the ﬂ ow. Th is indicates that the meaning of a sign in a speciﬁ c language 
can be determined only by the diﬀ erences between it and the other signs in the same language 
- not by looking for some or other stable concept (signiﬁ ed).
In a very simple sign system, that of the traﬃ  c light, three coloured lights act as signiﬁ ers, 
each with its signiﬁ ed (meaning). Th e red light means "stop!", but there is nothing inherent 
in the colour red that demands this meaning. A red light in front of a house or building in 
certain areas of a city would indicate an entirely diﬀ erent meaning – that sexual services may 
be bought there. In the system of traﬃ  c lights, red can be given a meaning because of its 
contrast with the green and amber. It has no essential meaning on its own outside the system 
of diﬀ erences. In another system of signs the three colours could have diﬀ erent meanings. 
Meaning, one could conclude, depends on diﬀ erences within a particular system of signs.
Th e way in which signs convey meaning not by some or other essence, but by their respective 
diﬀ erences also becomes apparent in the following examples:
How do we recognize the signiﬁ er bed and connect it to something on which one sleeps? 
Diﬀ erent people will pronounce it diﬀ erently. Aft er all, the very fact that one can recognize 
someone’s voice on the telephone implies that individual people pronounce words diﬀ erently. 
Similarly, in handwriting we do not all form our letters in the same way. According to 
Saussure, the form of the signiﬁ er is not absolutely ﬁ xed; it is also deﬁ ned in terms diﬀ erences 
between signiﬁ ers within the same system of signs. We recognize the signiﬁ er bed (as a place 
for sleeping) if its sound pattern or written form is suﬃ  ciently distinct from that of other 
signiﬁ ers in the system: bad, led, red, bet, beat, wed, etc. Note that confusion does arise when 
the diﬀ erences are not made clear in speech or in writing. Th us bed and bad may sound the 
same when pronounced with the broad accent of the American South. Chinese and Japanese 
people will confuse led and red, because their languages make no distinction between r and 
l.
Th e meaning of the sign "8:30 Cape Town-Bellville train" is not determined by inherent 
characteristics of this train. In fact, this train's speciﬁ c carriages diﬀ er from day to day. It 
could also, on occasion, go further than Bellville. Moreover, if it were ten minutes late (or ten 
minutes early), it would still be identiﬁ ed as the "8:30 Cape Town-Bellville train". It could be 
called such even if it arrives still later; as long as it is not confused with the "9:30 Cape Town-
Bellville train". Th e meanings of this sign are thus determined by its place in a system (the 
railway timetable) in which it diﬀ ers from other signs in the same system. 
Th e game of chess is played with a limited number of pieces: the kings, queens, bishops, 
knights, rooks and pawns. Th e speciﬁ c physical shapes of the pieces are of no importance and 
one gets chess sets with all sorts of diﬀ erently shaped pieces. What is important, however, is 
that the pieces should not be confused with one another. Th e rook, for instance, may be in 
the shape of a tower or of an elephant or of a tank, as long as it can be distinguished from the 
bishops, knights and other pieces.
Th is view may also be applied in the interpretation of the book of Jonah.
We do not learn more about the meaning of the sign “the great city of Nineveh” by collecting 
information about the “physical” city of ancient Nineveh. Th e link between “the great city of 
Nineveh” in the text and the empirical city is indirect. Th erefore the connection between the sign 
and the empirical city does not give us a reliable indication of the meaning the sign “Nineveh” as 
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it appears in this text. Rather, the meaning of “the great city Nineveh” is deﬁ ned by its similarities 
to and diﬀ erences from other signs in the text: the “great wind”, the “great storm”, the “great fear” 
of the sailors, and so on. Its meaning also becomes clearer when “Nineveh” is related to other 
geographical symbols such as the “temple” (in Jerusalem), “Joppa” and “Tarshish”. It is especially 
the contrast between Israel and Nineveh (the symbol of enmity against Israel) that is important 
in establishing the signiﬁ cance of the sign Nineveh in this story. 
Saussure concludes that meaning does not reside in the individual sign, but solely in the 
relationships among signs in the same system. One establishes these relationships by looking 
at the diﬀ erences that make it possible to distinguish between the signs. Th us Saussure says that 
concepts “are purely diﬀ erential, not positively deﬁ ned by their content but negatively deﬁ ned by 
their relationship with other terms of the system” (quoted in Culler 1976:26). In the system of 
language “there are only diﬀ erences, with no positive terms”.
It is fair to say that Saussure’s argument at this point is not merely diﬃ  cult, but, according to many 
critics, confused and faulty. It is indeed true that the diﬀ erences between signs in a system make 
it possible to convey meaning. It is not clear that we acquire meaning by looking at diﬀ erences. In 
the system of chess, the rook is not deﬁ ned by the shape of the piece, but it is deﬁ ned (positively) 
by the way in which it moves according to the rules. You do not learn that by knowing the rules 
according to which the other pieces move and knowing that the rook move is diﬀ erent. Th e 
phrase oft en used by structuralists, “meaning is diﬀ erential,” is vague and misleading.
(c) Language as a system of signs: langue and parole
In principle, Saussure’s argument that individual signs have meaning only within the whole of 
the sign system is meant to apply to all sign systems: dress codes, transport systems, games such 
as chess, and so on. Th e best example of such a sign system is, however, language itself. Although 
we all use language every day, we cannot really say that we deal with language as system every 
day. We deal with language in the form of individual utterances. Even people who have spoken 
English all their lives might never have stopped to consider the English language as a complete 
system of signs.
Saussure deals with this by distinguishing between two aspects of language: langue and parole. 
Parole is language-in-use, language employed as a medium of communication, and it is the form 
in which we meet language in conversations and in texts. Th e typical features of parole are that 
it is employed by individuals and that it appears as an action at a speciﬁ c time. In instances of 
parole, we recognize someone’s individual voice, style of writing or point of view. It is also tied to 
individual limitations: each person has a restricted vocabulary and a limited competence in using 
the language. We use parole for certain kinds of communication: we ask for or provide information, 
give advice, express a view, argue, complain, console, and so on. Th ese communications are 
speciﬁ c to particular times and particular contexts. “Egypt is in North Africa” states a general 
truth, but “I am hungry” applies only at certain times.
Langue, on the other hand, is language-as-system, a network of codes, rules and meanings. It is 
a grammatical system that goes beyond any individual; it is purely formal and does not exist as 
an entity in time and space. Langue belongs to the language community as a whole, although no 
member of the community ever masters it entirely. One does not “see” or “encounter” langue, 
but it governs one’s use of language. Langue is what makes it possible for us to understand a 
sentence in a language we know, although we have never heard that particular sentence before, or 
to formulate new sentences ourselves. In parole people select and combine signs from the system 
of signs (langue).
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It might appear as if parole has priority over langue, because it is the aspect of language we 
encounter every day. But Saussure argues that every instance of parole implies the prior existence 
of a langue (a system of language). In chess the langue is constituted by the rules of the game; 
the parole of chess is the moves made in actual games. It should be clear that chess players are 
interested in playing chess, but one cannot begin to play before one has learned the rules. Langue 
logically comes before parole; therefore Saussure insists that the task of linguistics is to study 
langue. Th e outward manifestations (parole) depend on the underlying system (langue). 
(d) Synchronic and diachronic studies of language as langue
According to Saussure, language as langue oﬀ ers a coherent linguistic system that can be 
objectiﬁ ed and analyzed as such. But langue itself changes over time. If meaning depends on the 
relationships among signs in a system of signs, how does one deal with the changes in the system 
itself? Saussure argues that it is possible to make a cross-section of a language at a given moment, 
thereby capturing the rules and codes as they operate at that moment. Th e basic characteristics 
and rules of the system, as well as the functions of the various signs within the system, can then 
be described.
Saussure describes such an analysis of the linguistic system of signs as it operates at a given 
moment as a synchronic approach. It should be distinguished from a diachronic approach, in 
which historical changes in the system itself are investigated. It is for the very reason that language 
is used (parole) that evolutionary changes take place in the language system (langue): these can 
be investigated diachronically. A diachronic investigation of a game of chess, for instance, would 
describe the shift s (the inﬂ uence of each move) in the system of signs (the pieces on the board 
– not the rules of the game). A synchronic approach would describe the relationship among 
the pieces on the board at a given moment (and deduce from this that one of the players is in 
check).
Saussure assigns a certain priority to a synchronic approach when it comes to the study of the 
meaning of signs. Diachronic studies, for instance etymological studies (studies of the origins of 
words), seldom oﬀ er a clue to the meanings in the present system of signs. If I do not know what 
the word “werewolf ” means, it might help me to know that the ﬁ rst part is from an Old English 
word for “man”, although this information does not replace a current deﬁ nition. But if I do not 
know what the word “world” means, I will not be any wiser if someone tells me that it comes from 
two words that meant “man” (“wer” as in werewolf) and “age”. Nor will I be able to use the word 
“silly” correctly if all I know is that it originally meant “happy” or “blessed” – I must also know 
the contemporary meaning of “foolish” or “simple”. Saussure did not reject diachronic studies 
completely; he himself wrote on the developments in certain languages. He did maintain that the 
meanings of signs are determined only by the relationships among diﬀ erent signs in the same 
system of signs. Th ese relationships have to be studied synchronically.
(e) Semiotics and the adoption of the linguistic model
Saussure himself suggested that all sign systems could be studied according to his linguistic 
theory and proposed that an academic discipline should be developed to “study the life of signs 
within society” (quoted in Culler 1976:90). He wishes to call this new discipline semiology, but 
the name semiotics, previously coined by the American Charles Peirce, was generally adopted in 
the English-speaking world. Although the various approaches in the ﬁ eld of semiotics cannot be 
discussed here, two consequences of the extension of Saussure’s ideas may be noted:
It became clear that sign systems play an important role in all aspects of our lives, although not 
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all signs are linguistic signs in the strict sense. For instance, religious traditions have rituals in 
which certain objects and actions (apart from the words used in the rituals) are meaningful 
to those who participate. In the Christian celebration of the Lord's Supper, the bread and the 
wine should not be taken as mere items of food; they function as signs. Indeed, whenever we 
say that something is meaningful (or signiﬁ cant), we take that something as a sign.
Although language itself (as langue) is an overarching sign system that functions in all texts and 
conversations, it became clear that within the linguistic system there are distinct sub-systems 
with their own rules. For instance, in a prayer one uses linguistic signs, but the special way 
in which one uses them is determined also by the “rules” of prayer. In a similar way, cultural 
rules, rules of politeness and rules regarding speciﬁ c genres impose themselves on our use of 
language. It is not enough to know the general rules of, say, the English language when one 
writes an academic paper. One also has to know the conventions of academic writing, such as 
the correct ways of referencing and drawing up a bibliography.
Structuralism became a general movement when Saussure’s theory of the sign and sign systems 
was applied to diverse disciplines: anthropology, social theory, sociology, literary criticism, 
psychology, and so on. Although each discipline had its own “ﬁ eld”, it was found that the linguistic 
model could be applied to all these ﬁ elds. Th is meant that each ﬁ eld of study was viewed as 
having a langue and various instances of parole based on the langue. Th e langue is the system 
of signs, together with the rules and codes governing their use. Th e instances of parole are the 
manifestations of the underlying system in individual cases. To understand an instance of parole, 
one has to refer to the system that made this particular manifestation possible, although the 
system is not immediately visible.
Roman Jakobson did much to spread Saussure’s views among literary critics and to show how 
these views could be applied. His views inﬂ uenced many of the French structuralists (Greimas, 
Gennette, Barthes, Riﬀ aterre and others). Building on an insight of Saussure, he distinguished 
between the paradigmatic axis (the axis of selection) and the syntagmatic axis (the axis of 
combination) in a text. Th ese two axes are related to the rules that make text construction possible. 
Th e idea and its implications can be illustrated as follows:
How does one gain an understanding of the sentence “Th e dog bit the boy”? Clearly, one does not 
have to see the actual event; the sentence would make sense even if no event of this nature took 
place. Nor do we refer to “the intention in the mind of the author” – which is out of our reach. 
We understand the sentence because it is structured (composed) according to rules of selection 
and combination. Th ese rules allow us to construct innumerable other sentences with the same 
structure, but they also rule out of court certain constructions. 
At the level of selection (on the paradigmatic axis) we ﬁ nd that we can substitute for each word in 
the sentence (or for all of them) another word without changing the structure. For “dog” we could 
have “cat”, “ant”, “snake” and so on. For “bit” we could have “licked”, “followed”, “scared” and so 
on. Th e list of words that can be function at a particular place in this sentence is the paradigm. 
We cannot make sense of “Th e any (or “big” or “at”) bit the boy”; at that point a noun is needed. 
Moreover, we need something that we perceive as able to bite. “Th e ﬂ oor bit the boy” would 
puzzle us.
Th e particular word selected at a point (from the paradigm) is pinned down in its meaning in 
terms of binary oppositions (oppositions of two terms). Th us “boy” has meaning in terms of the 
oppositions human – non-human, male – female and child – adult.
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At the level of combination (on the paradigmatic axis) we ﬁ nd that we can use the same words to 
create a diﬀ erent sentence: “Th e boy bit the dog”. Th is sentence has a meaning diﬀ erent from “Th e 
dog bit the boy” simply because the words are combined in a diﬀ erent order. But “Boy dog the 
bit the” is not a possible combination; it is meaningless. Note also the diﬀ erence between “People 
are there”, “Th ere are people”, “Are there people?” and “Are people there?” Again, systematic, rule-
bound diﬀ erences (contrasts) allow us to grasp the meaning of these sentences.
Finally, we may note how other codes intrude on the process of selection and combination. 
Formally, the sentence “Th e boy bit his sister” follows the pattern of “Th e dog bit the boy”, but our 
understanding of the sentence would be partly determined by social and moral rules that mark 
such behaviour as “bad not good”. And in “Th e boy was bitten by the dog” the emphasis is not 
quite the same as in “Th e dog bit the boy”.
Of course, the analysis of a text is far more complex than the analysis of a sentence, but Structuralists 
hoped to discover the rules that govern the composition of larger units as well. Instead of asking 
what word from what paradigm was selected in a sentence, one can ask what type of plot from 
what list of possible plots was selected in a story. Or one can ask why the events were combined in 
a speciﬁ c order, rather than in another possible order. In Jonah, for instance, one has to ask why 
there is (speciﬁ cally) a scene at sea (and not, for instance, the crossing of a desert). And if Jonah 
fell into a big sleep when he entered the ship, why are we ﬁ rst told about the storm before we are 
told this? Even simple questions about selection and combination help us to get a grip on a text. 
Why speciﬁ cally Jonah, a character who is mentioned elsewhere in the Bible? Why Nineveh and 
not Damascus?
Structural analysis aims primarily at ﬁ nding out how (according to what rules) texts are 
constructed as meaningful units; what the individual texts mean is oft en seen as secondary. Th e 
question “how?” is answered by referring to the network of relationships in the text (parole) and 
the structuring rules that allow certain selections and combinations and disallow others (langue). 
Th e analysis thus moves at both a surface level and a “deeper” level. At both levels, however, the 
emphasis falls on relationships, patterns or networks rather than on individual elements. As a 
result, structuralists oft en present their conclusions in the form of diagrams, graphs or other 
schematic representations.
(e) Structural analysis: Surface structure 
A speciﬁ c text is an instance of language as sign system, but it may also be considered a system 
of signs in its own right. In looking for the meaning of a word in a text it would not do to jump 
immediately to the sign system of language, because the particular word may have gained a special 
meaning within the context of this text. One ﬁ rst has to analyze the internal relationships within 
the system of signs presented by the text. Th e idea is that a text is never a disorganized collection 
of words and sentences. Th e way signs are organized in a text inﬂ uences the meaning of both the 
text as a whole and of its individual parts. Th e question is therefore: how is the meaning of a text 
expressed in its structure? 
To examine the structure of a text is to examine its construction, its literary composition. What 
are the parts and how were they combined? In one form of structural analysis popular among 
biblical interpreters, texts are broken down into small syntactic units called cola or syntagmemes. 
Th e various relationships between two consecutive cola and among bigger groups of cola are then 
analyzed and described. Repetitions of certain prominent words or themes (called vehicles of 
structure) in the text are also noted.
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A structural analysis of the text of Jonah 1:1-3, for instance, would look like this:
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In this example, the following may be noted:
Th e structure of the whole section depends on the basic contrast between colon 1 as a whole and 
cola 2-6. Th e text must be understood in terms of this basic contrast between “go to” and ‘ﬂ ee 
from”. Colon 1.1-1.4 is dependent on colon 1. In colon 1.1-1.3, three equivalent actions are strung 
together. Th is is followed by 1.4 which oﬀ ers the motivation for 1.1-1.3. In cola 2-6, too, a series 
of equivalent actions are listed.
Such a structural analysis of a text provides the basis on which the meaning of text can be 
established. Th e idea is that one can test a particular hypothesis about the meaning of a text by 
using the empirical data in the text (the diﬀ erent cola). Structuralist approaches have pretensions 
of being scientiﬁ c: they oﬀ er a controlled way of understanding a text.
(f) Structuralist approaches: Depth structures in a text
In structuralist approaches, a distinction is sometimes made between the surface structure and the 
so-called depth structure of a text. Most interpreters of the Bible use structural analyses only with 
regard to the surface structure. When structuralism is accepted as a comprehensive philosophical 
framework, one has to go beyond that. 
Structuralism as a philosophy does not regard sign systems as products of human creativity. 
Language is not generated by people; people are generated by language structures. Human 
frameworks of thought and horizons of comprehension are determined by a system of signs 
of which they themselves form only a part. All human behaviour and experiences are concrete 
manifestations of and are subconsciously regulated by underlying conventions, ordering principles 
and social codes or rules. We live and think within the basic contrasts (or “binary oppositions”) 
of our sign systems. 
Th e meaning of signs is determined by other signs in the surface structure, enabling us to make 
sense of texts. But these relationships among signs are further conditioned at an unconscious 
level by a set of deeper-lying contrasts, which enable us to make sense of ourselves, our lives 
and our world. Contrasts between male and female, subject and object, life and death, nature 
and culture, good and evil, God and human being, friend and enemy, hero and villain would be 
typical examples. Oft en these binary oppositions are linked to one another in a complex system, 
so that, in some cultures, male is to female as culture is to nature and as life is to death. By means 
of such linkages we order our world and classify our experiences in it.
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On the other hand, in our actual lives we cannot simply choose one half of the binary opposition 
and reject the other half. Our culture is built upon nature and in our lives we have to come to 
terms with death. Th erefore texts – and particularly those texts to which we attach particular 
importance, such as sacred texts and myths – pay great attention to both ordering themes and 
ideas into opposites and mediating between opposites. Oft en important texts deal – sometimes 
at a hidden level - with the “great opposites” and with the transformation of the structures of 
opposition which make transition possible. Th e following examples should make the point 
clear:
Th e joining of male and female sexually (in intercourse) and socially (in marriage) and the 
passing from death to life (birth) and from life to death (dying) are perennial themes in texts and 
are marked by special rituals in practically all religious traditions. Th e rejection and exclusion of 
evil and the atonement (expiation, purging) that brings about reconciliation and re-integration 
is another typical theme in literature and religion. Less obviously mediation between opposites is 
involved in cooking: nature (the raw) is transformed into culture (the cooked). Indeed, in some 
cultures cooking is a ritual with religious undertones and the ﬁ re in the hearth (the mediator) is 
regarded as sacred.
Th e depth structure oft en manifests itself at the surface (for instance, in a text) in a coded form. 
For instance, life and death may be represented through symbols in a text that does not mention 
life and death at all. Th e depth structure cannot, therefore, be directly deduced from the data 
provided by the surface of the text; it is rather to be found in the ordering principles which are 
presupposed in the text, but are not always directly expressed in it.
Th e following example may make the distinction between surface structure and depth structure 
even clearer: imagine a woman in a beautiful party dress with all the accessories. We may consider 
all the items of clothing as a structured whole, noting how each item ﬁ ts with the other items. For 
instance, her scarf, beautiful in itself, may clash with the dress, or her handbag, not particularly 
fancy, may go perfectly with the outﬁ t. In this analysis we consider each item in its relationship to 
the outﬁ t as a whole and assign meaning to it on that basis.
Having decided that her outﬁ t as a whole ﬁ ts together beautifully, we place her in a social setting, 
say, at an important horse race. Her clothing now marks her as a wealthy spectator who is there 
to show oﬀ  her fashionable attire. It distinguishes her from the jockeys in their uniforms, the 
waiters who serve the drinks, the stable hands, and so on. We have now considered her outﬁ t as 
signiﬁ cant from another perspective: it follows a particular dress code as opposed to other dress 
codes that may be found at the same event. If, in this setting, she were to serve drinks or rub 
down the horses in such an outﬁ t it would be found strange indeed. In this case we have viewed 
her outﬁ t as an instance of parole based on an underlying langue (the sign system of clothing as 
a whole).
Finally, we place her in an African jungle where, with the help of a half-naked local tribesman, 
she is trying to escape from a gang of poachers. Obviously her ﬂ imsy dress (already torn!) and 
high-heeled shoes are out of place, but this may not be the main point. We are probably in a 
story that stages the opposition culture-nature (and possible also life-death and male-female). 
Her “culture” has become a liability and the wealth represented by her clothes is useless in this 
setting. We can already suspect that the tribesman will become a mediator, helping her to ﬁ nd a 
new perspective on the opposition culture-nature. It does not matter that the story is likely to be 
popular melodrama. Th e same binary oppositions operate in high literature, although they are 
packaged in a more sophisticated way. Here we are not considering her outﬁ t “in itself ” or as one 
dress code among others, but as vehicle of the depth structure of the text.
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5.3.2 Jonah in the light of a structural-analytical approach
In structural-analytical approaches, the emphasis falls especially on the literary structure and 
composition of texts. Since the book of Jonah is a highly artistic composition, one could expect it 
to show an array of intricate structuring devices. It is not possible to pay attention to all of them 
here or to go into all the technical distinctions of a structural approach. Th e following examples 
should be suﬃ  cient:
(a) Th e composition of the whole 
One possible analysis of the total structure can be represented as follows:
Part A Part B
1:1-3
Th e calling of Jonah
3:1-3
Th e calling of Jonah
1:4-16
Jonah and the pagans (the crew) on the ship
3:4-4:5
Jonah and the pagans (the Ninevites) in the 
city
2:1-11
Jonah and God outside the boat
4:6-11
Jonah and God outside the city
(b) Elements common to parts A and B
Th ere are a number of striking parallels between the two main parts of the book of Jonah:
Each part starts with Jonah's calling (1:1 and 3:1). Th e two commissions diﬀ er slightly: Jonah 
is ordered in 1:2 to preach "against" Nineveh, while in 3:2 he is ordered to preach only "to" 
Nineveh. In chapter three there is also no mention of Nineveh's wickedness.
Jonah reacts in 1:3 by ﬂ eeing, but in 3:3 by obeying.
A storm strikes the pagans at sea, and a "storm" strikes the city of Nineveh aft er Jonah's 
message. Th e theme of wind is repeated: the windstorm at sea in chapter 1 and the desert 
wind that scorches Jonah in chapter 4.
Jonah gives a (somewhat unwilling) "testimony" in both 1:9 and 3:4.
Jonah's own comfort is more important to him than the plight of the pagans: he goes to sleep 
in the hold of the ship (1:5), and he builds himself a little shelter against the hot sun while 
waiting to see what is going to happen to Nineveh (4:5). While Jonah is "sitting" comfortably 
in the shade, the king of Nineveh is also "sitting" - in sackcloth and ashes.
Th e subjects (the sailors and the people of Nineveh) act independently from (and in 
anticipation of) the rulers (the ship's captain and the king of Nineveh).
Th e pagans "cast" things oﬀ , the sailors "cast" oﬀ  the ship's cargo, the king climbs down from 
his throne and "casts" oﬀ  his cloak. Yahweh also "casts" a storm upon the sea (1:4 literally in 
the Hebrew). Jonah asks the sailors to "cast" him into the sea, which they proceed to do.
Both the captain and the king hope that God should consider them so that they would not die 
(1:6, 3:9). In both cases there is a formula of uncertainty (perhaps; who knows?) 
Th e pagans' reactions are surprisingly positive each time. In chapter 1 the pagan sailors, 
amazingly, come to believe in Yahweh. Th is serves as an overture to chapter 3 in which the 
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impossible, the quite unthinkable (at least for any loyal Jew), in fact happens: Nineveh as a 
whole comes to repentance.
Th e pagans' ﬁ nal reaction includes, in both parts, three kinds of activity through which they 
serve Yahweh (compare 1:16 and 3:5f):
religious actions: prayers;
ritual actions: the oﬀ ering of sacriﬁ ces/fasting and mourning;
ethical actions: innocent blood should not be spilt (1:14); there should be remorse about 
the blood that has already been spilt (3:8). In contrast to this, Jonah calls for blood 
vengeance (4:2).
All three of these elements are important: in Israel’s history the third element had been 
neglected all too oft en.
In both parts the pagans are saved because the storm subsides (1:15), and because the anger 
of Yahweh against Nineveh subsides (3:10).
In both parts a change in location takes place: from a situation where Jonah is in the midst of 
pagans to a more private dialogue between God and Jonah.
In each part Jonah is in terrible distress: he ends up in a stormy sea, and he is burnt by a 
scorching sun and a desert wind.
Jonah is in the belly of the ﬁ sh for three days (1:17) and passes through Nineveh in three days 
(this being implied in 3:3).
Two "didactic miracles" take place: Jonah is saved by a ﬁ sh and by a miraculous plant.
Jonah chooses or prefers to die (1:12, 4:3, 8, and 9).
In the ﬁ rst part Jonah does not get what he deserves; in the second part Nineveh, the wicked 
city, does not get what it deserves. Both cases illustrate God's mercy.
Both parts end with a question the reader would have wanted to ask: what is Jonah going to 
do now?
Th e ﬁ rst and last verses of the book as a whole are also symmetrical: chapter 1:1 is about the 
judgment that Nineveh deserves; chapter 4:11 is about Yahweh's mercy for Nineveh.
(c) Th e composition of the parts (including concentric structures)
Chapter 1:4-16
Th is section has a most interesting concentric structure. It can be sketched as follows:
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A) Narrative: storm arises and theme of fear (4-5a)
 B) Prayers of sailors (5a): each to his own god
  C) Narrative: sailors in the storm (5b-6a)
   D) Words of the captain (6b): the cause of the storm
    E) Words of sailors (7a)
     F) Narrative (7b): the lot falls on Jonah
      G) Words of sailors (8): question to Jonah
       H) Jonah’s confession
      G) Words of sailors (10a-b): Jonah’s reaction
     F) Narrative (10c): Why the lot fell on Jonah
    E) Words of sailors (11)
   D) Words of Jonah (12): I am the cause of the storm
  C) Narrative: sailors in the storm (13)
 B) Prayers of sailors (14): all pray to Yahweh
A) Narrative: storm subsides and theme of fear (15-16a)
Th e concentric elements show interesting parallels:
A) Th e two sections of narrative indicate the beginning and the end of the storm. Th e wind is 
“cast” on the sea and Jonah is “cast” into the sea. Th e outer edges of the concentric structure 
deal with the interaction between Yahweh and the sailors, in which Jonah is not involved.
B) Th e prayers of the sailors are at ﬁ rst addressed to their own gods, but later to Yahweh.
C) During the storm the sailors try to save themselves by technical means.
D) It is not clear whether some form of parallel between the words of the captain and the 
words of Jonah can be identiﬁ ed.
E-G) In the two sets of the sailors’ utterances, their fear continues to grow.
Th is schematic representation makes it clear that Jonah and his “confession of faith” are the 
focus of this section. In Jonah’s confession it is striking that he ﬁ rst emphasizes his ethnic ties 
(“A Hebrew am I”) and only then proceeds to say who his God is (“I serve Yahweh, the God 
of heaven who made the sea and the dry land”). Th is tends to conﬁ rm the view that Jonah was 
a Jewish nationalist for whom his people were more important than either the sailors or the 
people of Nineveh (enemies of Israel). Note too the irony in his confession of faith: how can 
you say that God created the sea when you are trying to escape from this God by sea?
Chapter 1:17-2:10
Jonah's "psalm" has three stanzas. In the ﬁ rst two stanzas (2:2-4 and 2:5-7), four themes are 
repeated, namely:
Jonah's prayer to Yahweh,
Jonah's plight as a drowning man: rivers, waters and the primal deep engulf him,
Jonah's separation from God and his falling prey to the realm of death,
Jonah's remembrance of God and the temple in the midst of his distress.
Th e third stanza links up with the following themes from the end of chapter 1:
Th e relationship between the pagans and God,
Th e oﬀ ering of sacriﬁ ces to Yahweh,
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Th e making of vows to Yahweh.
Jonah’s abhorrence of the denial of Yahweh by pagans is ironic - especially since the reader is 
already aware of what happened at the end of chapter one.
Th e following further parallels can be identiﬁ ed in chapters 1 and 2:
Crisis (the storm, Jonah in the sea),
Prayer (the pagans and Jonah pray to their gods/ God?),
Salvation (the storm subsides and Jonah is spewed out by the ﬁ sh),
Vows, sacriﬁ ces and prayers are oﬀ ered to Yahweh.
c) Other concentric structures
Scholars have also identiﬁ ed other concentric structures in Jonah. For instance, 3:4 to 4:5 may 
be concentrically structured. Th e section begins when Jonah enters the city and ends when 
he leaves it. Th e king’s implicit “confession of guilt” (3:7-9) constitutes the centre. Th is invites 
comparison with Jonah's confession in 1:9.
A concentric structure can also be identiﬁ ed in 4:2-11. Th e section begins with Jonah’s words 
(4:2-3) and ends with Yahweh’s words (4:10-11). Yahweh’s action (4:7-8a) stands at the centre. 
Th e interplay of words and actions (and Jonah’s changing moods) is prominent in this section. 
Readers are invited to work out the details of these two concentric structures for themselves.
A more complex analysis of chapters 3 and 4 would look like this (with the focus on the dialogical 
nature of chapter 4):
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Note how contrasts such as those between Jonah’s anger and God’s mercy, and between life and 
death, function in this structure. Note too how certain themes keep cropping up: the plant (*) and 
the people and animals of Nineveh (#), for instance.
(d) Some vehicles of structure
Th e following themes occur repeatedly in the book as a whole:
Life and death: God saves the lives of the sailors, and of Jonah, and of the Ninevites. Th e 
sailors and the king pray to their gods/God that their lives might be spared. Jonah prefers to 
die: in the ship, in the city, under the tree/plant (that dies itself). Compare Moses and Elijah’s 
requests to die (Numbers 11:15, 1 Kings 19:4).
Prayers: Th ere are many prayers: those of the sailors, that of Jonah in the ﬁ sh, those of the 
Ninevites, that of Jonah in the city, that of Jonah outside the city. It is interesting to compare 
the notions about god, God and Yahweh expressed in the respective prayers. Th e sailors, for 
instance, pray “each to his god” in 1:5, but in 1:14 they pray to Yahweh. Th e Ninevites also pray 
to God and “this god” reacts to their prayers.
Sacriﬁ ces: Th e sailors “sacriﬁ ce” their cargo to the sea (to save themselves and Jonah), Jonah is 
thrown overboard as a “sin oﬀ ering”, the sailors sacriﬁ ce to God aft er the storm has subsided, 
in the ﬁ sh Jonah promises sacriﬁ ces to God (2:9), and the Ninevites bring sacriﬁ ces to God.
Fear: Th e sailors fear the storm in 1:5, Jonah says that he “fears” Yahweh, the sailors fear 
when they hear this, and when the storm is ﬁ nally stilled they are ﬁ lled with a great fear of 
Yahweh.
Anger/evil: (in Hebrew the same word can denote both): In 1:1 we hear that the evil of the city 
of Nineveh (the city of violence and cruelty) has angered Yahweh. A storm rages at sea (1:4), 
the sailors ask Jonah why this evil (disaster) has struck them and the raging storm ﬁ nally 
subsides. Th e king of Nineveh wonders whether God might not perhaps cease being angry 
(3:9); Nineveh repents of its evil ways. God sees that Nineveh has turned away from its evil 
ways (3:10), therefore God too turns around and averts the evil (the disaster) that had been 
intended for Nineveh. In 4:1 Jonah is angry when God spares Nineveh, Israel’s archenemies, 
but he rejoices at the miraculous plant. Twice Yahweh asks Jonah whether he has any reason 
to be angry – initially, because the city had been spared (4:4) and later, because the plant had 
withered (4:9). In both cases Jonah avers that his anger is justiﬁ ed (again in 4:9). It is as if the 
evil/anger of Nineveh had rubbed oﬀ  on Jonah.
Grace and mercy: God shows grace to the sailors, to Jonah, to the people of Nineveh, and to 
their animals. Compare, too, the grace of the sailors to Jonah when they try their level best 
to save him. Jonah shows an extraordinarily great concern for the miraculous plant (4:10), 
but a lack of mercy for the people of Nineveh. Jonah’s problem is precisely that Yahweh is too 
gracious and merciful to each and everybody (4:2). On the other hand there is an element of 
judgment that strikes at least the possessions of the sailors and the miraculous plant.
God's power: Although the word “power” is never explicitly used in the book of Jonah, the 
image of God’s power is constantly held up to view: God has the power to send a storm at 
sea and to let it abate; to create heaven and earth, sea and dry land (1:9); to use a great ﬁ sh, a 
miraculous plant and a tiny worm as instruments; and to instill a sense of awe in both groups 
of pagans.
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(e) Outline of a depth structure in the book of Jonah
One does not speculate about the depth structure in Jonah to get a better understanding of the 
unique message of the book, but to identify the structures and structural transformations it 
shares with many ostensibly very diﬀ erent texts. At the foundation of this book one encounters 
contrasts or binary oppositions that underlie many diﬀ erent narratives. Humans, being products 
of rule-bound systems based on these binary oppositions, have to give come to terms with these 
oppositions. Th ey can do so in many ways, but – because of the systematic rules – not in any 
way.
Many interpreters have concluded that the opposition “Israelite-heathen” is the central theme of 
the book. Some have added that the problem of dealing with foreign nations became particularly 
acute in the post-exilic period, when Israel had lost its political independence and had to submit 
itself to the superior power of heathen rulers. But the binary opposition “insider-outsider” is not 
bound to an historical context. It can apply (as it does here) to one national and religious identity 
as opposed to other national and religious identities; it can also apply to personal identity as 
opposed to the “outside” forces of society. In virtually all cases the “insider” position is considered 
precious because it confers identity, yet some accommodation with the “outside” is a practical 
necessity.
Th e “insider” position is treasured because it is associated with life and goodness, while “outside” 
is the threatening sphere of evil and death. Th us in the book of Jonah “Israel” is the side of life, of 
goodness and of true religion, while “Nineveh” is the side of death, evil and opposition to Yahweh. 
Yet there is a dark side to “insider identity” that can be described by the binary opposition 
between “relationships” and “isolation”. When Jonah insists too strongly on rejecting contact with 
outsiders, he becomes progressively more isolated – from Yahweh, from Israel and from himself 
(in the deep sleep). In the second half of the book, something similar happens: Jonah, having 
isolated himself from Nineveh, rejects Yahweh and chooses death (the ultimate isolation).
Both these binary oppositions (“insider-outsider” and “relationship-isolation”) are related to a 
third one, namely that between “justiﬁ cation” and “guilt”. “Justiﬁ cation” (or vindication) maintains 
life, identity and relationship: the justiﬁ ed person has a legitimate place in the community. “Guilt” 
leads to exclusion from relationships (the casting out of the sinner), loss of identity and death. 
Nineveh’s guilt should lead to its exclusion and destruction (1:2; 3:4). But Jonah’s guilt (his 
disobedience) should also lead to his death, and therefore he is cast into the depths of the sea. 
In the second half Jonah again rebels against Yahweh and judges for himself that death is all that 
is left  to him. His own individual identity (his “word” in 4:2) cannot sustain him in his isolation 
from Nineveh, his people and Yahweh.
Th roughout the book the word of Yahweh mediates between the opposites. Th e book starts and 
ends with Yahweh’s words. Nineveh is saved when its people believe the word that came from 
Yahweh (4:5). Th is word, however, calls for a response. When Jonah ﬂ ees without a word, Yahweh 
commands a storm and a monstrous ﬁ sh, which we expect will bring him certain death. But when 
Jonah prays in the belly of the ﬁ sh (thereby entering into relationship again), Yahweh’s command 
turns the instrument of death into a vehicle of salvation. When Jonah responds positively to 
Yahweh’s command in chapter 3, Jonah’s word of destruction also becomes (indirectly) a word of 
salvation.
New relationships are established by means of the word. One could also say that his word provides 
the means of judging questions of guilt and justiﬁ cation, death and life, outside and inside. Th ose 
who respond to Yahweh’s word (as the sailors and the people in Nineveh did and as Jonah did 
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in chapter 2) are led back into the world of relationships, of justiﬁ ed action and life. Identity 
then becomes redeﬁ ned as religious identity, which is deﬁ ned in terms of how they respond to 
Yahweh’s word.
Th e point of this analysis only becomes clear when we see how it enables comparisons with 
other transformations of the same structural components. We may note (very brieﬂ y) how the 
Indian religious philosophy of Advaita Vedanta deals with the same problematic. In this system 
the question of identity is posed more broadly: who am I in relation to everything outside me? 
Why is it that the more I act, the more my acts (in as much as they are mine) tie me to a world of 
exclusive categories and potential enmity, competition and conﬂ ict? Here physical death is not 
the main problem; the enemy is the spiritual death of being tied to a cycle of rebirths (samsara) 
which always leads me back to my isolated position in the world of “things”. My actions (karma), 
good or bad, cannot allow me to break free, because (being my actions alone) they conﬁ rm my 
isolation.
Th e answer is found (in most forms of Advaita Vedanta) in a deliberate withdrawal from action 
in the world and an ascetic self-isolation. Th is reaches its climax in deep meditation, in which 
I reach the state of samadhi (literally, “being with yourself ”). But it is precisely in this state that 
I realize that my true self (Atman) is identical with the impersonal Ultimate Reality (Brahman). 
Since Brahman is not a distinct thing or person, but everything, my identity with Brahman is 
my identity with everything. I recognize that the world of separate entities is an illusion (maya) 
created by my ignorance (avidya). Th e mediator here is true existential knowledge (vidya), which 
allows me to experience myself as one with the cosmic whole.
Th ose who adopt structuralism as a philosophy would argue that the book of Jonah and Advaita 
Vedanta represent two diﬀ erent but equivalent ways of dealing with certain binary oppositions 
that structure our lives. Being the product of these structuring oppositions, we cannot but deal 
with them in some way, but there is no reason to prefer one way to another. 
5.3.3 Observations and evaluation
Many early structuralists were on the left  of the political spectrum. In their view one of the 
merits of structuralism was that it exposed various forms of elitism by showing that "high" 
and "low" texts, "advanced" and "primitive" cultures, are all constructions based on the same 
structural rules. Th e privileged position accorded to certain texts, cultural practices or ways 
of behaving is not based on inherent or naturally given superiority. Th ese texts, practices and 
ways of behaving are simply some of the many possible ways of expressing meaning according 
to the underlying rules of sign systems. Other expressions would be equally meaningful. 
In particular, structuralist theory undermined the notion of specially “gift ed” authors or 
interpreters whose “insights” place them beyond the common mass. All authors obey the 
same rules of selection and combination; all trained (rather than gift ed) interpreters can 
analyze their writings.
Ironically, in the ﬁ eld of biblical interpretation structuralist approaches were eagerly adopted 
by conservative interpreters, some of whom paid little attention to the theoretical grounding of 
structuralism. Using the tools of structural analysis, such interpreters were able to write highly 
technical articles and commentaries on biblical texts, while avoiding awkward historical-
critical questions. Sometimes the new perspective brought to light things that had previously 
been overlooked. Sometimes, however, the impression was created that the presence of 
diﬀ erent voices in the text, the contexts in which these voices spoke and the diﬀ erent ideologies 
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they expressed could be ignored, as long as one could ﬁ nd some “structure” in the text and 
represent it by means of a diagram.
Th e greatest value of the structuralist approach is that it forces one to deal systematically
with every aspect of the text. Instead of focusing on a particularly artistic metaphor here 
and a striking contrast there, structural analysis seeks to account for all the diﬀ erent literary 
components in a text. Th is highly disciplined approach can also produce an appreciation of 
and interest in the artistic composition of a text (as it does in the case of Jonah). Th is does not 
yet clarify the meaning of a text for any particular audience. Moreover, the task of revealing 
fully all the rules by which a text was composed is enormous, even if the text is brief. Aft er 
many pages of analysis of a short passage, one still wonders whether all aspects have been 
covered.
Structuralist approaches claimed that it is possible to determine how a text makes meaning 
in a systematic and controlled (scientiﬁ c) way. In this respect structuralism was a positivistic 
enterprise. Th is claim to scientiﬁ c precision was, however, undermined by the implausibility of 
some of the conclusions they reached and by disagreements among structuralists themselves. 
Clearly the diﬀ erent contexts of readers also inﬂ uence analysis. An interes ting example of this 
is the inﬂ uence of structuralism itself. Structuralists usually discover some neat structure in 
a text because (on account of their presuppositions) they want to ﬁ nd such a structure. As a 
result, the ﬁ ndings oft en appear somewhat forced.
Th e technical distinctions and terminology employed in structuralist approaches render 
them obscure to all but a small circle of adepts. Had structuralists agreed to a single standard 
terminology, this problem would not have been fatal: in practice each structuralist developed 
her or his own terminology. It is no wonder, therefore, that the results of structuralist studies 
are oft en ignored or regarded as irrelevant in other circles.
Structuralism was a brief fashion. It ﬂ ourished in the early 1960's, but by the end of the decade 
it was already losing its appeal. Th is makes it easy to overlook its lasting inﬂ uence. Much of 
what structuralism taught us is now accepted as self-evident, even by those who do not call 
themselves structuralists. For instance, instead of taking a particular passage in a text as a 
chance product of nature or a unique reﬂ ection of the author's mind, we now ask ourselves 
what rules of selection and combination operate in the passage and how the particular 
selections and combinations inﬂ uence the meaning. Th e particularly valuable contribution of 
structuralist ideas to the study of narratives will be examined in the next section.
5.4 Narrative approaches
5.4.1 Background and theory
Since the 1930’s there has been a growing reaction within secular literary studies against the 
excessive emphasis on the historical aspects of the interpretation of texts. (Th is development 
has already been discussed in the introduction to chapter 5 above.) Increasingly the idea was 
propagated that a literary work is a work of art and should be appreciated as such. Th e assumption 
that the author’s intention is decisive in the interpretation event was shelved. Th e historical 
circumstances within which the text originated, and more particularly the speciﬁ c circumstances 
of the author, need not be taken into account in the understanding of the text. Once the literary 
work has been completed, it assumes a life of its own. Th is assumption of the independence of 
the literary work as a work of art started pushing the interest in the world of production of texts 
into the background.
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In due course this view started inﬂ uencing the interpretation of biblical texts as well. Although 
a thoroughly literary interest in biblical texts has emerged as an articulated position only during 
the last thirty years or so, the appreciation of the literary qualities of the Bible goes back a long 
way. Th ough initially some attention was given to certain literary aspects of the Bible in a sporadic 
and random way, an increasing number of voices started calling for the recognition of the Bible 
as literature.
Th e interest in the literary qualities of the Bible is not conﬁ ned to one level only as these manifest 
themselves at various levels (see the discussion above in section 5.1). Some interpreters, for 
instance, focus on the semiotic-structural components of a literary work. Others emphasize the 
stylistic and aesthetic aspects, yet others certain narrative aspects in the text. Th e common factor 
in all these approaches is the importance attached to the literary aspects of biblical texts: the text 
itself is the point of departure for the discovery of the meaning of the text. In this discussion the 
focus falls on the approaches that try to reach a better understanding of the narrative literature 
of the Bible. A “narrative approach” (sometimes called a narratological approach) thus entails 
a sensitivity to the the presentation and development of the story itself. In a certain sense one 
could say that, whereas the structuralists focused their attention on the linguistic structures in 
texts, narrative analyses are also looking at structures, but then at the level of story-telling. In the 
discussion of the book of Jonah in the light of a narrative approach, some attention will also be 
given to certain elements of style that can play a role in this type of interpretation.
It is important to note that up to now narrative approaches have not been methodologically 
circumscribed or deﬁ ned with great precision. Th ere is no “standardized” narrative approach. 
Th is can be ascribed partly to the relative newness of this approach to textual interpretation, and 
partly to the particular nature of this type of approach.
Th e following narrative aspects are usually considered in this approach:
(a) Plot/story line
Some literary critics (in the Anglo-Saxon sense of the term) are of the opinion that this is the 
most important aspect of narrative texts. For any narrative to be a narrative, it has to have a story 
line or plot. Without this it would not be considered a narrative.
In his description of narratives, Aristotle tried to indicate that there is such a thing as a story line or 
plot. His deﬁ nition of plot was that it referred to the ordered succession of events in the narrative. 
In other words, in any narrative one can, by deﬁ nition, identify certain moments that together 
form an ordered unit. Aristotle had already broadly distinguished between the beginning, the 
middle and the end of the narrative.
In more modern theories these distinctions have been considerably reﬁ ned, and include signiﬁ cant 
moments of the plot such as introduction, inciting moment, working out/complication, climax, 
turning point, descending action, denouement and conclusion. Nor do all these moments 
necessarily have to occur in all narratives. Analysis of the plot/story line helps the interpreter 
in two important ways. Firstly, it enables the interpreter of narratives to get a grip on the line of 
tension in the narrative. Secondly, and closely connected to this, it provides a way of identifying 
the changes the narrative wishes to bring about, whether these are changes in knowledge 
(that is, by the end of the story the reader knows more), changes in values (which concern the 
development of the characters’ values and also the values of the reader) or changes in situation 
(those concerning the events recounted in the narrative).
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(b) Characters
A narrative normally features characters. Th e plot emerges precisely when characters are described 
in their relationships to themselves, to other characters and to events. Biblical narratives are no 
exception. One has to be forewarned, however, that biblical narratives show far less interest in 
the psychological aspects of characters than modern narratives do. In biblical narratives the 
characters serve the story line; they are seldom employed in the narrative for the purpose of ﬁ xing 
the attention on the characters themselves.
Not all characters necessarily function in the same way in a narrative and therefore a distinction 
between diﬀ erent types of characters is commonly made. Th ere are diﬀ erent versions of this 
distinction. Some simply distinguish between “round” characters (characters that are described in 
some detail, that undergo development during the narrative, of whom more than one dimension 
is revealed to the readers) and “ﬂ at” characters (characters that act in a purely functional way 
in the narrative, that do not undergo character development, of whom little is said). A variation 
on this bipartite distinction is the tripartite model that distinguishes between “fully-ﬂ edged 
characters”, “types” and “agents”. Th e “fully-ﬂ edged” character is a complex one, of whom the 
narrative shows a number of traits and qualities. Th e “type” is described only in terms of one 
feature of her character, one that is of particular importance to the story line. Th e “agent” is little 
more than a function of the plot; nothing is actually recounted about a character of this type.
A yet more reﬁ ned model of distinguishing between character types in narratives is the actant 
model. Th is model developed from Russian formalism and particularly Vladimir Propp’s analysis 
of a number of Russian folktales. It is applied especially in structuralist approaches to narratives. 
According to this model, certain thematic roles may be distinguished in a narrative. For instance, 
in all stories we ﬁ nd somebody (a sender or subject) who wants to establish something (an object) 
with respect to someone else (a recipient). In this process there are oft en other characters who 
function on the side of the sender (helpers) in the attempt to achieve the goal. On the other 
hand, there are also oft en characters who wish to prevent the sender from achieving the goal 
(opponents). Th ese various roles may be taken by diﬀ erent characters, but one character may take 
more than one role.
Using the well-known story of “Little Red Riding Hood”, the model can be explicated as follows. 
Th e mother acts as the sender/subject sending the nice food (object) to the grandmother 
(recipient). Little Red Riding Hood (helper) has to carry out the task, but along the way she is 
led astray by the wolf (opponent). Ultimately the forester (another helper) comes to save the day. 
Th us the roles relate to one another in the following way:
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Th is model not only oﬀ ers the possibility of distinguishing the thematic roles of the characters; 
it also attempts to establish a link between character types and story line. By discussing these 
thematic roles within a narrative, one has already said much about its structure.
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(c) Th e role of the narrator
Modern literary theories oft en distinguish between i) the real author, ii) the implied author, iii) 
the narrator, iv) the narrative, v) the narrator’s audience, the narratee, vi) the implied reader, and 
vii) the real reader. Th e following diagram explicates these distinctions:
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Before we look at the role of the narrator, a brief explanation of the distinctions between the real 
and implied author and the real and implied reader is in order.
Th e real and the implied author
Th e real author of a narrative is the person responsible for its origin. When a real author 
creates a narrative, she projects something of her own world onto the text. Th e real author is 
indeed outside the text, yet there is something of the author present within the text, so that 
one constantly becomes aware of the imprint or "voice" of the author as one is reading. Th is 
projection of the real author, the implied author, is not, however, identical to the real author. 
Th e values, norms, interests and world-view of the implied author as reﬂ ected in the narrative 
do not necessarily coincide with the values, norms, interests and world-view of the real 
author. It is possible, for instance, that someone should write a novel in which homosexuality 
is sympathetically portrayed although the real author may, in fact, be quite opposed to it.
Th us the implied author does not refer to the real author (who can be known only through 
historical reconstruction of the world behind the text). Rather, the implied author is a literary 
construction made by the present-day reader on the basis of the narrative itself. To rephrase: an 
historical approach is interested in the real author (behind the text), while a literary approach 
focuses on the implied author - using only the data provided by the text itself.
Th e real and the implied reader
Th e same distinction applies with regard to the real (empirical) reader and the implied reader. 
Th e real reader (today, or in the past) is the reader who physically takes up the book and reads 
it. 
Each narrative includes an invitation to readers to share an experience, to imagine and 
construct a state of aﬀ airs, to get in touch with certain values, feelings, decisions and views 
of life. Th e author cannot, of course, control who is going to read the narrative. Th e narrative 
may be intended for an audience quite diﬀ erent from the one that ends up actually reading it. 
A text may indicate in numerous ways for what readers it was intended and what reactions are 
expected from the readers. In these ways the envisaged readers of a text are "written into" the 
text, just as the author is "written into" the text. In other words, the implied author assumes an 
ideal, implied reader, who is not necessarily identical to the empirical reader.

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It is possible to build up an image of the readers for whom the text was actually meant. Th is 
"implied reader" can be inferred from by interpreting the text itself.
Although these distinctions may help to interpret the intended eﬀ ects of a text, there are 
many scholars who believe that they are not necessarily of much use when it comes to the 
interpretation of ancient texts such as the Bible. As there is little historical evidence bearing 
on the majority of biblical texts, the search for the real author is oft en regarded as speculative. 
In such cases the analysis of the real author and the implied author may coincide more or less 
fully. Th e distinction between the narrator and the implied author is also oft en suspended 
- especially where the narrative does not indicate a speciﬁ c narrator.
Th e narrator and the audience
In spite of these diﬀ erences of opinion, there is agreement about the importance of the role of 
the narrator for the understanding of narratives. What is a narrator?
Th e narrator is more than simply someone who tells a story to a particular audience. It is 
rather a speaker who appeals to an ideal audience to react to certain aspects of the narrative 
in a certain way. Th e narrator is not necessarily someone of ﬂ esh and blood; it is the voice that 
controls the narrative. Th e role of the narrator can be illustrated by means of the metaphor 
of the ﬁ lm. Th e narrator is the eye of the camera that determines what information will be 
passed on to the audience. At times it provides a close-up, at other times a survey. At times the 
events are followed closely and in detail; at other times certain events are deliberately passed 
over and thus kept from the audience.
Sometimes one of the (main) characters in the narrative is the narrator. Th e story is then told 
from the perspective of that character (in the ﬁ rst person). Th e narrator, however, does not 
necessarily have to be explicitly portrayed in every narrative. In fact, this happens very seldom 
in the narratives of the Bible. Th is does not mean that the narrator does not play a role in such 
narratives: whenever a story is told, the role of a narrator is presupposed.
Obviously the narrator is not identical to the real author. For instance, when somebody writes 
the script for a ﬁ lm, it seldom happens that this person acts as narrator in the ﬁ lm (except 
perhaps in documentaries). Oft en one of the characters is employed for this purpose, but 
oft en there is no explicit narrator. Although the narrator is a creation of the real author, it is 
the narrator, and not the real author, who expresses the narrative.
A narrative may occasionally include a reference to the person or persons (audience) to whom 
the story is told. Th is recipient of the narrative, the narratee, does not necessarily have to have 
any relation to the implied reader for whom the narrative is really intended. A story that is 
purportedly told by an old man to his six-year-old-grandchild is not necessarily aimed at 
younger readers.
Th e example of Luke 15:11-32 (the story of the prodigal son) can illustrate the point. Th e 
audience of the story, or narratee, is the Pharisees and the scribes that came to listen to Jesus 
(15:1). Th e original story was clearly intended for them in the sense that they were supposed 
to recognize themselves in the position of the older brother. Th is audience is not, however, the 
"implied reader" of "Luke's" (the implied author's) text. Th e voice of "Luke" uses the parable 
of the prodigal son to communicate something to another audience of readers of the time 
(perhaps that of readers in Rome?). Th e real author (the historical person Luke, without 
the quotation marks) had no inkling of the fact that real, empirical readers in the twentieth 
century would read this same story and discover other implications in it.
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Th e diagram above with its parallel distinctions between empirical author and reader, implied 
author and reader and narrator and narratee should now be clearer.
Th e attributes of the narrator
Many narrators may exhibit the attributes of omniscience and omnipresence:
A narrator may be present in two places simultaneously and recount what happened at both. 
In this sense the narrator is "omnipresent". A narrator also has access to all characters and 
their thought processes, thus the narrator is "omniscient" as well. Th e narrator can present 
the information selectively to the audience in accordance with the story line and the intended 
eﬀ ect of the narrative.
Th is does not mean that these attributes belong to certain people of ﬂ esh and blood. Th e 
narratives themselves present an image of the narrator. Aft er all, we know intuitively that it 
would be irrelevant to ask at some point during the story "How does the narrator know this?" 
A good example is the creation story in Genesis 1, where the narrator even has access to God's 
thought processes. Th e narrator says repeatedly that God saw that everything was good. It 
does not occur to any of us to ask: "how does the narrator know what God was thinking?" We 
accept intuitively that narrators possess this type of insight.
In addition, the narrator is in a position to manipulate the reader:
Th e attributes of "omniscience" and "omnipresence" and the role of the "camera eye" view 
that the narrator occupies enable the narrator to manipulate the reader. Th ere are various 
techniques of narration by means of which the reader may be led to react in speciﬁ c ways. A 
narrator might, for instance, choose to reveal certain events/ information to the reader, while 
some of the characters in the story do not have access to the same information.
A typical example would be if the reader were to know that there are certain dangers lurking 
along the road followed by a traveller (a character in the narrative), while the character carries 
on in blissful ignorance. Th e reader, better informed than the character, would react with 
fear and increased tension. A splendid example of this from the Old Testament occurs in the 
Ehud/Eglon narrative in Judges 3. Although the readers are already aware that king Eglon 
lies murdered behind the closed doors, the guards do not know this yet. Th ey suspect that 
the king is defecating in the cool room and are loath to disturb him at such a time! In the 
meantime, Ehud makes good his escape. 
In other cases the narrator may choose to give the reader less information than the characters 
have. Th e reader cannot then understand the events or the actions of the characters. For 
instance, early on in the Ehud/Eglon narrative (Judges 3:16) it is not clear to the reader 
why Ehud makes himself a double-edged sword and why he straps it to his right side. Th is 
technique arouses the reader's curiosity and invites the reader to read on.
A narrative approach to the interpretation of biblical texts teaches the reader to be sensitive 
to the role of the narrator. By discovering the "presence" of the narrator in narratives and by 
learning to spot the techniques the narrator uses, the reader is able to gain a good indication 
of the response a particular narrative is intended to evoke.
(d) Narrative time
Th e aspect of narrative time is of crucial importance for the understanding of narratives. Th e 
story does not tell only of events that take place in time (whether they are historical events or 
not), but also arranges the events in the story in a speciﬁ c temporal order. Th is arrangement of 
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events does not necessarily correlate with the chronological order of the events that make up the 
story. Th erefore it is possible to distinguish between narrated time and narrative time.
Narrated time and narrative time
Narrated time is the actual duration of the events recounted in a narrative. Narrative time, on 
the other hand, is the quantity of "telling time" expended on the particular events. Narrated 
time is thus measured in years, months, hours and minutes, whereas narrative time is measured 
rather in terms of the number of words or sentences that an event takes up in the narrative.
For instance: say the event recounted in a narrative is a journey by train from Cape Town to 
Johannesburg. In reality this event would take quite a number of hours. Th e narrated time 
refers to the number of hours needed for the completion of the journey and for possible delays 
along the way. A narrator may elect to describe this event in exhaustive detail, thus taking up 
quite considerable narrative time. A narrator may, however, prefer to refer only brieﬂ y to the 
whole journey from Cape Town to Johannesburg; even a single sentence embedded in the 
broader narrative could suﬃ  ce. In this case the narrative time is considerably shorter.
By being sensitive to the relation between narrated time and narrative time, the reader has a 
sense of the shift s in emphasis that the narrator introduces into the narrative. 
Changes in chronological order
It is also possible for the narrator to achieve certain eﬀ ects by making changes in the 
chronological order of the events.
A narrator may sometimes choose to defer the recounting of certain events (that is, to narrate 
them chronologically later than they occur). Th is technique is called analepsis. On the other 
hand, she may also choose to recount certain events before their chronological occurrence, 
that is, proleptically. A third possibility is to “sidestep” certain events by leaving them out of 
the narrative. Th is can be done deliberately in order to create the possibility of ambiguous 
meaning or to serve an ironic purpose (paralipsis).
An example from the Jonah narrative can elucidate this: why did Jonah ﬂ ee to Tarshish? Since 
his motivation is not given initially, a possibility is opened up for the reader to form his own 
opinion. Th is opinion is later contrasted with the real motivation when a motivation is given 
further on in the narrative. Th e “side-stepping” of information may, however, also be the 
result of a lack of information about, or interest in, certain events (elipsis).
Th e frequency of narration
Th e frequency of narration, closely connected to the order of the narration of events, is 
another important narrative aspect to be taken into account in the interpretation of biblical 
narratives.
In this regard there are various possibilities, such as: (i) something occurs once and is 
recounted more than once; (ii) something occurs more than once, but is recounted once only; 
and (iii) something is recounted the same number of times that it occurs. A narrative approach 
would want to account for the motive for, and eﬀ ect of, the variations in frequency. Th is is of 
importance in determining what the narrator is trying to achieve with the narrative.
(e) Point of view
Point of view has occasioned heated debate in the literature about narrative theory. Point of view 
(or perspective or focalization) concerns the question: “who sees?” or “whose perspective is now, 
at this stage of the narrative, being presented?” Once more the image of the eye of the camera 
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explains the point: when the narrator selects what she or he wants the reader of the story to “see”, 
not only the choice of events is important. A further choice is made, namely through whose 
eyes the selected events will be viewed. Th e gospels provide a further example to illustrate the 
perspective of the narrator. Th e story of Jesus would have been dramatically diﬀ erent had it been 
told from the perspective of the Pharisees.
Although the theoretical literature provides several models for the classiﬁ cation of narrative 
points of view, the following will suﬃ  ce here (for the purpose of analyzing biblical narratives):
A narrator may elect to recount events from his own perspective: this is the most common 
form. Unless the contrary is indicated by means of literary techniques, we may always assume 
that we are dealing with the narrator's point of view in a narrative. Th us in most cases the 
narrator's values and norms apply in the evaluation of events.
Th e next possibility is that the narrator is telling the story from the point of view of one of 
the characters. In the narrative text various techniques of focalization may be employed to 
indicate a shift  from the narrator's point of view to the character's point of view (or vice 
versa).
A last possibility is that the narrator may present the events from the point of view of the 
reader of the narrative. Th is possibility is seldom utilized in biblical narratives.
Th is broad description of narrative theory oﬀ ers techniques that can be used to read the book 
of Jonah as a narrative as well. Th e story of Jonah can, at the same time, illustrate the value of a 
narrative approach.
5.4.2 Jonah in the light of a narrative approach
Although the narrative elements of a story such as Jonah’s never function in isolation, but rather in 
an integrated way, these elements are, for the sake of clarity, discussed separately in this section.
(a) Narrative plot
In the discussion of the structuralist approach, it has already been pointed out that the book of 
Jonah exhibits two well-deﬁ ned parts, namely 1:1-2:10 and 3:1-4:11. Th e distinction between 
the two halves is clearly established in the introduction to chapter 3 of the book of Jonah: “Th e 
word of Yahweh came to Jonah a second time.” Th e repetition of the commission (parallel to 1:1 
where Yahweh’s commission to Jonah is given for the ﬁ rst time) serves as a stylistic criterion that 
indicates the start of a new episode. Th e distinction between the halves is further determined 
by dramatic criteria. Th ere is a change of place (no longer on the sea or in the ﬁ sh, but on dry 
land; no longer on the way to Tarshish, but on the way to Nineveh) and of action (no longer 
disobedience, but obedience).
Within each of these two larger episodes one can further distinguish two scenes. In the ﬁ rst 
episode, these are 1:1-16 (Jonah on his way to Tarshish and the storm at sea) and 1:17-2:10 (Jonah 
praying in the belly of the ﬁ sh). Th e second episode has two comparable scenes, namely 3:1-10 
(Jonah preaches in Nineveh and God pardons Nineveh) and 4:1-11 (God talks to Jonah about his 
anger aft er mercy is shown to Nineveh).
Th e hypothesis that Jonah was a staunch Jewish nationalist who did not want to go to Nineveh 
because he knew that God would oﬀ er grace to the hated Ninevites as well, leads to interesting 
results for the analysis of the narrative plot. Th e story line of the narrative can be represented by 
the following diagram:
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Quadrant A: 1:1-16
In this section the "descent" theme features very prominently. Jonah descends to Joppa, 
descends into the ship, descends into the hold of the ship and lies down to sleep, is thrown 
overboard and descends into the depths of the sea (associated with the realm of death). It 
is possible to argue that the repetition of the Hebrew word "go down, descend" is purely 
coincidental and simply indicates physical actions. Yet many interpreters have seen this 
repetition as a technique to suggest a spiritual dimension. Th is suspicion is strengthened by 
the contrast between Jonah's relationship with the true God and the sailors' relationship with 
their gods. Jonah confesses that he is a Hebrew who worships the true God - the God who is 
in control of heaven and earth, of the sea and the dry land - but he himself admits that he is 
ﬂ eeing from this God. In the end the sailors are the ones to pray to the true God, to oﬀ er a 
sacriﬁ ce and to make vows.
Quadrant B: 1:17-2:10
In this section the "descent" theme is continued at ﬁ rst when Jonah is swallowed by the ﬁ sh. 
Indeed, in the ﬁ rst part of Jonah's prayer he emphasizes that he has descended to the very 
foundations of the earth, to the realm of death itself. Th e second part of the prayer, however, 
brings about a reversal. It is now Jonah's prayer that reached God in the holy temple; he is 
the one who sings a song of praise, oﬀ ers a sacriﬁ ce, and makes a vow to Yahweh. Th e end of 
the scene continues this "upswing" - the ﬁ sh spews Jonah out onto the dry land. (Th is is by 
no means the only possible interpretation of Jonah's prayer. Some are of the opinion that it is 
a selﬁ sh prayer that indicates no change of heart. In the interest of the model, we follow the 
previous interpretation here.)
Quadrant C: 3:1-3:10
Th e new episode starts with a continuation of the "upswing": Jonah obeys God in that he 
departs for Nineveh. Jonah's sermon, which takes up only a few words, announces judgement 
and the destruction of the pagans. Th is short sermon, however, brings about a great reaction. 
Th e king even issues a decree to encourage his subjects to conversion and repentance to the 
true God. On the basis of the Ninevites’ repentance, God decides against the disaster that was 
in store for them (which formed the content of Jonah’s sermon!).
Quadrant D: 4:1-11
Th is scene brings a return of the "descent" theme. Jonah's reaction to Yahweh's gracious 
sparing of Nineveh (4:2) makes it clear that his nationalistic concept of God leaves no room 
for grace shown to pagans. Th is reproach of Jonah's casts him into a deep emotional and 
spiritual crisis. Th e "downward" movement ends, while Jonah disappears like a phantom. Th e 
narrative does not pander to the reader's curiosity by saying what happened to Jonah.
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Th is description of the story line in the Jonah narrative can be further correlated with the ﬁ ner 
distinctions between the moments of the plot oft en found in the theoretical literature. Th e story 
begins with the inciting events, namely Yahweh’s commission to Jonah (1:1-2). Initially the events 
follow a negative course (1:3-16), but then a positive reversal takes place (1:17-2:10). Th is change 
of course is followed by a real turning point in the narrative, namely that the disobedient Jonah 
now becomes obedient (3:1-4). Th e climax of the narrative is reached when Nineveh repents and 
Yahweh shows them mercy (3:5-10). Th is is followed by descending action in that the climax of 
God’s grace is negatively evaluated by Jonah (4:1-8). Th e denouement takes place when Yahweh, in 
rebuking Jonah, places Yahweh’s grace in perspective (4:9-11). Th e narrative lacks a conclusion.
Clearly this story line intends to bring about certain changes in knowledge in the implied reader. 
Th ere is progression, especially with regard to who, and how, God really is. Th e implied reader’s 
image of God changes from one of a God whose deeds are manifest in destructive ﬁ re, thunder 
or lightning, wind or storm to one of a God who is gracious, a God who has sympathy with all 
nations (and even with the cattle of Nineveh), a God who accepts their repentance lovingly. Such 
a message would have been highly relevant to an audience of staunch Jewish nationalists who 
wanted to claim God for Israel alone.
(b) Characterization
Th e main characters in the narrative are Yahweh and Jonah. One would be justiﬁ ed in calling 
both of them “round” or “fully ﬂ edged” characters. Jonah undergoes dramatic development 
in the course of the narrative, but ultimately ends up as a pathetic ﬁ gure once more. Jonah is 
characterized mainly by means of the dialogues in which he engages and his internal conversation 
(the prayer of 2:1-10). In both the dialogues and the action, Jonah is contrasted with the other 
characters - the sailors and the Ninevites.
God is characterized mainly by means of the contrast between Jonah’s view of God and the way 
in which God is revealed to the Ninevites. Th is contrast also represents the change in information 
that the narrative intends to bring about in the implied reader.
Th e pagans (the sailors and the Ninevites) complete the classic pattern of three main characters. 
As individual characters, however, they play less important roles than the other main characters. 
Th ese characters are introduced mainly in the interest of the story line, but also in the interest of 
the characterization of the main characters.
Th e actant model for the classiﬁ cation of characters can be utilized productively for the analysis 
of the Jonah narrative. It is, however, striking that the characters in this narrative oft en ﬁ ll several 
roles simultaneously, or change roles in the course of the narrative. Yahweh, for instance, is both 
sender and subject. Th e sailors, originally opponents, ﬁ rst become helpers and ﬁ nally recipients. 
Jonah is an opponent, but also becomes a helper (partially at least). Th e diagram of the actant 
model above can be expanded as follows to describe the roles of the characters:
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Th is description makes it clear that there is actually a reversal of social roles in the book of Jonah. 
Th e sailors (pagans and foreigners) act, contrary to all expectations, as helpers of Yahweh; that is, 
they further Yahweh’s purpose. Jonah (a prophet), however, does not act as a helper but, contrary 
to expectations, as an opponent of Yahweh. 
Although the terms “antagonist” and “protagonist” are not used in the actant model, it would be 
correct to say that in this story Jonah acts primarily as antagonist, while Yahweh represents the 
protagonist of the narrative.
(c) Th e role of the narrator and changes in point of view 
Th e narrator of the Jonah narrative plays an important role in deciding what information will 
be available to the reader at what stage of the narration. In fact, certain transitions are made by 
withholding certain information. For instance, aft er Jonah has received Yahweh’s commission for 
the ﬁ rst time, nothing is said of his internal struggle about it. All that is said is that he prepared 
to ﬂ ee to Tarshish. Only at a later stage (when questioned by the sailors) does he admit that he is 
ﬂ eeing from the living God. A further example is the transition between Jonah’s sojourn in the 
ﬁ sh and the second commission by Yahweh. Surely Jonah would have had to enquire about his 
whereabouts before he would have been able to plan his journey to Nineveh? Yet all we read is that 
he prepared and went to Nineveh. Th us the narrator presents both Jonah’s original disobedience 
and his later obedience to the reader without wasting words.
Th e narrator also controls the “camera eye” through which the scenes are presented. By 
manipulating scenes in this way, the narrator creates certain contrasts. One moment the narrator 
focuses on the great storm and the panic-stricken sailors calling out “each to his god”; the next we 
get a close-up of the prophet Jonah asleep in the hold of the ship.
For the most part the story is told from the point of view of the narrator. At three crucial points, 
however, the focus shift s to the point of view of speciﬁ c characters. Th ese points are marked by 
the three prayers in the narrative. In 1:14 the sailors’ inner feelings are revealed in the words 
of their prayer. Th is prayer contains, somewhat ironically, a confession of Yahweh’s freedom to 
decide what is best and to act accordingly. Th e perspective of Jonah’s inner experience dominates 
chapter 2 (Jonah’s prayer in the ﬁ sh). Note that the omniscient narrator knows what Jonah said 
even inside the ﬁ sh. Jonah’s prayer in 4:2-3 is also given from Jonah’s point of view. Th is point of 
view contrasts with the one reﬂ ected in chapter 2.
Th e narrator allows the narrative to end abruptly in chapter 4. Once again, certain information 
is withheld: the reader does not ﬁ nd out what became of Jonah or how his knowledge of God 
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changed. Th e narrator lets the narrative end in direct speech, Yahweh being the speaker. Th e 
reader is spurred on to serious reﬂ ection. God remains free to show care and mercy at will to any 
person or persons. In this way the purpose of the narrative (see the “object” in the actant model 
above) is ﬁ nally brought to the centre of the reader’s attention.
(d) Time and changes in tempo
Th e tempo of the Jonah narrative is frequently accelerated or decelerated. Acceleration is achieved 
mainly by making the narrative time shorter than the narrated time. Jonah’s journeys to Joppa and 
Nineveh are very brieﬂ y mentioned. Only the barest minimum of information is given. Similarly, 
the storm at sea and the conversion of Nineveh are described without going into much detail. Th e 
acceleration of tempo creates a dramatic eﬀ ect.
Occasionally, however, the tempo is decelerated. Th is is achieved mainly through dialogue. 
Th ere are long dialogues involving Jonah and the ship’s captain or sailors and between Jonah and 
Yahweh. In one case Jonah engages in a monologue (the prayer of 2:1-10).
Th e purpose of these decelerations of the tempo, even stoppages in the ﬂ ow, is to emphasize what 
is really important from the point of view of the narrator. Th e dialogues that have this delaying 
eﬀ ect play an important role in characterizing Jonah (see the discussion above), but serve also to 
bring about the change in the knowledge of God to which the reader is led. Th e emphasis falls on 
who God is, how God acts towards people and how diﬀ erent people react to God’s actions.
(e) Other elements of style
Certain other elements of style contribute to the strengthening of the eﬀ ect of the narrative. A few 
of these are discussed below.
Hyperbole
Th ough adjectives are most sparingly used in biblical Hebrew, nearly everything in the Jonah 
narrative is called "great": the great city of Nineveh, a great wind, a great storm, a great fear on 
the part of the sailors, a great ﬁ sh, an enormously great city (in the Hebrew it says that it was 
a great city "for God" or "by God's standards"), a great reaction on the part of the Ninevites, 
a great anger on the part of Jonah, followed by a great joy about the miraculous plant. Some 
interpreters believe that this excessive emphasis on greatness should contribute to making the 
reader realize that this is a story, a type of parable, and not a true historical account.
In contrast to this, Jonah appears small and small-minded. Th is aspect is emphasized in the 
scene in which Jonah sits under the plant. Th e Hebrew word for this plant, variously translated 
as "gourd" or "castor-oil plant", is probably a diminutive. Aft er Yahweh had reacted by showing 
great mercy to the Ninevites, Jonah sits nursing his little grudge under his little plant.
Irony
Ironic representations abound in the Jonah narrative. Th ese representations make it possible 
to obtain more information about the characters, especially Jonah, by means of comparisons 
and contrasts. Irony is also used to reverse some of the conventions of biblical narratives. 
Th e reader expects that a prophet would normally react to a command of Yahweh's with 
obedience. In this case, when Yahweh commands Jonah to get up and go, Jonah gets up and 
goes - in the opposite direction! Th is irony is further expressed by means of several contrasts 
in the narrative.
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During the storm an ironic situation prevails on the ship: the sailors all pray to their various 
gods while Jonah lies asleep in the hold. Here, instead of a situation in which the prophet 
prays to Yahweh, we ﬁ nd heathen sailors at prayer. Later in chapter 1, the sailors are the ones 
who confess that Yahweh is free to act at will, while the prophet opposes this freedom of will 
by ﬂ eeing to Tarshish. Jonah prefers even to be cast overboard rather than to pray to Yahweh 
that the storm might be stilled. It is not Jonah, the prophet of Yahweh, who takes the religious 
initiative; instead the captain of the ship has to plead with Jonah to pray to his god that the 
storm might be stilled. Jonah makes no eﬀ ort to save the sailors; instead they try to save him. 
Th ey plead with Yahweh not to let them kill an innocent man. Finally, at his own request, they 
do cast Jonah overboard and the sea becomes calm. Th us pagans receive conﬁ rmation that it 
is indeed the prophet of Yahweh who is the guilty party.
Th e last chapter is marked by Jonah's impatience with Nineveh. He cannot understand how 
God can show mercy to the city instead of destroying it. In stark contrast to Jonah's impatience, 
God's patience with Nineveh is emphasized. Jonah asks Yahweh to let him die rather than face 
shame. God's answer is to provide the shade of a plant. To give one more indication of God's 
freedom, God sends a worm to gnaw at the plant the following morning, so that it withers. 
Once more Jonah reacts with impatience and anger. Yahweh responds with the question of 
whether Yahweh is not free to care for Nineveh. Th is question remains in the air, since the 
narrative ends here.
Th e ironic contrast between Jonah and the sailors, and Jonah and God, leads the reader to 
discover the theme of the narrative, namely God's freedom to show mercy to pagans as well.
5.4.3 Observations and evaluation
Since a large portion of the Bible (especially of the Old Testament) consists of narrative texts, 
the ﬂ owering of the narrative approach has had positive results for its interpretation. Th is 
approach takes the literary character of these texts seriously and tries to do justice to it in 
the interpretation. In the case of Jonah, it also implies the possibility of appreciating the 
outstanding narrative qualities of this book.
Although modern literary theories can be utilized to good eﬀ ect, it is worth remembering that 
the Bible comprises ancient texts that oft en followed diﬀ erent literary conventions. Modern 
theories must therefore be adapted to accommodate the unique character of these texts. It 
would be a mistake to "impose" any modern theory on these ancient texts without further 
investigation.
When a narrative approach is employed, the presupposition is that the world of the text is not 
necessarily the world of physical reality. A narrative creates its own reality. Th is means that the 
content of narratives is not necessarily regarded as historical or factual. Th is does not in any 
way negate the religious dimension of the narratives. Th e spiritual value is not bound up with 
the factual correctness or historical accuracy of the narrative, but with the testimony of faith 
in God that they embody. In practice this means that it does not really matter whether Jonah 
existed or whether there were really ﬁ sh so big that they could swallow people whole. Th e 
spiritual appeal depends on what the narrative wishes to achieve with regard to the implied 
reader, namely a testimony of faith in the freedom of God to show grace beyond the limits of 
Israel, even to Nineveh. Narrative approaches help us not to pose the wrong questions to the 
narrative genre - something that oft en happens when the interpreter insists on identifying the 
spiritual value of the biblical text with its historical accuracy.
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In some narrative studies of the Bible the primary interest is the literary qualities of the texts, 
without incorporating the theological dimension into the analysis. When doing a narrative 
analysis on biblical texts, one should constantly remember that these stories were told and 
written down in ancient times with a theological intention in mind. Th is implies that one 
should be aware of the rhetorical eﬀ ect of these narratives in their contexts of origin and 
transmission, and they should be interpreted accordingly. Narratives are sometimes one of 
the best literary forms to express faith convictions, and to convey these convictions to next 
generations.

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Approaches focusing on the reception of texts
6.1 Introduction
In the previous section we saw how and why interpreters turned away from studies of the 
production of the text to the text itself. In the last decades of the previous century, the debate on 
interpretation began focusing on the reception of texts by diﬀ erent readers. Th e role of the reader 
in the production of meaning became the centre of interest.
6.1.1 Criticism of previous approaches
Previous approaches tended to disregard readers and their (diﬀ erent) contexts. Historical-critical 
approaches focused on the origin of a text and text-immanent approaches on the relationships 
among elements in the text itself. In both cases the reader is merely the one who receives what 
is already objectively “there”. Th e interpretation of a text might then be compared to opening a 
parcel to reveal its content. Th e great danger is precisely that careless handling will damage the 
content, that is, that the ideas, interests and emotions of the reader will get in the way of “correct” 
interpretation. Although interpretation requires much eﬀ ort and skill, it does not create meaning. 
Against this view, various objections were now raised:
Diﬀ erent readers do not agree about the meaning of a text in the way that diﬀ erent 
mathematicians agree about the correct answer to a sum. Somehow “the meaning of the text” 
is not something one can calculate according to a set procedure. When two learned and clever 
scholars give diﬀ erent interpretations of the same text, there is no clear way of testing who is 
right. Instead, one oft en feels that both are saying something important, although neither has 
managed to say everything that can be said. If the meaning of a text were a fact that one could 
discover, one would expect consensus about it, but this is not what one ﬁ nds in practice. Even 
those who use the same approach reach diﬀ erent conclusions.
Th e lack of consensus could be explained as something temporary. We are still slowly moving 
towards the correct and full interpretation of each individual text, but one day we shall get 
there. Th is argument, however, does not ring true. Th e Bible, for instance, has been interpreted 
for many centuries. It does not look as if this long history of interpretation has brought us 
closer and closer to a ﬁ nal answer. Instead, new meanings have time and again been discovered 
in the biblical text. If we examine this process, we see that each era has looked at the Bible 
from a diﬀ erent angle, oft en using the methods and ideas that were popular at that time. 
Although the text has not changed, people at diﬀ erent times have interpreted and applied the 
text diﬀ erently. It would seem that the interpretation of the Bible is deeply inﬂ uenced by the 
context within which it is read. (Th e same can obviously be said about other old texts).
Previous approaches had tried to base interpretation on objective and certain facts. It was felt 
that historical studies or a study of the text itself could provide such facts. But is this true? 
Aft er all, any historical reconstruction is itself an interpretation; therefore diﬀ erent historians 
hold diﬀ erent views on historical events. And texts, though they seem to provide a ﬁ xed 
starting point, do not contain all the information we need to understand them. What sense 
can I make of a note written by someone I do not know to someone else I do not know, unless 
I know in what context it was written? To understand any text, I need to construct a context 
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in which it makes sense. To do so, I have to draw on my own world of experience and not only 
on the words in the text.
Th ose who concentrated on the text itself could argue that they dealt only with clear facts, 
with what is “in the text for all to read”. Still, not all meaningful aspects of texts are “present 
in the text” in an unambiguous way. Consider the case of humour. If something in a text is 
funny, a complete and accurate interpretation should certainly render an account of it. But 
in what sense is “something funny” present in the text? A passage is not marked “funny”, nor 
does the text say “laugh here”. Th e humour I ﬁ nd in the text depends on my response to what 
is in the text. I may even miss the humour because my culture has not taught me to regard 
what is described in the text as funny, or because I personally lack a sense of humour. Th us 
it seems that I can identify humour in a text only by introducing something of myself (my 
cultural training and my personality) into the reading process. In the same way tension, irony 
and opposition are not simply “in the text”; they depend on the perception of the reader.
6.1.2 Th e active, creative reader
Th ese objections to previous approaches led many to the conclusion that the role of the reader in 
interpretation had been misunderstood. Th e reader cannot be regarded as a tape-recorder with 
a blank tape that simply records the meanings that come to him from the text or from historical 
studies. Such a view turns the reader into a passive “receiver” of a “message”. Th e new view was 
that reading is an interaction in which the reader is far from passive. Th e reader does not merely 
discover meaning, but plays an active part in the creation of meaning. Texts do not “have” ﬁ xed 
meanings that simply need to be “unwrapped”. Instead, meaning arises in the interaction between 
texts and readers who deal creatively with the texts.
Th is led to a new interest in the reading process, which had previously been seen as largely 
unproblematic. Now scholars started asking what actually happens when one reads. Most people 
would agree that reading can be hard work. What sort of work does a reader do? What are the 
mental processes involved? What skills and competencies are involved? Are some people better 
readers than others and, if so, why? How can one improve one’s reading skills? Such questions 
are frequently asked in cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics, but they are also discussed 
among literary critics and literary theorists. 
At the same time there has been a new appreciation of the creativity of readers. Authors were 
always praised for creativity and originality, but readers were expected to reproduce the meanings 
of texts precisely. Th e new emphasis on the reception of texts has led to a blurring of the distinction 
between the author’s creative work and the reader’s reproductive work. Consider the following 
example: You hear a good sermon on a well-known biblical passage and say: “Now I understand 
the passage for the ﬁ rst time”. Th e sermon, which is really the minister’s interpretation of the 
text, has suddenly brought to life a text that you have known for years. Th e sermon is about the 
text, but the sermon is not simply the text. It is a piece of creative work in its own right. Th e Bible 
and other classic texts continue to inﬂ uence people over many centuries partly because readers 
continue to read them in new, creative ways.
6.1.3 Reading from within a context
Readers do not, however, read as isolated individuals. Th e very fact that one has to know the 
language in which a text was written to read it shows that reading has a social dimension. One 
cannot make sense of a text written in a language one does not know. Actually, a reader needs 
far more than a bare knowledge of the language. Many aspects of the reader’s context play a role: 
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cultural and religious values and beliefs, social conventions and customs, the reader’s experience 
of interaction with other people, and so on. Th us the individual reader draws on a whole world of 
knowledge and experience when she or he reads. Th e speciﬁ c context of the reader provides the 
horizon of understanding that enables the reader to make sense of the text.
When readers were seen as passive “reading machines”, the diﬀ ering contexts of readers could be 
ignored. If, however, readers actively construct meaning and use their contexts to do so, then it 
matters greatly what the context of a particular reader is. Since readers’ contexts diﬀ er, we may 
expect a variety of interpretations and, as we have seen, this is precisely what we get in practice. 
Th at there has been some degree of consensus among academic readers of texts should not fool 
us. Academic readers of the Bible were, up to recently, nearly always middle class, white males 
who shared a similar educational background. In short, these readers could be expected to have 
very similar perspectives on texts because they all read from a (largely) shared context. But what if 
the same texts were to be read by women, by members of the working class or by blacks? Th e turn 
to the world in front of the text brought a new interest in the role that the diﬀ erent contexts of 
readers play in the reading process. Academic reading was no longer seen as the sole standard.
Th is led to a number of studies in “contextual reading”. Some examine the inﬂ uence of diﬀ erent 
historical contexts. How was the Bible (for instance) read during various eras? How was it read 
by people facing speciﬁ c historical challenges (for instance, under apartheid)? Other studies 
examine the role of diﬀ erent social contexts. How would women, blacks, gays or workers read 
a speciﬁ c text? What role does social class play in reading? How does a group’s experience of 
oppression aﬀ ect reading?
6.1.4 Implications
Th e view that readers play an active role in the creation of meaning has the following 
implications:
Th e view that the reader is able to ascertain (make certain of) the meaning of a text in an 
objective or neutral way can no longer be held. Th e claim that the meaning of texts can in any 
way (by a “close reading” of the text itself, for instance) be accurately determined makes no 
sense if reading is seen as a creative process. Since the reader actively makes sense of a text 
(and does not merely ﬁ nd sense in it), the distinction between the “meaning-for-the-reader” 
and the objective “meaning-of-the-text-in-itself ” cannot be maintained. As we have seen, it is 
to be expected that diﬀ erent readers who look at texts from diﬀ erent perspectives will reach 
diﬀ erent conclusions.
Because readers create meaning with the use of tools they ﬁ nd in their diﬀ erent contexts, there 
will always be a plurality of interpretations of a speciﬁ c text. Th e ideal of ﬁ nding one single, 
ﬁ nal interpretation is abandoned. Indeed, diﬀ ering views can be accepted as both inevitable 
and, in some respects, enriching. In particular, the formal, academic way of reading is no 
longer held up as the sole standard.
If one recognizes that the reader is a person of ﬂ esh and blood, it follows that “meaning” 
cannot be understood in purely cognitive terms, that is, as something concerning ideas or 
thoughts only. Meaning invariably also includes the eﬀ ect or practical inﬂ uence of the text 
on the reader. In the turn to the world in front of the text the emphasis falls on the use of 
language as an eﬀ ective act and on interpretation as a transaction in which all the parties are 
actively involved. Certainly, language can be used eﬀ ectively to carry information or thoughts, 
but it can also be used to call people to action, to stir their feelings or to stimulate reﬂ ection. 
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“Meaning” is thus deﬁ ned more broadly to include the emotional and volitional (of the will) 
aspects.
In the following sections we shall look more closely at: Approaches that focus on the role of 
the reader (6.2), Rhetorical criticism (6.3) and Deconstruction (6.4). Th e following group of 
approaches should also be noted:
6.1.5 Contextual approaches
In a sense all interpretation of the Bible is contextual. It is the attempt to discover the meaning 
of the Bible from within a context and for a particular context. Contextual approaches, however, 
entail a deliberate attempt to take people’s concrete experiences and problems in a speciﬁ c context 
as the point of departure for the interpretation of the Bible. Contextual approaches focus on 
the inﬂ uence a speciﬁ c world of experience has on the interpretation. Th e claim that certain 
interpretations have universal validity is rejected.
Th e latter claim is especially typical of the academic world and is connected to the view that “true 
knowledge” is objective and generally valid. As opposed to this, contextual approaches emphasize 
both that the academic world itself reads texts with contextual spectacles and that the academic 
world represents a highly restricted context. People from quite diﬀ erent contexts who have had 
diﬀ erent experiences also read texts and ﬁ nd meaning in them. Th ey use their own world of 
experience to make sense of the texts and the texts to make sense of their world. Contextual 
approaches speciﬁ cally want to bring to attention those interpretations oft en dismissed as 
“unscientiﬁ c” in academic circles. Aft er all, these interpretations show how the majority of people, 
those with little or no academic training, deal with texts.
In the ﬁ eld of biblical interpretation there are a number of people who want to read the Bible 
through the spectacles of speciﬁ c groups, each with its own experience of oppression and 
marginalization. Th e speciﬁ c context of the interpretation depends on the group in question - 
victims of classism, racism, cultural imperialism and the like.
Liberation theology, black theology, feminist theology and African theology, for instance, have 
each developed their own hermeneutics, so as to interpret the Bible from within a context and for 
the relevant context. In all these cases the positive evaluation of interpretations from within the 
group’s own experience and context is accompanied by a distrust of the dominant interpretations 
in the society. Th e latter are seen as ideological distortions that serve to maintain the status quo. 
Such contextual approaches are thus closely related to the ideological criticism that is discussed 
in Chapter 7.
6.2 Th e role of the reader
6.2.1 Background and theory
We have seen that some approaches regarded the reading process as relatively unproblematic: a 
reader registers the properties of the text mechanically, much as a tape recorder records sounds. 
Should the meaning carried by the text not be clear immediately, further analysis, either of the 
text itself or of the world behind the text, can bring clarity. Such analyses are comparable to 
techniques to turn the volume up on the tape recorder or to remove mechanical distortions from 
the tape. In both cases the techniques serve solely to allow for better, clearer reproduction of 
what is already ﬁ xed on the tape. Obviously the best readers would be those able to record and 
reproduce the meanings of the text without a hint of distortion.
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Scholars who have, over the past few decades, challenged this view demanded that the creative role 
of the reader be recognized. To grasp their point, we need only look at what happens when one 
reads an extremely simple text, say the four letters “S T O P” that appear on the ubiquitous traﬃ  c 
sign. One would say that this text should be clear to all people with an elementary knowledge of 
English or Afrikaans. We seem to know at a glance what “stop” means.
Indeed? Is the single word a noun (punctuation mark, hole on a musical in strument) or a verb (to 
ﬁ ll up, to stay over)? Th e text itself does not indicate that it is a verb in the imperative. Even when 
this is read into the text, one can hardly say one has grasped the meaning of the text. Aft er all, the 
command applies to motorists, not to pedestrians. In addition, the motorist should be aware that 
the text requires her to bring the car to a halt, not to stop talking. Nor does the motorist bring the 
car to a stop immediately, but at the “right place”, a place not indicated by the text at all. If, on the 
next day, the same text should lie ﬂ at on the pavement, the motorist would not attach the same 
meaning to it. Th e same text is now a diﬀ erent text.
From this example one learns the following:
Th e text of the stop sign has the meaning conventionally associated with it only if somebody 
reads that particular meaning into it. What is “in the text itself ”, before it is read, is much too 
vague and ambiguous to be called “meaning”.
Th e reader must introduce meanings from her world, the world-in-front-of-the-text, in order 
to make sense of the text. A truly objective reader who simply registers properties of texts on 
a blank tape (not that this is possible) would not be able to ﬁ nd any meaning in the text of the 
stop sign.
What the reader needs is far more than a knowledge of the particular language (the type of 
knowledge found in dictionaries and grammars). Rather, it is a knowledge of language usage, 
a familiarity with the functioning of sign systems.
Th e “meaning” at stake here is not a “content”, something stored in a “meaning bank”, that 
a reader may discover or acquire. It is more like an event. Th e sign warns or commands the 
reader to react in a certain way. Th e reader “understands” the meaning only if she knows how 
to handle the text of the stop sign, how to ﬁ t it into the practice of driving a car
Th e example tacitly reminds us that reading is a process that takes time. Had the stop sign 
contained a long list of instructions, a motorist would have been unable to read them in the 
available time.
It is possible to argue that the example of the stop sign provides a slanted view. Is it not by chance 
that the word “STOP” is ambiguous? And is it not on account of the contingent demands of road 
traﬃ  c that traﬃ  c signs employ brief, incomplete texts?
Modern linguistic studies indicate that these objections cannot be sustained:
Firstly, modern linguistics has shown that polysemy (multiple meanings) is not a property of 
some words only; it is inherent in language as such. Th erefore linguistic expressions can in 
principle never be univocal and unambiguous. Th ere are always more possibilities than you 
can pin down in a single “meaning”.
Secondly, sign systems always function in a limited way. Th ey serve to represent what is not 
present. Th ere can be no question of completeness in a set of signs. Th e single word “stop” 
does not direct the reader to a clear, univocal meaning, but a longer, “more complete” text 
would not solve the problem. On the contrary, the prolifer ation of signs would tend to create 
a new set of gaps for the reader to bridge. To read is therefore not to ﬁ t the pieces of a jigsaw 
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puzzle, cut from one block, back into place to “restore” the original picture. Th e reader who 
wants to gain a complete picture from reading a text can manage this only by fabricating some 
of the missing pieces herself. Th e complete picture gained in reading a text is partly a creative 
construction of the reader. It is not, as it were, there in the text. In this respect a text always 
contains less than the meaning the reader ﬁ nds in it.
Texts are not treasure chests from which readers can extract ready-made meanings. Evidently 
the reader plays a vital role in the process of interpretation. What exactly this role entails is not, 
however, equally clear.
Oft en the term “reader-response criticism” is used as a blanket term for all the diverse approaches 
in which the role of the reader is taken seriously. Th is includes approaches such as the following:
Stanley Fish’s aﬀ ective stylistics
Norman Holland’s transactive criticism
David Bleich’s subjective criticism and
the reception aesthetics of the Constance School (especially Hans Robert Jauss and Wolfgang 
Iser)
Th ere is, however, no uniform theoretical framework adopted by the proponents of all these 
approaches. Th e diﬀ erences between the various approaches oft en depend on more or less suitable 
models or metaphors employed to explain the reading process. It is not possible to deal with each 
of the various approaches in detail here. What follows outlines certain general implications of 
approaches that emphasize the creative role of the reader, and indicates some important issues in 
the debate.
(a) Th e reader and the critic: two perspectives
Th ese approaches oft en distinguish between the perspective of the reader and that of the critic. 
Critics are like spectators who discuss a game of football that they have just seen. Readers are 
like players who are involved in the game themselves. Th e critic looks from the outside at a 
complete whole (a text); the reader ﬁ nds herself engaged in making (creating) the text. At any 
given moment, a reader has to struggle to make sense of this sentence or this word. Th e text as a 
whole cannot yet be seen. While the critic reﬂ ects (thinks back), the reader looks forward, trying 
to ﬁ nd a path through the text. Although the two perspectives cannot be separated completely, 
the distinction has proved useful.
At ﬁ rst glance it would seem that the critic is in the better position, because the critic can, as it 
were, “see everything”. Th e critic no longer has to battle to put together the various bits (words, 
phrases, sentences) in order to make sense of them, but can calmly analyze the relationships 
between the various parts of the text that are already “there”. Th e problem is that the critic can 
easily forget how he or she had to struggle as a reader. Aft er all, the critic has a text to reﬂ ect on 
only because he or she has gone through the process of reading. In the case of sport, the players 
and the spectators are two diﬀ erent groups of people. In the case of interpretation, the critic is the 
same person who had previously been a reader of the text. Nobody can interpret a text as a critic 
without ﬁ rst having read it.
At the stage of reading, one oft en has to make diﬃ  cult decisions. To be sure, the word “bat” is 
there on the page, but the reader has to decide that in this context it means a cricket bat and not 
a ﬂ ying mammal. To read is always (at least to some extent) to put together a text by attaching 
meaning and coherence to the individual parts. When one returns to the text as a critic, the 
analysis (taking apart) one gives will depend on how one put the text together in the ﬁ rst place. 
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Put more simply, what the critic “ﬁ nds” in the text is oft en simply what this same person put there 
as a reader. Th us the exegesis (taking from the text) of the critic is at least partly based on the 
eisegesis (putting into the text) of the reader.
Th is means that no critical interpretation is ever fully objective. Unless I ﬁ rst face the diﬃ  culties 
of the reading process, I cannot step back to regard the text from the perspective of the critic. As 
we saw previously, the perfectly objective, passive reader would not make any sense of a text. It 
is precisely what readers put into the reading process that makes reading meaningful. Of course 
one does not read completely subjectively, that is, as an isolated individual with nothing but one’s 
own thoughts as a guide. Even as a reader one sometimes takes a step back to look critically at 
one’s own reading. Perhaps the ﬁ rst idea that pops up in one’s mind does not provide satisfactory 
sense, forcing one to examine other possibilities. In this way the perspectives of reader and critic 
interact in the practice of interpretation.
(b) Th e reader’s context
One cannot read, we said, without using the resources one ﬁ nds in one’s context. What are these 
resources? What exactly do readers bring to the reading process? Among the divergent opinions 
three groups may be distinguished:
Some theorists emphasize the free, creative subjectivity of the reader. Readers use their 
imagination to call up possibilities that would give the text a degree of coherence and sense. 
Wolfgang Iser’s view is typical of this line of thought. He believes that reading involves an 
interaction between text and reader. Th e text in itself does not “have” a meaning, yet it does 
contain certain ﬁ xed points. One cannot, for instance, arrive at the meaning of a text by simply 
adding up the already-known and ﬁ xed meanings of the individual words, because each word 
can have many meanings and can gain new ones in a speciﬁ c context. But the reader cannot 
simply ignore the words (or some of them) either. Th e words present a challenge to the reader: 
How can the words be understood in such a way that they hang together and provide sense? 
Which of the possible meanings for each word would be required? Th e reader has to test 
the various possibilities in her imagination until she ﬁ nds a satisfactory “picture” of the text 
as a whole. It is only at that stage that the text becomes a living reality or, as Iser puts it, is 
realized. Th ough Iser does not deny that readers are inﬂ uenced by historical and social factors, 
the reader’s inherent ability to create possibilities imaginatively is central to his view. But 
reading is not a one-way process in which the reader gives meaning to the text according to 
set patterns. Th e reader also learns and grows in the process of meeting the challenges posed 
by the text. Iser’s theory thus emphasizes the freedom and creative potential that all human 
beings share.
Other theorists emphasize the psychic structure and dynamics of the reader, employing 
various psychoanalytical theories about the psyche. According to these theories, the reader is 
not a free subject, but one formed by the interaction between many factors and processes in 
the human psyche and by the individual’s experiences as a child. Th e individual reader would, 
for example, approach a text with particular repressed contents in the unconscious and with 
particular techniques developed by the person for coping with (or manipulating) reality.
Norman Holland, for instance, uses the term “identity theme” to indicate a constella tion of 
defence mechanisms, expectations, fantasies and transformation patterns that develop in a 
unique and lasting way in each individual. Such an identity theme determines how a speciﬁ c 
reader would approach a text. Th e reader may exclude certain possible meanings (defence) 
or satisfy certain expectations, imaginatively creating sense (fantasy), and, ﬁ nally, make a 


Fishing for Jonah (Anew)
116
meaningful whole out of the text that is meaningless in itself (transformation). According to 
Holland, interpretation is a function of identity: each person interprets according to her or 
his identity theme. Holland’s theory thus emphasizes the way in which readers are shaped by 
factors in their personal lives.
Still other theorists emphasize the way in which the individual reader is formed by social 
factors and therefore carries certain communally determined frameworks and strategies into 
the reading process. Th e motorist who reads the stop sign eﬀ ectively, does so because in her 
society such signs are conventionally read in this way. One can say that the conventions of the 
community operate through the individual.
In this regard Jauss talks about the reader’s horizon of expectation - the particular culturally, 
socially and historically determined frame within which a reader makes sense of a text. Such 
an horizon provides the available possibilities for meaningful reading. Since one’s horizon of 
expectation codetermines what is read (that is, what meaning is assigned to a text), readers 
with diﬀ erent horizons of expectation (for instance, in diﬀ erent historical periods) would read 
the same text “diﬀ erently”.
In his later work Fish goes even further. According to him, the reader actually writes the text, 
following certain conventional strategies of interpretation that he acquired as a member of an 
interpretive community. Th e text in itself contains no clear indicators that force the reader in 
a particular direction. Nonetheless, reading is not the free creation of meaning, nor is it the 
product of individual identity, for the reader is, aft er all, formed as reader by the interpretive 
community to which she belongs. Fish’s theory thus emphasizes the way in which individual 
readers are shaped by communal forces and conventions.
Who is right? Probably there is some truth in each of these views. In fact, these views are not 
mutually exclusive. Th e context of the reader has many aspects. General human potential is one 
factor, personal history another and the conventions of a social group still another.
(c) Meaning as event in time
New Criticism warned people against the “aﬀ ective fallacy”, the tendency to confuse the meaning 
of the text with the eﬀ ect the text has on the reader. Critics who emphasize the role of the reader, 
on the other hand, are inclined to say that the meaning of the text is the eﬀ ect it has on the reader. 
Meaning happens when one reads and is closely related to the eﬀ ect, experience or response 
associated with reading.
Iser distinguishes between the text, which has no meaning in itself, and the literary work, which 
comes into being as something meaningful only in the reading process. Other theorists avoid the 
word “meaning” altogether, preferring to talk about the “reading experience” or the eﬀ ect of the 
reading process. Th ose who wish to maintain a clear distinction between the eﬀ ect the text has 
on the reader and the meaning of the text in itself, have to adopt the perspective of the critic (see 
a above). But, as we have seen, critics need to remember that any meaning one ascribes to the 
text can only be something one had previously acquired as a reader interacting with the text. Th e 
“meaning of the text” is not something to which one has independent access, access that bypasses
the reading process. Th e critic’s analysis is at best a reﬂ ection on a prior reading experience. Th us 
the critic too reports on the eﬀ ects and events that occurred when a text was read.
If one sees meaning as a stable “content” that is “transmitted” through language, it is possible to 
distinguish between an objective meaning “in the text” and a subjective response “in the reader”. 
Th e former is then the true, pure intention of the text and the latter a contingent side eﬀ ect. 
But if one recognizes the active role of the reader in creating meaning, the distinction becomes 
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problematic. It looks as if the statement “Th is text is about growing up” describes the text itself, 
whereas the statement “Th is text inspires me” merely says something about my reaction as a 
reader. A closer look shows that the ﬁ rst statement, which identiﬁ es the theme of the text, also 
reports a reaction of the reader: “Th is is what struck me as the central point of the text”. Another 
reader may identify a diﬀ erent theme. At the same time, the second statement deﬁ nitely reports 
a response to the text. It does not say that I happened to feel inspired when I read the text, but 
claims that the text did something to me. Surely what a text does has to be part of its meaning.
Th e idea that meaning is an event or activity is not as strange as it would appear. Th e very form 
of the word “meaning” suggests an activity (compare “running”, “talking”, “meeting”). If I possess 
a book, I do not yet possess its meaning; it becomes meaningful only when I read it. And when 
I say that I found the book meaningful, I do not always mean that it gave me new information. 
Perhaps it made me see things I already knew in a diﬀ erent way. Th e attempt to separate meaning 
from activity and the eﬀ ects of activity turns meaning into something abstract. Th e perspective 
on meaning as event is largely shared by rhetorical criticism, an approach that also emphasizes 
the active, eventful nature of language usage (see 6.3).
When meaning is seen as a stable content, the meaning of a text can be represented by means of 
spatial models. A type of diagram or chart can be used both to show the structural connections 
between the various elements of meaning (compare 5.3 on Structuralism) and to provide a 
synoptic view of the text as a unit. Such an approach is typical of a focus on the world of the text. 
New Criticism, as we saw, thought of texts as pictures in words. Th e main task of literary criticism 
is to describe the relationships between the elements that make up the picture. In the same way 
structuralists like to use diagrams to represent their ﬁ ndings.
If meaning is seen as an event, however, the passing of time becomes central and temporal models
are more suitable. Th e reader (as opposed to the critic who looks back on a completed process) 
is never dealing with the whole of the text at once. What is loosely called the event of reading is 
really a series of events following one another in rapid succession.
In his earlier work Fish developed a method to make readers aware of this series of events, events 
that normally ﬂ it by so rapidly that readers are not aware of them as distinct moments in the 
reading process. It simply amounts to this: you repeatedly halt your own reading process to ask: 
“What is the eﬀ ect of this sentence or word on the reader?” By reading thus, in slow motion as 
it were, the reader becomes aware that reading is not simply the registering of blocks of ﬁ xed 
meaning. It is, rather, a movement that takes place step by step and from moment to moment. 
What moves in this reading process is not the text; it is the reader herself. Th e reader’s ideas, 
feelings and expectations change from moment to moment.
When this movement through the text is pictured as a journey, the possibilities and limitations 
of this view become clearer.
When people go somewhere for a holiday, the journey from home to the destination is merely a 
means to an end. Th e destination is all that matters. You can, however, also undertake a journey 
as a holiday. In this case the journey itself is the goal and “meaning” of the holiday. Similarly, 
the meaning we seek when we read may lie the reading process itself, in the “journey through 
the text”. Th e implication is that you do not grasp the text’s meaning aft er you have read it, as if 
the meaning were the ﬁ nal destination. Brief summaries of the meaning of classical texts (such 
as the Bible) usually sound fairly dull and do not reveal why these texts are highly rated. Aft er 
the journey, a chart of the route or the souvenirs one brings back hardly tell the full story of the 
journey. What matters is the experience one gains during the time of travel.
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Th is emphasis on the temporal aspect of reading leads to an approach that shows little interest 
in any ultimate conclusions about the meaning of the text. Th e aim is rather to produce more 
sensitive readers, readers able to beneﬁ t more from their own reading experiences.
(d) Iser’s model of reading
Wolfgang Iser tried to describe the reading process itself. Like Fish, he pays attention to the 
temporal aspect: one reads step by step and one’s view changes from moment to moment. Th is 
does not imply that, at a given moment, the reader is dealing only with “this sentence” or “this 
word”. Because the reader is trying to join the various parts in order to get to a meaningful whole, 
he is always looking back and looking ahead. He reads “this sentence” in the light of previous 
sentences and forms expectations about what is to follow on the basis of “this sentence”. At the 
same time a reader oft en has to revise a previous opinion in the light of “this sentence”, leading 
to a new under standing of previous sentences. Th e reader’s expectations are also constantly 
being adjusted. In brief, the reader is constantly orientating and reorientating herself, constantly 
assigning and reassigning meaning in the process. Wolfgang Iser, who places great emphasis on 
these aspects of anticipation and retrospection, puts it as follows:
Every sentence contains a preview of the next and forms a kind of viewﬁ nder for what is to 
come; and this in turn changes the “preview” and so becomes the “viewﬁ nder” for what has 
been read. (In: Suleiman & Crosman, 1980:54)
Th is movement of the reader through the text is not without problems, for the text as such 
does not supply all the “steps” needed in the reading process. Th e example of the stop sign has 
already shown that no text contains a full set of instructions for reading it. Th ere is always at least 
something the reader has to add to make sense of the text.
In this connection Iser talks about “gaps” or “open spaces” in texts that the reader has to ﬁ ll in. 
Th e gaps challenge the reader to involve herself in the creation of the literary work (for Iser this is 
more than simply the written text). Th e reader makes sense of the text by ﬁ lling in the gaps. Th is 
involves choices, because the gaps may be ﬁ lled in diﬀ erent ways. “What I have read” is not simply 
what was already there in the text; it is partly what I constructed by ﬁ lling the gaps in the text.
According to Iser, a text does contain some ﬁ xed beacons that limit the creativity of the reader. 
Th e ﬁ xed beacons are not, however, really ﬁ xed meanings; they become part of a meaningful 
whole only when readers connect them to one another to form a picture. Th e connecting lines are 
not prescribed; they may be drawn in a number of ways.
Iser explains his view using the example of stellar constellations. Th e stars themselves remain in 
the same relationship to one another, but diﬀ erent people see diﬀ erent pictures in the same group 
of stars, because they link them in diﬀ erent ways. Th e reader, of course, is constantly drawing 
connecting lines, oft en drawing new lines and revising old ones as new beacons appear.
According to Iser and his followers, the reading event is an interaction between text and reader in 
which both indicators in the text and the reader’s creative contribution play a role.
(e) Who determines the meaning of a text?
All approaches that emphasize the role of the reader agree that there is a degree of indeterminacy
in all texts. Aft er all, if texts determined their own meaning completely, the role of the reader 
becomes a purely technical one. Many theorists believe that Iser still assigns too small a role to the 
reader and that he overemphasizes the limits imposed on the reader by the text. Can one really 
say that the text limits the reader in any way?
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When one looks for examples, it soon becomes clear how diﬃ  cult it is to ﬁ nd ﬁ xed points in the 
text. Indeed, there are words, but words, as we have seen, do not have ﬁ xed meanings. Formalist 
critics attached great importance to the form or structure of texts and described such structures 
in detail. But before that, many readers had made sense of the same texts without saying a word 
about structure. It seems that structure is not something that is objectively “there” in the text; it 
is something that appears when readers approach the text from a certain perspective. Th eorists 
strongly impressed by this oft en say that all meaning derives from readers. In Fowler’s words: 
“Texts do not make meaning; readers make meaning” (1991:26). 
Th is line of thought brings with it its own problems. If the text really makes no contribution, 
what is it that we interpret? Would it not be better to study “reader X”, rather than “the book 
of Jonah”? And what can we ultimately say about “reader X”, since our only access to reader X’s 
interpretation (whether oral or written) is our own reading experience of it. Now “reader X’s 
interpretation” can, according to this line of argument, play no determining role in our own 
reading experience. In this situation each reader is ultimately a prisoner in his or her own world, 
quite cut oﬀ  from other readers.
David Bleich and Stanley Fish attempt to get round this problem without assigning any 
determining role to the text.
For Bleich, the reading experience is indeed purely subjective. At the level of immediate 
response, the reader creates purely subjective meaning by the process of symbolization. 
When one wants to say something about the reading experience, however, one moves to a new 
level, that of interpretation. At this level the reader’s response is re-symbolized, but no longer 
in a purely subjective way. Interpretations make use of the language we share with others, 
therefore interpretation is a social matter. For Bleich, meaning (at the level of interpretation) is 
something that is negotiated between interpreters as they search for a mutually acceptable way 
of expressing their responses in words. In this process, knowledge is created, not discovered. 
What we call “knowledge” is the result of a current agreement. Since “knowledge” or 
“meaning” is not anchored somewhere in the text (or even in the response to it), “knowledge” 
or “meaning” remains open to re-negotiation. Nor is the untrained reader in a worse position 
than the expert is, for the expert’s knowledge concerns only current agreements, and these 
have no objective or normative value.
In his later work, Fish approaches the matter from another angle. He does not give the text 
any determining role, nor does he believe that individual readers create meaning purely 
subjectively. A reader is always already a member of an interpretive community that prescribes 
the available strategies of interpretation to her. Th e reader writes the text, as it were, but the 
reader herself has already been “written” by her interpretive community. Readers cannot but 
interpret texts by means of the dominant reading strategies of their interpretive community, 
therefore their interpretations are usually experienced as convincing by other readers from 
the same interpretive community. Th is “unquestionable” meaning, however, owes nothing to 
“facts” given in the text. Interpretations may change as the interpretive communities themselves 
change, but these changes are not the result of the deliberate eﬀ orts of the individual reader. 
Th ere is no room here for Bleich’s “negotiated knowledge”.
Actually one can hardly call the later Fish a “reader-response critic” any longer, since the 
reader, according to Fish, functions nearly as mechanically as the “reading machines” that 
merely register meanings in a text. Th e only diﬀ erence is that the machines are now driven by 
interpretive communities and not by texts.
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(f) Who is “the reader”?
Th ose who emphasize the interaction between text and reader (thus still assigning an important 
role to the text) oft en seek features in the text itself that would stimulate and structure the activity 
of the reader. Th e concepts “implied”, “inscribed” or “encoded” reader are oft en used in this 
regard. In diﬀ erent reading models these concepts are employed in diﬀ erent ways.
Wayne Booth, for instance, sees the implied reader as the ideal recipient of the text, the person 
who ﬁ ts the text like a glove, as it were. Th e real (contemporary) reader does not necessarily 
start oﬀ  as this ideal recipient, but in the text an ideal reader, one who would understand the 
text “from the inside”, is presupposed. Gener ally the empirical reader tries to identify with this 
ideal reader implied in the text. If the real reader refuses the role the text seems to prescribe 
for him, the reading expe rience will probably not be very rewarding. On the other hand, when 
the reader is able to identify completely with the implied reader, reading reaches an optimal 
level.
It should be clear that Booth’s implied reader is only partly “in the text”. To identify the implied 
reader in itself requires a reconstruction (interpretation) that diﬀ erent readers may make 
diﬀ erently. Moreover, the emphasis Booth places on identiﬁ ca tion and assent indicates that 
his model lies on the boundary between reader-response criticism and rhetorical criticism 
(compare 6.3).
Iser uses the same concept, but his implied reader is even less a creation of the author. Th e 
implied reader takes shape only in the reading process, when the real reader starts realizing 
that the text presents her with an agenda: gaps to be bridged, decisions to be made, and so on. 
Because the outline of the implied reader depends as much on what is absent from the text 
as on what is present in the text, Iser places his implied reader between text and reader, not 
inside or outside the text.
Jonathan Culler and others who prefer the term “inscribed reader” have something else in 
mind. Th ey are interested in the conventional codes that make a text readable, the ways in 
which a text accommodates or frustrates readers. Th e inscribed reader is neither the ideal 
recipient nor the creative co-author of the literary work, but is linked to the codes emphasized 
in the text. Th e pattern of these emphases (their succession and the tensions between them) 
marks out the route readers must follow through the text, or indicates the actions readers 
must perform. It does not enforce a particular read ing, but outlines the ﬁ eld opened by the 
text, the ﬁ eld within which sense can be made of the text. To rephrase: the inscribed reader 
indicates the possibilities of re ception of a text; it does not determine the speciﬁ c reception 
(that is, interpretation).
(g) Th e ideal or competent reader
Th e above cases deal with a reader connected to a particular text and thus, in a limited sense, “in 
the text”. Another series of terms explores the reader’s ability to read texts as such. What makes 
a person “able to read” or “receptive of texts”? Mere knowledge of the alphabet, grammar and 
the meanings of words is clearly not suﬃ  cient. Even a person who knows a particular language 
well may be unable to understand certain texts in that language. Equally, two people who share 
a language may read the same text with diﬀ ering degrees of insight: to the one it means little; the 
other discovers an endless world of meaning in it.
If there are levels of reading ability, there must be a theoretical standard for measuring reading 
ability. Various theorists personify this standard as the “ideal”, “competent” or “informed” 
reader. In each case the personiﬁ cation indicates the sum of presuppositions that make reading 
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meaningful and meaning-conferring action possible. When a real reader gets stuck because 
she does not know the meaning of a word, one of these presuppositions is revealed: a reader 
must have the necessary semantic knowledge and skills. Oft en, however, the presuppositions 
remain hidden. Th e reader who does not “spot” the reference to another text (because she is not 
acquainted with the other text) does make sense of the text, but passes over certain possibilities of 
meaning nevertheless. Th e “ideal reader” would draw on these possibilities of meaning. Th e real 
reader reads the reference, but not as a reference. Similar examples can be given for word play, 
genre, irony, and the like.
Th e problems surrounding the term “ideal reader” can be seen in Culler’s struggle with it. Th e 
concept “all possible readings” is too vague (even as a theoretical construct). What would be 
impossible? Consequently, Culler at ﬁ rst spoke of the ideal reader as one with all the possibilities 
of making acceptable readings at his disposal. Even such a “reader” is a theoretical construct, 
for nobody can possibly have all the codes and conventions of a society at her ﬁ ngertips. But, 
it remains diﬃ  cult to distinguish between “acceptable” and “unacceptable” readings. Moreover, 
the term “ideal reader” suggests that certain readings are better than others, a view diﬃ  cult to 
substantiate. Is a reading better simply because the reader has exploited more possibilities? Aft er 
all, to heap up possible interpretations haphazardly is not to make much sense.
For these reasons Culler now prefers the term “competent reader” (not “ideal reader”). Th is term 
still refers to a person commanding a wide range of possibilities for making sense of a text, but 
implies that diﬀ erent readings or interpretations may be equally competent. Th us Culler rejects 
the idea of a graded standard.
In his earlier work, Fish introduced the term “informed reader”. Th e idea of a ranked order is not 
avoided here: readers can be more or less informed. Fish does not suggest, however, that more 
informed readers (more closely approaching the ideal) necessarily provide better readings of a 
text. Rather, more informed readers are more sensitive to the possibilities of language.
It should be noted that Riﬀ aterre’s “superreader” does not belong here. Th e “superreader” is not 
an imaginary ideal person, but a framework constructed from a number of readings of a text by 
apparently competent people. Th e framework indicates what elements in a text evoke response, 
irrespective of the content of the response, thereby showing us what elements in a text are of 
literary signiﬁ cance. Riﬀ aterre’s “superreader” is not, to be sure, “in the text”, yet refers to elements 
in the text. Moreover, a superreader is linked to a speciﬁ c text. 
What do the categories such as “ideal”, “informed” or “competent” reader contribute to the 
practice of interpretation? How do these theoretical constructs relate to real readers?
First, they set an ideal for readers who want to present an argued, critical reading. Such readers 
try, as it were, to adopt the position of the ideal reader. Th ey deliberately look for possibilities, 
try to render a full account, and so forth. Fish (1980:49) says that his informed reader is 
partly himself: “... a real reader (me) who does everything within his power to make himself 
informed”. Real readers strive to overcome their limitations (at least in part) and to read the 
text as an ideal reader would.
Secondly, they remind us that communal conventions and codes make interpretations 
acceptable to others. Th e ideal or competent reader is (partly) also the idealized image of the 
interpretive community. Individual readers need the aid of communal conventions in dialogue 
with others, who judge whether their readings are “competent”, “informed” or “acceptable”. 
Th e concept “informed reader” is particularly signiﬁ cant, since it implies that the individual 
gains the possibilities that enable meaningful reading from the interpretive community.
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Th irdly, these concepts serve to make the implicit, oft en unconscious, presupposi tions of real 
reading an explicit topic of discussion. When I ask about the codes, conventions or rules of 
reading or about the possibilities of reading meaningfully, I become aware of the limitations of 
my own reading. I see what I did not do (but could have done) when I read the text and what 
types of competence I might have lacked. On the one hand, this aids critical, self-conscious 
reading; on the other hand, it places “my reading” as one relative to other possible readings.
6.2.2 Jonah in the light of the role of the reader
Th e discussion above shows that the role of the reader may be introduced into the discourse 
about the interpretation of a text in a number of diverse ways. Moreover, an analysis of reader 
responses as they emerge in temporal order (as advocated by Fish) would require much space, 
even in the case of a text as brief as Jonah. For present purposes some limits had to be set.
In the following discussion the various possible approaches are grouped under two headings: a) 
“Th e reader in the book of Jonah”, and b) “Jonah in the reader”. Under the ﬁ rst heading the ways 
in which the activity and involvement of the reader seem to be presupposed by certain aspects 
in the text itself are examined. Under the second heading, the possibilities that readers may have 
at their disposal for making sense of the book of Jonah are examined. In both cases, for brevity’s 
sake, typical examples are selected.
(a) Th e reader in the book of Jonah
It is striking that the book of Jonah ends in a question (addressed to Jonah) to which the text 
provides no answer. Th e answer is, as it were, left  to the reader. One could say that this gap in 
the text deliberately leaves the readers the task of writing the ending. Iser’s terms “gap” and 
“implied reader” can be explicated using this example. 
Th e question is not strange in itself: had the story continued to record Jonah’s answer, the 
eﬀ ect would not have been the same. It is what is absent from the text, the missing answer, 
that seems to force the reader to take a hand. On the other hand, this “gap” does not allow the 
reader random freedom, for it occupies a speciﬁ c place in the reading event.
A question about Yahweh’s right to show mercy could have arisen earlier, immediately aft er 
the sparing of Nineveh. Aft er all, even at that stage there was a question Jonah did not answer 
(4:4). By the time the reader reaches 4:11, the question appears in a new light because of Jonah’s 
actions in the intervening time. In fact, a reader may even, in retrospect, revise her answer to 
the question in 4:4 (another gap). Th e answer the reader provides or reads in at 4:11 must ﬁ t 
into the previous reading events, yet it can also necessitate a rereading of the preceding text. 
In the chess game between reader and text it is, as it were, the reader’s move, but the possible 
moves are limited by the game to which the reader has already committed himself.
We now see why Iser does not place the implied reader either inside or outside the text. 
Th e silhouette of the implied reader appears (and changes) only in the reading process. It 
is something between text and reader. It is not easy to explain why the reader has a limited 
choice at 4:11 and why no answer can be given without thereby accepting certain implications. 
Neither certain features in the text nor particular aspects of the reader can, in isolation, 
provide an adequate explanation. It is only the person who has shared in the reading events 
(experiencing and shaping them), that can give an adequate answer at 4:11.
We looked at the gap that ends the text ﬁ rst, since this example is a simple one. Earlier on, 
gaps could only be bridged tentatively. As early as 1:3 the reader experiences a major gap in 
the text. When Jonah ﬂ ees, neither Jonah nor the narrator supplies a reason. Obviously there 
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is no ﬁ xed law that such a reason must be given, yet what sense can a reader make of any story 
if characters act without reasons? Here, too, a temporary answer from the reader is required 
for the reading process to make sense.
Th e pressure to supply an answer will probably be strengthened by the reader’s retrospective 
view of the ﬁ rst two verses. Jonah’s ﬂ ight is particularly shocking when seen in the light of the 
expectations created by these verses. One strongly expects Yahweh’s commission to a prophet 
to be carried out, because Yahweh is the Great King and prophets are Yahweh’s messengers. 
Formally, verse 3 commences (in Hebrew) as if the conventional formula of obedience (that 
does occur in 3:3) will follow. Following Fish’s method of observing the reading process 
in slow motion, one might say that the reader, having read the ﬁ rst words of verse 3, has 
already completed the verse in anticipation. When the sentence takes a diﬀ erent course, this 
abnormality calls for an explanation.
What possible explanations would be available at this stage? Of the many theoreti cally possible 
explanations only a few can really be based on what the text has provided up to now. A reader 
acquainted with the lot that befell prophets of doom (even in Israel) and with Nineveh’s 
reputation (perhaps from the book of Nahum) would all too readily employ the word “fear” 
to ﬁ ll the gap.
Th e decision that the reader makes at 1:3 depends in part on how the reader bridged a previous 
gap, one so “small” that it is easily overlooked. In verse 2 the most natural reading runs “... 
and preach against her (Nineveh), for...”. Th e Hebrew, however, is slightly ambiguous. Th e 
reading “... and preach to her, that...” is also possible, though this would certainly not be the 
normal way of construing the Hebrew. In any case, the “normal” reading would have been 
more acceptable to Jews, who felt one had to preach against Nineveh. Th is reading implies 
that Jonah was commissioned to announce doom. Th e second, somewhat “abnormal”, reading 
leaves room for Nineveh to react positively to a warning and opens the possi bility that Jonah 
ﬂ ed to avoid this positive outcome. Th is example also shows that gaps do not occur only 
where something is absent from the text. Ambiguity also creates gaps. 
In 4:2 the reason for Jonah’s ﬂ ight is ﬁ nally mentioned again. Meanwhile the reader’s tentative 
bridging of the gap is not conﬁ rmed or refuted directly. Forms of the Hebrew word yara’
(to fear) do, however, appear six times in 1: 5-16. Th is conspicuous repetition inﬂ uences the 
reader’s retrospection. At this stage (for the reading events to make some sense), the reader 
has to start asking: “What is this story about?” Th e reader has already had to revise the 
expectation (created by verses 1 and 2) that the story is about a prophetic message to Nineveh. 
Now the repetition of the fear motive creates the impression that the story deals with yara’ 
in two senses of the word: fearfulness and the respect for Yahweh that is the mark of true 
religion in the Old Testament. Th us it becomes easy for the reader, in her retrospection, to 
read fear into verse 3 as well, thereby conﬁ rming her previous, tentative explanation. At the 
same time, a new expectation is created, namely that the crew’s true fear of Yahweh (1:16) 
will be rewarded, while Jonah’s fearfulness will be punished. Note that Jonah too confesses 
(in copy-book phrases) that he fears Yahweh. To say that his confession is hypocritical is a 
judgment made by the reader in the light of the story up to that stage.
When Jonah does ﬁ nally oﬀ er a reason for his ﬂ ight (4:2), the reader has to reconsider his 
previous decisions. Possibilities previously rejected present themselves again. What one 
cannot say is that previous gaps have now been bridged by the text itself. Th e reader must 
decide whether or not to believe Jonah. Had Jonah given his “oﬃ  cial” reason immediately 
before or aft er 1:3, this decision would not have seemed important. Surely the reader had 
no reason to distrust Jonah then. Now, however, Jonah’s credibility is in serious doubt. Note 
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how the temporal aspect keeps cropping up in approaches that concentrate on the role of the 
reader. From the position of the critic with his encompassing, spatial overview of the text, it is 
possi ble to discuss Jonah as if there is no gap regarding the reason for Jonah’s ﬂ ight. From the 
position of the reader, however, there are two vital gaps: one at 1:3 and another at 4:2. Both 
demand a decision and the reorientation that accompanies it.
Th ese examples suﬃ  ciently illustrate the complexity of this approach to interpretation. One 
has to stop at virtually every word and frequently one is forced to return to the beginning 
to recon struct the whole of the picture, taking as much care as the ﬁ rst time. Moreover, the 
reader is repeatedly led (or misled) to try to complete the story tentatively:
When the story does not, as expected, end with chapter 1, readers have to readjust. A story 
of deserved punishment becomes one of undeserved grace.
When Jonah obeys Yahweh's command at the beginning of chapter 3, readers may resurrect 
the expectations created in 1:2, but place them in a new perspective. Bitter experience can 
teach us to obey Yahweh, as it does Jonah.
Th e new expectation is that Yahweh will save Jonah (his faithful messenger) from Nineveh 
amid the storm of rage evoked by his message. But this expectation is not met either; the 
story takes a diﬀ erent course.
From the point of view of the text and its origin, Jonah is one story; the reading process, however, 
involves many stories - written and rewritten by the reader.
Further examples of gaps in the text and of the role of the reader may be brieﬂ y mentioned:
Why does Jonah ask to be cast into the sea (1:12)? Any answer must depend on readers’ 
changing assessments of Jonah as a character. Th e text never settles the issue.
Repetitions of key words and phrases occur very frequently. Repetitions may be boring, but 
in Jonah they serve rather to challenge or stimulate the readers, because the same word or 
phrase gains new meanings in the changing contexts. Th e play on the Hebrew word ra‘ah
(evil, disaster, rage), which runs right through the story, is particularly striking.
Apparently unnecessary repetition or information (redundancy) leads readers to ask why 
there is more in the text than is (apparently) required. Th rice (1:2, 3:2, 4:11) Nineveh is called 
“the great city” (and 3:3 adds a parenthetical remark about Nineveh’s size). Th e phrase may be 
conventional in 1:2; later one has to ask why the text harps on this theme. Would the reader 
give the same answer at 3:3 and at 4:11?
Th e striking structural parallels between the two halves of the book have already been 
discussed as a formal feature in chapter 4. Readerly approaches emphasize the eﬀ ect on the 
reader: the reader is invited to understand and assess certain events in the light of previous, 
parallel events.
Whenever parallels dominate, any rupture in the pattern presents the reader with a challenge. 
In 3:2 there is a near repetition of 1:2. Th e slight diﬀ erences should make the alert reader ask 
why the second commission is not quite the same. As mentioned earlier, 1:2 is apparently a 
commission to deliver a message of doom, yet a diﬀ erent reading of the verse is possible. Since 
the implication of doom is markedly absent in 3:2, the reader has to reconsider her reading 
of 1:2 as well.
Verse 3:4 plays on an ambiguous word. Jonah preaches that Nineveh will be overturned (the 
literal meaning of the Hebrew), using a word than usually denotes total destruction. In this 
context (at this stage) the reader could hardly understand it diﬀ erently, yet the same word 
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can be used positively of a complete change of heart. Later, when Nineveh has indeed been 
“turned around”, but not destroyed, the reader might consider whether Jonah’s prophecy has 
not been (ironically) fulﬁ lled aft er all.
Critics of other schools had long known about these aspects of the text and had noted the role 
that humour, irony and quotations from or references to other parts of the Old Testament play 
in Jonah. Th ese aspects have been dealt with by traditional interpreters (without emphasis 
on the reader): humour has been examined by Wolﬀ  (1977), irony by Good (1981), and 
quotations and references by Magonet (1979). Readerly approaches, however, remind us that 
these features are not “in the text” in an absolute way. What the reader does not experience 
as comic is not humour for the reader; what the reader does not recognize as a quotation or 
reference cannot play a role in interpretation as a quotation. Moreover, readerly approaches 
emphasize the function and eﬀ ect of humour and irony, rather than the mere identi ﬁ cation 
of “characteristics”. Th e close connection between this approach and the rhetorical-critical 
one becomes clear here. Both operate from a functional perspective and examine an ongoing 
process.
Th e book of Jonah is richly endowed with challenges for the alert reader - only a few of these are 
mentioned above. For instance, it takes an informed reader to notice that the episode of Jonah 
and the ﬁ sh has links with the many stories about heroes that descend to the netherworld or 
are swallowed by the chaos monster, only to be reborn as new people. Later, when it turns out 
that Jonah is not such a wonderfully “new person” aft er all, the reader must consider whether 
this archetypal story might not have been used in a playful, ironic way. 
Th ese examples show that the implied reader of Jonah is a particularly knowledgeable and skilful 
reader. Having reached this conclu sion (which in itself requires considerable reading skill), you 
tend to watch out for possible hidden meanings throughout the rest of the book.
Finally, it cannot be overemphasized that we are dealing with possibilities; the text does not 
provide ﬁ nal answers. Th e meanings conferred by readers therefore remain tentative. Instead of 
leaving readers dissatisﬁ ed, the book is the more meaningful because it cannot be reduced to a set 
“message”. Th eorists frequently attach great value to “open” texts that yield no ﬁ xed, ﬁ nal meaning. 
Th erefore Jauss (1985) regards Jonah as remarkably “modern”. Th e “great value” is, admittedly, 
relative: it applies primarily in the case of literary texts. In the case of commands or instructions 
for use, we require “clarity”. In many respects the book of Jonah is meaningful precisely because 
it continues to invite interpretation and discussion. Th e abiding inﬂ uence of this text on readers 
is closely linked to the impossibility of ever ﬁ nally “clarifying” its meaning.
(b) Jonah in the reader
Th e previous section suggests that features in the text invite (but do not automatically cause) 
reactions in the reader. Whether or not the reader responds to the invitations depends on the 
reader’s competence as reader. Th is competence is present in the reader prior to any reading of 
the book of Jonah. In other words: Only readers who are familiar with a language and its grammar, 
communal codes, conventions and strategies of reading are able to identify “features in the text that 
call for a response”.
For instance, the question at the end of the book appears “striking” to the experienced reader 
only because she knows that narratives seldom end in this way. Th e reader who has already, on 
the basis of communal narrative codes, decided that Jonah is a narrative, ﬁ nds the concluding 
question extraordinary. Yet a typical problem in logic could also start as a narrative and end in a 
question. In such a case the concluding question is not “striking”.
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To read a text with understanding is to read it as “something” (a joke, narrative, recipe or set of 
instructions). To identify a text as “belonging to this type” readers need to be familiar with the 
codes, conventions and markers typical of each genre. In the book of Jonah the very ﬁ rst Hebrew 
word, wayehi (more or less, “And it came to pass”) is a typical marker of narratives in biblical 
Hebrew. Th e presence of some isolated markers or codes cannot, of course, provide absolute 
certainty about the type of text (the introductory wayehi does not, for instance, settle the question 
of the historicity of a passage). One cannot (as some structuralists had hoped) describe the 
complete system of codes governing a text, because codes and conventions, though communal, 
do not belong to all members of a community absolutely. Not all readers are ideal or competent 
readers in terms of the internal standards of their community.
Readers of the book of Jonah need both a general competence regarding the language (grammar, 
vocabulary, and so on) and a speciﬁ c competence that would make this text “readable”. One cannot, 
however, separate the two forms of competence completely. An example illustrates the point:
In Jonah 1:3-5, forms of the Hebrew word yarad (“go down”) occur three times. At the general 
level the reader has to know this verb, its forms and its usages to read the section. Th is knowledge 
in itself suﬃ  ces to “make sense” of the story. To conclude that the verb symbolizes Jonah’s moral 
“downfall” requires more knowledge. One could argue that, purely at the level of narration, 
other words (halach and bo’) would have served as well. Moreover, “down” conventionally has a 
negative connotation in such cases. By exploiting these possibilities readers make more sense of 
the narrative.
Th ere is, however, a limit to the possibilities experienced as meaningful or fruitful within an 
interpretive community.
A reader who overlooked the symbolic potential of yarad in her own reading might, when it is 
pointed out to her, regard this possibility as enhancing the impact of the text. Most readers would, 
however, reject as far-fetched the sugges tion that special value should be attached to the middle 
word in the Hebrew text, to the numerical values of certain Hebrew letters or to the total number 
of letters in the text. Yet these strategies of interpretation have been used in certain circles (e g 
Jewish cabalistic circles).
It follows that one cannot say that the competent reader is the one who considers all possibilities 
of meaning. Competence is deﬁ ned in terms of the values of the community (Fish’s interpretive 
community). Within the commu nity, competence also involves that certain possibilities are ruled 
out (from the start). Seeing that diﬀ erent interpretive communities assign meaning in diﬀ erent 
ways, we can hardly talk about readers in general.
When we deal with an ancient text, we have to consider how the ancient community of readers 
would have reacted. Th e place name Nineveh would probably have evoked an immediate, strong 
reaction among the original readers. A modern reader without specialized knowledge might not 
even know that Nineveh is the name of a city. Historical recon struction is, however, an accepted 
strategy of interpretation within the majority of schools of interpretation. Th is strategy presupposes
that a text is best understood when its original meaning (the meaning it had for the ﬁ rst readers) 
can be ascertained. With the aid of historical studies (that also involve reading and interpre tation) 
and the human imagination, one tries to place oneself in the position of the ﬁ rst readers.
But this is not the only possible reading strategy, nor is it simply “available”. Modern readers 
may feel reasonably sure that they know what “Nineveh” signiﬁ ed to the ﬁ rst readers of Jonah 
(an element of speculation does enter here, but this goes for other reading strategies as well). 
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Elsewhere the data needed for this strategy of historical reconstruction may be lacking. See the 
following examples:
Jonah’s booth or shelter reminds modern, critical readers of the feast of booths, but interpreters 
have not yet made sense of the connection. Was there a controversy among Jews about the 
feast of booths that could illuminate the passage? We simply do not know.
In Jonah, various divine names (mostly Yahweh and Elohim) are used for Israel’s God. Given 
the highly artistic composition of the book, these variations can hardly be ascribed to chance. 
All the same, scholars have failed to detect a meaningful pattern in the variations – one that 
convinces the scholarly interpretive community. Either we are dealing with a code that is no 
longer available to us, or modern readers are employing a code that identiﬁ es a problem not 
apparent to readers in those days.
Th e examples above indicate what a complex, unending task it is to study the readability of a 
text in terms of codes, conventions and reading strategies. One cannot even pin down all the 
acceptable possibilities for constructing meaning in a speciﬁ c community. And an “unacceptable” 
possibility may become “acceptable” if it suddenly gains enough adherents.
Th is approach is more useful as an indicator of the inﬂ uence that the reader’s world exerts from 
the very beginning of the reading process. What the reader already knows - about Jonah, about 
Yahweh, about prophets - determines how the very ﬁ rst verses will be understood. Further 
expectations based on these ﬁ rst verses are connected to the horizon of expectation the reader had 
prior to reading. Texts become “eﬀ ective” only when they are activated by readers. For instance, 
readers might see the repetition of certain words (ra‘ah) as meaningful, while hardly noticing 
other repetitions (in an English text “the”, “and” and “is” occur frequently). To describe the role 
of the reader solely in terms of eﬀ ect, reaction or response does no justice to the proactive role 
of the reader.
Th e reader’s presuppositions and reading strategies usually operate at the unconscious level. Th e 
conscious attempt to examine them - checking with what knowledge and ignorance, with what 
standards of sense and nonsense, I (not “we” or “the reader”) have read - helps me to place my 
reading in context. Th ough it does not produce a new reading of Jonah, it does help me to make 
sense of interpretations by other readers of Jonah who made diﬀ erent choices in the reading 
process. An analysis of my own road through the text does not, in itself, oﬀ er a reading strategy. 
It merely opens the possibility of clarifying, in a confrontation or dialogue with other readers, 
the reading strategies I have already used. Out of this confrontation or dialogue a new “I”, “we”, 
interpre tive community and interpretations may be born.
6.2.3 Observations and evaluation
Th ough “reader-terminology” is currently popular and is likely to remain so, there are indications 
that no theory of “reader response” will gain lasting favour as an approach to interpretation. Some 
of the theorists named in the discus sion on background and theory (Fish and Culler) have already 
distanced themselves from this approach.
Th e unwieldy and vague title of this section: “Approaches that focus on the role of the reader” 
is signiﬁ cant in itself. Th e role of the reader has become an important emphasis or focus in the 
debate on interpretation, but the debate has not yielded an accepted theory with well-de ﬁ ned 
questions. Th e various possible theoretical frameworks and complexes of ques tions currently 
in use are neither necessarily complementary nor without internal problems. Th e “interesting” 
views they provide oft en lack coherence.
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Certain empirical approaches seem promising and reasonably unproblematic. One could, for 
instance, explore how a text has been interpreted in diﬀ erent historical periods (reception 
history) or how diﬀ erent readers today read the same text (empirical reader-studies). In both 
cases the question about the reader’s role in interpretation is postponed, not addressed, because 
in reality the researcher is giving an interpretation (reading) of a previous interpretation 
(reading). Th e conclusions of such studies oft en depend on the tacit assumption that the 
researcher has some form of direct access (not itself an interpretation) to the text and to the 
interpretations of other readers.
Th e bald claim that all interpretations are freely created by individual readers has the advantage 
of being irrefutable. Unfortunately, you cannot cite evidence in support of it either. By denying 
the possibilities of fruitful communication from the outset, views of this type spell the end of 
all arguments and studies. In philosophy such views - views that leave each individual locked 
into his or her own windowless world - are called solipsistic. When the reader’s role becomes 
the alpha and the omega in interpretation, this role can no longer be discussed in a communal 
theoretical debate.
Th e idea of an interaction between text and reader looks attractive, but in practice it proves 
impossible to delimit the roles in the interaction. From one perspective it seems as if the text is 
the only real object of study aft er all: the text has gaps, provides challenges, oﬀ ers possibilities 
and requires certain responses. From the opposite perspective the reader has the last word. 
Each aspect of the text is a product of the reader’s creative act of interpretation and the role of 
the text virtually disappears.
In his later work Culler accepts that this problem cannot be solved:
“For the reader the work is not partially created but, on the one hand, already complete and 
inexhaustible ... and on the other hand, still to be created in the process of reading ... Th e 
attempt to produce compromise formulations fails to capture the essential, divided quality of 
reading.” (1982:76)
A study of the factors that enable reading as such (or of the attributes of the ideal “competent 
reader”) would doubtless provide interesting results - if anybody could complete such a 
mammoth task. Up to now only vague and general conclusions have been reached. To say that 
your whole world of experience is involved in reading is simply to postpone the question by 
posing it in a new way.
Th is does not make the rediscovery of the role of the reader a senseless episode in the debate 
on interpretation. Valuable perspective on the creativity of the reading act, the temporal nature 
of reading and the active involve ment of the reader have been gained. As a result, we speak less 
naively about what a text “says”, about the text’s “structure” or “message” and about the status 
of our own interpreta tions. What we normally do thoughtlessly when we read or interpret has 
become an area of study that generates its own questions.
Moreover, these approaches have made a contribution in the very area where they failed to 
fulﬁ l anticipated expectations. Th e focus on the reader’s role was needed to generate questions, 
although it proved too restrictive to allow for adequate discussion. Small wonder that the concepts, 
techniques and questions of reader-response criticism are now bearing fruit in other approaches. 
Questions about reader identity and role led away from the exclusive focus on the reader - either 
towards a better understanding of texts and textuality, or towards a more comprehensive study of 
contexts and contextuality.
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6.3 Rhetorical-critical studies
6.3.1 Background and theory
Unlike other fashionable approaches to interpretation, rhetorical criticism has old roots. Th e 
ancient Greeks already studied and taught rhetoric as the art of speaking eﬀ ectively. For centuries, 
rhetoric, logic and grammar formed the trivium, the basis of education in Europe. Even today, 
eloquent speakers and writers wield great inﬂ uence, while those who lack eloquence are ignored. 
It is impossible to overlook the practical importance of rhetoric.
All uses of language are “eﬀ ective” in that people use language to do something: to convey 
information, to warn, to promise, to criticize, and so on. Th e point is that not all people achieve 
the eﬀ ects they aim at – some are more eﬀ ective users of language than others. When I warn 
someone, I have performed the act of warning, yet my act remains ineﬀ ective unless my warning 
is heeded. Rhetoric is concerned with the eﬀ ect that the use of language has on an audience. It is 
in this sense that rhetorical criticism involves a focus on the world in front of the text, the world 
of the reader.
Aristotle saw rhetoric as an important part of philosophy in the broader sense, deﬁ ning it as the 
art of persuasion in matters about which diﬀ erence of opinion is possible. Logical, mathematical 
or empirical proofs are seldom able to settle everyday disputes. Oft en important decisions have 
to be taken in the absence of absolute certainty. Unless one is prepared to resort to force or to 
leave these decisions to chance, one has to search for “good reasons” to adopt one course rather 
than another. In this search for wise, reasonable decisions, one is forced to depend on rhetoric. 
Th is applies to courts of law and political assemblies, but also to debates on economics, religion 
and morality. In the modern, democratic world in which more people are able to voice their 
opinions and in which few things can count as certain, the renewed interest in rhetoric is hardly 
surprising.
(a) Art of eloquence or art of persuasion?
Rhetoric, we might say, is about “speaking to good eﬀ ect”. But what exactly is “good eﬀ ect”? From 
the very beginning, there were two views on rhetoric. One saw rhetoric as the art of eloquence 
(good speaking). According to this view, the “good eﬀ ect” is an impressive, stylish speech, one 
of which the audience will say: “Well said!” A rhetorical act is seen as eﬀ ective when it puts 
across a case in a clear, coherent and striking way. Th e emphasis falls on matters such as choice of 
words, coherent structuring and the use of ﬁ gurative language. In such cases the study of rhetoric 
becomes largely the study of style and the “special eﬀ ects” (variously called ﬁ gures, schemes and 
tropes) speakers use to impress their audiences. Since this approach focuses on the resources of 
language, it is oft en taught in language departments.
Th e other view saw rhetoric as the art of persuasion. According to this view, the “good eﬀ ect” is 
an inﬂ uence exerted on the audience, one that makes the audience say: “Now I am convinced!” 
A rhetorical act is eﬀ ective when the audience is persuaded to change its opinions, actions or 
attitudes. Th e emphasis thus falls on arguments, appeals and evidence, in brief, on the “good 
reasons” presented by the speaker. In some cases the study of rhetoric becomes largely the study 
of informal logic or practical argumentation. Since this approach focuses on reasoning in the 
broad sense, it is oft en taught in philosophy departments.
Clearly these two views on rhetoric overlap at many points. What is said in a clear, coherent and 
striking way will oft en persuade people. When I say that a speech impressed me, I am already 
suggesting that it inﬂ uenced me in some way, although I may not be fully persuaded by the 
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speaker’s arguments. In the same way I can hardly say that someone made a good point without 
admitting that the person managed to use language eﬀ ectively at that point. Still, the overlap 
is not complete. One can admire a speaker’s skill without being in the least impressed by the 
arguments and one can see the strength of an argument presented in a jumbled, ungrammatical 
way. Rhetorical theory has not been able to bridge the gap between rhetoric as art of eloquence 
and rhetoric as art of persuasion completely.
In the following sections, I shall deal mainly with rhetoric as art of persuasion, but without 
denying that persuasion itself oft en depends on eloquence.
(b) Rhetoric as the attempt to inﬂ uence others by means of words
Although the term rhetoric was originally used to refer to communication between a speaker and 
an audience, it can also be used of written communication. What matters is that the speech or text 
is viewed as something addressed to a group in order to exercise a certain inﬂ uence on it. In one 
sense all uses of language are rhetorical, because all linguistic expressions can have a persuasive 
eﬀ ect (in the broad sense), irrespective of the intention of the author. One can apply a rhetorical 
perspective to any (written or oral) communication by examining its potential to inﬂ uence an 
audience.
Still, all communications are not rhetorical in the same way. When you ask me what time it is and 
I tell you, I would not say you persuaded me to tell you what the time is and you would not say 
that I convinced you that it is ten o’clock. It is not very useful to regard a command, a request or an 
examination question as an example of rhetoric. But oft en the intention to inﬂ uence or persuade 
- the attempt to bring about change - can clearly be seen. For instance, it makes sense to assume 
that the major portion of the Bible was written with the deliberate purpose of inﬂ uencing people’s 
religious and ethical views.
Rhetoric does not, however, always aim at dramatic change, a total “conversion” of the audience. 
It is seldom a matter of getting an audience to accept fully something they had previously rejected 
completely. Chaim Perelman rightly said that rhetoric seeks to gain or strengthen an audience’s 
adherence to certain views. Th e following examples will illustrate this point: As a Christian I may 
“adhere to” (Perelman’s terms) certain beliefs without always paying much attention to them. If 
my adherence to these beliefs is strengthened, I do not believe new things, but I may start acting 
more consistently according to the beliefs I already held. On the other hand, someone who has 
not persuaded me to accept his point of view may have succeeded in inﬂ uencing me. I may view 
his opinion more sympathetically (“Although he is wrong, he has a point”); therefore I may be 
prepared to look for a compromise.
Since rhetoric is the attempt to exert inﬂ uence through words, words must have a certain power. 
Rhetorical power is, however, a form of power exerted solely through words. If someone holds 
a gun to my head and orders me to hand over my money, that person does not have to speak 
eloquently or to use reasonable arguments. Similarly, certain people use their political or social 
positions to inﬂ uence others without taking trouble to persuade. I may “agree” with my boss 
because I do not wish to be ﬁ red. Because I do not really agree, I have not been persuaded. In such 
cases one cannot talk about the power of rhetoric. But when I persuade the gunman not to rob 
me or convince my boss that my plan is better than hers, I do use rhetorical power Many theorists 
argue that we need rhetoric because it puts reasonable persuasion in the place of coercion (the 
use of force).
If nothing forces me to change my opinion, why should I be persuaded to do so? In what way can 
words inﬂ uence me? Rhetoric seems to provide a clear answer: Words have an inﬂ uence when 
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they give me good reasons to act or think in a certain way. Th e trouble is that it is impossible to 
deﬁ ne “good reasons”. If I believe the policy of a certain political party will work in my interests, 
I have a good reason to vote for that party. But if I believe, at the same time, that this policy will 
not be in the interest of the country as a whole, I shall also have a good reason not to vote for that 
party. We shall look at such problems in more detail later. For the moment it is suﬃ  cient to note 
that rhetorical power depends on good reasons, but that reasons can be good in diﬀ erent ways 
and that diﬀ erent “goods” can clash with one another.
Th e question of persuading arises only if we accept that words can inﬂ uence people to change in 
certain respects. Th e inﬂ uence of words is, however, not a mechanical, predictable force. If one 
says that a particular rhetorical act has the potential to inﬂ uence an audience, this does not imply 
that the potential will always be realized. Th e audience may react by manifesting a particular 
change, but may also refuse to be persuaded. Th us one has to assume that the audience too has 
a certain freedom: a freedom to choose and a freedom to change. Again, this freedom is not 
absolute. I cannot persuade someone to ﬂ y by ﬂ apping her arms. Because the eﬀ ect of rhetoric 
depends on the power of words, which cannot be calculated exactly, and on the reaction of an 
audience, which cannot be predicted with certainty, no rhetorical theory can really claim to 
provide all the answers. Rhetoric remains a messy, unclear ﬁ eld of study. 
Th ose who study rhetoric deliberately restrict themselves to a sphere within which there are few 
certainties and many unanswered questions. Although there is (aft er many centuries) no generally 
accepted theory of rhetoric, the practice of rhetoric still ﬂ ourishes.
(c) Studying motivation
Rhetorical criticism focuses on “language as action”, on what people wish to achieve when they 
use language and how they pursue their aims. While most approaches to interpretation ask what 
a text means, rhetorical criticism asks primarily what a text does (or tries to do). Th ough words, 
being unpredictable tools, cannot cause or force people to act or think in a certain way; they may 
motivate people or give them “good reasons” to do so. Rhetorical criticism therefore studies texts 
as structures of motivation or webs of “good reasons”.
What motivates people to change their minds or their actions? In some cases people are persuaded 
by rational arguments and proofs. Rhetorical critics will therefore look for the arguments presented 
in a text, but they need to be aware that not all reasonable arguments will follow the formal rules 
of logical and scientiﬁ c proof. 
Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman, who made great contributions to rhetorical theory in 
the 20th century, both tackled the problems surrounding “proof ”. On the one hand, many argue 
that one should only believe what can be proved beyond doubt – by the methods of science or 
formal logic. Th ese absolutists seek ﬁ xed, universal truths. On the other hand, many now argue 
that no proof is ever adequate. Each “truth” seems true to the person who believes it, but no 
truth is beyond doubt. Such relativists or sceptics deny that there is any universal truth or reliable 
knowledge.
Toulmin and Perelman argue that neither absolutism nor relativism provides us with guidance 
in important practical matters. Doctors who have to make diagnoses and prescribe treatment, 
voters who have to decide for which party to vote and judges who have to deliver verdicts in court 
cannot rely on absolute truths, yet they have to make decisions that aﬀ ect the lives of people. To 
make wise decisions, they are forced to depend on good reasons that fall short of absolute proof. 
Rhetorical arguments provide such reasons. For instance, although the evidence in a court case is 
never absolutely conclusive, there are cases where “guilty” is the only reasonable verdict.
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Rhetoricians oft en make use of arguments that are reasonable without being fully conclusive. In 
many areas of our lives more conclusive forms of proof are simply not available. Th erefore, when 
rhetorical critics examine the “arguments” in a text, they take into consideration all aspects of 
the text that appeal to people’s reason in the broadest sense. For instance, an example showing 
the good or bad eﬀ ects of certain policy in the past does not prove that this policy will have 
the same eﬀ ect in future. Nevertheless, it does establish a possibility that should be reasonably 
considered. Similarly, if one quotes the view of an expert to support one’s claim, one has, strictly 
speaking, proved nothing. Yet it is reasonable to consider the opinion of experts when one makes 
a decision. 
In examining arguments in this broad sense, rhetorical criticism tries to establish what claim the 
text makes, what evidence it oﬀ ers to support the claim and how the evidence is linked to the claim 
(why it is considered relevant to the claim). Th e assumption is that humans are – at least to some 
extent – reasonable beings, who respond to good reasons and attempt to make wise, informed 
decisions in the absence of conclusive proof. Rhetorical critics oft en use the juridical analogy: a 
court has to reach the best possible decision based on available evidence. In the court situation, 
being unable to exclude uncertainties and the possibility of error, one has to weigh probability 
and improbability, stronger or weaker grounds. In short, it is a situation of human freedom and 
limitations.
But people are not only reasonable beings – not even in this broad sense. People are also strongly 
motivated by their feelings, values and interests, and rhetorical acts exploit this. Th erefore 
rhetorical criticism also has to pay attention to the ways in which a text plays on the less rational 
aspects of the human personality. What is it that people treasure, hope, fear or despise? What 
evokes compassion, anger, enthusiasm, laughter or courage in an audience? When one deals with 
such questions, one has to look beyond the arguments themselves and examine carefully the 
positive and negative connotations people may attach to certain words, deeds and ideas. Th is is 
by no means easy, because connotations and associations are not eternally ﬁ xed; they vary from 
time to time and from culture to culture. 
A modern reader will not automatically grasp the connotations that “Nineveh” held for ancient 
Israelites. Even the knowledge that Nineveh was a pagan city, the capital of the Assyrian Empire, 
will not help one to understand the fear and hatred that mention of this city evoked. In the 
parable of the Good Samaritan, Jesus plays on people’s feelings about diﬀ erent groups of people. 
Although the text mentions a priest, a Levite and a Samaritan, it does not explain the associations 
these characters called up. Th e appeal to feelings (values, interests) is oft en not clearly marked in 
the text itself, but depends on the particular context that the author shares with the audience.
Some believe that any appeal that is not to reason is somehow disreputable or misleading. People 
should base their decisions on reason - not on feelings, prejudices or preferences. Th ere are, 
however, good reasons (!) to reject this strict view. First, it is not always easy to draw a clear 
dividing line between “pure” reason and “mere” feeling. When money goes missing, we are 
likely to suspect the person with a long criminal record rather than the one with a reputation 
for honesty. From a strictly logical point of view this is prejudice, but it is certainly not an 
unreasonable prejudice. Feelings, preferences and “prejudices” oft en contain hidden elements of 
reason. Moreover, an appeal that caters to people’s existing feelings and values is likely to ﬁ nd a 
more receptive audience. Once the audience is in a receptive mood, one can try to change certain 
aspects of their thought and behaviour. Paul follows, for example, this strategy when he addresses 
the Athenians (Acts 17:16-32).
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Finally, the appeal to people’s feelings spurs people on to action, while mere intellectual agreement 
can remain passive. Th e Bible oft en uses appeals to feeling when it wants people to act on an idea 
and not merely to assent to it. Rhetorical criticism studies such appeals to see how they tend to 
motivate, activate, empower and inspire.
Remarkably oft en people are also motivated by the impression they form of the particular 
speaker or writer. Does the person come across as honest (rather than sly), compassionate (rather 
than callous), reasonable (rather than fanatical)? In short, is this a person in whom I can have 
conﬁ dence? Although we are not always aware of it, we are frequently swayed by the person 
(author or speaker) rather than by the person’s arguments. Because this is so, skilled rhetoricians 
are careful about the impression they make on an audience: they present a particular case, but 
they also present themselves.
When one hears a speech, the speaker’s body language, gestures, tone of voice, and facial 
expressions all help one to form an impression of the speaker’s character. When one studies old 
texts, one has to rely on a more restricted body of evidence. Can one draw conclusions about 
an author’s character from the author’s written text? If “drawing conclusions” had to depend on 
a reliable method that would establish beyond doubt what the author was like, the answer has 
to be “no”. Nevertheless, we do in practice draw such conclusions and we can – to some extent 
– defend them. Authors do “put their stamp” on texts, particularly through their style. Th e style 
of an author invites us to label the author: learned, enthusiastic, courageous, imaginative, caring, 
and so on (or, frivolous, pompous, domineering, prejudiced, and so on).
Speciﬁ c situations call for speciﬁ c virtues. We may take it that authors wish to present themselves 
in a favourable light, but it is important to note which feature is highlighted in a particular text. 
Whereas one situation might demand decisive action and thus a forceful personality, another 
situation might require tact and care – and a diﬀ erent type of personality altogether. By attending 
to the self-presentation of authors and speakers, rhetorical criticism gets a better understanding 
of the demands of a particular rhetorical situation (at least, as it was seen by the people in 
question).
Aristotle identiﬁ ed three grounds of persuasion: logos (reason), pathos (feelings) and ethos (the 
character of the speaker). Th ese have been dealt with above. Are there others? Undoubtedly people 
are motivated by beauty and artistry and also by a sense of wonder and admiration. Whether or 
not these motivations should be considered separately or as subdivisions of the three mentioned 
above is a matter of deﬁ nition.
Rhetorical criticism studies the rhetorical characteristics of texts that seem to have an “appeal 
function”; that is, texts that seem to motivate people to change their minds or actions. As we have 
seen above, such texts, although they do not oﬀ er conclusive proofs, do present an audience with 
good reasons. Th ey appeal to the audience’s reason, feelings and values, and impression of the 
speaker or author.
Since rhetoric itself oﬀ ers no certainties or guarantees of success, rhetorical criticism has no 
absolutely ﬁ xed points of departure. Th e rhetorical critic cannot claim absolute validity, guaranteed 
by a logically coherent theory, for her conclusions; the critic herself stands within “the realm of 
rhetoric”. Rhetorical criticism does not reach conclusions that eliminate all possible doubt, but 
this does not mean that rhetorical criticism proceeds at random or “illogically”. Instead, rhetorical 
critics proceed as rhetoricians themselves do: they build up a case as best they can and present it 
for approval to an audience. 
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Rhetorical critics make claims about a text and its functioning, back these claims by reasonable 
arguments and try to give a coherent, convincing, reasoned account that is relevant to the 
understanding of the text. Obviously, the reader of such an interpretation retains the freedom to 
reject the reasoned account - on reasonable grounds. Th us rhetorical criti cism studies rhetorical 
acts by rhetorical means. Rhetorical criticism is itself a rhetori cal act.
(d) Audience orientation and the rhetorical situation
Th e rhetorical act is always structured from two sides. It is no use pleasing your audience if this 
means sacriﬁ cing your intention; it is equally useless to state your case clearly but in such a way 
that it has no impact. Along the way the audience has to be won over. Th is means that “audience-
orientation” has to be built into the structure of the rhetorical act. Perelman rightly says that the 
speaker who builds her argument on assumptions not acceptable to the audience is guilty of a 
form of question-begging. Th e speaker wishing to persuade an audience of the very thing of 
which they are not persuaded (which they do not accept yet) has to start with what the audience 
does accept and work from there.
Th erefore a skilled rhetorician will search for “common ground” with the audience. Shared values, 
beliefs and ideas become the springboard for the rhetorical action in that the “already accepted” 
paves the way for the “not yet accepted”. Kenneth Burke paid great attention to the way in which 
rhetoricians need to identify with their audience. Unless the audience perceives the rhetorician as 
someone sharing to some extent their interests, values, language, and so on, the rhetorical act will 
fail. Of course, the rhetorician does not identify with the audience at all points: rhetoric works 
through identiﬁ cation to transformation. 
In many ways Jesus brought a strange and revolutionary message. How were people to accept 
something so new and diﬀ erent? In the New Testament we oft en see how Jesus identiﬁ es with 
his listeners by taking as a point of departure their everyday experiences and values. Would a 
shepherd not look for a lost sheep? Would a parent give a child who asked for bread a stone? Isn’t 
it silly to light a lamp and then to hide its light? In this regard classical (Greek) rhetoric spoke of 
common topics (or commonplaces) that provide the basis for further arguments. 
Rhetorical criticism has to identify both the common ground (shared topics) and the contested 
areas in a rhetorical text. For instance, the author of the book of Jonah does not have to convince 
the intended audience that Jonah was in the wrong when he disobeyed Yahweh. Th at much 
was common ground. Th e idea that Yahweh could also care for and have mercy on heathen 
nations was, however, not generally accepted. In dealing with ancient texts, it is hard to tell the 
diﬀ erence between the shared presuppositions and the new, disruptive ideas. Oft en ideas that 
were commonplace to ancient audiences seem novel to us, while ideas that struck the original 
audience as revolutionary are now part of our tradition.
Audience orientation has implications for our view of the form of the rhetorical act. Th e 
form (structure, style, and so on), oft en dismissed as mere “presentation” or “ornamentation”, 
frequently helps to create a basis of identiﬁ cation. Th us a speaker addressing an audience packed 
with academics would wish to show a familiarity with the technical terms of academia. A speaker 
addressing a group of factory workers would, in turn, choose a “down-to-earth” approach and 
exhibit his knowledge of the slang of the township. In both cases the aim is to turn the potentially 
opposing “me” and “you” into an “us”. On the other hand, a striking metaphor oft en invites an 
audience to see a familiar situation in a new light.
Because each rhetorical act takes place in a particular context with its own shared presuppositions 
and areas of dispute, rhetorical criticism has to make an eﬀ ort to reconstruct the rhetorical situation 
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in which the text functioned. Lloyd Bitzer described a rhetorical situation as one in which a group 
of people (the audience) face an exigence (a problem, obstacle or lack) that can be modiﬁ ed by 
a rhetorical discourse, but subject to speciﬁ c constraints. For the sake of simplicity, we may call 
the exigence the problem, noting that certain problems cannot be solved by rhetorical discourse. 
We cannot make pollution disappear by talking about it, but we can change the attitudes of the 
people who cause pollution by talking to them. A rhetorical situation is thus one in which words 
can make a diﬀ erence. 
Th e constraints in a rhetorical situation determine to what extent change is possible. Some 
constraints cannot be overcome by means of rhetoric (physical realities, for instance) and 
others (ﬁ xed beliefs, respected traditions, strong personal interests) are not easily overcome. 
But a rhetorical discourse introduces its own constraints (arguments, the appeal to feelings, the 
speaker’s character), which also press on the audience. Indeed, the rhetorician will try to make 
the rhetorical discourse “ﬁ t” the existing situation so as to exert maximum inﬂ uence.
Th e following is a typical rhetorical situation: A student (the audience) with some talent does 
badly at university because he lacks self-conﬁ dence (the exigence). A lecturer talks to the student 
to encourage him (the rhetorical discourse), keeping in mind the problem and the constraints 
inherent in the situation. She cannot turn the student (who has limited talent) into a genius; she 
can try to overcome the constraints of a negative self-image, an attitude of despondency and a 
lack of conﬁ dence.
An understanding of the rhetorical situation (the problem, the audience, the constraints) makes 
the task of rhetorical analysis much easier. Unfortunately, we do not have all this information 
when we deal with biblical texts. In such cases rhetorical criticism has to resort to methodological 
ﬁ ctions such as the “implied speaker” or the “implied audience” to get some grip on the rhetorical 
situation. Instead of knowing the setting and seeing how the text ﬁ ts into it, the rhetorical critic 
has to examine the text and deduce from that what situation it would have ﬁ tted. Th is procedure 
is obviously unreliable, yet it is part of our reading practice to make such assumptions about texts. 
Here, as elsewhere, rhetorical criticism chooses a course that is theoretically suspect, but that 
conforms to our everyday practices.
Each rhetorical situation involves a basis of shared values, premises and conventions, even where 
there are diﬀ erences of opinion concerning the speciﬁ c problem. Th is alerts us to the social 
basis of rhetoric. Even when the rhetorical situation involves a single speaker and an audience of 
one (or when one addresses oneself rhetorically), rhetoric is by its nature not a matter between 
individuals. Th e broader community provides, as it were, the platform from which rhetorical 
transactions can take place. Rhetorical criticism overlaps with ideological criticism, because both 
approaches deal with the social context that inﬂ uences communication between individuals. Th e 
ethical implications of this will be discussed in a later section.
(e) Some tools of rhetorical criticism
Th ere is no single standard method or terminology in rhetorical criticism, although a variety of 
approaches have been proposed. One of these, socio-rhetorical criticism, has been discussed in 
chapter 4. Th is section will look brieﬂ y at the traditional (or Neo-Aristotelian) approach and note 
some of the contributions of Chaim Perelman and Kenneth Burke.
Th ose who follow the classical tradition - that of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian and others – make 
use of the classiﬁ catory concepts (in Greek and Latin) developed in the classical era. Th ese 
concepts were originally used in the teaching of practical rhetoric, but they have some use in 
rhetorical criticism as well.
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A rhetorical discourse is ﬁ rst classiﬁ ed according to its genus: forensic, deliberative or epideictic 
rhetoric. Forensic rhetoric, the rhetoric of courts of law, deals with past actions and judges them 
to be either just or unjust. Deliberative rhetoric, the rhetoric of political meetings, deals with 
future policies and judges them to be either advantageous or disadvantageous. Epideictic rhetoric 
originated from speeches at funerals, where the character of the dead person was discussed. 
Aristotle believed it dealt with the present (the past being an example for the present) and judges 
actions to be either honourable or shameful. Th e scope of epideictic rhetoric was later expanded 
so that this genus included the rhetoric of teaching and preaching.
In classical theory the rhetorician had ﬁ ve tasks (“oﬃ  ces”): to ﬁ nd relevant arguments (inventio), 
to arrange the material logically (dispositio), to ﬁ nd the appropriate words and style (elocutio), to 
memorise the speech (memoria) and to deliver the speech (actio). Only the ﬁ rst three are relevant 
to the rhetorical criticism of texts.
In considering the arguments in a discourse, the critic identiﬁ es the topics or commonplaces 
(topoi or loci) that serve as “common ground”. Next the critic identiﬁ es the various argumentative 
devices used in the discourse: enthymemes, maxims, examples, signs, and so on. Th e critic 
also determines to what the speaker or writer appeals at each point: logos, pathos or ethos (see 
above).
Regarding the arrangement of the discourse, the critic notes the divisions of the rhetorical 
discourse from the introduction (proem) to the conclusion (peroratio) and judges whether each 
of these achieves its speciﬁ c purpose and whether they ﬁ t together. One might also pay attention 
to the purpose of the rhetorical discourse and each of its parts. According to Cicero, the three 
“functions” of rhetoric are to persuade (suadere), to teach (docere) and to delight (delectare).
In considering word choice and style, critics pay attention to the linguistic techniques used in 
the discourse, especially ﬁ gurative language (tropoi or ﬁ gurae). Is the style appropriate, clear and 
interesting? What purposes are served by the ﬁ gures of speech? 
Th is approach, of which only the outline has been given here, works best when it is applied to 
formal discourses following the classical pattern. It is, for instance, of considerable use in the 
study of the Epistles in the New Testament, since at least Paul probably had some knowledge 
of the rhetorical theory of his day. Its shortcomings are more obvious when one tries to apply it 
to rhetorical discourses cast in other forms (narrative, for instance) and from other times and 
cultures. 
Chaim Perelman called his “new rhetoric” a theory of argumentation, but his view of “practical 
reasoning” is so broad that he is able to include under “argumentation” many discourses that 
classical rhetoricians would not have considered to be argumentative. For instance, he discussed 
ﬁ gures of speech not as ornaments but as arguments in the broad sense. Moreover, he maintains 
that rhetoric is the typical form in which we reason about matters of value. Because “proofs” 
are not available in such matters, the emphasis falls on ways of inﬂ uencing people’s views and 
attitudes. 
He pointed out that the rhetorician must strive from the outset to establish the presence of certain 
key ideas or values. By ﬁ xing attention on a particular issue, theme, value or idea (and by placing 
others in the background), the rhetorician takes the ﬁ rst step towards making the audience see 
things in a new light. Figures of speech oft en help to “create presence”.
Having established presence, the rhetorician uses various argumentative means to change the 
audience’s established pattern of thinking. Sometimes the rhetorician uses looser forms of accepted 
patterns of argumentation: quasi-logical arguments (arguments showing formal resemblances to 
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syllogisms), arguments based on claims about the nature of reality (“each result has a cause”), 
arguments based on illustrations or arguments based on analogy. In each case the starting point 
has to be what is already accepted by the audience: all arguments are, according to Perelman, ad 
hominem arguments in that they are directed at a speciﬁ c audience and caters to the perceptions 
of that audience.
But some of the argumentative devices are not “arguments” in the normal sense. A typical example 
is the forging or breaking of links (liaisons) between ideas or attitudes. Perelman argues that our 
views are very oft en based on our associations. For instance, we may associate age with weakness 
of body and mind and therefore show a bias against older people. But this liaison can be broken 
and a new one can be established that links age to experience and wisdom. Similarly, an idea 
with a positive connotation, say, justice, may be made to appear negative in a speciﬁ c context by 
distinguishing between a true and a false form of justice.
Rhetorical critics using Perelman’s insights will point out how a rhetorical discourse gives presence 
to certain aspects of a case and denies presence to others and how argumentative devices function 
at a hidden level, for instance, through suggested analogies. Most of all, it will seek to show how a 
rhetorical discourse establishes and breaks the links between ideas that shape our perceptions.
Since Kenneth Burke’s contribution to rhetorical theory cannot be summarized brieﬂ y, I mention 
only some of the terminological tools he provided to rhetorical criticism. His basic philosophical 
point of departure is that human social behaviour, unlike the behaviour of physical objects, cannot 
be studied by using the methods of natural science. Physical objects obey the laws of motion; 
human social life depends upon symbolic action (the use of language being the prime example). 
For the study of symbolic action the metaphor of drama is the most appropriate; therefore he calls 
his approach dramatism
In a drama certain actors (agents) within a certain setting (scene), do certain things (acts), using 
certain means (agency) to achieve certain goals (purpose). From this Burke derives his dramatistic 
pentad: scene, agent, agency (means), purpose and act. Th ese ﬁ ve basic terms he regards as the 
“principles of motivation”. I do something because the circumstance demands it (scene), because 
of the person I am (agent), because I have the means or opportunity to do it (agency), because 
I have a goal in mind (purpose) or because I am reacting or responding to a previous act (act). 
Obviously these principles of motivation usually work together, but in a particular context I may 
stress (“feature”) one of them. In analyzing texts, one would ﬁ nd that some texts emphasize the 
determining force of the context (scene), others the character of the hero (agent), others the way 
in which people are spurred on by a goal (purpose), and so on.
Burke is particularly interested in what he calls the ratios between the terms of the pentad. In a 
ratio two terms are linked in a way that suggests that the one term gives rise to the other one. 
Two examples will have to suﬃ  ce: If a text suggests that people (agents) are the products of their 
environment (scene), the text uses the scene-agent ratio. Another text, using the agent-scene 
ratio, might suggest that people create their environment. Similarly, the agent-act ratio asserts 
that a person’s inherent character determines that person’s actions: the dishonest person tells lies. 
But the act-agent ratio asserts that a person is shaped by his or her actions: the person who slips 
into a lie here and there eventually becomes habitually dishonest.
What some call “pentadic analysis” (the study of the motivational terms and ratios in a text) is a 
powerful tool for coming to grips with the tendency of a text. For instance, when the scene-agent 
ratio dominates, the text presents a mechanistic, deterministic view of human behaviour. When 
the agent-scene ratio prevails, however, the text has an idealistic tendency. Burke also argues that 
four “master tropes” - metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony - provide basic structuring 
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devices for rhetorical composition. Burke understands the terms very broadly, not as ﬁ gures of 
speech but as devices for presenting one’s views in language. Th e term metaphor, in his view, 
embraces all techniques that invite readers to see a matter from a certain perspective, metonymy 
embraces all techniques of reduction, synecdoche all techniques of representation, and irony all 
techniques that set up a contrast or a dialectic.
Th e following should help to clarify Burke’s idea: All rhetoricians wish to present a particular 
perspective; they want an audience to see a matter from a speciﬁ c angle. Th is makes a degree of 
reduction necessary. When I talk about Sarah as a good (or bad) teacher (my perspective), I do 
not consider Sarah as a (good or bad) athlete. I reduce my view to what is relevant. But I also have 
to ﬁ nd ways of representing my perspective. I need examples, references or anecdotes that present 
Sarah as a good (or bad) teacher. Moreover, I will make my perspective clearer by contrasting it 
with other perspectives. Sarah stands out as a good teacher when she is compared to Clive. Or, 
Sarah’s decision in a certain situation demonstrates that she is a good teacher when one considers 
other decisions she could have taken.
Th e theory of the master tropes helps rhetorical critics to see the basic “shape” of a rhetorical 
discourse: What is the basic perspective? What is eliminated by way of reduction and how? What 
techniques of representation are used? What contrasts and dialectical interactions are set up? Th e 
theory also helps one to question a text critically: Is the perspective not too narrow or too broad? 
Does the reduction not eliminate relevant details? How adequate is the representation? Are the 
contrasts too sharp or too vague?
A merit of Burke’s theory in general is that it can be applied to texts that are not overtly rhetorical 
or argumentative. Burke prefers the more supple word “identiﬁ cation” to “persuasion” and argues 
that rhetorical acts oft en inﬂ uence people’s attitudes rather than their beliefs or actions. Many 
biblical texts that present no direct arguments and issue no clear commands can be read as 
invitations to identify with certain views, actions or characters and to adopt a certain attitude to 
these. It is quite possible that this indirect approach is in the long run more inﬂ uential than the 
direct one.
(f) Rhetoric and ethics
Rhetoricians exercise a certain power, and where power is involved, ethical questions cannot be 
avoided. “Who exercises power, on whom, to what purpose?” are key questions in rhetorical 
criticism. Comprehensive answers can be given only from within the context of systems of values. 
If rhetoric indeed has transformative power, a critic has to answer questions about the value of 
the intended transformation. Moreover, since rhetorical criticism is both the study of rhetorical 
acts and is itself a rhetorical act, it cannot avoid responsibility by claiming that it studies texts with 
“scientiﬁ c objecti vity”. 
Modern rhetorical theory generally denies that values are simply posited and that reasoned 
discourse about values is therefore ruled out. Wayne Booth’s view on this can be considered 
representative. According to him, the clear distinction between value judgments (about which one 
cannot argue) and factual judgments (about which proofs can be oﬀ ered) cannot be maintained. 
Th e moment one asks “Why ought I to change my view on this matter?” facts and values are 
inextricably linked in the subsequent debate.
Th e problem of the ethics of rhetoric goes back at least to Plato or even the Old Testament (cf 2 
Sam 17). When is rhetoric good? If rhetoric’s sole purpose is to persuade, one could say that it is 
good when it persuades successfully. But what if a good (skilful) speaker should persuade people 
of a bad (immoral) case? Hitler was a highly successful orator; Jeremiah was apparently not. 
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Moreover, a certain type of success is always easy to achieve: “It is not hard to praise the Athenians 
to the Athenians” (Aristotle). Must we say that the unscrupulous politi cians who buy votes with 
extravagant promises (that the party has no intention of even trying to honour) are practising 
good rhetoric simply because they are clearly successful?
Such questions are also relevant to the rhetorical study of the Bible. Th e book of Jonah is an 
impressive rhetorical performance, but other books in the Old Testament present us with 
diﬀ erent views about the relationship with foreigners. In particular, one has to compare to Jonah 
Nahum’s rejoicing over the fall of Nineveh (regarded as brilliant poetry!) and the books of Ezra 
and Nehemiah, which probably come from much the same time, but emphasize separation from 
foreigners. In other cases one has to account for traces of chauvinism, sexism and class interest 
in the Bible.
Some rhetorical critics, particularly the neo-Aristotelians, sidestep the problem. Th ey restrict 
themselves to a classiﬁ cation and description of the rhetorical techniques and avoid value 
judgments. Th is has led to the accusation that rhetorical criticism dodges its critical responsibility 
by failing to deal with the ideological edge of texts – the very “textual power” that is integral to 
rhetoric. When rhetorical criticism does ask critical questions about matters such as class interests 
and power relations in texts, it becomes a form of ideological criticism.
Perelman and Burke did not pretend to be neutral observers of a particular practice; both openly 
defended speciﬁ c values that they wished to see applied in social life. Th ey made their “ideological” 
commitments clear and argued against opposing positions. Burke in particular developed his 
whole sprawling terminology as a “counterstatement” (the title of one of his books) to what he 
saw as prevailing tendencies.
Rhetorical criticism is well placed to pose questions of power and values particularly sharply. Th e 
very fact that people are oft en persuaded by “bad” rhetoric proves that no value system commends 
itself as self-evident to all people. Moreover, it can be shown that each value system is rooted in 
rhetoric and can be defended only by means of rhetoric. But the study of rhetoric also shows that 
one cannot simply adopt a stance of undiﬀ erentiated tolerance: some value systems – backed by 
powerful rhetoric – have had intolerably bad eﬀ ects.
Clearly some kind of standard is needed to prevent all possible rhetorical utterances from being 
placed on exactly the same level or being judged solely in terms of practi cal success. Toulmin 
talks of the court of reasonability in which all clear-thinking people with suitable experience act 
as judges. In the same vein Perelman postulates a universal audience of reasonable and competent 
people. To demolish such construc tions is not very diﬃ  cult. In reasoning about values, terms 
such as “clear-thinking”, “suitable experience”, “reasonable” and “competent” provide the material 
for questions, not the answers.
Other possible answers are, however, equally unconvincing. Before accepting a beautifully 
egalitarian theory that places all rhetorical utterances at exactly the same level, we should consider 
whether we are prepared to allow each would-be Hitler’s racial rhetoric free play, to expose our 
sick children to any form of crackpot treatment or to regard the views of a person who claims 
to be a fried egg as worthy of serious consideration. In answer to those who accept that the 
only standards are those of the majority or those of the rulers, it is necessary to point out that 
majorities may change their minds as well, and that power relationships shift  - in both cases oft en 
as the result of successful rhetoric.
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(g) Another form of rhetorical criticism
In the ﬁ eld of biblical interpretation, James Muilenburg and others following in his footsteps 
used the term rhetorical criticism in another way, pleading for a type of criticism that would be a 
corrective to the one-sidedness of form criticism. Th eir argument is two-pronged:
Form criticism sees each literary unit as an example of a genre and thus focuses on the general 
features of the genre and on the Sitz in Leben that is common to all texts of this genre. Th us 
the speciﬁ c features of the text (for instance, its artistry) disappear into the background. Th e 
rhetorical criticism proposed by Muilenburg examines primarily the unique literary features 
of a text – those features that diﬀ erentiate it from other texts of the same genre.
Form criticism usually deals with smaller units that can be identiﬁ ed as “pure genres” and 
tends to ignore the more comprehensive units within which these units are embedded. In the 
book of Jonah the prayer in chapter 2 departs from the narrative genre of the rest of the book. 
Should the prayer therefore be studied in isolation or should one ask how the prayer and the 
narrative complement each other? Th e prayer may be a secondary addition, but in principle a 
literary composition may be a skilful blending of genres. Muilenburg’s approach leaves room 
for the study of complex texts containing elements of diﬀ erent genres.
Th is approach sees rhetoric primarily as the art of eloquence or the art of literary composition. 
Th is type of rhetorical criticism would be more aptly called stylistics or literary appreciation.
(h) Th e rhetoric of the text and the rhetoric in the text
In practice, rhetorical criticism can take one of two courses. It can focus on the main elements in 
the chain of argument, the typical rhetorical style and the overall rhetorical thrust of the particular 
text. It can also concentrate on the ﬁ ne details of the individual strategies in each sentence and on 
the rhetorical “turns” (tropes) that go towards building up – bit by bit - the persuasive force of the 
whole. If the former approach is adopted, we may speak of the rhetoric of the book of Jonah or of 
the rhetorical strategy (singular) of the book. If the latter approach is adopted, it is better to talk 
of the rhetoric in the book of Jonah or of the rhetorical strategies (plural) of the book. Naturally 
the two can be combined. Th e following application of rhetorical criticism to the book of Jonah 
concentrates on typical examples.
6.3.2 Jonah in the light of rhetorical criticism
By placing the ﬁ rst three verses under a microscope we can illustrate how rhetorical criticism 
deals with minute detail. Th e result is the more signiﬁ cant because one’s ﬁ rst impression is that 
we are dealing with a very simple, unsophisticated narrative style.
According to Perelman, the ﬁ rst task of the rhetorician is to create presence, to ﬁ x the nub of the 
matter in the minds of the audience. Obviously more than the introductory sentences can be 
used to do this, yet it is desirable that the distinction between foreground and background should 
be apparent at an early stage. Th e ﬁ rst two verses succeed admirably in placing the core material 
in the foreground. It is the conventional framework itself (And the word of A came to B saying: 
Get up, go to C and do E) that immediately ﬁ xes attention on the variables in the formula. Th e 
reader is immediately aware that this is a story about Yahweh, Jonah and Nineveh, and that the 
repayment of evil by evil is at stake. Th e last part of verse two, in particular, conﬁ rms that the locus
(or topos) of the argument is the ethical ﬁ eld.
Th e three actors in the ethical drama are all known to the audience and all call up powerful topoi 
and associations:
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One could say that Yahweh self-evidently belongs to the formula in verse 1 and that it is a 
commonplace (commonly accepted topos) that Yahweh is the judge who punishes evil (verse 
2). Th at Yahweh is the God of Israel is also presupposed by all. From this perspective it is even 
possible to consign Yahweh to the background. Only later, from verse 4 onwards, the author 
makes it clear that we are not dealing with the self-evident Yahweh who is little more than a 
mechanical ethical principle, but with an active - even unpredictable - God.
Jonah is known to the audience from 2 Kings 14 and occupies a much more ambiguous 
position. As a commissioned prophet (here) and as a "true prophet" (2 Kings 14), he is on 
the "right side" in the ethical sense; as a prophet of hope and a prophet from Galilee in the 
Northern Kingdom, he is under suspicion.
Nineveh obviously represents the threatening, oppressive pagan world (cf the book of Nahum). 
Th e speciﬁ c reference to Nineveh as "the great city" (the only "superﬂ uous" phrase in the ﬁ rst 
sentence) is the beginning of a rhetori cal strategy that becomes evident only at a later stage. 
At this stage it serves a twofold rhetorical purpose. It is linked to the evil ascribed to the city 
- great evil deserves great punishment. It also emphasizes how the small Israel (represented 
by the individual Jonah) had to face a vast heathen world, a theme that runs through the book 
and that naturally links up with the experience of the audience.
Perelman has argued that a persuasive speaker has to start with premises accepted by the audience. 
Th e ﬁ rst two verses activate a number of commonplaces that serve as “common ground”. Th e 
familiar “call formula” helps to create a non-threatening atmosphere: we are getting a good, 
orthodox story. Th at evil will be requited with evil is nothing new; that Nineveh in particular 
deserves punishment is self-evident; that a prophet is commissioned to announce this judgment 
is normal (cf Amos 3:7). Skilful readers, mindful of Jonah’s earlier activity, would regard Jonah’s 
commission here as a ﬁ tting complement to his earlier activity (reported in 2 Kings 14): ﬁ rst 
salvation for Israel; now punishment for Israel’s enemies!
Even at this elementary level we detect traces of Burke’s master tropes, although conﬁ rmation is 
given only in the rest of the story.
It is fairly obvious that Jonah represents Israel and Nineveh the heathen world (synecdoche). 
Th e com plex relationship between Israelites and non-Israelites, with all the feelings attached to 
it, is reduced to a single, concrete set of events (metonymy). From the ﬁ rst sentence onwards 
these events are placed within the perspective of Yahweh’s commissioning and judging word. Th e 
question is not how Israelite and non-Israelite relate to each other in general, but how this relation-
ship appears in the light of Yahweh’s commission and judgment. Just as the metaphor “the winter 
of our discontent” applies a certain perspec tive (the coldness and misery of winter) to a person’s 
feelings, making us see the feeling from that perspective, Yahweh’s word oﬀ ers the perspec tive 
from which Jonah’s and Nineveh’s actions are viewed. Whatever else one might say about Jonah 
or Nineveh (from a diﬀ erent perspective) is secondary and is therefore eliminated by metonymic 
reduction.
Th e motive force behind the events is irony rooted in the fact that the characters in the story 
are not static, self-identical entities, but enter into dialectical relationships with themselves and 
among themselves. In the ﬁ rst two verses it is still possible to see Yahweh as “self-evidently good” 
and Nineveh as “self-evidently bad”; about Jonah the readers give a double judgment from the 
start (see above). Jonah, one could say, is an ironic ﬁ gure from the outset. Around him the other 
characters develop in dialectical relationships.
If we look closely, it becomes apparent that the persuasive force of the book of Jonah depends 
virtually entirely on the reader’s acceptance of the validity of these discursive strategies. Readers 
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who would, for instance, reject the validity of the perspective outright (by denying the existence 
of a God) would not be persuaded of anything. Nor can the book of Jonah function as a persuasive 
argument for people who do not accept that a story that apparently re counts a contingent, unique 
set of events can address a problem that crops up repeat edly in diﬀ erent forms at diﬀ erent times. 
Th e story is persuasive only if we grant that the complexities of the problem can be reduced to and 
represented by a story such as this.
Ultimately all persuasion depends on the acceptance of the possibility of an internal dialectic 
or ironic self-consciousness. Readers who are either unchangeable givens or variables that 
are constantly created anew by external factors cannot yield to persuasion. Persuasion applies 
only to people who can change in dialectical relationships with others and who can themselves 
induce change. Such people can see themselves ironically and are therefore not bound to their 
own identiﬁ cation with themselves. Here the readers are invited to ﬁ nd themselves in Jonah (to 
let Jonah represent them), but also to “see Jonah doubly” and to reapply this double vision to 
themselves. When I see myself doubly (or ironically), I become aware that in addition to the “I-
with-this-opinion” there is already another I, critical of this opinion. I may choose which “I” I 
want to be; I may allow myself to be persuaded.
Starting from shared presuppositions, the author can present arguments to induce change. Th is 
has to be done with great care, because no audience welcomes an abrupt reversal of their values. 
If Yahweh suddenly decides to pardon Nineveh or Nineveh is suddenly portrayed as good, the 
audience would dismiss the story as implausible. Even in Jonah’s case the author has to take 
care. But the audience is less than certain about Jonah and would not be totally surprised to 
hear bad things about him. (Would the story succeed rhetorically with Isaiah in the main role?) 
Nevertheless, the audience initially has three reasons for identifying with Jonah: he is an Israelite 
(one of us), a prophet (a man of God) and opposed to Nineveh (our enemy’s enemy is our friend). 
At the start, the identiﬁ cation pattern is simple and, to the audience, self-evident: we and Jonah 
and Yahweh are on the good side; on the opposite side stands those evil people without Yahweh 
(Nineveh and all other pagans and oppressors).
No rhetoric on earth can reverse such an identiﬁ cation pattern completely, nor is this what the 
author of Jonah intends. It is possible to oﬀ er arguments indicating that certain aspects of the basic 
pattern may be rearranged - on the basis of the presuppositions of the pattern itself. In this case 
it entails that Nineveh (and other pagans) may not be self-evidently opposed to Yahweh and that 
Yahweh may not be self-evidently “on our side”. Here the dangers of identiﬁ cation clearly emerge: 
Identifying ourselves with Yahweh and Yahweh’s cause may easily come to mean, in practice, that 
we identify Yahweh with ourselves and our cause.
In verse 3, Jonah, the rhetorical catalyst, starts pulling the identiﬁ cation pattern apart. Th e readers 
are shocked by a prophet who ﬂ ees from his task without bothering to give a reason or to argue 
his case - although the shock is somewhat lessened by the fact that it is a Galilean prophet of 
salvation. Rhetorically the shock serves a double purpose:
First, it is necessary to capture the readers’ attention. Th e stock formulas and nearly self-evident 
thought content of the ﬁ rst two verses have served their purpose of placing author and audience 
on the same level. Now the audience must not be allowed to fall asleep. (Classical rhetoric called 
this technique of stirring matters up aft er the introduction tua res agitur.)
Secondly, the audience’s identiﬁ cation pattern changes immediately. If Jonah is no longer 
on Yahweh’s side, we are no longer on his side. He now belongs to the side of the pagans. Th e 
adjustment is not that painful, for no ﬁ rm identiﬁ cation has taken place yet. Th e Jonah with 
whom the audience could identify was a commissioned prophet, an Israelite and the instrument 
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that would bring about the downfall of Nineveh. Now he is just a Galilean from the distant past. 
Th e audience may now refuse to be represented by such a person (we are not like that!) and feel 
even more snugly at home on Yahweh’s side (we, at least, know better!).
In distancing itself from Jonah, the audience makes a crucial admission: not all Israelites are 
automatically on Yahweh’s side - Jonah’s people, the Northern Kingdom, were not. Perhaps (who 
knows?) not all of “us” are either. And perhaps not all pagans are the same. Th e fragmentation of 
the “us” is not forced on the audience from the outside; it ﬂ ows from the elements of the original 
formula itself. Th e “good” side is for Yahweh and ... whoever is not for Yahweh has no business 
there. Th e author helps the audience to make this move:
First, the word yarad (go down) is used twice of Jonah in this verse. Th is ﬁ ts naturally into the 
narrative (although other words were available), but does carry the suggestion of a “downward 
path”. In fact Jonah keeps going down all the way to the belly of the ﬁ sh. Secondly, the implications 
of Jonah’s ﬂ ight are clearly portrayed in the last part of verse 3. Instead of going to Nineveh with 
Yahweh (in obedience to Yahweh) to preach against pagans, he goes to Tarshish with pagans (the 
sailors) to avoid Yahweh and Yahweh’s command. When Jonah turns against Yahweh, he ends up, 
automatically as it were, in pagan company.
Th e author does not, however, condemn Jonah harshly. It is rhetorically important that the 
audience should later identify with Jonah once again, else they would not be able to recognize 
themselves in the ﬁ gure of Jonah. Jonah’s “badness”, like Jonah’s “goodness”, is therefore left  open 
to question. Th at Jonah ﬂ ees is shocking, not abominable. What are his reasons? If he were simply 
scared, it would be quite human. Note that it is human, not speciﬁ cally “Israelite”. So even the 
excuse the audience oﬀ ers on Jonah’s behalf undermines the type of thinking that would separate 
Israelite and pagan completely.
Moreover, Jonah’s “sin” is really more than a little ridiculous. Who can ﬂ ee from Yahweh? If distant 
Nineveh’s wickedness “came up before Yahweh’s presence” (verse 2), one cannot ﬂ ee to Tarshish 
to escape this presence (verse 3). Th e audience may be inclined to say: “If Jonah had stopped to 
think, he would not have made such a fool of himself. All this trouble and expense (Jonah’s ﬂ ight 
is described in detail) wasted on a crazy project doomed to failure!”
Th e humorous tone that marks the book as a whole has the rhetorical function of producing a 
playful mood. When the charge against Jonah is ﬁ nally directed against the audience, it is not in 
an atmosphere of bitterness or malice.
Th e premises that are present in embryonic form in the ﬁ rst three verses form the basis for the 
rhetorical strategy of the book, which cannot be discussed in detail here. One major strategy is 
the undermining of “self-evident truths” by “breaking liaisons”. 
Yahweh is, for instance, divorced from the one-sided characterization as "God of Israel", whose 
task is to look aft er Israel alone. In place of this Yahweh who acts mechanically and according 
to a set pattern we get "this God" of whom one has to say "perhaps" and "who knows?" (1:6 
and 3:9; both from the mouths of pagans). Th e national God is replaced by "the God of heaven 
and earth who created the sea and the dry land" (1:9; ironically from the mouth of Jonah). 
Th is too is a God that pagans might ﬁ nd and serve (1:14, 16). Above all we are confronted by 
a Yahweh who is more that a personiﬁ cation of moral law, a Yahweh who repents (3:10) and 
shows mercy (4:10; from Yahweh's own mouth).
Pagans are divorced from a one-sided, negative judgment. In 1:5-16 the crew's progression 
stands in contrast to Jonah's regression. Th e crew moves from blind fear and prayer "each to 
his God" to a deep "fear of Yahweh" (in the usual Old Testament sense of "true faith") and later 
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pray, sacriﬁ ce and make vows to Yahweh. Th e audi ence can pardon their misdirected prayers 
in verse 5 for the same reason that they pardoned Jonah: they are a little confused. Fearing, 
praying and casting something overboard are the correct reactions to the storm, and ﬁ nally 
the crew learns to fear correctly, pray correctly and cast overboard correctly.
Th e audience might regard Nineveh's sudden repentance with suspicion; therefore the author 
carefully guards against any possible impression of superﬁ ciality. In the king's decree the three 
aspects of repentance are listed in climactic order: the ritual (fasting), the spiritual (prayer) 
and the moral (change of lifestyle) (3:7-8). Rhetorically these verses also serve to build tension 
(the ﬁ rst two aspects alone would not have suﬃ  ced at all). At the same time the learned target 
audience can pride itself on having picked up this snippet of theological skill.
Th e ﬁ gure of Jonah poses the greatest challenge to the author as rhetorician. If the audience 
identify with Jonah outright, they are going to end up where Jonah ends up - in outraged rejection 
of Yahweh’s grace to pagans. If they distance themselves completely from Jonah, they are not 
going to realize how much of Jonah they carry within themselves. Th e fact that Jonah is the only 
Israelite in the story - and the main character to boot - makes him the natural candidate for 
identiﬁ cation. Moreover, in 4:1-3 he is allowed to air views that many in the audience would share 
- though they may not articulate them as baldly.
Th e author’s rhetorical strategy is therefore aimed mainly at undermining Jonah’s image by 
making him appear ridiculous. Th is is very clear in 1:3-12 and 4:5-9, yet elsewhere, where he 
strikes a more digniﬁ ed pose, elements of irony are not lacking. In 4:3 Elijah’s words ﬁ t ill in 
Jonah’s mouth. In his prayer in 2:2-10 there are dubious features (compare the smug 2:8-9 with 
1:16). But the author guards against a sustained attack on Jonah: in chapter 2 and in 3:1-4, he 
is deliberately rehabilitated and made into something of a hero. Aft er all, the author’s intended 
readers are neither naive nor wilfully disobedient; they are a group of people who believe that 
they share with Jonah the experience of having learned obedience the hard way. 
It is rhetorically highly important that Jonah should fall, get up, and fall again, and the author 
manages this with superb skill and artistry. From a narratological perspective, the ﬁ rst part of the 
book may be read as a cautionary tale about deserved punishment (up to 2:1) or an inspirational 
tale about undeserved grace, the second part being a complete story in itself. In the rhetoric the 
two parts are interwoven.
Th e ﬁ rst part makes the point that Israelites too may be deserving of punishment and that pagans 
too may come to serve Yahweh. It also shows Yahweh as a God who bestows undeserved mercy. 
Th e problem is that readers may distance themselves from Jonah at this stage; therefore Jonah 
becomes a hero in the start of the second part, enabling readers to “adopt” him again. Once more 
Yahweh shows undeserved mercy – to the disgust of Jonah and of those in the audience who are 
unable to stomach any reprieve for Israel’s sworn enemies. Th e conclusion catches the readers oﬀ  
balance, because they are still (at least partly) identiﬁ ed with Jonah. Th us they can hardly deny 
that the ﬁ nal question applies to them or avoid the suspicion that they may have made fools of 
themselves.
Th e delicate balance between identiﬁ cation with Jonah and rejection of Jonah is maintained in 
Yahweh’s actions towards Jonah. Th e audience is at times invited to reject Jonah and to laugh at 
him, yet Yahweh never rejects him and takes him remarkably seriously. In the ﬁ nale, Jonah is 
not bound to one of his two roles by an answer put in his mouth. Whether Jonah is to be hero 
or clown, servant or rebel, remains a matter of choice. To take the side of Yahweh’s mercy in 4:11 
does not necessarily imply a rejection of Jonah (or of Jewishness); to sympathize with Jonah’s 
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protest in 4:1-3 need not imply a ﬁ nal rejection of Yahweh. Th us room is made for the audience 
to be persuaded without loss of face.
In the long run, no rhetorical strategy can depend on undermining alone, for the purpose of 
rhetoric is positive: to induce or increase adherence. Th e “self-evident truths” are not merely 
undermined; they are placed in a new perspective and in their essence conﬁ rmed. One could 
argue that the author merely “gave presence” to some implications of Israel’s religion that had 
been overlooked.
It is not denied that there are essential diﬀ erences between people and that these depend on 
diﬀ ering relationships with Yahweh. Th e point is rather that Israel’s own history shows that such 
diﬀ erences are not eternally ﬁ xed or ethnically determined. Both the historical placing of the story 
and the veiled references to Israel’s history are relevant to this. Th e one-sided view is undermined 
- precisely because it is a one-sided view of Israel’s own creed. Th e Yahweh of this story, the 
Yahweh against whom Jonah rebels, has always been a “gracious and merciful God, slow to anger 
and full of kindness”. Th at Yahweh rules over all nations was no new idea either. By forging a link 
(liaison) between these two aspects of Israel’s faith and by drawing the conclusions this has for 
Israel’s relations with pagans, the author succeeds in present ing what was at ﬁ rst an unacceptable 
idea as the logical consequence of Israel’s faith.
Still, it required great rhetorical skill to guide the audience along this course. One is struck by 
the strong appeal that is constantly made to the intellectual powers of the audience. Th e artistry 
of the narrative (discussed in other sections) requires skilful and alert readers. Such readers, in 
turn, enjoy the intellectual game and commend themselves when they notice the subtleties. One 
cannot call this an appeal to the intellect - rather an appeal to the prejudices of the intellectuals! 
But it is assuredly not simply a striving for eﬀ ects, for the eﬀ ects carry the readers through the 
argument and in that sense carry the argument itself.
6.3.3 Observations and evaluation
Rhetorical criticism focuses on what is done when language is used, on the appeal function or 
motivational force of utterances. A text is seen primarily as a transaction between people, an 
address directed at a speciﬁ c audience in a speciﬁ c context. Although rhetorical criticism can 
still draw on the classical tradition of rhetoric as the art of persuasion and the art of eloquence, 
the “new rhetoric” has broadened the scope of rhetoric so that the rhetorical perspective may 
be applied to texts that would formerly not have been regarded as rhetorical. Nevertheless, the 
rhetorical perspective can probably not be applied equally fruitfully to all texts.
Other possible perspectives are not neces sarily challenged; indeed, rhetorical criticism oft en 
has to use the methods and results of other approaches. Th us rhetorical criticism uses the tools 
of historical criticism to reconstruct rhetorical situations and “close reading” or structural 
analysis to examine the details of a text. When rhetorical criticism deals with the exercising 
of power in the public sphere, it clearly resembles ideological criti cism. Th e emphasis on the 
audience’s role links rhetorical criticism to readerly approaches.
Th e network of links with other approaches makes rhetorical criticism a versatile approach, 
but also leaves it open to criticism. In the absence of a standard “method”, rhetorical critics 
may be accused of selecting bits and pieces of other approaches, ﬁ tting them together and 
adding rather speculative thoughts about the purpose or intention of the text. Rhetorical 
critics may answer that they themselves move in the sphere of rhetorical acts: they do not 
speak from a loft y perch above the “realm of rhetoric”. At this practical level many questions 
of theory and methodology necessarily remain unanswered.
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More serious criticism concerns some presuppositions of rhetorical criticism that do not 
necessarily ﬁ t into other theoreti cal frameworks. Rhetorical criticism seems to presuppose that 
the potential eﬀ ects of texts are largely dependent on the techniques that authors consciously 
employ and that audiences respond with a considerable measure of freedom of choice. Th ese 
presuppositions seem to ignore the unconscious forces that may determine both authors and 
audiences and the possibility that texts may gain meanings not intended by their authors. 
Th e clear distinction between conscious and unconscious may be questioned. Burke argues 
that rhetoric oft en works (in the case of the author and the audience) at a level between the 
conscious and the unconscious. But rhetorical critics seldom assert that authors are in full 
control of what they write or that audiences have unlimited freedom of choice. Th ey tend to 
restrict themselves to the sphere of everyday life in which we all necessarily assume a degree of 
responsibility for our actions and a measure of free choice. Th ose who wish to deny all validity 
to these everyday perceptions have to construct grand theories to support their massive claim. 
Such theories are seldom plausibly and almost invariably elitist.
Th is approach is of great value to biblical interpreters, because much of the Bible was clearly 
written with the intention of persuading. Th e study of the Bible’s appeal function has to be of 
interest to those interpreters who read the Bible primarily with a view to its use in our context 
- in the preaching of Christian churches, for instance. Unfortunately, rhetorical criticism has 
generally dealt only with the rhetorical situation of the original audiences. If they are to serve 
the needs of Christian communities, rhetorical critics will have to develop in more detail a 
historical rhetoric to studies the potential impact of texts in changing contexts.
6.4 Deconstructionist approaches
6.4.1 Background and theory
Th e relationship between the terms deconstruction, poststructualism and postmodernism is a 
matter of debate. For present purposes I shall regard postmodernism as the blanket term for 
a powerful but diﬀ use current of thought which has, since the late 1960’s, challenged the (real 
or perceived) principles of European modernity. Although postmodernism has inﬂ uenced – in 
diﬀ erent ways – many academic disciplines, it is a general climate of though that is not conﬁ ned 
to theoretical enterprises. Poststructuralism I shall regard as a particular theoretical branch 
of postmodern thought that both appropriates and criticizes the principles of structuralism. 
Deconstruction I regard as a branch of poststructuralism that takes its lead mainly from the 
French philosopher Jacques Derrida (who coined the term) and the Belgian-born American 
literary theorist Paul de Man. In this chapter I draw mainly on Derrida’s work.
Unfortunately, these neat categories fail to capture the complexity of the academic debates. 
Prominent ﬁ gures in these debates (Michel Foucault, Edward Said, Julia Kristeva, Harold Bloom, 
Giles Deleuze, Gayatri Spivak, and many others) are not easy to place. Th ey borrow freely from 
one another, but also implicitly and explicitly criticize one another at certain points. Most of them 
would probably reject the notion of distinct schools, each with its clearly delineated theory, as a 
misplaced remnant of modernist thinking. 
Moreover, they deliberately operate across disciplines, questioning the traditional boundaries 
that separate philosophy, literary criticism, social theory, gender theory and psychoanalysis from 
one another. Th ey take over and mix insights gained from a bewildering variety of sources: Marx, 
Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Saussure, Bakhtin and Levinas are among the favourites. Th e borrowed 
material is, however, reworked and subjected to searching criticism. Th eir own contributions 
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would not necessarily appear under the banner of poststructuralism or deconstruction; they may 
be presented as psychoanalytical criticism, feminist criticism, postcolonial criticism, cultural 
studies or even (occasionally) Marxist criticism.
If the previous paragraphs did not leave readers confused, they have failed in their purpose. 
Poststructuralism and deconstruction both oppose neat theories that can be slotted into our 
existing framework of thought alongside other theories; they wish to shake the framework itself. 
A feeling of bewilderment may be the inevitable eﬀ ect of the process by which they hope to 
restructure our ways of thinking. Th e next section will deal with this in more detail.
(a) Th e agenda of poststructuralism and deconstruction
Th ough the complexities of poststructuralist and deconstructive thought make it diﬃ  cult to 
introduce these theories to those unacquainted with it, it is fair to say that most poststructuralists 
share a particular view of the Western tradition and an agenda that ﬂ ows from this view. 
In brief, poststructuralists believe that Western thought and practice have for many centuries 
been stuck in a groove. Neither revolutionary ideas nor liberation movements have managed 
to change this. Both have yielded some (limited) results, but these partial successes have not 
aﬀ ected the structure of thought and practice as a whole. Each time the apparent novelty was 
ultimately incorporated (or co-opted) into the existing framework. Th us Marx’s ideas bore fruit 
in the Russian revolution, but this neither ended oppression (within the Soviet Union) nor shook 
the foundations of capitalism. Marx’s hope that workers’ organizations would usher in a radically 
new era has come to nothing, because organized labour and labour action (strikes, negotiations, 
etc) have simply become an everyday part of the system.
Th e point is that “the system” that churns out oppression is not primarily located in an elite group, 
a system of ownership, a mode of production, a body of laws or a bureaucracy. It is located in the 
whole of our signifying system, which ties the various parts together in such a way that breaking 
one of the individual bonds makes little diﬀ erence. I use the term “signifying system” with some 
hesitation, because it could create the impression that poststructuralists are concerned only with 
ideas. Th is accusation is oft en made. But poststructuralists generally resist the subject-object 
dualism that opposes ideas to actions, institutions and material objects. A signifying system 
in my usage does not exclude embodiment or materiality. Institutions, practices and “bodies” 
belong to the signifying system to the extent that they have meaning or signiﬁ cance for us. Th e 
signifying system distinguishes the “normal” (or “natural”) from the “abnormal” (or “unnatural”) 
and thereby provides the norms for the society. It imposes an order in the very depths of our 
thinking that inevitably ends in the subordination of some to others. Because it operates beneath 
the level of consciousness, we (the vast majority, not a small minority) cooperate with it “freely”. 
Th us when there is no police force to enforce the law, we police ourselves.
Poststructuralists claim that what we (practically everyone) see as “normal”, “proper” or “natural” 
is no more than one possibility among many. It is not “given” to us by God, nature or reason; it is 
a construction that can be deconstructed and reconstructed in a diﬀ erent way. Th ere is no ﬁ xed 
point or foundation (God, nature, the human subject) from which all constructions have to start. 
Since no construction can claim to have a ﬁ rm foundation, all constructions are to some extent 
violently imposed: they exclude other possibilities without adequate reason.
In the overarching signifying system various aspects of our unsatisfactory world are interlinked 
in surprising ways: truth with power, the subject with subjecting or being subjected, propriety 
and private property, the private with privilege, authorship with authority, and so on. Moreover, 
the various forms of discrimination (manifested in racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, and 
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so on) have a common root in judgments linking “otherness” with abnormality, unnaturalness 
and irrationality. Th ese judgments (discriminations!), though baseless (without ﬁ rm foundation), 
have real consequences – those who step out of the accepted signifying system are branded “mad” 
and placed in an asylum. Because of the pervasive inﬂ uence of the signifying system (we have 
internalized it), attempts to attack it at a particular point have little hope of success – as we have 
noted above. Nor is there any “foundation” that can be undermined.
Th erefore, when poststructuralists direct their attacks at a range of targets, it is never with the 
aim of simply discrediting a particular idea or changing a particular practice. Th e attacks are 
theoretical in the sense that they question and undermine the ways of thinking and acting that 
gave rise to the particular ideas and practices. Th us each attack destabilizes the system by exposing 
its general weakness.
(b) Th e legacy of structuralism
Structuralism can be viewed as the culmination of attempts to develop a controlled, veriﬁ able and 
scientiﬁ c approach to the study of texts. Poststructuralism obviously rejects this positivistic strain 
in structuralism. In a number of other respects, however, structuralism provided arguments that 
poststructuralists found very useful.
First, Saussure argued that meaning cannot be found in a reality outside language. Since the 
signiﬁ ed is part of the sign itself, all meaning is mediated by the sign system – any link with the 
world outside language is at most indirect. Secondly, he showed that the link between signiﬁ er and 
signiﬁ ed is arbitrary. It is not given in nature or reason, but is constructed in diﬀ erent ways in each 
language. Th irdly, he argued that the meaning of signs is determined diﬀ erentially, that is, by the 
diﬀ erences between signs within the same system. Meaning is not determined by some essential 
attribute of a sign that makes it possible for us to understand it in isolation (outside context of 
the sign system). Finally, Saussure suggested that all sign systems may be studied according to the 
pattern he developed for the study of language.
Poststructuralists adopted these ideas and expanded their scope. All meaning (or signiﬁ cance) 
is mediated to us by language or by a system structured like a language. For instance, (sensory) 
perception does not give us an access to reality that bypasses language, nor does it inform our 
language. Instead, perception is an eﬀ ect of language: we perceive only according to the categories 
provided by our language. Words represent things, but the need for representation already implies 
the absence of the thing represented. Our meaningful world as a whole is a linguistic world.
But the system of language is made up of arbitrary signs (not rooted in nature or reason). Th e 
implication is that our “meaningful world” is merely a particular construction, not a ﬁ xed reality. 
As Saussure showed, diﬀ erent languages categorized “reality” in diﬀ erent ways. Th is does not 
mean that particular individuals constructed the system of language, because language as system 
(langue) is impersonal and communal. It would be more apt to say that the system of language 
constructs us by providing us with a meaningful world. Th e “meaning” of this world is not, 
however, eternally ﬁ xed or founded on a ﬁ rm base.
If meaning is diﬀ erential and not based on an essential property of the sign, it follows that no sign 
may be privileged above the others. All signs are equal in that they all mean in terms of the others. 
Not only does the language system lack a foundation outside itself; it has no centre in itself. Th ere 
is no “transcendental signiﬁ ed” outside the system and no singular meaning around which other 
signiﬁ ers group themselves in ranked order. Instead, to determine the meaning (signiﬁ ed) of 
any sign, I have to refer to other signs, which again refer me to still other signs. Nowhere do I 
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encounter a meaning that comes forth from contemplating the sign in itself and that escapes the 
endless process of diﬀ erentiating.
Structuralism assumed that a sign system (langue) can be studied synchronically, in an ahistorical 
state of stability. Given such a ﬁ xed system, it is possible to analyze texts based on this system in an 
objective, strictly scientiﬁ c way. Although the wiser structuralists did not claim that this procedure 
would reveal the meaning of a text, they believed it would show how the text is structured as 
a meaningful unit. Th e strictly objective procedure would eliminate most disagreements and 
limit the proliferation of conﬂ icting interpretations. All this becomes possible because the basic 
stability of the sign system is assumed and because the interpreter is regarded as a neutral observer 
outside time and space. .
Poststructuralists challenge these presuppositions. Th e ideal langue of synchronic studies can be 
conceptualized as a ﬁ eld in which the signs occupy ﬁ xed positions with relation to one another. 
Th e relative positions of the signs (not their “content”) determine their meaning and the rules of 
their usage. Now such a stable situation does not persist for even a minute in practice. Th e mere 
use of signs continually destabilizes the system. When a word is used in new contexts, the result 
is a shift , however small, in the whole system (since all the relationships have to be realigned). But 
the practical point that parole (the use of signs) constantly changes the langue (the sign system) 
is not the main one. Derrida argues that the possibility of using signs depends on the principle of 
arbitrary substitution or representation. Th e signiﬁ er “stands for” the signiﬁ ed, but there is not 
reason why a particular signiﬁ ed should stand for a particular signiﬁ er. Th is allows for a situation 
in which one signiﬁ er can stand for diﬀ erent signiﬁ eds, so that the sign is internally diﬀ erentiated 
(diﬀ ers from itself).
Th e signiﬁ er “cat” can be used both “literally” and “ﬁ guratively” (Deconstruction generally 
questions the ﬁ xed boundary between literal and ﬁ gurative). Since the literal and the ﬁ gurative 
“cat” are not diﬀ erent signiﬁ ers, we have to say that the sign “diﬀ ers from itself ” in the two uses. 
Moreover, we can also say that a lion is one of the big cats. Th is is not a ﬁ gurative use of the word, 
yet it is diﬀ erent. Th e possibility of this internal diﬀ erentiation is always present in language – it 
belongs to its very structure.
Paul de Man approaches the problem from a diﬀ erent angle. Th e three systems that work in 
language - grammar, rhetoric and logic - do not complement one another but oft en clash. Th us 
the phrases “biblical interpretation” and “scholarly interpretation” follow the same grammatical 
pattern (attributive adjective plus noun), but have diﬀ erent logical patterns. Similarly, “You were 
very clever” may be praise or criticism. Th e ironic sentence and the “straight” sentence cannot be 
distinguished from one another grammatically. 
From the side of readers there is no greater stability. Again, the practical point that no human 
reader has an overview of the whole system or the time to diﬀ erentiate the individual sign from 
all other signs is a minor one. Readers are in principle not outside the signifying system, being 
themselves eﬀ ects of the system. In the process of reading they leave their traces on the text 
and the text leaves its traces on them. When I read the end of a text I am no longer the reader I 
was when I read the beginning. Nor will I be the same when I reread the text. Readers too are 
internally diﬀ erentiated, in ﬂ ux, unstable.
Derrida thus questions the distinction between langue and parole and argues that the structure 
of language is in constant ﬂ ux. Indeed, ﬂ ux, substitution and diﬀ erentiation are the structuring 
principles of language. No ﬁ xed structure is objectively present in a text or in the underlying 
language. Meaning is indeed contextual in the double sense that it depends on the context of signs 
within a system and on the context of use. Since both the system and the use are in ﬂ ux, however, 
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the context cannot be pinned down. As Derrida puts it, the context is never “saturated” - it has no 
boundaries. Whereas structuralism emphasises the importance of diﬀ erential language systems, 
poststructuralism emphasizes the diﬀ erentiality of the system.
(c) Logocentrism and the metaphysics of présence
Derrida claims that the Western tradition of thought has been dominated by “logocentrism” 
(logos = word, speech, idea, reason) and the metaphysics of presence. According to Norris 
(1982:19), “Deconstruction works to undo the idea - according to Derrida the ruling illusion 
of Western metaphysics - that reason can somehow dispense with language and arrive at a pure, 
self-authenticating truth or method.” 
In logocentric systems some ﬁ xed point of reference is identiﬁ ed and used as a centre of all 
signifying systems. Everything else is assigned meaning in relation to this centre; even change can 
be understood in terms of the unchanging centre. Th is “logos” that serves as centre may be God 
(as “transcendental signiﬁ ed”), some truth or idea, an absolute origin (arché), or – typically in 
Western humanism – the reasonable, self-conscious human subject. Whatever it is, it is conceived 
to be unitary, self-identical (it simply is itself), immediately present to itself (it needs no outside 
mediation), the source of meaning and value, and self-authenticating (it vouches for itself). Th is 
obviously means it must be located outside language as a system of diﬀ erentiation, in which 
nothing has meaning in itself or remains ﬁ xed in space and time.
Derrida connects the notion of a ﬁ xed centre with that of “full presence”, the notion that something 
can fully know itself and be fully conscious of itself as “this, here and now” as opposed to “that, 
there and then”. “Presence” thus refers to both time and space and sets up a boundary between 
“inside” and “outside”. Th e “inside”, being primary and authentic, is the judge of the “outside”, 
which is always secondary and copied. Western philosophy has usually regarded the human 
subject, viewed as uniﬁ ed, self-conscious and rational, as such a centre, fully present to itself. 
Th e subject’s inherent rationality (logos) gives rise to the idea (logos) “inside” the subject (purely 
interior, without the mediation of language). Secondarily, the subject’s speech (logos) expresses 
this interiority by means of the word (logos). 
Logos as word (language) is thus secondary to logos as reason, as idea present to the subject before
it is expressed. Th e human subject as creator of language uses language to order the outside world 
in accordance with reason – the subject is “the measure (judge) of all things”. Meaning therefore 
can always in principle be ﬁ xed: it is a human product based on an idea that was fully present to 
the language user. Derrida’s critique of the notion of présence questions the assumption that the 
human subject has an immediate or direct (introspective) access to its own consciousness, that 
the subject is itself the pure origin of univocal meaning.
Before moving to the details of Derrida’s critique, it is important to note that he does not regard 
logocentrism (or the metaphysics of presence) as a harmless philosophical mistake. Th e basic 
oppositions implicit in any logocentric system (identity-diﬀ erence, rational-irrational, centre-
margin, primary-secondary, and so on) give rise to a whole chain of oppositions. Just as the basic 
oppositions were ordered hierarchically (always giving preference to the ﬁ rst term), so the other 
oppositions derived from them also impose violent hierarchies. Th ese hierarchies are at work in 
(for instance) sexism, racism and homophobia.
Although Western humanist philosophy spoke of “the (human) subject” in general, in practice 
the spokespersons of logocentrism were (virtually without exception) European, middle-class, 
heterosexual males. Th is set the standard for “being a subject” and “being at the centre”. Th ose 
who did not conform to this standard were banished to the margins. Establishing a centre 
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inevitably leads to the marginalization of some. Th e centre never simply stabilizes an order in 
language; since language (in the broadest sense) is the source of signiﬁ cance, the linguistic order 
has political and social implications. When identity is privileged at the expense of diﬀ erence, 
those who are perceived as diﬀ erent will automatically be regarded as inferior.
Derrida points out that none of the orders imposed in the name of a centre or foundation has ever 
validated itself. Each supposed description (of the “true” order) is accompanied by a command, 
a prescription. “Th ese are the facts; therefore this is what you have to do.” A truly self-evident 
and self-validating order would require no command. Although logocentric thought claims to 
inform us about the (real) order of the world, it really orders the world to conform to its (arbitrary) 
commands. Logocentric thought, far from being a “purely rational” search for neutral “truth”, is 
closely linked to strategies of domination – knowledge is power!
Once the notion of a centre (foundation, arché, full presence) is rejected, nothing limits what 
Derrida calls the play of signiﬁ ers. Without a secure, ﬁ xed point with reference to which we 
can test our interpretations, the search for ﬁ nal truths, assured knowledge, reliable methods 
and criteria, eternal moral values or any “metaphysical comfort” (Nietzsche) becomes pointless. 
Contrary to popular opinion, however, Derrida does not reject all notions of truth, knowledge, 
criteria and moral value. He seeks to redeﬁ ne these notions, freeing them from their metaphysical 
baggage and their complicity with regimes of domination.
Derrida recognizes that this is no easy task. Logocentrism (metaphysics) is not a conspiracy cooked 
up by philosophers in the service of a small elite. It has shaped our whole language (and thus our 
subjectivity) so radically that we cannot “mean” except by means of the language of metaphysics 
– it is our only language. To pretend to criticize the signifying system “from the outside” would 
be to slip back into the very mistake of metaphysics, the mistake of claiming a position outside 
language. Derrida therefore deliberately uses language (the language of metaphysics!) against 
itself, looking for openings, inconsistencies and instabilities that can be exploited to undo the 
built-in logocentrism of our language. Deconstruction is not a new theory or method, but is an 
activity in and against language.
(d) Phonocentrism and “writing”
Derrida’s denunciation of what he calls “phonocentrism” and his preference for “writing” are 
closely connected to this argument against logocentrism. Phonocentrism assumes that the 
spoken word directly expresses a thought that was fully present to the speaker beforehand 
(outside language). It implies that the speaker has immediate access to his or her own meaning. 
In phonocentric thinking writing is devalued, because it is merely a “substitute” for speech, a 
“copy” of speech. Derrida explains:
Th e priority of the spoken language over written or silent language stems from the fact that 
when words are spoken the speaker and the listener are supposed to be simulta neously present 
to one another; they are suppo sed to be the same, pure, unmediated presence. Th is ideal of 
perfect self-presence, of the immediate posses sion of meaning, is what is expressed by the 
phonocen tric neces sity. 
Writing, on the other hand, is considered subver sive in so far as it creates a spatial and temporal 
distance between the author and audience; writing presupposes the absence of the author and 
so we can never be sure exactly what is meant by a written text; it can have many diﬀ erent 
meanings as opposed to a single, unifying one (quoted in Kearney 1986:116).
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Using Saussure’s theory, Derrida argues that speech is possible only on the basis of a system of 
substitution, a possibility of making “copies”. Th is system and this possibility exist prior to and 
outside the act of speaking. It is, in a sense, inscribed (written) in the language and in the speaker 
as a product of language. Moreover, “meanings” are not created spontaneously in the minds of 
speakers; they are always already inscribed in the language. In this sense speech is a copy of 
writing. 
Derrida’s point is far from simple and clear. In the ﬁ rst place, by writing he does not mean writing 
as we know it; therefore his term is oft en left  untranslated - as écriture. Th ough écriture in his 
sense is not identical to (ordinary) writing, it is analogous to writing rather than to speech. Nor is 
he saying that speakers or writers interpret what they have said or written aft er the act of speech 
or writing is completed. He is saying that speakers and writers have no direct, privileged access to 
“their” ideas – no access that bypasses “a kind of writing”.
Perhaps the best way to get a grip on Derrida’s use of écriture is to note with what he associates 
it. As opposed to speech (supposedly an expression of an original, self-suﬃ  cient thought present 
to the speaker), écriture is related to separation, diﬀ erentiation and absence. Th e written text is 
no longer tied to the supposed source, but moves away in time and space. It survives the death 
of its author; in a sense it is the death of the author, because the text, once written, slips from the 
authority of the author. In its journey the written text is subject to diﬀ erent interpretations and 
uses in diﬀ erent contexts – it is not tied to the intention of an author. Th e written text is not self-
identical but self-diﬀ erentiating. Instead of marking presence, it marks absence (of its author, its 
referents and a determinate meaning).
But écriture also relates to the impersonal, non-conscious and arbitrary aspect of the linguistic 
system and the inﬂ uence these have on supposedly free subjects. Derrida oft en relates écriture to 
what Freud called the unconscious. In this respect it suggests that subjects do not create meaning 
“freely” and consciously, but are constrained by rules and forces of which they are not even 
aware. Admittedly, Derrida does not regard these rules and constraints as if they were “things” 
- substantial in themselves and outside language. Like the trace (see below), écriture is not a thing, 
but rather a non-thing – the indented (empty) space when a letter is engraved that makes the 
letter appear by pure diﬀ erentiation. Derrida also notes, using the same image of engraving, that 
writing is not without a certain violence (pressure, indentation). 
Derrida delibe rate ly overturns the existing hierarchy by giving preference to “writing” rather 
than to speech. Speech is really another form of writing. It is possible to understand speech only 
through its analogy to writing. But this overturning is not ﬁ nal; it is a preliminary move against 
logocentrism and phonocentrism.
(e) Diﬀ érance, the trace and the play of signiﬁ ers
As we have seen, Derrida believes that neither the system of signs nor the sign itself is stable. Th e 
system is constantly changed by parole and the sign tends to become internally diﬀ erentiated. 
In Saussure’s theory diﬀ erences could be used to determine meaning, because signs and their 
relationships to one another were deemed stable. One could identify in terms of diﬀ erence. When 
everything is in ﬂ ux, ﬁ xed diﬀ erences give way to a process of diﬀ erentiation. Derrida uses the 
term diﬀ érance to capture something of this instability. Th e term is based on two meanings of 
the French verb diﬀ érer: 1) to diﬀ er (to be non-identical, separate, distinct, not equal) and 2) to 
defer (to interrupt, postpone, delay, divert). Derrida notes that the French verb “seems to diﬀ er 
from itself ”; it is an example of internal diﬀ erentiation. He also insists that diﬀ érance is “neither a 
word nor a concept” (Derrida 1998:385). Derrida derives from both these meanings a new noun 
153
Chapter 6
that diﬀ ers from the normal French word diﬀ érence in writing but not in speech: diﬀ érence and 
diﬀ érance are pronounced the same.
By packaging the two meanings in one term, Derrida addresses simultaneously two aspects of 
diﬀ erentiation, the spatial and the temporal. “To diﬀ er” suggests what is separate or non-identical 
by being diﬀ erentiated in space. “To defer” suggests something diﬀ erentiated in time – “not now 
but later”. According to Derrida, diﬀ érance is what makes diﬀ erentiation in time and space 
possible. It is not a diﬀ erence or set of diﬀ erences, but the condition of “diﬀ erencing”.
Diﬀ érance may be taken as indication that the meaning we assign to a text is always preliminary, 
that meaning always moves beyond our reach. At the very moment that meaning is “established”, 
this meaning is undermined by the new diﬀ erences that have instantly emerged between this 
newly established meaning and other existing ones. Each new act of interpretation sets oﬀ  a chain 
reaction of diﬀ erentiation through which closure (ﬁ nality about meaning) is inﬁ nitely postponed. 
Th is common understanding of the term is not wrong, but it does not plumb the depth of Derrida’s 
idea.
By calling diﬀ érance the provisional name for “sameness which is not identical”, he shows his 
interest in the interplay between sameness and diﬀ erence, regularity and singularity. 
Texts (contrary to the view of some) are not simply “marks on paper”, open to any random 
interpretation. Th ey are, instead, re-marks (iterations, repetitions) that emerge with a degree of 
recognizable regularity from previous cases. For instance, they “belong to” a known genre or 
exhibit the known style of an author. Without this regularity, texts would be unreadable in an 
absolute sense. Yet texts are also irreducibly singular and can never be deciphered according 
to a ﬁ xed code or law. Derrida oft en uses the example of the (handwritten) signature to explain 
this. A person’s signature is supposed to be the unique mark of authenticity, a representation of 
the uniqueness of the person. Yet to function in this way, the signature must be repeatable and 
recognizable. Th is opens the door to copying in the sense of forgery.
Diﬀ érance “designates this unity of chance and necessity” (Derrida 1998:389), the fact that textual 
meaning is determined in many ways, but never in such a way that meaning is the determinate 
eﬀ ect of determinate causes. Diﬀ érance as internal diﬀ erentiation (“non-identiy with oneself ”) 
“renders determinacy both possible and necessary” (Derrida 1988:149), but also limits it.
Diﬀ érance has to be deﬁ ned mainly in negative terms: it is not a thing or substance, an activity 
of the subject or the object, an origin or cause (in the past) or a telos (in the future). Nor is it 
absence, nothing or negativity; it goes beyond the normal dialectical oppositions - presence-
absence, being-nothingness, inside-outside, cause-eﬀ ect, arché-telos – of metaphysical thinking 
and undermines them.
In this respect it is closely linked to the “non-concept” trace – probably the most diﬃ  cult term in 
Derrida’s vocabulary. In both French and English the word trace has a wide range of meanings – 
path, footprint, faint mark, minimal quantity, and so on. Networks of traces enable interpretation, 
but traces are not speciﬁ c aspects “in the text”. One could say that these traces are something 
like the memory of texts, keeping in mind that memories are not eternally ﬁ xed (traces may be 
erased). Moreover, traces also relate to the future. In interpretation traces enable both a degree of 
retention (of the past) and a degree of pre-tension (determinate openings towards the future).
Traces make it possible for interpreters to oﬀ er readings that would at least ﬁ nd widespread 
acceptance, but they do not set an absolute limit. Indeed, both diﬀ érance and the trace leave room 
for play, another important term in deconstruction.
Fishing for Jonah (Anew)
154
Th e word play (speciﬁ cally the French jeu) has a number of meanings. It can refer to the 
uncompromised, free activity of (for instance) children - usually associated with fun. In this 
sense it is sometimes translated as “freeplay” (a translation Derrida dislikes). It can also refer 
to the (relative) “looseness” between parts in a machine, which is absolutely necessary for the 
functioning of the machine. Without play in this sense, the machine seizes, jams and grinds 
to a stop. Lastly, play is also (in French) associated with gambling. In this sense, it adds to the 
connotation of uncertainty that of risk and possible loss.
Derrida makes use of all these senses of play. In contrast to the despe rate ly serious quest for the 
one, univocal meaning of a text, the play of interpretation has an element of irreverent gaiety and 
a lack of deadly solemnity. “Decon struction cele brates the endless multiplication of meaning over 
the spurious if com forting unity of a single correct reading” (Kearney 1986:123). Derrida himself 
delights in playing with words, in punning and parody. But he does not believe that play is either 
fully creative or in all respects free. Th e play of signiﬁ ers also implies that human beings can never 
control or creatively “make” meaning. Subjects are themselves subject to this play: they are as 
much playthings as they are players. Nor is the game of interpreting without cost. Oft en there is 
much at stake, yet one cannot avoid the risk. One can, however, gamble responsibly!
Two implications of Derrida’s notion of play deserve careful attention. Because there is a certain 
play, interpretation is both unlimited and limited. Although there is always an opening for new 
meaning, some interpretations are indeed false or bad (see Derrida 1988:146). Th is is not really 
a paradox. Th e list of positive whole numbers (1, 2, 3, 4 ... ) is inﬁ nite (unlimited), but certain 
numbers (-1, ⅛, 0, etc) fall outside this list.
Moreover, the proliferation of possible interpretations does not depend on the “richness” of 
texts, but on their “poverty”. Th e features of texts that enable new and diﬀ erent readings are all 
connected to openness and lack. For instance, writing (écriture) is not bound to a ﬁ xed context in 
time or space, ﬁ xed laws (of genre, etc) or an originating intention of the author.
No one is able to control the inﬁ nite possibilities of meaning in language, since there is no centre 
that stabilizes the system. As Culler (1975:247) says: “Interpretation is not a matter of recovering 
some meaning which lies behind the work and serves as a centre governing its structure; it is 
rather an attempt to participate and observe the play of possible meanings to which the text gives 
access.” Some take this to mean that the meaning of a text is indeterminate and that deconstruction, 
having done away with stability, amounts to a dizzying pursuit of an endless stream of novelties. 
Indeed, some American theorists seem to relish above all else the sense of being “cast into the 
abyss”, the “state of suspended ignorance”.
Derrida, who dislikes the term “indeterminacy”, oft en draws attention to the great stability in 
our patterns of thought, conventions, usages and traditions and notes that without this stability 
no reading would be possible. But the stabilizing factors are not ﬁ xed, absolute or natural; the 
point of deconstruction is that they may be questioned and destabilized. To ignore an established, 
traditional reading in order to present a “new reading” (which will always in some ways be an 
old one) is to miss a vital opportunity to interrogate the traditional reading. How did it establish 
(impose) itself? What possibilities were pushed to the margins when this tradition became central 
and why? What forces (ideological, political, etc) were at work?
What “play” does is to open up the space for such questioning. In “writing” the possibility of 
“closure” is in principle ruled out; precisely those texts that (on the surface) wish to establish (ﬁ x) 
a particular view manifest most clearly the structural impossibility of grounding anything by 
means of language. Somewhere in each of the texts there will be an opening, a counter-current, 
an ambiguity, an “otherness” with respect to what the text puts forward as its identity. At these 
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points where the text “diﬀ ers from itself ” the structure of undecidability (of the meaning, act, 
intention, etc) in the text is revealed. Derrida uses undecidability (rather than indeterminacy) 
because decisions are in fact made and have to be made; the term undecidability suggests that 
deciding is an act of responsibility and not the following of a ﬁ xed law (method, procedure).
In Derrida’s work the experience of undecidability is oft en linked with words that – when they are 
carefully examined - undermine the logic of logocentric thinking: supplement, graft , pharmakon, 
hymen, etc. It is not possible to examine all of these here. In American deconstruction more 
emphasis falls on the disjunction between literal and ﬁ gurative language. At certain points a 
text allows two mutually exclusive readings – a literal and a ﬁ gurative one. Since the language 
itself does not oﬀ er a solution, the reader is faced with an aporia (blockage) that reveals the 
impossibility of reading. Language is opaque: it shows itself, but it is neither a mirror of nor a 
window upon the world beyond language. It sometimes seems as if American deconstruction 
(emphasizing indeterminacy) lacks the ethical edge of Derrida’s deconstruction, which always 
involves responsibility toward “the other” that calls from the text.
(f) Textuality, intertextuality and dissemination
One of the logocentric oppositions that Derrida calls into question is that of “inside and outside”. 
As a result, the notion of “the” text (neatly framed, separated from other texts and with its own 
author) becomes questionable. Texts are “invaded” by other texts and “spill over” into other 
texts. Th ese “other texts” are by no means all texts in the traditional sense (written documents). 
According to Derrida, social practices, cultural norms and political ideologies (for instance) 
are all texts that inﬂ uence other texts and are inﬂ uenced by them. All texts share in a general 
textuality, which means that they are inscribed and exhibit the structure of writing (as deﬁ ned by 
Derrida).
Th us Derrida’s famous statement “Th ere is nothing outside the text” (or, “there is no ‘outside-of-
text’”) does not mean that nothing but written documents (or expressions in language) exist. With 
this statement he wishes to emphasize that we have no access to reality but through language in 
the sense of écriture (see Degenaar 1992:201). Derrida is not arguing that everything in reality 
consists of texts (written documents). He wishes to undercut the notion that the meaning of a 
text can be ﬁ xed by referring to a stable point outside the text (context, reality as it is perceived, 
etc). Because these supposedly “outside” factors exhibit the structure of écriture, they are by no 
means more ﬁ xed and stable than texts in the normal sense. Th ey function as signs among other 
signs, and our awareness of them is shaped by textuality and language. Th e play of signiﬁ cation 
and diﬀ érance aﬀ ects them as well.
Texts cannot be read from a ﬁ xed, non-textual point of reference outside themselves. Nor can they 
be read as self-enclosed systems of meaning. A “text” is, from a deconstructive perspective, not an 
ahistorical, stable or ﬁ xed document that remains “there” as an unchanging self-identical monu-
ment. If this were the case, the meaning of the text could indeed be determined by describing 
in detail the relationships within the ﬁ xed frame (as proposed by New Criticism). But texts are 
caught up in the play of signiﬁ cation in which they are constantly diﬀ erentiated from themselves. 
Indeed, there is no point of origin at which the text ever was self-identical. Texts are thus more 
like on-going events than like “things”.
When a text is written, it is at once new and old; it is both a new selection and combination 
and a repetition of other texts. Th e “author”, inscribed into the author role by a vast number of 
texts, consciously uses existing “texts” (themes, plots, technical terminology, structuring devices, 
arguments, etc). But a great number of other existing texts ﬁ nd their way into the new text at the 
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unconscious level: ideological biases, grammatical schemata, snatches of forgotten experiences, 
etc. When this text is read, something similar happens. Th e reader (also inscribed as a text) brings 
to the reading, both consciously and unconsciously, a host of “texts”. Th e text is read “in the 
context of ”, “in the light of ”, “as opposed to”, “with a view to” or “from the perspective of ”. All 
these phrases refer to the participation of other texts in the process of reading.
Moreover, each reading (or re-inscription) of the text leaves “traces” that may (or may not!) be 
activated in subsequent readings. For instance, many readers of the Bible are deeply inﬂ uenced by 
the traces left  by centuries of biblical interpretation within Christian communities. Th ese traces, 
in turn, may depend on earlier (now erased) traces left  by long forgotten “texts”. Nevertheless, 
it would be wrong to think of a linear history in this regard. Some people would understand a 
modern play based on the book of Jonah in the light of their previous knowledge of this book, but 
some may read the play ﬁ rst and then read the book aft erwards “in the light of the play”.
Th e term “intertextuality”, apparently ﬁ rst employed by Julia Kristeva, is oft en used in this regard. 
Intertextuality does not simply mean that texts contain conscious or unconscious quotations 
from and references to other texts. It refers to the open process of play among texts, which allows 
one to read (again, consciously or unconsciously) one text in the light of another – earlier or 
later - text. Th us one could speak of “Derrida’s inﬂ uence on Plato”, given that Derrida’s reading 
of Plato’s Phaedrus has left  a “mark” that is currently hard to ignore when one reads the latter. Of 
course, “Derrida’s inﬂ uence on Plato” makes sense only if the two personal names are taken to 
refer to texts.
Th e notions of textuality and intertextuality undermine the opposition presence-absence, because 
they remind us that any text is “present” to us only by virtue of other, absent texts. For instance, 
for someone without prior acquaintance with the particular language in a text, the text would 
be absent as a meaningful text. “Acquaintance with the language”, however, implies knowledge 
of other, absent texts. Neither presence nor absence is “pure”, because the two supplement each 
other in writing or reading.
Without a central “presence”, meaning cannot be “located” – behind, in or in front of the text. 
Instead, meaning is disseminated, scattered, spread out across the boundaries of texts. Th e term 
dissemination, which cannot be discussed fully here, implies both a loss of meaning and a gain of 
(new) meaning. When seed (semen) is scattered, it shift s its location, loses its “nature” and gives 
rise to new life that is “the same but diﬀ erent.” One could also talk of a cross-fertilization among 
texts, in which meanings are both exchanged and changed.
Here one has to remember Derrida’s broad conception of “text”: intertextuality and dissemination 
can lead to the inter mingling and transformation of diﬀ erent systems of signs. Th us dissemination 
also takes place when a particular ideology inﬂ uences a text and the text in turn inﬂ uences a 
particular social practice. Of course, the “inﬂ uences” are not direct and predictable, but in a sense 
“playful”. Th ere is no continuous line in which the ideology necessarily reinforces the social 
practice through the text. Instead, there is oft en rupture, fragmentation, doubling back – mainly 
because other texts intervene along the way. Meaning is therefore constantly being constructed 
and deconstructed in an inter textual event in which a reader (another unstable “text”) becomes 
entangled in a play of diﬀ erences among other unstable texts.
A further implication is that a text never belongs to either the author or the reader and is never 
written or read either “subjectively” or “objectively”. Deconstruction disputes the communication 
model with its hierarchy of author-text-reader and any rigid distinctions between the world 
behind the text, the text itself and the world in front of the text. Instead, a text is seen as an 
157
Chapter 6
integral part of an inter textual play of signs through language. A text is merely an “episode” in the 
history of textuality.
Derrida’s terms are oft en tricky precisely because he seeks to undermine the meta-physical 
connotations entrenched in our languages. In his vocabulary textuality, écriture, diﬀ érance, trace, 
play, supplement and dissemination have specialised meanings. At the same time he acknowledges 
that one is forced to use words that are tainted by logocentric thought, although they are in some 
ways inappropriate. For instance, he frequently uses the terms language, sign and structure, but 
he makes it clear that deconstruction is not a theory of language (as langue), of the sign or of 
structure. He also regards the words “meaning” and “interpretation” with suspicion.
(g) Deconstruction and the reading of texts
Derrida prefers the term “reading” to “interpretation” because the latter suggests a reliable, ﬁ xed 
method that can be used to “decipher” meaning in the text. He certainly does not want to sell a 
“new method of interpretation” called deconstruction. Deconstruction, as Derrida practices it, 
actually entails a wide variety of reading strategies; he insists that each text (and context) partly 
determines the strategy to be used. It is, however, possible to identify some characteristic reading 
strategies oft en employed in deconstruction.
Contrary to the view of some critics and some admirers of deconstruction, a deconstructive 
reading is not a random “playing around” in which “anything goes”. Derrida insists that any 
reading needs a “guardrail” to prevent it from going oﬀ  at a tangent. Th is guardrail is provided by 
a careful “straight” reading that employs all “the instruments of traditional criticism” (including 
reference to possible intentions of the author). By following “solid” traditions, conventions and 
codes one reaches a reading that would ensure a minimal level of consensus as to the meaning 
of the text. Th at is, most people would agree that the text at least means roughly this. Certain 
completely ridiculous and incompetent readings are excluded.
But the preliminary reading is not based on absolutely stable, “natural” facts; the traditions and 
conventions used to reach this reading are stable and solid only up to a point. A deconstructive 
reading questions and destabilizes at least some of them, showing that other forces are at work 
in the text as well. Barbara Johnson says in this regard that deconstruction proceeds by “teasing 
out the warring factions” in the text. Deconstruction is thus not an assault on the text from the 
outside, but an analysis that shows the text to be internally divided – the text “deconstructs itself ”. 
One needs to get the overt “drift ” of the text in the preliminary reading in order to demonstrate 
the counter-currents within the text.
Deconstructive readings oft en identify words, metaphors and arguments in the text that turn 
out to be double edged, or crucial breaks in what purports to be a closely knitted line of thought. 
Th ese show how the text could easily have taken another direction.
A famous example is Derrida’s reading of JJ Rousseau’s argument about speech and writing. 
Rousseau insists that speech is superior to writing; the written word is no more than a secondary, 
inadequate “supplement” to the spoken word. To overlook this “surface meaning” of Rousseau’s 
text is nothing but incompetent reading. But in his deconstructive reading Derrida shows 
how slippery the term “supplement” is. Something that is full and complete in itself requires 
no supplement. Moreover, in French “supplement” can mean “that which supplants (replaces) 
something else”. In a long and rigorous argument Derrida demonstrates that Rousseau’s use of the 
word “supplement” eﬀ ectively overturns the point Rousseau strives to make.
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Th e history of biblical interpretation provides examples of the contradictions that arise from 
following “self-evident” or “undeniable” lines of reading. Since the time of the New Testament 
many interpreters have argued that women are “clearly” secondary and inferior to men because - 
in Genesis 2 - Eve was created aft er Adam as his “helper” (supplement!). But the same interpreters 
oft en argue that humans are superior to all other creatures because – in Genesis 1 – they were 
created aft er all the others. And many interpreters believe that Jonah 1:9 is the key verse in the 
ﬁ rst part of the book, because it stands at the centre of the structure (not the beginning or the 
end).
In other cases the deconstructive reading depends on what is all too deliberately excluded from 
a text or pushed to the margins. For instance, a text may seek to lay down the rule that X = Y 
“in all normal cases”. Th e text thus acknowledges that X is not always Y, but may sometimes be 
A or Z. It tries to neutralize such challenges to the rule by ruling that some cases are abnormal. 
Th e “abnormal” may indeed be ignored, but what is left  unsaid is that certain cases are called 
“abnormal” merely because they do not conform to the rule. Such cases are thus not ignored 
because they are (“naturally”) marginal; they are marginalized because the rule ignores them.
Deconstruction attempts to turn a text against itself to show how traditional interpretation 
(including the “interpretation” that constituted the writing of the text) has sought to exclude or 
marginalize meanings allowed by the play within the text. It emphasizes the “openings” in the text 
that logocentric readings, intent on a single truth, seek to suppress. Th rough these openings we 
then hear diﬀ erent voices calling to us from the text and become aware that the apparently self-
identical text is inhabited by diﬀ erences and otherness.
Since individual texts are woven into a broader fabric of textuality, deconstruction is not simply 
an exercise in abstract philosophy or literary criticism. As we have seen, Derrida believes that 
the typical binary oppositions of metaphysics are linked to a social order and its hierarchical 
structure. Deconstruction exposes the hierarchy by undermining and overturning the binary 
oppositions, which are, aft er all, merely constructions or impositions. Deconstruction is therefore 
(in the case of its worthier exponents) a form of social critique.
Derrida explains his procedure as follows: Having recognized that the binary oppositions of 
metaphysics set up an “order of subordination”, deconstruction does not try immediately to 
neutralize the oppositions. Th e opposition male-female, always implying subordination of the 
female, is not deconstructed by saying that men and women are equal. First one has to reverse
(overturn) the order by positing that men are secondary to women. Of course, this is not a “truth” 
that deconstruction wishes to establish; indeed, the reversal remains within the old logocentric 
system of thinking. But this move of “upsetting” (overturning) will prove to be so upsetting 
(unsettling, disconcerting) to people that they may rethink the entire system of which the male-
female hierarchy is part. Without the moment of reversal, it is impossible to displace the system, 
that is, revise the entire conceptual framework.
In this connection Derrida speaks of a “double gesture, a double science, a double writing”. 
Deconstruction posits and practices the reversal of the order, knowing that the reversal provides 
no adequate answer to the problem. Precisely those who now see that the superiority of women 
to men is nonsense (having previously regarded the superiority of men to women as sense!) 
would be forced to question the whole chain of concepts that ties people to this opposition - and 
others. Derrida’s point is that any particular opposition or concept functions within a “systematic 
chain” or system of concepts. It is the conceptual order (and the related non-conceptual order) as 
a whole that has to be shift ed. 
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6.4.2 Jonah in the light of deconstruction: Fishy stories a, b, c …
Since deconstruction questions the notions of a privileged reading and a correct way of interpreting, 
no reading is the (ﬁ nal or correct) deconstructive reading. All readings that show how a text “diﬀ ers 
from itself ” and from the accepted interpretation of it contain elements of deconstruction. Oft en 
deconstructing the “accepted” interpretation involves rigorous and detailed arguments based on 
the possibilities oﬀ ered by the text itself. By calling attention to such possibilities, deconstruction 
demonstrates how we impose meaning by a process of exclusion. But experiments with unusual 
forms of presentation are also sometimes used to demonstrate how random and questionable any 
“method” (system, structure) is.
In this section I juxtapose three fragments of deconstructive readings of Jonah. Th e fragments 
– all interpretation is fragmentary – yield no new totality, but undermine the notion of a ﬁ nal 
synthesis terminating all questioning. Rather than showing how deconstructive criticism “should 
be done”, they demonstrate the plurality of possible interpretive discourses. 
(a) Th e sign of Jonah
What is the book of Jonah about? Jonah and the sailors? Jonah and the ﬁ sh? Jonah and Nineveh? 
Most interpreters agree that the book is about Jonah and God, because these two characters 
appear throughout the book, from the beginning to the end. Th ey are the two “signs” we have to 
interpret to understand the book.
While most of the characters (even the ﬁ sh!) are referred to by diﬀ erent words (signiﬁ ers), Jonah 
is always called Jonah. Surely the stable signiﬁ er /Jonah/ holds the key to the book – if we can 
only ﬁ nd out what it signiﬁ es! Jonah’s personal name hints at his unique individuality as a subject. 
According to the typical humanist view, he must therefore be an autonomous source of meaning. 
Moreover, he is called “the son of Amittai”, which can be read as ‘the son of truth”. Of what truth 
is Jonah a sign? What does /Jonah/ (the signiﬁ er) mean?
One possible answer is that it simply means (in Hebrew) “dove”. Of course Jonah is not literally 
a bird. Could he be a dove ﬁ guratively? But we have no stable ﬁ gurative meaning for dove. Is 
he Noah’s dove? Th e dove of peace? Th e Holy Spirit? Th e silly dove that ﬂ utters back and forth 
(Hosea 7:11)? Th e dove that mourns (Isaiah 59:11)? Th e beautiful dove (Song of Songs 1:15)? 
Just as language allows the signiﬁ er /dove/ to be linked to both a common species of bird and a 
singular person, so the logic of ﬁ guration allows “dove” to have divergent ﬁ gurative associations.
Can we determine the meaning of Jonah as signiﬁ er and subject through the actions and words of 
Jonah? Again the interpreter is thwarted. In 1:9 Jonah “says who he is”, but his previous disobedient 
actions give the lie to his “confession”. In 3:4 Jonah obediently delivers Yahweh’s message (3:4), 
but this word, which is not his own, turns out to be false as well. Nineveh is not destroyed. His 
other words and actions are equally ambiguous and convey no clear message. When he admits to 
the sailors that the storm is his fault (1:10), he provides no new information - the lot had already 
told the sailors this (1:7). In 4:2 Jonah refers to a previous “word” of his, suggesting that this had 
been a true word. Th is word had never been spoken and, in any case, it is simply a repetition of 
an old tradition.
In the last chapter Jonah ﬂ uctuates between anger, despair and gladness, demonstrating once and 
for all that there is no stable meaning to the signiﬁ er /Jonah/ and no ﬁ xed centre to the subject 
Jonah. Indeed, Jonah ﬁ nds life so meaningless that he wishes for death. Th e sign of Jonah and the 
subject Jonah, far from being sources of meaning and truth, become the tomb of meaning and 
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truth. Th e signiﬁ er remains stable, but it keeps gliding over diﬀ erent signiﬁ cances without being 
ﬁ nally ﬁ xed to any one.
Conventional exegetes might agree with this, adding that God provides stability and meaning in 
the story. But in the book God has diﬀ erent names. Early on there is some logic to the change in 
divine names. Jonah is called by Yahweh, the God of Israel. Th e sailors, being “pagans”, pray “each 
to his god”. Th e divine name Elohim that is used here can mean God, a god or gods – there is no 
diﬀ erence in the Hebrew. When the captain asks Jonah to pray to his god (Elohim), a plurality of 
gods is again assumed. In 2:9 Jonah says that his God is Yahweh. Having heard about this God 
(Yahweh), the sailors pray and sacriﬁ ce to Yahweh. Th us the ﬁ rst section distinguished between 
Yahweh, the God of Israel, and the gods of other nations.
But later things become more diﬃ  cult. In 3:3 Nineveh is called a “great city of god” (Elohim). 
Th ough this is usually taken to be a superlative (“great even by divine standards”), it could mean 
that Nineveh was a city of Elohim (gods?) rather than Yahweh. Th e beginning of verse 3:5 is 
usually translated “and the men of Nineveh believed God”; it can also be translated “but the men 
of Nineveh believed in Elohim” (god or gods), suggesting that the people of Nineveh placed their 
trust in Elohim, not Yahweh. Th ey pray to this god of theirs (haElohim) and this god (haElohim) 
saves them. Is this god Yahweh or is Yahweh just one face of “this god” who is served by the people 
of Nineveh too and whose name is a plural?
In 4:2 Jonah introduces a new divine name El, the name of a common Semitic god. Is Jonah 
suggesting that he knew Yahweh was always just El? Aft er this, all logic goes out of the use of 
divine names. In 4:6 Yahweh Elohim makes the gourd to grow, but in 4:7 haElohim sends a worm 
and in 4:8 Elohim sends a wind. In 4:9 Elohim addresses Jonah and in 4:10 Yahweh addresses 
Jonah. Th e last chapter uses four diﬀ erent divine names!
Does this mean that Yahweh, El, haElohim (the God) and Elohim (the many gods) are all the 
same? Th is could be a sobering though, but it does not explain the diverse actions attributed to 
the divine ﬁ gure. We hear of anger and punishment, of compassion and repentance, of creative 
and destructive actions (the gourd and the worm). Can we still think of a divine unity masked 
by diﬀ erent names or must we accept that our singular idea of the divine is a vain attempt to get 
the better of an irreducible plurality? Since the book was written aft er the exile, the author and 
readers would have known that even the one solid “achievement” recorded in the book – the 
sparing of Nineveh – had no lasting meaning. Nineveh was destroyed in the end; therefore the 
word of salvation was as deceptive as the word of judgment.
Th is is not “the message of Jonah”, nor would deconstructive critics claim that it is. Th e book is 
clearly a playful plea for openness to others (non-Israelites) and a defence of a pluralism anchored 
in faith in and obedience to Yahweh. What the deconstructive reading does is to question this ﬁ nal 
anchoring by showing that a more radical plurality and a less restrained play has slipped into the 
text in spite of the overt intention of the text. Th e God (haElohim) who is supposed to provide the 
centre has to be named by a word that is grammatically in the plural and acts in ways that are so 
unpredictable as to undermine all stable foundations.
It turns out that Jonah, as stable signiﬁ er or (supposedly) centred subject, has no stable meaning 
or truth to impart. All his words are ambiguous, questionable, unreliable. But the attempt to 
establish a foundation for meaning and truth in God as transcendental signiﬁ er fails, because God 
has many names and acts in diverse ways. Yahweh, whose “other” plural (internally diﬀ erentiated) 
name can stand for (true) God and (false) gods, issues a word to Jonah, but this word is not a ﬁ xed 
truth. Its meaning is deferred: what was seen as a ﬁ nal word of condemnation turns out to be a 
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call to repentance. Is this divine word any more certain than the “word” that the sailors received 
when they cast the lots?
(b) Fishing expeditions: Fragments of an interminable dialogue
A: Surely you don’t think theologians swallow the story of Jonah whole? As Campbell Morgan 
said: “Men have been looking so hard at the great ﬁ sh that they failed to see the great God.” 
May an author not use ﬁ ction to present the truth?
B: Come now. If the great ﬁ sh of chapter 1 is ﬁ ction, so is the great, compassionate God of chapter 
3. Certainly, the book is about salvation, but what saves us is not the ﬁ ctive ﬁ sh or your ﬁ ctive 
God, but our ability to create ﬁ ctions, to build worlds of words. What you have to give up is not 
the factuality of the ﬁ sh story, but the notion of facts beyond our ﬁ ctions.
C: Th ere you miss the point. Indeed, ﬁ ctions are ways in which we express ourselves, but we do 
express ourselves, our real psychic life. You are running away from that problem just as Jonah 
did. He had to face up to his unconscious self, his darker, monstrous side before he could relate 
to his higher self. So the ﬁ sh and God are equally part of the real Jonah. Fictions pure and 
simple don’t help us to deal with the storms in our life.
A: I can’t buy that. Jonah is not the individual; he is the representative of his people, their bigotry 
and xenophobia. Th at’s what imprisons him.
B: So Jonah was swallowed by his interpretive community? Th e great ﬁ sh was Stanley Fish! Th at 
would explain why he remains angry and negative up to the end: there is no way out of the 
interpretive community. Perhaps the book is a self-consuming artifact.
C: You should read Jung on symbols of transformation. Defeating the monster and rising again 
from the watery grave symbolizes rebirth – even the Christians got that right. Th at’s why Jonah 
in chapter 3 is willing to obey his higher self and to venture into new territory.
A: Now you’re the victim of your interpretive community. Clearly the story pokes fun at your 
archetypes by standing the familiar story on its head. Instead of wailing inside the ﬁ sh, Jonah 
has a whale of a time – because he thinks he’s safe from the outside world. Anyway, who’s ever 
heard of rebirth by vomiting?
B: Vomiting? I’ve always heard ‘spewed forth’, but I like vomiting much better. It gets rid of the 
misleading organic metaphor of giving birth. You know, what is fully formed inside and is then 
exteriorized as the unique creation of the subject? Vomiting makes me think of the words we 
take in from the outside and cannot handle, master or assimilate to our systems. It reminds us 
that we can chew over the otherness of language but cannot digest it. We can deal with it only 
by disjunction – vomiting.
C: Th e unbearable queasiness of being – or is that Sartre? So the postmodern turn simply means 
that your stomach turns whenever you ﬁ nd something hard to digest. And yet you run to the 
ends of the earth – to Tarshish if you like - aft er every tasty neologism. You swallow the most 
unlikely stories as long as they tell you don’t have to face yourself.
A: Or, for that matter, the other or the Other that you go on about. Because the book of Jonah 
is also about Nineveh, about oppression, poverty, AIDS. It’s far more comfortable to think of 
these as undecidable ﬁ ctions, isn’t it? As I said, you’re stuck in the ﬁ sh.
B: And you in your ﬁ shy story. With your Other that you’ve mastered by making it in your image. 
You’re truly “ﬁ shers of men”, trying to get your hooks into people. Why should I take the 
bait? You have compassion for Nineveh, a city you haven’t seen and won’t ever see. A city 
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of oppressors, if one is to believe the story. Why shouldn’t I have compassion with all that 
that is excluded from the story-world you embrace? Where are the stories of Jonah’s wife and 
the women of Nineveh? Or of the animals starved in a “pious” act of repentance for human 
crimes? Or of the ﬁ sh forced to swallow an indigestible meal?
No, I’m not running to the abyss to escape from your story – or yours [turning to C]; I am 
showing you that the abyss is inside your stories and your stories inside the abyss.
(c) Jonah in Noah’s ark: Fishing for intertexts
Once upon a time, long, long ago, a man called Noah lived in the enormous city of Nineveh. 
Nineveh was an ecological disaster. Its trees had been cut down for ﬁ rewood. Th e recycling 
depots and waste-removal services could not cope with the mountains of garbage. A column of 
thick smoke rose above the city. Overpopulation had become critical.
Noah knew that Nineveh’s time was up: the city had lost all norms. Th e king of Nineveh had 
taken to pieces Jerusalem, the “foundation of peace”, killing the men, raping the wo(e)men and 
desecrating the temple. Noah believed that the city-god of Jerusalem would take revenge. Th is 
rumour was brought by a (Holy?) dove, supposedly a prophet, a “son of truth”. 
Noah discussed this with the men in the city, warning them about their mistaken conﬁ dence in 
Nineveh’s military and economic power. Th ey said, “Go and tell it to the marines” and continued 
with their conspicuous consumption. Noah replied “Th en you have to paddle your own canoe 
when the storm breaks” and went oﬀ  to build himself a life raft .
Th ree days later it started raining heavily. For the last time, Noah visited the little bower on the 
hill that he had used as a love nest. Th ere he had ﬁ rst introduced his mistress to apples from the 
tree which grew there - and to other forbidden fruit. Pocketing one last apple - it was then that 
the worm wormed its way into his pocket – he set oﬀ  for his raft . Th e people of Nineveh were not 
worth saving; it was better for him to live than to die with sinners. So Noah publicly washed his 
hands, saying: “I am innocent of your blood soon to be spilt.” He wanted no more of these fools 
he once called his people, of the rising crime rate and the economic instability. Since he had told 
his sons to set aside some animals for a rainy day, he felt quite at ease. Together with his sons and 
the animals (they were happy to leave their wives and mistresses behind), Noah boarded the raft , 
hardly sparing a thought for the hard-hearted people of Nineveh. As the rain poured down for 
forty days (cf Genesis 7:17; Jonah 3:4), Noah’s raft  drift ed down the Tigris. Nineveh lay on the 
Tigris, which, according to Gen 2:14, was one of the rivers of paradise. 
Meanwhile, the king of Nineveh, by now quite worried, declared a state of emergency, proclaiming 
that everybody should from now on follow a rigorous, simple lifestyle. Th e SPCA declared a day 
of fasting for the animals (cf Jonah 3:7) and sacred cows saying “Th e rich must live simply so that 
the poor animals may simply live.” Th e king also tried to make peace with third-world countries 
such as Israel, promising to ad/just/ his imperialist policy. Even the multi-national companies, 
who had no clue what their right hand advisers or their left -wing allies were doing (cf Jonah 4:11), 
followed the new economic directives.
Th e people of Nineveh started to grasp at religious straws. New religious groups mushroomed. 
Everybody prayed, whined and burnt straw dogs. It was, however, too late. When the storm 
calmed aft er forty days, the enormous city had been covered with the primeval waters of chaos. 
Every citizen and all the animals had drowned. Th e damage must have cost billions, but nobody 
was left  to pay it to. Centuries later another King of the Jews did pay a deposit to try to put the 
divine wrath in perspective somewhat.
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Noah’s little raft  was swept away to the Persian Gulf, while the Wind blew wherever He wished. 
Th e Waves swept over the little boat and almost smashed it to pieces. Noah and his sons cried 
“Save us! We are about to drown!” But they could not ﬁ gure out whom to call to. Even a global 
divinity competition to see which god could save them got them nowhere.
And the dove and the worm? Th e dove hovered over the stormy waters till it found shelter on 
Noah’s raft . Noah’s sons, considering it to be a bad omen, wanted to kill it, but Noah piously 
pleaded for the prophetic bird’s life. Th e worm had laid its eggs and its oﬀ spring infected all the 
animals, so that most of them had to be cast overboard (except the golden heifer). Only two of 
each species eventually survived. Finally, they realized that they needed to sacriﬁ ce a scapegoat: 
“It is better that one bird die rather than a whole crew” (cf John 10:50). So they wrung the dove’s 
neck and were astonished to ﬁ nd an olive leaf from the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem in its beak. 
Th e dead dove, thrown into the sea, became a snack for a giant ﬁ sh, the Leviathan, one of God’s 
recreational monsters (cf Psalm 104:27).
When the giant ﬁ sh swallowed the dove, the storm subsided, the Wind died down and darkness 
fell on the whole earth (cf Mark 4:39) Th e sons of Noah saw the olive leaf as a sign of hope from 
the city-god of Jerusalem, so they solemnly swore to serve this god.
Noah and his sons then prepared for an enormous party. While Shem and Japhet went to chop 
wood and carry water, Ham pickled a leg of pork and Noah got pickled on wine. Naked, Noah 
went to sleep it oﬀ  and dreamt of a Holy Dove that said: “Keep watch, pray, and care for all the 
surviving animals. All animals (even worms and snakes) have to reproduce and ﬁ ll the earth (cf 
Genesis 1:17). Let all species of animals and plants, all the languages and peoples, all cultures 
and religions, multiply and become as technicoloured as the rainbow. Holy is our Democracy. 
Let babies caress poisonous snakes (cf Genesis 3:15 and Isaiah 11:8). Th is is a new heaven and a 
whitewashed earth.”
Th en Noah, still in a drunken stupor, had a second vision. His raft  was ﬁ lled with animals, worms 
and birds (cf Acts 10:12). Somebody said: “Hammer your ploughshares into pangas and ﬂ ick-
knives (cf Joel 3:10). Slaughter and eat. But ﬁ rst get yourself decently dressed. Everything that 
moves on earth will now be meat/meet for you, as long as you do not spill any pig’s blood. Noah 
replied: “Sounds good, but wouldn’t all the animals, birds and worms fear me now (cf Genesis 
9:2)?” He also com plained “I cannot obey both these commands. It is too diﬃ  cult to wor ship two 
gods.”
When Ham woke Noah, he teased him about his crazy dreams: “You pigged out on the wine.” But 
Noah blamed the pickled pork and swore never to touch it again. His hangover was so bad that 
he wished he were dead. “I am better oﬀ  dead than alive,” he said.
Shem then reprimanded Ham for these remarks. From then on there were family feuds. Th e 
descendents of Ham (re)built the city of Nineveh (cf Genesis 10:10f), kept pigs and were anti-
Semites. But Shem thought Ham and his descendants were cursed and no better than pigs. Shem 
said: “I am now appointed as the pastor and lecturer for my brother. He shall be our wood chopper 
and water carrier” (cf Genesis 9:26). Japheth was happy to be relieved of this task (but he did not 
bury his hatchet) and went to live around Tarshish (cf Genesis 10:4).
Th us Noah’s descendants happily embodied his double vision, shedding and mingling the blood 
of many people and animals. Th ey demanded retribution (cf Genesis 9:5) for the blood of their 
kin (only). Animals were safe only when the men had to sleep oﬀ  the glut aft er a party.
Did the dove survive inside the Leviathan? Of course not! It was dead before it hit the water. 
Prophetic messengers get ridiculed, persecuted, and cruciﬁ ed. Th e digestive juices of the giant 
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ﬁ sh liqueﬁ ed the poor dove. Th e sea monster had got his meal on time: God had opened his 
hand and provided food for his beloved toy (cf Psalm 104:25-28). Th e birds and the sea creatures, 
separated from one another on the ﬁ ft h day, were now happily reunited (cf Genesis 1:21).
But aft er three days and three nights a new dove was formed from the watery chaos – created 
of water and Spirit. It stretched its wings, escaped from the jaws of the whale and ﬂ ew over the 
Mount of Olives. According to Acts 1:12, the Ascension of Jesus Christ took place from the Mount 
of Olives. Th ere it disappeared into the sky, free and forever beyond our reach. Or what do you
think ...?
6.4.3 Observations and evaluation
Derrida’s writings deserve to be treated with respect – any brief summary would be inadequate 
and a summary “evaluation” (by way of either dismissal or appropriation) would be presumptuous. 
Th e following observations are tentative indeed and some concern deconstruction as a fashion 
rather than deconstruction as a term – one among many - in Derrida’s terminology.
Deconstruction at its best is rather like a Ferrari: expensive, powerful and elegant, but also tricky 
to handle, diﬃ  cult to maintain and not necessarily the most reliable means of transportation. 
Few can aﬀ ord to buy it; still fewer can keep it in running condition. Interpreters who do 
not hold academic positions (and most of those who do) may judge that life is too short for 
deconstruction. On the other hand, the cheaper imitations are not good investments. It might 
be possible to adopt some individual features of deconstruction to good eﬀ ect, although 
Derrida would disapprove. 
Deconstruction, unlike other, more superﬁ cial postmodern approaches, insists on rigorous, 
disciplined reading. Th ose who wish to practice it cannot dispense with the traditional tools of 
interpretation (including those of historical criticism). Far from rejecting such tools, Derrida 
considers knowledge of them and of their use to be a minimal level of competence. He is the 
last person to claim that one can go beyond a tradition by remaining largely ignorant of it.
Th at texts have no ﬁ xed, ﬁ nal meaning and that ideologies and power relations play a role 
in the production and reception of texts are not radically new insights. Deconstruction does 
oﬀ er a very complex set of arguments to support these points. In Derrida’s view, this complex 
argumentation leads to aﬃ  rmation of “play”, otherness and diﬀ erentiation without providing 
an excuse for relativism, nihilism or irresponsibility. In its broadest conception deconstruction 
is not an “approach to the interpretation of texts”, but an attempt to destabilize and displace 
an entire order of signiﬁ cation.
Th e attempt to show simultaneously that we cannot get outside language and that the 
language we have is fundamentally inadequate raises great problems. One may doubt whether 
any number of extremely technical texts, moving at a high level of abstraction and using an 
arcane specialized terminology, can have any practical inﬂ uence outside a small circle – even 
if the arguments all hold, which is far from sure. Some say that deconstruction has in practice 
established a new order of exclusion, because only an elite with the time and money to study 
it for years can ever become “insiders”.
Similarly, the passion for “the other” (especially the marginalized other) and the ethical 
agenda of deconstruction that goes with it are not always evident in practice. Various groups 
use deconstruction to further the interests of their own groups – hardly a novelty. Derrida’s 
“double science” sometimes becomes indistinguishable from cynical hypocrisy in the hands 
of less able writers. Undecidability issues in blithe fatalism among those who can aﬀ ord 
this luxury, while others take it as an opportunity to demonstrate their own inventiveness 
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(decentred subjects still love centre stage). 
Christians might object that the Christian faith at its most basic insists on God as centre, arché 
and telos. Th is is undeniably so, but God is never “fully present” to us; God addresses us through 
words, which are always open to diﬀ erent interpretations – this too is basic to Christian faith. 
Moreover, the “radically other” God of Christian faith is internally diﬀ erentiated as Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit, and is therefore never unilaterally either over or outside or inside us. 
Whether deconstruction can deal with faith, hope and love as easily as it deals with “meaning” 
is another question.
Christians, humanists and Christian humanists should also consider carefully the polemics 
against humanism found in most versions of deconstruction. Humanism as comprehensive 
doctrine or philosophy might well be presumptuous and inadequate (Christians would 
agree), but this is no reason to abandon humanism as a somewhat fragmented response to a 
vaguely perceived humanity, a response driven by responsibility rather than theory. Th e oft en 
mechanistic and violent terminology of deconstruction is at odds with even a humble sense 
of humanity, with the ﬂ esh and blood, skin and bones of human social life. Th ere is, I believe, 
a danger that the human baby will be thrown out with the humanistic bathwater.
If deconstruction were to tame our arrogance and teach us to face texts and one another 
with humility, it would be fully justiﬁ ed, whatever its other failures might be. Unfortunately, 
I see no signs of this happening. By a twist of irony, the rhetoric of deconstruction, being 
pretentious, aggressive and overly self-conscious, undermines the intention it professes.
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CHAPTER 7
Th e hermeneutics of suspicion: Th e hidden worlds of 
ideology and the unconscious
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Looking beneath the surface
A number of inﬂ uential approaches to the interpretation of texts are based on the suspicion that 
there are hidden factors at work in the production, circulation and reception of texts. Th ese factors 
are not directly addressed in the simple communication model (sender → message → recipient), 
yet they may inﬂ uence the interpretation events unconsciously and radically. Th ere is, as it were, 
beneath the worlds behind, in front of and in the text a basement level, a world beneath the text, of 
which interpreters are usually unaware. At this hidden level there are connections and blockages 
between author and text (or between author and reader) that are not visible at the surface.
Th e proponents of these approaches do not necessarily reject the results of other approaches 
completely. One can, for instance, study the historical background of a text, the structure of the 
text itself or the ways in which the text has been received and draw perfectly valid conclusions 
from all this. Th e trouble is that such studies, useful as they may be, do not tell the whole story. 
Th e surface meaning is oft en no more than a façade, a deceptive camouﬂ age of other, hidden 
meanings. What appears to be “rational” might ultimately be mere rationalization. Because 
normal practices of interpretation focus only on the surface, they oft en help to keep the world 
beneath the text concealed. To get to grips with the hidden world beneath the text, one has to 
adopt a systematic suspicion or mistrust regarding anything that may appear to be “given” or self-
evident in the text.
7.1.2 Guilty secrets
Many interpreters value objectivity highly. Th ey insist that the task of the interpreter is to deal 
with facts in a neutral manner, using impartial reason as the only tool. Once one assumes that the 
surface conceals certain things, this view becomes questionable. Why are some things concealed? 
If one hides something, it is usually because one does not want others to see it. Th e hermeneutics 
of suspicion suspects that what usually remains hidden is indeed a guilty secret. Neither authors, 
nor texts, nor readers are “innocent” or neutral. Th ey oft en work together to keep up the (false) 
appearance of normality and rationality. Consider this example: Two colleagues may have a 
conversation that sounds friendly and polite, although each may actually hate the other and may 
be out to undermine the other. Th e point is that the norms of our society do not allow them to 
express their hatred blatantly or to work against each other openly. For this reason the very real 
conﬂ ict is deliberately concealed behind a polite façade.
Th e hermeneutics of suspicion believes that similar things happen all the time. Th e apparently 
tranquil surface of our social life hides raging power struggles, generally involving oppression of 
the weaker by the stronger and the resistance that arises from this. Since aspects of these power 
struggles clash with our conscious standards of rationality and morality, a veil is drawn over the 
struggles or they are repressed to the unconscious. Th is is done by, for instance, maintaining a 
silence about certain key elements of the struggle. Silence serves a double purpose: the existence 
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of the problem is denied and the oppressive status quo is reinforced. For instance, many books 
(by white authors) set in apartheid South Africa simply dealt with whites and their problems. By 
leaving blacks (the vast majority of the population) out of the story, the problems of oppression 
and racial tension were hidden from view. Th e impression was created that “other problems” 
deserve more attention.
Another tactic is to represent certain things as natural, normal or self-evident at the surface 
level, thus rationalizing or justifying what is neither rational nor just. For instance, many (male) 
authors argued that “normal” women prefer to stay at home, keep house and raise children – the 
home is “by nature” the place of the woman. Such authors could then suggest that it is in the best 
interest of women that they should have no say in public life. If some women opposed this view, 
they would be made to appear “abnormal” or “unnatural”. Th at this view happens to serve the 
interest of male domination is, of course, left  unsaid.
7.1.3 Who fools whom?
Th e previous paragraph could suggest that a great number of people deliberately set out to deceive 
others in order to protect their own interests. Must one believe that what appears to be a simple 
love story in which the female characters conform to certain male expectations about women is 
“really” part of a subtle conspiracy to oppress women? Th e hermeneutics of suspicion does not 
usually make this claim. No doubt the author of the love story intended it to be simply a love story. 
Authors seldom deliberately and consciously create a deceptive surface to hide the “real” purpose 
of their books; they are usually as much deceived by the surface as their readers are. 
Th e hidden level is most oft en an unconscious level. A politician who consciously defends a 
speciﬁ c political ideology and equally consciously uses deceptive rhetoric in the process might 
still be inﬂ uenced by other ideologies of which he or she is unaware. Authors and readers are, 
in a certain sense, the victims or prisoners of their own ideologies and unconscious motivations.
In classical systems of philosophy humanity is oft en portrayed as characterized by self-
consciousness and rationality. As opposed to this, the “masters of suspicion” say that human 
consciousness and reason themselves are, in important aspects, formed by unconscious, irrational 
forces. If I, being male, grow up in a society in which women are treated as inferior, I will see 
women as inferior. Th is will appear to me as the only natural and reasonable point of view. When 
I write or read, I will not be thinking of oppressing women or of maintaining male privilege. 
Indeed, consciously I may intend to help “those that are weaker in body and in mind”. Th at this 
intention is based on a sexist presupposition will not occur to me. In the same way, the white 
South African authors who left  blacks out of their stories did not necessarily do so because they 
had a hidden agenda. Th ey frequently described the society as they really saw it, that is, as a purely 
white one.
Th e very language we use oft en contributes to the problem. Regarded abstractly, words may be 
neutral, but in their functioning in social life they are caught up in chains of connotations and 
associations. For instance, “male” carries connotations of strength, hardness and activity and 
“female” connotations of weakness, soft ness and passivity. Similarly, the use of “non-white” in 
Apartheid South Africa made white the “standard” and deﬁ ned blacks negatively as those who 
depart from this standard. Language is not the “pure” expression of reason; on the contrary, it 
frequently infects our “reason”. 
Authors and readers as conscious individuals may be quite “innocent”, “reasonable” and “honest” 
when they present their intentions, views and arguments. Nevertheless, there are guilty, irrational 
and dishonest elements at work in and through them. What they (really) do not know of is oft en 
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what they do not want to know. Th e unpleasant truths (about lust, oppression, and so on) have 
long been pushed to a level where they are out of the view of consciousness. Th ey have been given 
a pleasant covering and this covering is now all that reason and consciousness can see. Th us 
neither consciousness nor reason can provide the ﬁ nal key to interpretation. Both stop at the 
surface and may be misleading.
7.1.4 From the surface to the depths and back
Th is does not mean that the surface may be ignored. Since we have no direct access to the hidden 
level, we have to start with the surface. Certain clues that appear at the surface point the way to 
the deeper motives. When one knocks on the ﬂ oor of a house, the echo reveals that there is a 
cellar underneath the house. Th e rationalizations and concealments that operate at the surface 
can never succeed in creating an absolutely solid or coherent whole: there are always places where 
the construct sounds “hollow” or trails “loose ends”. Such shortcomings provide the clues that can 
be followed up with the aid of a hermeneutics of suspicion.
One must not expect that the clues will appear prominently or at key points in the text. Aft er all, 
the surface is shaped by conscious motives. One has to look at the edges, at what is not said or is 
taken for granted. One has to ask questions that are precisely not posed by the text. Say a story 
is about the relationships between the various members of a household. Th eir feelings, problems 
and motives are described in detail. One learns in passing that there are also several servants in 
the household, but nothing much is said about them. Now one can ask how they react to events, 
what their problems are and how they see the members of the family. One can also ask what 
diﬀ erence it would have made to the life of the family if they had not been there at all, instead of 
being merely “invisible presences”. Would the problems of the bored wife, the domineering father, 
the ambitious daughter and the lazy son have been diﬀ erent if others did not do all the household 
chores for them? And what should we say of a society in which certain people live and work in a 
house without being members of the household?
Of course texts also convey other important meanings – ones that lie much closer to the surface. 
Th e hermeneutics of suspicion does not claim that its interpretation of a text replaces all other 
interpretations. Indeed, those who adopt this approach oft en say that what they interpret is not 
the text itself but the ideological subtext, that is, the assumptions, attitudes and interests that lie 
beneath the explicit statements of the text. Nevertheless, the explicit statements of the text do 
appear in a new light when the ideological subtext is brought to the surface. For instance, the 
text may argue eloquently that a certain solution to a problem is appropriate. If one adopts the 
point of view of the text itself, this may well seem true. But if a reading of the subtext shows that 
the ideology of the text has ruled out certain other options without even considering them, the 
matter could look diﬀ erent. Th us a consideration of the factors hidden beneath the text could lead 
to a new view of the surface of the text.
7.1.5 Taking sides in interpretation
We have seen that the world beneath the text remains eﬀ ectively hidden from view precisely 
because texts are largely silent about it. Relatively few texts openly defend the oppression of 
women, for instance. Very many texts, however, take it for granted that women are in all ways 
weaker than men are. What is taken for granted does not have to be discussed. Th e hermeneutics 
of suspicion wants to break this silence by making the hidden assumption the topic of explicit 
discussion. At this point one can no longer ignore the diﬀ erent interests of diﬀ erent interpreters. 
When one admits that the surface hides power struggles, one also admits that it is impossible to 
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interpret from a neutral position. To interpret is, from the outset, to choose sides and to become 
engaged in the struggle.
Every text invites one to adopt a certain point of view, to look at the world in a certain way. Unless 
one complies to some extent, one cannot “follow” the text. Nevertheless, it is possible to step into 
the text, to follow its path, and then to step out again to regard the text itself critically and from a 
diﬀ erent angle. To illustrate this, we may return to the example of the story about the members of 
a household. Since the story is about a middleclass family, it is built on certain assumptions shared 
by members of the middle- class. Although the text may be severely critical of some aspects of 
middle-class life, the perspective required by the text is a middle-class perspective. In this case, 
it virtually overlooks the servants. To get to grips with the intention of the text, one has to read it 
through middle-class eyes. But having done so, one is not bound to accept this perspective as the 
ﬁ nal word. A working-class reader may reject the perspective suggested by the text and reread the 
text from the perspective of the servants. Th is is oft en called “reading the text against the grain”.
By thus taking sides, the reader moves away from interpretation as a search for facts to interpretation 
as a critical practice. Th e question is no longer what is, but what should be. One could argue that 
such a reader is acting out of self-interest, but at least this self-interest is open and explicit.
Although there are a host of diﬀ erent currents and interconnections among the practitioners of 
the hermeneutics of suspicion, two main groups can be distinguished:
Th e one current sees the power struggle as an internal one. According to the various 
psychoanalytical theories, the human psyche is a scene of constant conﬂ icts, although this is not 
apparent at the surface. To understand these conﬂ icts and their causes, one has to examine the 
unconscious aspects of the human psyche (see 7.2).
Th e other main current sees the social world as the primary arena of conﬂ ict. Th e oppression of 
certain groups by others (which lies at the root of social conﬂ ict) does not appear clearly at the 
surface, because the ruling group also controls the production of ideas. Th e ideology that justiﬁ es 
the status quo is so embedded in the structures of the society that oppressors and oppressed alike 
accept the situation as “normal” or “natural”. Interpretation as criticism of the dominant ideology 
unmasks the oppression and serves to change society itself in such a way that oppressed groups 
can come into their own. Marxists focus on the oppression of the working class by the capitalist 
ruling class (see 7.3), feminists on the oppression and marginalization of women by men (see 
7.4), and African interpreters on the results of colonial oppression (see 7.5). More recently, 
ecological theorists and theologians have argued that anthropocentrism leads to the “oppression” 
and destruction of non-human nature (see 7.6).
Th e following other approaches are not dealt with in detail in this book:
Materialist interpretation or ideological criticism
Th ese terms are sometimes employed as synonyms for Marxist interpretation, but sometimes 
indicate "post-Marxist" approaches that use Marxist insights without accepting Marxism as a 
comprehensive philosophical framework. Materialist interpretation emphasizes that products 
of the human mind (especially texts) do not originate, circulate and function within a separate 
world of their own, but are embedded in a material context. Ideological criticism emphasizes 
that texts, oft en in a hidden way, express the ideology and interests of a group and thus 
function in the power struggles within a society.
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Ideological criticism from a Th ird World perspective
A variety of approaches that have their origin mainly in Th ird World contexts focus on the 
related ideologies of racism, colonialism and Eurocentrism. Th ese approaches try to indicate 
how racist prejudices emanating from the dominant Western society have crept into the 
interpretation of texts like the Bible, how colonialism has imposed this system of values on 
people by force and how people's own social experiences and cultural values are still subjected 
to Eurocentric norms. In the ﬁ eld of interpretation, black theology and liberation theology 
address the problems of racism and colonialism. Aft er all, the Bible provides a copy-book 
example of how a text that did not originate within the Western cultural world has been 
"colonized", subjected to Western rules of interpretation and used as an instrument in the 
service of racism (in the apartheid system, for instance).
7.2 Psychoanalytical approaches
7.2.1 Background and theory
Th e theory and practice of psychoanalysis originated in the ﬁ eld of psychology. Following 
Freud’s pioneering work in this area, a number of schools of psychoanalytical thought have 
established themselves. Th ough they may at times diﬀ er fundamentally and vehemently, the 
various approaches are united in their emphasis on the unconscious aspect of psychic life. In 
psychology, psychoanalysis (Freudian) is distinguished from analytical psychology (Jungian); in 
the debate on interpretation, however, both Freudian and Jungian approaches are regarded as 
psychoanalytical.
For Freud and his early followers, psychoanalysis, as a theory about human psychic processes, 
served as a tool in psychotherapy. Nevertheless, this theory had (like Marx’s) wide-ranging 
implications for all areas of life. In speciﬁ c cases Freud himself indicated what implications 
his theory held for our understanding of history, culture and religion - and literary texts. In all 
these cases the theory of the psyche provides the key to a deeper insight into the phenomena 
in question. To grasp the role of psychoanalysis in interpretation, a familiarity with the basics 
of psychoanalytical theory is essential. At the same time it should be stressed that each school 
of psychoanalytical thought operates with its own complex conceptual framework, of which no 
more than a broad outline can be given here.
Of the various approaches, only those of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), Carl Gustav Jung (1875-
1961) and Jacques-Marie Lacan (1901-1981) are discussed here. Freud and Jung deserve attention 
as founders of inﬂ uential schools of thought; Lacan is important for the role he played in linking 
psychoanalysis and the theory of the interpretation of texts.
(a) Freudian psychoanalysis
Th e unconscious
Th e cornerstone of Freud’s view of the human psyche is the theory of the unconscious. What 
a person is conscious (aware) of at any given moment may be compared to the thin layer at 
the surface of a deep pool. While I am writing, I do not think of events in my childhood, the 
account I have to pay tomorrow or the meal I had last night. I may even be so taken up in what 
I am doing that I forget about my headache or fail to notice that I feel cold. For the moment, 
all these things are below the surface of my consciousness. Of course, I may become aware 
of these things again: they are not “lost” but simply temporarily hidden. According to Freud, 
these hidden “contents” are in the preconscious, the layer of the psyche just below consciousness.
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What is in the preconscious is not in the conscious at that precise moment, but can be brought 
to consciousness relatively easily, for instance, by the memory. 
At a far deeper level one ﬁ nds the unconscious. Th e unconscious contains contents that cannot 
be brought to consciousness, or that can only reach consciousness under special circumstances. 
Th is “underground” of one’s being cannot be known simply by referring to the contents of the 
conscious, yet it leaves its traces at the conscious level. Th e contents of the unconscious slip to 
the surface in dreams, in neuroses, in slips of the tongue and in works of art. As we shall see, 
however, these contents reach the surface only in a censored or “translated” form.
Th e psychic apparatus: id, ego and superego
According to Freud, the psychic apparatus of the adult consists of three components or 
“regions”:
Id: Th e most primitive part of the psyche, the id, is present from birth and consists of blind 
drives (or instincts) that call for satisfaction without taking either rationality or reality 
into account. Freud uses the German “Trieb”. In the oﬃ  cial translations this has been 
rather misleadingly rendered as “instinct”. In what follows, “drive”, “urge”, “instinct” and 
“instinctual drive” have been used inter changeably for the German “Trieb”. Freud identiﬁ es 
two instinctual complexes in the id: the erotic drive (in a very broad sense) and the death 
drive. (Freud did not recognize an independent death instinct in his earlier work. Some 
modern Freudians deny the existence of such an instinct.) Both operate according to the 
pleasure principle and are unable to work out plans for achieving their own satisfaction.
Ego: Th e psyche therefore develops, starting at birth, another structure, the ego, to mediate 
between the drives of the id and the demands of reality according to the reality principle. 
Th e ego has no energy of its own, but “borrows” psychic energy from the id, the latter 
being, as it were, the dynamo of the psyche. Th e ego is, for instance, able to direct the 
energy of the erotic instinct, the libido, in a rational way.
Superego: Th e superego develops from the ego as the child introjects (takes into itself) 
the values of society, especially those of the parents. Th e superego confronts the ego with 
moral demands that resemble the demands of the id in that they take neither rationality 
nor reality into account.
Only the ego and the superego have conscious aspects. Th e bulk of the psychic apparatus lies 
in the unconscious.
Psychosexual development 
According to Freud, people are psychically the same at a formal level: conscious, preconscious 
and unconscious, id, ego, and superego, erotic instinct and death instinct occur in them all. Th e 
process of psychic development, too, is in principle the same for all people, with the exception 
that the development of men and that of women take divergent routes at a certain point. 
Individual diﬀ erences are the result of relatively minor diﬀ erences in the way individuals pass 
through the stages of development. In particular, the critical transitions that a child should 
have made by the age of approximately six leave their marks on the personality.
Th e drives of the id, especially the erotic drive, provide the motive force of all psychic 
development. Various developmental phases represent diﬀ erent ways in which the energy of 
the erotic drive, the libido, is channeled. Heterosexual intercourse is but one of these ways. In 
the life of any person there are many “loves”, which are all manifestations of the erotic drive.
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At the very earliest stage the libido attaches itself to the ego alone. Freud calls this state of 
absolute, unconscious self-love primary narcissism. Th e libido is directed at processes that are 
experienced as pleasurable and at the organs associated with them:
During the oral phase, pleasure is associated with the action of sucking while feeding, and 
with the mouth as the organ that enables this.
Th e anal phase commences when the child gains control over its bowel movements and 
derives pleasure from exercising this control. Th e anus becomes the organ associated with 
pleasure.
Th e phallic phase commences when the male penis and the female clitoris are discovered 
as organs that can provide pleasure. According to Freud, this is when the development of 
men and women starts taking diﬀ erent courses. Of adult sexuality there can as yet be no 
question: the pleasure is autoerotic. Once the newfound sexuality is coupled to the love for 
a person, the child enters the crucial Oedipal phase.
Th e Oedipus complex and repression
According to Freud, the ego, from an early stage onwards, cathects (“occupies”) certain psychic 
images, ones associated with pleasure, with libido. Th us object love appears alongside self-love. 
(Obviously the libido cannot cathect the objects themselves - the real mother, for instance. 
What is “occupied” is the psychic image of the mother.) For children of both sexes the mother, 
as the one who feeds them, is the object of the earliest and strongest love. In the Oedipal phase 
this originally unproblematic love suddenly precipitates a crisis.
Th e myth of Oedipus, a man who accidentally killed his father and unwittingly married his 
mother, reﬂ ects, according to Freud, the cardinal conﬂ ict situation in the development of the 
male child. At about the age of ﬁ ve or six the boy experiences a desire to possess his mother 
sexually. Th is desire of the id is opposed by the ﬁ gure of the father, who acts both as bigger and 
stronger rival (the reality principle) and as repre sentative of the moral values that forbid incest 
(superego). Th e child would like to murder the father, but both the superego and the reality 
principle stand in his way. Murder is forbidden and, in any case, the father is too strong.
In this phase masturbation is accompanied by fantasies about the mother. When this is 
forbidden (sometimes with threats of castration), the result is great psychic anxiety. Th e 
boy feels himself threatened with a total loss of sexual pleasure: both by his father with his 
moral rules and physical strength, and by his mother who chooses his father above him. 
(Th e corresponding complex in girls is sometimes called the Electra complex. Daughters 
experience a similar attachment to the father and an urge to possess the father sexually. Since 
few theorists feel that Freud’s explanation of female sexuality is adequate, the matter is not 
dealt with here.)
Th e boy is unable to handle the resultant psychic conﬂ ict. His father is, aft er all, his role 
model. He wants to possess his mother as his father does and he does not wish to be castrated 
(= without penis = like his mother). Yet his father also stands squarely in the way of his ideal. 
As for his mother, she is and remains the object of his desire, yet she betrays him by preferring 
the father and by supporting the rules of the father.
Since this conﬂ ict cannot be dealt with, it is repressed into the unconscious - all aspects 
of infantile sexuality disappear from the conscious memory. Repression is not a conscious 
eﬀ ort to banish a thought or memory, but an unconscious psychic process. On the one hand, 
repression buries a particular event or feeling so eﬀ ectively that no eﬀ ort of memory and no 
amount of reminding can bring it back to the conscious. On the other hand, the repressed 
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contents are not quite lost. Th ey remain in the unconscious, from where they exercise a hidden 
inﬂ uence on people’s conscious actions.
Aft er the Oedipal phase, the child enters a latent phase, during which there is no conscious 
knowledge of or interest in sexual ity. Conscious sexual desire revives only at puberty - as 
adult, genital sexuality. In the case of more or less normal development the libido is now 
transferred to another woman (oft en one chosen as libidinal object because she resembles the 
mother in some way). Th e hatred for the father is partly turned into hero worship of the father 
through reversal, and partly projected onto other objects of hatred.
Psychic conﬂ icts, repression and neurosis
Freud does not see psychic development as a tranquil process of steady growth, but as the 
result of a series of conﬂ icts and challenges. Not all people resolve these conﬂ icts equally 
successfully. For instance, the psychic conﬂ ict marking the Oedipal phase generally leaves 
people with psychic wounds or scars (traumas) that they carry throughout their lives. How 
badly scarred the particular individual will be depends partly on hereditary factors, partly on 
environmental factors. Th e values and practices of the society, but particularly those of the 
parents, may favour or hamper “normal” development.
Th e same factors inﬂ uence the other phases of development. If the circum stances are 
unfavourable - for instance, if the parents are too strict or too permissive - the transitions are 
not made successfully. Th e person remains ﬁ xated at a speciﬁ c level, although this may not 
be apparent. Th e unconscious problem areas are, as it were, covered by the conscious, only to 
surface much later in crisis situations.
Th e psychic phenomena known as neuroses and psychoses are, according to Freud, invariably 
the results of problems during infancy. He does not deny that the crises of adult life may 
play a contributing role, yet this role is simply to reveal the hidden wounds of the past. It 
is on account of these wounds that the person is unable to deal with the crises of adult life. 
Although a person may have no memory of certain events during her childhood, she is never 
completely rid of them.
Here it becomes apparent how revolutionary Freud’s notions of the unconscious and 
repression are. One would expect that the events that most deeply inﬂ uence one’s life would 
also be those most ﬁ rmly ﬁ xed in one’s memory. But Freud’s argument is that precisely those 
psychic conﬂ icts that left  the deepest scars are repressed and therefore remain unconscious. 
Th erefore any explanation of a person’s behaviour that focuses only on the contents of the 
conscious and preconscious layers of the psyche is bound to be misleading. Th e ego allows 
into consciousness only what it feels it can deal with; what it cannot handle is at once the cause 
of psychic problems and what is not allowed into consciousness. 
Th e task of the ego is extremely diﬃ  cult at the best of times. Th e ego must constantly and 
simultaneously deal with the instinctual drives of the id, the moral taboos of the superego and 
the demands of reality. Like a traﬃ  c oﬃ  cer at a busy intersection, the ego has its work cut out 
to prevent tragic psychic traﬃ  c jams and fatal psychic collisions. Should the ego be burdened 
with problems from the past as well, collisions become inevitable. According to Freud, nobody 
can hope for more than a workable compromise between these opposing forces. Nobody is 
quite “normal” - we all have some neurotic traits.
Th e return of the repressed and the defences of the ego
Although Freud speaks of “contents” that are repressed, he regards the repressed material as 
something active, something ﬁ lled with energy. What is repressed constantly presses upward, 
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as it were, to reach consciousness and the (unconscious) ego constantly has to press it down. 
Th is battle never ends. No matter how hard the ego ﬁ ghts, the return of the repressed cannot be 
prevented completely. Th e repressed material, however, is not allowed to surface in its original 
form. Th e unconscious ego acts as a censor that prevents any recurrence of the intolerable 
tension that led to repression in the ﬁ rst place. Th e repressed therefore reappears at the 
surface in a reworked form, for instance, in dreams, slips of the tongue, neurotic symptoms 
and imaginative writings.
Th ere is, as it were, a compromise between the repressed drives and the ego censor. Th e 
repressed material is allowed to surface on condition that it surfaces “in disguise” and in 
a non-threatening form. Dreams can be dismissed as mere dreams and writings as mere 
ﬁ ctions. Moreover, even in dreams the drives appear in a “coded” form, so that they cannot 
easily be recognized for what they are. Nevertheless, what is allowed past the censor reveals 
the underlying tension - a tension that is only partially and temporarily relieved in dreams 
and works of art.
Th is account of the return of the repressed answers an important question that Freud’s theory 
has to face: If something is in a person’s unconscious, how can that person - or anyone else 
– become conscious of it? Th e answer is that the unconscious material does return to the level 
of consciousness, although its disguised or coded form makes it impossible for us to recognize 
it immediately. If, however, one has grasped the code, one can see through the disguise. One 
can, as it were, learn the secret language in which the unconscious expresses itself. 
Th e compromise involved in the return of the repressed does not solve all the problems the 
ego has to face. Th e ego has to deal with the instinctual drives, the demands of society and the 
realities of life, while keeping certain things repressed or censoring their expressions. In the 
face of these problems, the ego has developed certain standard defence mechanisms. Th ese 
allow for a release of psychic energy and a relieving of psychic tension. Again, knowing how 
these ego defences operate helps us to interpret people’s behaviour.
We cannot discuss all the defences of the ego here, but an important mechanism that the ego 
uses to deal with the tempestuous desires of the id, on the one hand, and the stern demands 
of the superego, on the other, is called sublimation.
Sublimation involves directing the libido to goals that are deemed praiseworthy in terms 
of the norms of the society. Art, science, religion and other expressions of culture originate 
in this way. Oft en the language in which people discuss these things betrays the hidden 
sexual background. Artists talk of art as their "mistress". For Christians, Christ is the 
"Bridegroom".
Sublimation is not, however, a panacea. Th e desires of the id cannot be circumvented 
completely by means of this mechanism. Freud believed that the combination of the rigid 
demands of Christian ethics and the high level of cultural life in modern societies places 
people under intolerable psychic pressure. Our vaunted "civilization" has failed to make 
us happy, for it was achieved at the cost of the satisfaction of instinctual desires. Th erefore 
Freud regards neither religious nor secular cultural values as worthy of unqualiﬁ ed 
approval.
Analysis and therapy
Obviously Freudian analysis cannot take a person’s account and explanation of her problem at 
face value. Such products of the conscious will not directly reveal the unconscious roots of the 
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problem. Th e purpose of analysis is precisely to bring the unconscious tensions to the surface, 
where they may be confronted and - at least partly - resolved.
As we have seen, this is possible because the repressed material appears at the surface in a 
systematically distorted form. Dreams, slips of the tongue and spontaneous comments (made 
without thinking) are not random or senseless. Th ough they are not immediately meaningful, 
the trained analyst can interpret them. Th e person (analysand) is asked to recount his dreams, 
to say whatever comes to mind, or to make snap associations. Th e therapist (analyst) interprets 
the data and tries to help the analysand to gain this insight about the meaning of the data for 
himself. Freudian analysis is fundamentally an interpretative process.
It is a great mistake to think that it is a simple process. Overly simpliﬁ ed accounts sometimes 
leave the impression that interpreting dreams, for instance, is a matter of knowing a list of 
symbols and their meanings (“X always stands for Y”). Although there are indeed some 
common patterns, the analyst practically has to learn a new “language of the unconscious” for 
each individual analysand. Th e pattern or code becomes clear only aft er very many analytical 
sessions, in which the analysand tells about her childhood, recounts dreams, makes free 
associations and in other ways provides data.
Th is process takes place in a circumscribed and controlled setting of acceptance. In this 
loaded atmosphere the analysand is able to live out the problem in miniature, as it were. Freud 
called this process, by which the whole problem manifests itself in the analytical situation, 
transference. At the start there will be resistances to the uncovering of the threatening 
material: the analysand may blame the analyst for his problems or project his desires onto her. 
Th ese very resistances, however, provide the analyst with clues about what is happening in 
the unconscious. Finally, analysand and analyst cooperate to bring the unconscious contents 
to consciousness. (Because the analyst is also human, counter-transference cannot be ruled 
out. Th e analyst too can act out her problems in the therapeutic situation. Freud believed 
that counter-transference should be avoided, but modern theorists believe that this is hardly 
possible.)
(b) Freudian textual interpretation
Dreams and texts
Freud attached special importance to dreams as indicators of unconscious tensions. Th e 
method he developed to analyze dreams and the underlying theory can, however, also be 
applied to texts. Aft er all, Freud himself subjected people’s stories about themselves (a type 
of text) and even written texts to this form of analysis. In what follows we may thus regard 
“dream” and “text” as interchangeable terms.
As we saw, the repressed material does not appear directly in the dream. Th e content of the 
dream as it is present in the conscious and available for recount ing, the so-called manifest 
content, conceals the unconscious content, the so-called latent content. Th e myth of Oedipus 
is a rather exceptional case, for there the manifest content and the latent content (love for the 
mother and hatred of the father) virtually coincide. But even there the truth is partly concealed: 
Oedipus does not know that the man he kills and the woman he marries are his father and 
mother respectively. More oft en the latent content appears in a thoroughly distorted form. 
Nonetheless, the distortion is not random but systematic; therefore someone acquainted with 
the mechanisms of the ego as censor will be able to dredge up the latent content.
Condensation, displacement and overdetermination
Th e main mechanisms at stake here are condensation and displacement.
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Condensation depends on the idea that the dream is a type of summary of the latent 
content. Certain items in the manifest content are loaded with more than one meaning, 
so that words and images function ambiguously. On the other hand, a key element in 
the latent content may appear in several guises in the manifest content. In “Jack and the 
beanstalk” for example, the mother is represented by the cow that has to be sold, the giant’s 
wife, and also the hen that lays the golden eggs.
Displacement is the process whereby an element in the unconscious is connected to 
another element - one that appears in the manifest content - by a chain of associations. Th e 
associations are sometimes transparent to all, but in some cases they depend on personal 
experience and involve seemingly irrational jumps. Th us the ﬁ gure of God in a dream may 
(in a Christian society) understandably refer to the human father, but the fear of “marks” 
might also be a disguised reference to the father if the father’s name happens to be “Mark”. 
In a further process – what Freud calls secondary revision - the word “marks” may be 
replaced by the word “stains”, which in turn demonstrates how manifest elements may 
be overdetermined. Stains as signs of guilt (guilt-stained, the stain of sin), stains as marks 
and thus as the father (Mark), and a recollection of a time the child was forbidden some 
pleasure for fear that she would stain her new dress - all of this could interlock to indicate 
one problem: a fear of the father with his moral laws that has been internalized and now 
stands in the way of the satisfac tion of desires.
Th e split self and the dream or text as compromise
Th e dream or text is not the product of a single, centred “self ”. Conscious and unconscious 
factors, id, ego, and superego, all play a role. It is vital to note that unconscious desires and 
the ego as censor, though opposed to each other, neverthe less both contribute to the forming 
of the manifest content. Th e ego censor distorts and transforms in order to prevent the 
unacceptable from reaching the surface, but at the same time the desires distort and transform 
themselves in order to subvert the censor and reach the surface aft er all, albeit in encoded 
form. Th e resultant text or dream is thus a compromise. From the point of view of the ego, the 
unruly desires of the id have been (partially) subdued; from the point of view of the id, the 
strict regulating function of the ego has been (partially) subverted.
Reading and writing, transference and counter-transference
Th e therapeutic situation creates the space within which unconscious problems crys tallize. 
Th e same thing may happen in the situation of writing or reading. Th e author who says “My 
writing is my life” may, ironically, be telling the truth without realizing it. Th rough the process 
of transference she may, as it were, be putting her whole psychic life on paper. Th e manifest 
content, the “message” or “purpose” of the book, would not reveal this secret. It is only when 
one examines certain “chance” elements - choices of words, metaphors, themes and symbols 
- that the unconscious drives behind the “urge to write” are exposed.
Th us the reader is able to analyze the author, using the tools of psychoanalysis. Th e reader, 
however, may also get caught up in the reading process. A reader who claims that he “has 
found himself ” in a certain book is telling the story of counter-transference. Th is reader has 
projected his own unconscious conﬂ icts onto the text and has thus read the text “through the 
spectacles of his unconscious”.
Modern psychoanalytical interpretation holds the view that this invariably happens. Th ere can 
no longer be talk of a single, “correct” reading. Each person reads with the conscious, rational 
part of the psyche, the part that employs conventional, “acceptable” reading strategies, but 
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only up to a point. Beyond that the unconscious takes over and covertly leaves its imprint on 
the reading process, an imprint that would diﬀ er from person to person.
Texts, desires, and drives
Freud’s view that the energy of the psyche is derived from the id implies that all expressions 
of the human psyche are powered by the instinctual drives of the id. Even the “highest” 
creations of humanity - art, science, religion, and the like - are products of the way the libido 
is channeled, displaced or repressed. Texts, too, bear the traces of desires that could ﬁ nd no 
other outlet. Th e urge to read or write and the pleasure we get from these processes are linked 
to our sexual and destructive drives. When we say we ﬁ nd reading exciting or relaxing, we 
are talking about sexual excitement and sexual release – in a displaced form. When we ﬁ nd a 
satirical book “satisfying”, we are giving vent to our destructive drive – at a distance.
To interpret texts psychoanalytically is to follow the traces of our erotic and destructive drives. 
Most approaches to interpretation focus on meaning – on what we can know, understand and 
ﬁ t into a rational scheme. Interpretation along Freudian lines denies that meaning and reason 
have the last say. Reading – and interpretation as a form of reading – is also about dealing with 
desires that are ultimately non-rational, about the way we circulate, rationalize and otherwise 
come to terms with these desires.
(c) Jungian psychoanalysis 
Th e collective unconscious and the libido according to Jung
Carl Jung, a pupil and erstwhile conﬁ dant of Freud, broke with Freud on two key issues of theory: 
the nature of the unconscious and the nature of the libido. Besides the personal unconscious 
of Freud, Jung recognized an impersonal collective unconscious. (Not that Freud’s view was 
that simple. Oft en he does grant a role to inherited factors present in the unconscious. His 
postulate of the Oedipus complex is, as it were, a theory of a single archetype.) Th e impersonal 
collective uncon scious is formed though the inheritance of patterns of thought and action 
that belong to the human race as a whole or to speciﬁ c human groups.
Because the contents of Freud’s personal unconscious are largely (not wholly) repressed 
tensions and conﬂ icts, they pose a constant threat to the ego. Jung’s collective unconscious, 
although it is not without threatening aspects, contains much that can help the ego in its 
development. Freudian analysis seeks to bring the unconscious contents to consciousness 
to eliminate psychic problems; Jungian analysis does the same, but with the purpose of 
stimulating personal growth.
In Jung’s view the libido is a life energy that is not restricted to the sexual sphere and that 
operates in a variety of mutually independent urges. As energy (here Jung uses the language 
of physics), the libido can undergo displacements and transformations without retaining the 
marks of its past. For Freud, libidinal energy, however it is displaced, remains linked to the 
sexual drive. For Jung, libidinal energy is simply psychic energy that may be used for a variety 
of purposes. It is neutral in the way that energy in physics is neutral. When, for instance, 
kinetic energy is used to generate electrical energy, the resulting energy is electric energy, not 
“displaced kinetic energy”.
Psychic development according to Jung
Th e implication for psychology is that it is no longer possible to explain people’s various urges 
as sublimations of sexual desires. When people feel the urge to create or to re ﬂ ect, it is not 
because sexual desires have been directed to these ends, but because there are independent 
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creative and reﬂ ective drives. Moreover, Jung’s view means that answers need not always be 
sought in the past - in infantile ﬁ xations and repression. When a person seems to be “stuck 
in the past”, the reason may be an unresolved conﬂ ict in infancy, but it may also be that the 
person is unwilling to face a new challenge.
Jung takes this view because – unlike Freud – he does not see psychic development as a process 
that is, in principle, completed at an early age. Psychic development remains possible in later 
life and a return of themes from the past may signal new challenges that have presented 
themselves. Th e “symptom” does not merely have an origin (in the past), but also a purpose 
(in the present). As a consequence, Jungian analysis does not primarily try to confront people 
with their past; it seeks to help them realize their potential for growth.
In the process of personal growth a person is assisted by the collective unconscious. Aft er all, 
each individual’s conscious experience is very limited, but the collective unconscious is the 
residue of the collective experience of millions of people.
Archetypes
Accord ing to Jung, the conscious and the unconscious are not enemies. Th e collective 
unconscious with its primal images and thought patterns oft en comes to the aid of the 
conscious. For instance, Jung points out that scientists sometimes ﬁ nd answers to their 
problems in dreams or through “chance events”. In these cases the unconscious, being less 
bound to current methods and thought patterns, came to the aid of the conscious.
Jung calls the “primal images” and “thought patterns” of the collective unconscious archetypes. 
Archetypes are, so Jung maintains, not innate ideas or symbols, although one gets to know 
them only through ideas and symbols (they are, aft er all, uncon scious). In themselves they are 
contentless, formal potentialities that open certain doors and close others. In practice, to be 
able to talk about archetypes at all one has to work backwards from their concrete expressions 
to a “nucleus of meaning”. Only then can archetypes be (loosely) named: the father, the mother, 
the child, the animus, the anima, and so on.
Archetypes are neither persons (one’s father) nor mental images of such persons; they are parts 
of one’s own psyche. Th us the anima represents the female in the man; the animus the male in 
the woman. Th e “that” of the anima in the man is archetypically determined: all men have it 
as part of their collective unconscious. Th e “what” (content) in the concrete, individual case 
is co-determined by personal experience: each man interprets the archetype partly in terms 
of experience. Th e “how” (relationship with it) remains open to change and development: for 
some men it is a threat, for others an ally, for still others a master.
Autonomous complexes and archetypal patterns
Some archetypes give rise to autonomous complexes, that is, parts of the psyche that act as 
virtually independent subjects. Examples of these are my persona (the image of myself I wish 
to project), my animus/anima (my self as a member of the opposite sex), my shadow (my 
evil alter ego). Th e unconscious tension between various autonomous complexes is one of 
the causes of psychic problems. For example, the man who wishes to present an excessively 
macho image and who rejects all traits associated with femininity experiences a clash between 
his persona and his anima.
Archetypal patterns manifest themselves in symbols, motives and themes that occur uni-
versally in human creations. Jung supports his argument for the existence of the collective 
unconscious by showing how these archetypal patterns crop up across the boundaries of time, 
space and culture. One could explain this by referring to tradition or cultural inﬂ uence, but 
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such an explanation is not always plausible. Jung concludes that such archetypal patterns must 
be deeply rooted in the human psyche and must serve some important purpose. 
Th ese symbols, images and themes occur particularly frequently in areas of life that are 
considered especially signiﬁ cant: in religion, in art, in dreams (regarded as very signiﬁ cant in 
many cultures) and in myths. Th is provides further conﬁ rmation of their importance. How 
is it that such archetypal patterns can – as they oft en do - give people a sense of peace, of 
wholeness, of courage, or of energy? It cannot be that they teach us something (at the conscious 
level), because they do not provide any new information. Jung concludes that they help to 
bring the personal unconscious in contact with the collective unconscious. Th e personal 
unconscious reacts to the archetypal patterns in a way that is not always explicable to the 
conscious subject. By enabling them to draw on the resources of the collective unconscious, 
these patterns people help people to handle their own psychic tensions better.
Integration and individuation
Freudian analysis aims primarily at achieving a workable compromise between the various 
forces at work in the life of the individual. Jungian analysis serves the process of integration 
with a view to continued growth. Th e diﬀ erent autonomous complexes have to be brought 
into balance. Moreover, the potential hidden in the unconscious must be recognized and 
utilized. Jung does not deny that the unconscious contains threatening elements, but believes 
nevertheless that confronting such elements equips one to deal with the challenges of life. In 
one’s shadow, for instance, one meets one’s own potential for evil. Th is does not by any means 
imply that this potential should be given free rein. Rather, the meeting with the evil in oneself 
should help one not to judge oneself (or others) too harshly.
Th e ultimate goal of psychoanalysis Jung calls individuation. Th e person who attains this has 
achieved a successful personal synthesis of the archetypes and autonomous complexes in her 
unconscious. Th is “wholeness” enables the person to live as a fully individual subject who is 
nonetheless in touch and in harmony with society, since the archetypes do not belong to the 
individual alone.
Th e impression that Jung’s approach disposes too easily of the conﬂ icts indicated by Freud is a 
mistaken one. Th e path of growth is arduous and many resistances bar the way. People easily 
become imprisoned in one aspect of their psychic lives and refuse to explore other possibilities. 
Th e person who becomes the slave of a particular self-image, for example, the minister who 
cannot stop acting like a minister, is a typical case. Only some attain individuation and then 
only through struggle and eﬀ ort.
Here we see the archetypal element in the “quest stories” that have been so popular in all 
ages and cultures. In these stories the hero has to overcome many seemingly insurmountable 
obstacles to attain her or his goal. Quest stories prepare us for the struggle and the dangers we 
have to face to reach individuation.
(d) Textual interpretation according to Jung
Th e above clearly indicates that Jungian “interpretation”, whether of persons, dreams or texts, 
focuses on the archetypal patterns and symbols in them. Th e purpose is not, however, primarily 
to trace these symbols back to their “origin” and meaning. In essence, the symbols and patterns 
communicate emotions, rather than rational content. Or better still, they link the conscious with 
the unconscious level where neither reason nor emotion (in the normal sense) operates. Th e idea 
that archetypes express potentialities is of importance here. Th e archetypes open up a series of 
possibilities; they do not establish certain ﬁ xed meanings.
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Th e right approach in investigating archetypal expressions is to follow them along their many 
routes through a process of creative ampliﬁ cation rather than to “clarify” them reductively. 
Creative ampliﬁ cation involves viewing a particular theme, symbol or image from all available 
vantage points in order to reveal all its diverse possibilities.
Jungians frequently use material from diﬀ erent eras and cultures - texts, myths, drawings and so 
forth - to illustrate how archetypes function in people’s lives. Th e archetypes, as we saw, belong 
to the collective unconscious and are thus not conﬁ ned to one person or group. In creative 
ampliﬁ cation the individual experience or text is brought into a dialogue with the collective 
experience of the human race.
At the same time one achieves closer contact with one’s own unconscious and the potential it holds. 
Th e insight gained thus is not, however, something that can be fully and rationally verbalized. Jung 
deliberately set himself against Western ratio nalism and gave generous recognition to practices 
that have been scorned as unscientiﬁ c and “primitive” in the Western world: magic, alchemy and 
shamanism. According to Jung, these practices oft en draw on an instinctive sensitivity to people’s 
psychic needs, a sensitivity lost in rationalistic societies. Th us the interpretation of texts along 
Jungian lines - like interpretation along Freudian lines - is not aimed at an intellectual grasp 
of “the meaning of the text”, but reminds us of the non-rational underground of our rational, 
conscious world.
In its practice Jungian psychoanalysis bears some resemblance to the midrash method and 
deconstruction. Jungians too would be inclined to clarify a particular story by telling several 
other stories. Th ey share with deconstruction a sensitivity to intertextuality and the openness of 
texts to creative play (although in both cases they set certain limits).
(e) Lacanian psychoanalysis
Lacan, “the French Freud”, forged a link between Freud’s insights, semiotics (the theory of sign 
systems), and modern linguistic theories. In Lacan’s work the distinction between psychoanalysis 
as psychological practice and psychoanalytical textual interpretation disappears. Th e psyche is 
structured like a language and can therefore be treated as a type of text; a text can be seen as a type 
of psyche, having its own conscious and unconscious.
On account of his complex conceptual framework and his provocatively elusive style, it is almost 
absurd to try to summarize Lacan’s ideas; the more so since Lacan would not recognize something 
as univocal as “Lacan’s ideas”. Th e following summary remains inadequate - as all interpretations 
are, according to Lacan.
Th e mirror experience and the imaginary order
According to Lacan, we live at the intersection of three orders: the real, the imaginary and the 
symbolic. Th e child is originally a chaotic bundle of impressions and sensations (psychically), 
without any ﬁ xed unity or identity. Th ere is no way in which the child can perceive itself as 
a separate, uniﬁ ed subject. Th e child then enters the imaginary order by discovering itself as 
a whole in a mirror image (literally or metaphorically). Th e mirror image provides a unitary 
image (it is “me” in the mirror), but it is an alienated and imaginary unity. Th us the subject as 
a uniﬁ ed subject ﬁ nds its origin in the imagination (and the image) and through what is really 
an “other” (mirror image).
Th is “other” through which “I” am, is simultaneously in a complex sense the mother. I am 
I because of desire for/of the mother (in French désire de mère means both). Th e mother is, 
as it were, the mirror in which I ﬁ nd myself as a self, because this mirror accurately reﬂ ects 
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my desire for the mother in the form of her desire for me. In this sense the child’s identity is 
not that of an autonomous self, but that of a dyad (a two-in-one) composed by mother and 
child.
Th e seemingly natural unity in which the desire for and the desire of the mother are completely 
complementary is, however, an illusion. Just as the image in the mirror is not me but an image 
of me, so the dyad is not a reality but a product of my imagination. I imagine the dyadic unity 
because I feel incomplete in myself, because my desire (simply by being desire) indicates that 
I am not whole. If I were a completed, self-suﬃ  cient being, I would have no desire. Desire 
and the sense of lack of being (manque-a-être) go together. Th e phallus becomes the signiﬁ er 
(“image”) of desire and, simultaneously, of lack (in as much as it reminds me that I cannot be 
whole without the other). 
Th e Oedipal phase and the symbolic order
In the Oedipal phase the illusion of the mirror stage is shattered when the father enters the 
scene. Th e illusory unity-in-duality disappears when the “no” and the “name” of the father 
(in French non du père and nom du père sound the same) appear. Th e rules of the father 
are simultaneously the rules of language: there is proper behaviour and things have proper 
names. Th us the child is introduced into the symbolic order within which signs (signiﬁ ers) 
replace signiﬁ eds. 
“Replace” implies the absence of the signiﬁ ed (meaning). Desire can now be named but can, 
by the same logic, no longer be fulﬁ lled. Put diﬀ erently, the symbolic order as social order 
imposes its rules on desire and thus castrates us with words. Just as the desire for/of the 
mother must, according to the rules (the moral system of rules), be indeﬁ nitely postponed, so 
it goes with all signs in their linguistic regularity (“rule-boundness”). Th ey represent without 
making present. Th e signiﬁ er does not open the way to the signiﬁ ed (meaning), but simply 
refers you to other signiﬁ ers in the same system. Every time you try to pin down a signiﬁ ed, it 
slides away under the signiﬁ er, leaving another signiﬁ er in its place.
Th e symbolic order provides the child with an identity, a unity that replaces the dyadic 
relationship with the mother. Simply put, I can now identify myself by using the word “I”. Th e 
word “I” is quite separate and diﬀ erent from the words “mother” and “father”, but the word 
neither expresses nor gives me access to any deeper unity or wholeness. “I” is merely the word 
assigned to me in the order of words (and I share it with all others who also call themselves 
“I”). Similarly, my social identity is the place assigned to me in the social order, without 
reference to my desires or wishes. Finally, my subjectivity, far from being the stable depth of 
my being, is also imposed on me by the symbolic order. I become a subject (supposedly an 
autonomous source of value, meaning and action) by being subjected to the rules of language 
and the rules of society. 
Here and elsewhere Lacan strings ideas together by means of metaphorical and associative 
links. Th e order of language, the social order and the structure of the psyche are not logically 
identical, but they are analogous and terms from the one order may be transferred to the 
other orders. Similarly, the mirror is both a real mirror and the mother, and the relationship 
with the mother is imaginary in the way that the mirror provides an image. But, one may ask, 
what do these metaphors, analogies and associations of terms from diﬀ erent ﬁ elds have to do 
with real relationships? Lacan might answer that we simply have to use the resources of the 
language we have and this language is ﬁ gurative to the core (see the next section). We do not 
have access to any language that is free of the ﬁ gurative, nor to any reality outside language.
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Desire and language 
Beneath the signiﬁ ers (the level of language) desire persists as the signiﬁ ed. Th e repressed 
(imaginary) desire becomes the unconscious, which is not in the psyche, but rather between 
the subject and the other. Aft er all, in the imaginary order the unity of the self depends on the 
other (mirror image and mother). Th e unconscious desire is desire for the other in order to 
be whole through the other.
From the unconscious emerge the ﬁ gurative strategies of language, namely metaphor and 
metonymy. Following Roman Jakobsen, Lacan views metaphor and metonymy as equivalents 
of Freud’s terms condensation and displacement. Th e repressed desires use these strategies to 
thrust themselves to the surface, despite the rules of language. Th e unconscious, created by 
language (the symbolic order), itself has the structure of a language.
It follows that language, like the subject (conscious and unconscious), shows a split. Th e 
conscious ego cannot deny its own underground and the rules of the superego cannot prevent 
the return of the repressed. Similarly, in language the meanings/desires of the unconscious 
undermine the planned, “intended” meanings of the conscious user of language. Th e 
deﬁ nitions and rules of dictionaries and grammars cannot bind the expressions of language 
to univocal meanings. Language is shot through with metaphor and metonymy, the intentions 
of the conscious author/reader notwithstanding.
Here the Freudian compromise surfaces again. Th e rules of language “castrate” and “bind” the 
subject to the symbolic order. Th e characteristics of the symbolic order are absence (of the 
object of desire) and deferral (of the satisfaction of desire in “ﬁ nal meaning”). Th e expressivity 
of language, however, subverts the rules of language through metaphor and metonymy, thus 
hankering aft er the imaginary order in which the “other” guarantees one’s illusory unity. In 
this respect a text is structured like a psyche, because a psyche is structured like a language. 
Th e text, like the subject, is no centred unity.
Th e real order
Where does the real order ﬁ t in? According to Lacan, the real order cannot be known or 
discussed, since it lies outside language. Th e symbolic order operates with the conventional, 
the imaginary order with the illusory: neither deals with reality. All we can say of the real is 
that it is that order that makes the functioning and interaction of the other two possible. To 
attempt to say more is to slip back into the symbolic order (which, in turn, is subverted by the 
imaginary order, even in its own ﬁ eld). Th e real order is like the screen upon which the images 
appear - a screen that is not itself visible because the images cover it.
Th e real may also be thought of as the ultimate object of desire, the Other (with a capital 
letter) that promises wholeness of self and full satisfaction, as long as one remembers that 
the real is permanently out of our reach. “Th e real” as signiﬁ er then stands precisely for the 
absence of what we desire.
Th is description of the real order, though negative, does have a function. It reminds us that 
neither the imaginary nor the symbolic order is ultimately “reality”, though both constantly 
make this claim. In psychoanalysis and textual interpretation we can never say “this is the 
way things really are”. Th e uniﬁ ed, centred subject and the uniﬁ ed, centred text are both in 
principle beyond our reach. Any attempt to give precedence to one possibility - author or 
reader, analyst or analysand, conscious or unconscious - or to plaster over the cracks would 
be misguided.
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Understandably, a common criticism of Lacan has been that his theory leaves little room for 
fundamental change. Everything may be said, read or interpreted diﬀ erently, but “the more 
things change, the more they remain the same”. Lacan himself admitted that the problem of 
absence or lack (manque), of unfulﬁ lled desire, is only identiﬁ ed, not solved, in his theory.
7.2.2 Jonah in the light of psychoanalysis
(a) Jonah in the light of a Freudian approach
Th e book of Jonah seems unsuited to classical Freudian analysis, since overt references to erotic 
drives are absent. One would, however, certainly be tempted to call Jonah neurotic and, according 
to Freud, neurosis has a psychosexual cause. Fingert (summarized in Lacocque and Lacocque 
1981:26f) argues that Jonah’s hatred of Nineveh is hatred of his mother who chose his father 
(God) above him (Jonah). Th e mother appears in several guises - as Nineveh, Tarshish, the ship 
and the ﬁ sh. Th e salvation of Nineveh means that Jonah has relinquished his ambivalent feelings 
towards the mother.
Does this force a sexual meaning on an “innocent” text? Perhaps, but it is striking that the father 
(God) and the son (Jonah) are conspicuously present, while the mother (and all female ﬁ gures) 
is conspicuously absent. Are the feelings about the mother/woman too threatening? Th en one 
would expect to ﬁ nd the mother/woman in concealed form somewhere in the text. Now the 
candidates - the city, the ship and the ﬁ sh - are all represented by feminine words in the Hebrew. 
Th e city, being a round, enclosed “container”, is a ﬁ tting metaphor for feminine sexuality, and 
Jonah enters both the ship and the ﬁ sh, as into a womb or in sexual intercourse.
How can the book of Jonah be interpreted along these lines? On the face of it, the main characters 
in the story are Yahweh, Jonah and Nineveh. It would thus seem that Nineveh is the mother. 
But Jonah feels no love for Nineveh; his love is for another city, Jerusalem (his own people). 
In the manifest content this love does not become explicit. Jerusalem is referred to only once 
- obliquely - when the temple is mentioned in Jonah’s prayer (2:4). Even then the desire emerges 
from the sphere of the unconscious (from the depths of the sea). Clearly the love for the mother 
(Jerusalem) has been repressed to the uncon scious. Th e mother can now appear on the surface 
only as the hated city (Nineveh). Th e conscious ego denies the love for the mother (Jerusalem) by 
reversing it and turning it into hatred towards the mother (Nineveh). Th e commission to preach 
against the city reﬂ ects the demand of the superego (= father = God) to renounce his love for 
the mother (Jerusalem). Th e demand is twofold: to leave the beloved city (Jerusalem) and to set 
himself against the hated city (Nineveh). At least, this is how Jonah interprets his commission. 
If the mother is not permitted to be the object of the libido, she must become the object of the 
destructive instinct.
Jonah, under the inﬂ uence of the id drive, refuses. Unable to ignore the demands of the superego 
completely, he ﬁ nds a compromise at the level of the conscious ego. He ﬂ ees - away from the 
mother (Jerusalem), but also from the father/superego (God). Jonah’s “deep sleep” may be seen 
as a regression to the very earliest stage of psychic development in which thought is regarded as 
omnipotent (thought creates the world). To both the beloved mother (Jerusalem) and the hated 
mother (Nineveh) he opposes the fantasized mother (Tarshish, for Jews the practi cally mythical 
“ends of the earth”). In his fantasy world Jonah is still able to ﬁ nd pleasure in the mother. Th e 
sleep incident probably indicates erotic dreams about the mother.
Jonah is, however, unable to dodge reality for long. Th e captain, the vigilant ego, wakes him with 
a reminder of the stormy wrath of the superego (previously evoked by masturbation?). In 1:9 
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and 1:12 we see how the unconscious surfaces by means of the ambiguities of language. Jonah 
confesses that he respects (or serves) God. Th e Hebrew yara’, which means “to fear” or “to respect”, 
expresses the ambiguity that marks the son’s relationship with the father according to Freud. His 
confession of guilt in turn hints at the nature of his guilt in a covert way: “I am a knower” (literally 
in the Hebrew). Th e Hebrew “know” (yada‘) is also used of sexual intercourse. 
Th e theme of fear (forms of yara’ – fear - are used repeatedly) indicates more than fear of the 
father. Forms of gadol (big) also crop up oft en and point to the sexual fear or anxiety of the child 
in a world of adults. Th e desire for the mother is accompanied by the fear that the child will 
simply prove too small and will be swallowed up, as Jonah is in the ﬁ sh and in the ship. Th is fear 
is at the same time the fear of rejection - Jonah is thrown from the ship and vomited (!) out by the 
ﬁ sh. Jonah’s every attempt to enter the mother (Tarshish, the ship, the ﬁ sh) ends in failure. Not 
surprisingly, the mother begins to assume a monstrous form (the ﬁ sh). At this stage Jonah reacts 
to the rejection by identifying himself with the demands of the superego/father aft er all, thus 
consigning the (now hated) mother (Nineveh) to the destructive instinct.
He interprets the commands of the superego as a total condemnation of sexuality. When 
he does “enter” the city, his purpose is destructive rather than erotic. Th e mother, symbol of 
seductive feminine sexuality, has to be destroyed. His message of destruction, in Hebrew literally 
“overturning” (hafekah), mirrors the reversal (overturning) of Jonah’s love for the mother at the 
conscious level. Th is allows us to understand Jonah’s rejection of Nineveh’s repentance (turning 
around).
Th e repentant Nineveh is still not the object of his desire (Jerusalem) and yet it is no longer “the 
enemy”. Jonah is far from ready for a mature relationship with the mother, a relationship in which 
the mother is no longer the object of either the erotic or the destructive urge. To make matters 
worse, there is mutual acceptance between the father (God) and the mother (Nineveh). Th e father 
(his superego model), who had recently (in Jonah’s view) declared the mother and, for that matter, 
all sexuality taboo, now accepts the mother (Nineveh) as sexual partner. No wonder Jonah feels 
cheated by the father/God. “Isn’t this what I thought?” (4:2). Th e whole game was a plot hatched 
by the father and the mother to exclude Jonah and to castrate him psychi cally.
Since both the mother, as object of the erotic urge, and the father, as source of moral demands, 
have failed him, Jonah withdraws from both (4:3,5). He decathects, that is, he withdraws his 
libido from objects and returns to a state of narcissistic regression (the state in which the libido is 
directed at the ego, before object love sets in).
In the last chapter Jonah ﬁ nds himself in a fantasy world once more - the shelter he builds is also 
feminine in the Hebrew, but it is a small and lowly dwelling compared to a city. Th e castor-oil 
plant is a phallic symbol that probably indicates masturbation here.
Th e ﬁ nal disillusionment dawns when the worm destroys the plant and the sun beats down on 
his head. Th is signals the disintegration of his neurotic (or even psychotic) fantasy world in the 
confrontation with harsh reality. Jonah is not able to rejoice for long in his narcissistic, autoerotic 
little world. Is the worm another phallic symbol (as it oft en is), or is it, as the counterpart of the 
phallic tree, the female clitoris (the Hebrew word is feminine). Perhaps both are equally apt. Th e 
“little worm” of the father overcomes the mighty “tree” of the son, for the former is real, the latter 
an illusion. At the same time the mother, though “defective” (without phallus), has managed to 
castrate the son psychically. Th e libido, beaten on all fronts, sounds the retreat and the death 
instinct, which had already surfaced previously (1:12, 4:3), is left  in possession of the ﬁ eld.
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Whose psyche have we just analyzed? A historical Jonah’s, the author’s or the reader’s? Who 
knows! As a matter of fact, it would be equally easy to present an interpretation portraying Jonah 
as a latent homosexual with anal-retentive and sadomasochistic tendencies. Aft er all, according 
to Freudians, anal ﬁ xation, homosexuality, and sadomasochism are oft en linked.
Th e key would still be the city/mother, speciﬁ cally Nineveh, the oppressive city. Th e dominating 
mother hen-pecks the father to such an extent that the boy’s sexual identiﬁ cation is disturbed. 
Th is would be the source of Jonah’s fear and hatred of the city/mother. Th e father in turn is 
prevented from becoming a strong superego model - Jonah considers God too lax in his demands 
on Nineveh. Th e son builds up an obsessive code with an excessive emphasis on “purity” (in this 
case, racial purity), but also loses control over his aggressive drives.
Other characteristics of this personality type are seen in Jonah’s obsessive feelings of guilt in 1:12 
and his vacillation between withdrawal and aggression. Jonah wants to choose his father’s side 
against the dominating mother (although at ﬁ rst he fears to do so openly), but only in order to 
reject the mother for a homosexual world of “the boys”. To reform the mother is certainly not his 
aim. And so forth.
Such speculative interpretations are always questionable. Th e supposed “clues” in the text do not 
remove the suspicion that anything can be proved by such means - if you know beforehand what 
you wish to prove. It is unlikely that Freud himself would have hazarded an interpretation based 
on such shaky evidence.
(b) Jonah in the light of a Lacanian approach
Th e advantage of an approach such as Lacan’s is that it concentrates on the text and its ambiguities. 
Th at many meanings may be attached to one item in the text is no problem, but rather a 
conﬁ rmation that there is no single, centred text or subject. In the following discussion only 
certain possible outlines of such a reading are indicated.
One could start by looking at the ostensibly “intended” meaning of the text, the plea for openness 
towards the “(m)other” - the city of Nineveh. Th e apparent stumbling block is that this other is an 
evil, hostile other. Th e proposed “solution” is that the other should divest itself of its evil through 
repentance. Th e reader is ﬁ rst soft ened up a little by the repentance of the sailors, whose otherness 
is not so outrageous. In both parts of the story God’s grace comes to the rescue, ﬁ rst of Jonah, 
then of Nineveh.
But at what level does the reconciliation take place? “Th e word of Yahweh came to Jonah ...” 
According to this word (3:3), Jonah goes to preach in Nineveh and as a result of this word Nineveh 
repents. Similarly, the sailors fear Yahweh (1:10) only on account of Jonah’s words (1:9). Change 
and reconciliation take place at the level of the symbolic order. Community is created by the 
acceptance of a communal sign system.
We ﬁ nd, for instance, that the sailors start praying like Israelites (1:14) and enter the symbolic 
world of sacriﬁ ces and vows (1:16). In exactly the same way the king of Nineveh suddenly starts 
talking like a dyed-in-the-wool theologian (3:7-9). Th is all happens when the regulating order 
of the Father, of Yahweh’s Name and his “No!” (to Nineveh’s actions) is accepted. Th e “word of 
reconciliation” is not at bottom a word of mutual recognition and equal partnership in dialogue; 
it is a word based on communal submission to an authoritarian order. It is a matter of shared 
shackles.
Two aspects of the text hint at this shadow side. In chapter 3 it would seem that the people of 
Nineveh make a praiseworthy, free choice. In the structurally equivalent chapter 1, however, it 
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is clear that the sailors have no real choice. Th e storm as the word of Yahweh brings obedience 
through fear. Th e word that wins over is backed by the word that overawes.
In 3:7 the ambiguities of language show how the symbolic order as a chain of authority (in a 
double sense) operates. Th e submission to the word/authority of Yahweh becomes eﬀ ective in 
Nineveh through the word/authority of the king (and his nobles). Th e change takes place “by 
decree of the king”. Th e Hebrew could also mean “according to the king’s taste”. Th e selfsame 
decree forbids people and animals to taste anything (the same Hebrew root), that is, to have any 
taste of their own! Th e impression is left  that the rules of the symbolic order - the ready-made 
meanings to which they would bind the signiﬁ ers - are no natural givens. Th ey depend on the 
caprice of the rulers, who use rules to rule the choices of their subjects out of court.
No wonder that Jonah resists this order. He cannot reach the “other” he desires by this route. At 
the critical moment, when Nineveh’s enmity seems to disappear, it transpires that the desired 
state in which the love for and of the “other” coincide, has not been attained. “And the people of 
Nineveh believed God” (3:5). Within the symbolic order all contact with the other is mediated
(thus deferred) contact.
In a double sense Jonah’s “success” in Nineveh failed to conﬁ rm his integrity. On the one hand, his 
“call” (qara’) to Nineveh (3:4) evoked no corresponding echo - Nineveh’s “call” (qara’) is directed 
at God (3:8). On the other, the order of words that he called to his aid turned against him, owing 
to the ambiguity of language. Th e “overturning” (hafekah) that he called down on Nineveh turned 
out not to be the overturning of destruction, but the contrary (hefek), the turnabout of repentance. 
God recalls his decision - the “laws” of the symbolic order apply only as long as they are to the 
taste of the rulers - and Jonah ﬁ nds the integrity of his calling called into question. Both his calling 
(as prophet) and his calling (to Nineveh) seem uncalled for.
Th e ingenious readers who imagine that they have thus subverted the “intended” meaning of the 
author and who prefer to choose Jonah’s side (the unconscious and its desires) should take heed. 
Th e text has not ﬁ nished with them. Th e Jonah-position cannot simply be identiﬁ ed with the 
unconscious. One does not dispose of the symbolic order that easily.
Jonah’s attempt to ﬂ ee to the “obscure object of desire” - Tarshish, the unknown (m)other - fails 
and must fail, for here too the access is a mediated (deferred) one. Th e ship and especially the 
ship’s fee (1:3) undeniably point to the symbolic order (the monetary sign system) in which the 
signs are ambiguous and the arrival is deferred. What should have been the ark of salvation 
becomes a ship of disaster and Jonah’s eﬀ orts run aground. Th e imaginary order is aft er all a world 
of dreams, a world of the deep sleep, in which one cannot really live. Th e all too mundane other, 
the ship’s captain, quickly wrenches one from it, and the sailors demand a word of explanation.
Nor does Jonah set himself against the chain of words as such in chapter 4. He merely wants to 
pit his word against Yahweh’s word (4:2). In other words, his rebellion is not against the father 
role, but against this father whom he wants to replace in order to be father himself (Oedipal). His 
refusal to be called to account by Yahweh this time (he does not answer the question in 4:4) is but 
an apparent withdrawal from the world of signs, rules and words. On his own he simply rebuilds 
his own world of signiﬁ ers, of good and evil (for example: plant = good, worm = bad). Indeed, 
his miniature garden of Eden, his “paradise regained” with its single tree, does not lack its own 
miniature serpent. Jonah ends up with the rest of the human race aft er all.
A more penetrating analysis à la Lacan would undoubtedly also look for the reason why the ﬁ sh 
is given both a male (dag) and a female (dagah) name and why the “name of the Father” is not 
always the same, since diﬀ erent divine names are used. Th e question is whether we can really do 
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anything at all about the chains of words, except bury them under a fresh avalanche of words. In 
Jonah’s opinion only death can free us.
Yahweh’s last words provide a suggestion that may not be acceptable to Lacan (but who knows?). It 
concerns mercy or empathy (hus). It is striking that Yahweh invokes this and not faith (’emunah), 
a word of which the etymology suggests the world of ﬁ rmness and certainty. It is Yahweh’s mercy 
that oﬀ ers salvation, not the certainty of his word, nor the ﬁ rmness of Nineveh’s faith in it (3:5). 
But is this a way out or simply another way, one of many, to signal the presence of desire and the 
absence of the desired in language, a conﬁ rmation that our empathy is a sympathy, a “suﬀ ering 
together”, born of a shared frustration?
(c) Lacocque and Lacocque’s reading of Jonah
I shall not oﬀ er a Jungian reading of Jonah. Readers are referred to Lacoque and Lacocque’s Th e 
Jonah Complex. Th e two Lacocques, father and son, Old Testament scholar and psychologist, 
draw on a range of theological and psychological sources, but at key points they take a Jungian 
course (without, however, mentioning archetypes).
7.2.3 Observations and evaluation
Probably the most signiﬁ cant contribution of psychoanalysis has been that it has drawn 
attention to the unconscious drives and motivations lying beneath the surface of the ostensibly 
rational, ordered world of consciousness. Th is has two implications for interpretation.
Firstly, it means that a text should be approached with suspicion, even and especially when 
all seems clear and rational. Th e notion of the unconscious implies that neither author nor 
reader is a centred, uniﬁ ed subject. Th ere are always at least two "I's" and two texts.
Secondly, it alerts us to the irrational and apparently confusing aspects of texts. Th e 
loose ends or obscure elements in texts that are either forced into a reasonable pattern or 
ignored in normal inter pretation become pointers to the unconscious of the text. Th at this 
is not how we usually read reminds us that readers too are divided subjects. Th e reader's 
unconscious ego, in the service of the superego, tries to repress the unaccept able, the 
chaotic, the ruleless.
In its Jungian form, in turn, psychoanalysis points to the positive contribution that the non-
rational (rather than the irrational) - as it crops up in texts in the form of archetypal patterns, 
symbols and themes - can make to psychic transformation. To be captivated by a text is, at this 
level, to recognize a challenge to growth.
In the absence of a uniﬁ ed subject, one must ask in whose service interpretation stands.
For Freud it is the ego that needs to be supported in its arduous struggle to maintain a 
rational balance between the drives of the id and the demands of the superego. In spite of 
contradictory postmodernist readings of Freud, this therapeutic motive seems to dominate 
throughout in Freud's work.
For Jung the aim is the integrative process of individuation in which conscious and 
unconscious, individual and community, are brought into harmony.
For Lacan it is a matter of recognizing and accepting a split that renders any attempt to 
master reality from one pole or the other illusory.
A problem is that all discussion of the unconscious and the irrational takes place in conscious, 
rational categories. How does one become conscious of what is by deﬁ nition unconscious? It 
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can only happen in terms of a theory that is and remains highly speculative. When Freudians 
ﬁ nd traces of infantile neurosis in a text and Jungians discover archetypal patterns in the 
same text, they are following their respective theories. Why should we accept these particular 
rationalizations of what they admit to be irrational? In some respects psychoanalysis itself is 
a religion demanding faith.
7.3 Marxist approaches
7.3.1 Background and theory
Human history has been marked by oppression and the protest and struggle against oppression. 
Marxist theory attempts to chart this history of oppression, conﬂ ict and change, using the 
conceptual framework and analytical categories developed by Karl Marx and his followers. Th is 
requires a thorough grasp of each phase of development in a society, which can be gained only 
when the roots of social life, the hidden causes of conﬂ ict, have been laid bare. At the same time 
Marxist praxis employs all available means (including theoretical analysis) to bring about change 
in the society so as to eliminate oppression and conﬂ ict.
Such a comprehensive project requires a complex and subtle theoretical framework, one to which 
this brief introduction cannot do justice. In fact, among Marxists themselves there are many 
diﬀ erences of opinion, so it is wise to talk of “approaches” in the plural here. (Marxism has oft en 
been the target of crude generalizations by its opponents. Th e ardent supporters of Marx, however, 
have also oft en been guilty of oversimpliﬁ cations and misunderstandings, so that the polemics 
against what is called “vulgar Marxism” have become part of the Marxist theoretical debate.)
Marx and his early followers did not focus on the interpretation of texts. Nevertheless, Marxism 
gradually developed its own approach to the interpretation of texts, since texts and their 
interpretation undoubtedly play a major role in society. Th eir interpretative approach is, however, 
embedded in the broader theoretical framework that cannot be understood without a grasp of the 
key concepts of Marxism.
(a) Basic concepts in Marxist theory 
Historical dialectic, theory and practice
Marxist analysis views social phenomena in a radically historical light. Ideas, laws, institutions 
and practices cannot be understood or adjudged in terms of timeless categories. Th ey function 
– positively or negatively - in speciﬁ c historical contexts. Each context again has a speciﬁ c 
place within a broader historical context. Marxists use dialectical analysis, a method based 
on the identiﬁ cation and analysis of fundamental contradictions and tensions in a particular 
society, to get a grip on history. In his use of the term dialectic Marx was inﬂ uenced by Hegel, 
who saw dialectic as a dynamic, historical process.
Th e fundamental contradictions (oft en overlooked in non-Marxist historiography) provided 
Marx with the key to the understanding of history as a process based neither on timeless, 
self-evident principles, nor on a random play of chance. Th e fundamental contradictions in a 
society at a speciﬁ c stage help one to understand both the complex conjuncture of elements in 
the society and the constant develop ments and interactions in the society. Marxists reject the 
type of analysis that would study aspects of a society in isolation or in a static state.
Th at Marxists study societies and their history in detail does not mean that Marxists seek 
neutral facts. Because they wish to change the world, Marxists reject a purely theoretical 
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approach. Th eory serves practice and is itself a change-bringing endeavour - a theoretical 
practice. Marxist analysts are aware that they cannot step outside history to gain an objective 
overview of it; instead, they are, also in their theorizing, themselves actors in history. Moreover, 
they are convinced that one’s practical involvement in the struggle against oppression is an 
asset (not a liability) in the search for a more adequate theory.
Materialism and social labour
Marxist analysis starts with the concrete, the material: people produce to fulﬁ ll their needs - 
they must eat before they can think. In production, mate rial people interact physically with a 
material world to meet (ﬁ rst) their material needs. Marxism is, indeed, materialism. Yet these 
material interactions and relation ships have a certain history. Productive labour changes both 
the material world and the people engaged in it. If I plant now, I can eat later and, still later, 
think. Admittedly, people are determined by their history and environment (they are material 
beings that must eat and reproduce), yet people also make their history, their environment 
and themselves through productive labour.
From a “purely material” base, through productive labour, humans developed a “spiritual side”. 
“People shall not live by bread alone” says the Christian ... and the Marxist. Th e diﬀ erence is 
that the Christian intends to say something about the being (or essence) of people; Marxists 
intend to say something about their history. People today (and for a long time) need more 
than food. For Marxists the “spiritual side” remains rooted in the material world, for no “idea” 
or “God” has come from outside the historical process to tack a spiritual tail onto material 
people. Instead, matter itself has developed to a “higher” form.
Concrete productive labour is social labour. As solitary beings people would have remained 
stuck at the stage where each is barely able to meet his or her most pressing needs. By its very 
nature, reproduction is social. As the possibilities of production were developed, new social 
relationships emerged, just as complex chemical compounds are formed by diﬀ erent combina-
tions of basic elements (even two forms of pure carbon, graphite and diamond, have quite 
diﬀ erent properties). Th e modern individual, in her very “uniqueness”, is a product of social 
relationships. Th e theory that people are socially determined (and actively determine their 
social world) does not negate individuality. Rather, it is the social order that reduces people to 
mere types - black/white, female/male, literate/illiterate, and so on. Only when social role and 
individuality are not posed as opposites can people come into their own as individual, social 
beings. According to Marx, this can only happen in a socialist society.
Revolutionary social dialectics, mode of production and class struggle
Productive social labour has up to now always involved struggle and contradictions. First, 
people won the battle for survival in the dialectical relationship with nature through the 
social organization of labour. Th en, having overcome many natural obstacles, people started 
dominating one another. A new dialectic, one between employer and employee, master and 
servant, oppressor and oppressed, appeared. Th e Marxist concept of dialectic implies a quite 
speciﬁ c type of interaction – one that involves tension, antagonism and ultimate revolutionary 
change. Water in a closed container will evaporate and condense as the temperature changes. 
Although there is an interaction between the gaseous form (water vapour) and the liquid form, 
both remain forms of water. In the Marxist concept of dialectics, one pole (thesis) confronts 
another pole (antithesis) in an intense tension, till the tension is resolved in a wholly new 
given (synthesis). (Hegel and Marx both use the untranslatable German word “aufh eben” for 
the resolution of dialectical contradictions. Th e German word implies both a canceling and a 
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lift ing to a higher level.) Th e two poles thus do not remain in permanent interaction, nor does 
the one pole gradually overwhelm the other. From the very tension something new is born.
Put in concrete terms, oppressor and oppressed are indeed in interaction: the one cannot exist 
without the other. Of a peaceful coexistence, however, there can be no question. Nor can the 
tension between oppressor and oppressed be resolved by minor changes in the pattern (more 
or less oppression, a transference of some people from the one group to the other). Only when 
there are no oppressed will there be no oppressors, and vice versa. Th is requires a wholly new, 
a revolutionary, ordering of society. Marxist theory is a theory of revolutionary dialectics. In 
practice, a revolution usually (perhaps always) requires violence, since the concrete advantages 
the oppressive system holds for the oppres sors directly correlates with the disadvantages it 
holds for the oppressed. Th e oppressors cling to their position with as much determination as 
the oppressed show in their struggle to free themselves from oppression.
According to Marxism, oppression does not occur by chance, as the result of the coincidental 
wickedness of some individuals. It is in fact built into the very structure of class societies and 
is the result of the speciﬁ c mode of production in the particular society. Th e concept “mode of 
production” refers to the combination of the means of production (labour force, tech nology, 
and so on) and the relations of production (the way labour is socially ordered).
As long as a certain group controls the means of production and determines the relations of 
production, there will be competing classes in the society. Between the various classes (groups 
that have diﬀ erent relation ships in terms of the production process) a class struggle rages. At a 
certain stage - when the current relations of production come into conﬂ ict with the available 
means of production so that further development of the production process is hindered - the 
internal contradictions in the mode of production reach breaking point. Class struggle passes 
into revolution, bringing about a new mode of production and a new set of relationships 
among people.
Since productive labour lies at the root of all societies, each society’s mode of production, 
the so-called economic base, determines the nature of the society. All social phenomena are, 
in the last instance, dependent on the economic base. Th e laws, philosophies, religions, art 
forms and so forth make up the ideological superstructure. Th ese “products of the mind” do 
not descend from an independent spiritual sphere or a world of pure thought, but are (in a 
complex way) products of the base.
Ideology and false consciousness
Th e superstructure is not, however, simply a reﬂ ection or reproduction of the base. On the 
contrary, the dominant ideology oft en conceals and distorts (Marxists say mystiﬁ es) what 
happens at the base. Even when it presents a mystiﬁ ed image (and precisely then), the ideology 
remains an expression of the real tensions at the base. Th ough the ideological products of 
a society are complex and even contradic tory, the dominant ideology, seen as a whole, is 
also the ideology of the ruling class. Th erefore the dominant ideology will ultimately serve 
the interests of the ruling class by protecting the status quo (though this may not always be 
apparent at the surface). Free and ﬁ erce theoretical discussions may, for instance, be encour-
aged in a speciﬁ c society - to act as a safety valve that would cripple revolution ary action by 
creating the impression that correct theory in itself will provide the solution.
Most Marxists agree that an ideology is not derived directly from the mode of production. 
Although any ideology ultimately has its roots in the economic base, ideology and base do not 
quite follow parallel lines of development. Th e ideological superstructure can also react back 
on the base. Nor is ideology simply an intentional fraud perpetrated by the dominant class 
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to protect its position. Members of the ruling class oft en truly believe their ideology, because 
they themselves are (on account of their upbringing) products of their class position and class 
ideology. Th eir false consciousness becomes, as it were, the spectacles through which they see 
the world. Since the ruling class also controls the means of intellectual production (schools, 
universities, newspapers, and so on), it may easily appear to them (and to members of the 
working class) that their intellectual world, their ideology, is the intellectual world.
Th e working classes, on the other hand, are not only economically exploited; they are also 
ideologically neutralised. Most of them cannot com pete because they lack adequate (or any) 
schooling. Th e few who rise through eﬀ ort and sacriﬁ ce are allowed to do so only on the 
condition that they accept (internalize) the dominant ideology. A number of them even enter 
the ranks of the ruling class. Th ese exceptions are held up as “examples” to other workers, but, 
being few, they make no diﬀ erence to the basic structure of the society.
All the same, the fundamental contradictions and tensions in a class society cannot be 
suppressed completely. Th e emphasis on competition in a capitalist society, for instance, 
prevents the ruling class from forming a united front at all times. Th e safety valves that the 
ruling class are forced to provide - free theoretical discussion, co-option of some workers 
into the ruling class, and the like - mean that “dangerous” or “subversive” ideas may ﬁ nd their 
way into the dominant ideology. One might compare here Freud’s view on how the repressed 
contents of the unconscious make their way to the surface. 
(b) Marxism and the interpretation of texts
Text production and ideological criticism
Literature, speciﬁ cally religious literature, belongs to the ideological superstruc ture. Indeed, 
in modern societies the written word is the prime vehicle of the dominant ideology. But 
the production of texts (material objects) is also part of the productive social labour in a 
society. Books are written from a social situation for a social situation - they are embedded 
in society.
Th e typical questions of historical-critical interpretation are reﬁ ned, expanded and posed 
more pointedly by Marxist interpreters. Who writes? Under what circumstances? For whom? 
With what purpose? Th ese old questions receive a new edge in Marxist interpretation. Since 
authors are not independent, neutral “creators of meaning”, one has to ask about the class 
position and class interests of the author. Th e same goes for the audience. From a Marxist 
perspective one would also ask: Who within a society has the leisure to write? How is the 
society structured to stimulate the production of certain types of text? Who controls the 
publication and distribution of texts? How is the consumption of texts institutionally regulated 
in a society (think of handbooks at universities)? When you start studying these questions, 
it becomes clear that the production and consumption of texts cannot be divorced from the 
social and historical processes in the particular society.
Since texts are the vehicles of ideology, the “meanings” and “values” attached to them cannot 
be taken at face value. Texts are not “innocent”; therefore the problems that a text presents at 
the surface may be a deceptive point of departure for the interpreter. A Marxist reading oft en 
reveals how a text is rooted in its ideological context by looking at the unstated presuppositions 
behind the text and the all too deliberate “silences” in it. Th e “other” of the antithesis oft en 
appears indirectly, “between the lines”.
Th e introduction to this section used the example of a book from the apartheid era in South 
Africa in which all the characters are whites to show how a text can obscure a fundamental 

193
Chapter 7
conﬂ ict within a particular society by simply ignoring it. Similarly, many books simply 
presuppose certain social relationships, institutions and practices; slavery, feudalism, 
capitalist production, a hierarchical class system, and so on. Precisely when these factors are 
not considered – critically or otherwise – in the text, their “absence” may inﬂ uence the entire 
framing of the text, the questions it asks and the answers its proposes. For instance, a text may 
invite readers to praise a servant’s act of loyalty to his master, while the same act may, from 
the servant’s point of view, reﬂ ect the servant’s complete dependence on his master. Marxist 
analysis would point out the discrepancy between the perspective of the master (presented in 
the text) and that of the servant (not presented in the text) and show how class positions based 
on economic factors inﬂ uenced these perspectives.
Marxists have no more faith in “centred” subjects than Freudians do. Many of them would 
say (following Althusser) that the author as subject is at certain points interpellated by the 
dominant ideology. In brief, this means that the concrete author is as it were interrupted by 
the claim of ideology and becomes a subject (or is subjected) by taking an ideological stance. 
But many Marxists (following Bakhtin) also argue that certain texts are dialogical. In such 
texts no single voice or ideology dominates the text; diﬀ erent voices speak within the same 
text.
Texts that negate the fundamental dialectic in a society serve an ideological function in that 
society. On the one hand, they deny or justify the underlying economic relationships and 
power structures in the society, which appear, if at all, only as “self-evident” or “given” in 
the text. On the other, they help form the men tal apparatus of the readers. Th e readers are 
inﬂ uenced to look for the solutions to the problems of the society within the framework 
oﬀ ered by the text. Authors are not always fully aware of this, for their own thoughts have 
already been ideologically moulded.
Marxist interpretation thus seeks to bring to light the interests a text serves in prac tice, by 
indicating how the text functions within a broader ideological framework.
Interpretation as revolutionary praxis
Marxist interpretation does not deny that the interpreter is also a concrete person with 
class interests. On the contrary, Marxism deliberately wants to use the critical practice of 
interpretation as a means of engaging in the class struggle. Interpretations, like texts, are 
always on the side of either the oppressor or the oppressed.
Th e implication of this for the practice of Marxist interpretation is that Marxists cannot blithely 
juxtapose a plurality of “meanings” or possibilities of meanings. Th e ambiguity of linguistic 
signs is not denied, yet value judgments are not ruled out either. Marxists are concerned 
primarily about the reality of oppression and not about abstract “possible meanings”. In the 
world of ideas all sorts of interpretations may be equally “interesting”; in the concrete context 
of clashing class interests and inequality, every interpretation involves the exercising of power 
and is thus subject to positive or negative evaluation. Unlike some postmodern interpreters, 
Marxists cannot completely evade the question of correct or adequate interpretation (although 
Marxists are more concerned about correct practice than about correct theory).
Terry Eagleton (1983:210f) summarizes this point as follows: Marxist interpretation is not 
in the ﬁ rst place a method of interpretation. Marxists may use a variety of methods, some 
not Marxist in origin at all. What does typify Marxist interpretation, is the purpose for which 
particular interpretations are used.
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Meaning in historical perspective and the complexity of contexts
For Marxists the “meaning” and “value” of a text are not eternal, universal cate gories: a text 
acquires value or meaning in quite speciﬁ c historical contexts. Indeed, the same text may, at 
diﬀ erent times and in diﬀ erent societies, acquire totally diﬀ erent values and meanings. For this 
reason, socio-historical analysis generally plays an important role in Marxist interpretation. 
In the case of texts from the distant past, especially, one has to distinguish between the 
ideological role the text played then (at the time of writing) and the ideological role the text 
acquired for later (also present-day) readers.
Marx’s associate Frederich Engels argued that Christianity was at its birth a progressive, 
revolutionary movement with a strong socialist slant. Later, however, Christianity became a 
powerful state religion and served as protector of the status quo. Whether or not one accepts 
his historical analysis, one has to ask the type of questions he asked. Is a biblical text that was 
originally the manifesto of a marginalized minority still “the same text” when it functions as 
a rule enforced by a powerful elite?
In all cases the interpreter must guard against a facile labeling of phenomena that does not 
take the dialectical processes within the society into account. Revolutions are not always 
progressive and dictatorships are not always reactionary. A text that might have had a 
progressive impact in its own time may today carry reactionary implications (and vice 
versa). Even the author’s acknowledged ideological stance does not disqualify or validate a 
text. According to Lukacs (1964), the “reactionary” Balzac and Tolstoy were better able to 
expose the problems of their times than were their more “progressive” contemporaries. (One 
sometimes gets the impression that “dialectical analysis” can be a way of justifying personal 
preferences. In the case of Lukacs, one can assume that his “ﬁ ndings” were inﬂ uenced by 
Marx’s predilection for Balzac and Lenin’s for Tolstoy.)
Under the inﬂ uence of Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser (in particular), modern Marxist 
theorists have become sensitive to the complexity of developed capitalist societies. In such 
societies it may be misleading to talk about one uniﬁ ed economic base and one uniﬁ ed 
ideological superstructure. Within one encompassing economic system (capitalism) various 
partially independent ideological “worlds” (sub-ensembles) have developed, each connected 
to its own speciﬁ c relationships of production, its own dialectics and class struggle. Th e varied 
ways in which these sub-ensembles interact with one another and are inﬂ uenced by diﬀ erent 
aspects of the production process create conjunctures that cannot be analyzed by means of a 
simple base-superstructure model. In diﬀ erent situations one person may be the oppressed at 
one moment, the oppressor at the next. 
Moreover, most capitalist countries now tolerate a variety of ideologies, including ones 
hostile to capitalism. One can no longer talk of a ruling class dominating an oppressed class by 
force and through a single “ruling ideology”. Instead, the ruling group exercises a hegemony 
(Gramsci) based on the prestige and conﬁ dence of the group and its ideas. Th is prestige 
attracts a large number of subalterns who willingly follow the lead of the hegemonic group. In 
the analysis of texts one cannot play oﬀ  “oppressor” and “oppressed” against each other in a 
simplistic way. One has to consider the intricate ways in which a hegemonic ideology co-opts 
subalterns and maintains itself against rival ideologies.
For the interpretation of texts this meant that a sharper focus on the unique dynamics of 
textual production and textual consumption was needed. If one bears in mind the quite speciﬁ c 
conjunctures within which each text is written and interpreted, one cannot expect that every 
text should address the problematic of the society as a whole. It is the task of interpretation to 
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lay bare the quite distinct forms of ideological struggle within which this text is embedded 
and to consider the constraints and possi bilities inherent in certain literary traditions - those 
of genre, current aesthetic values, publishability and the like. Engels had already recognized 
that works of art yield less easily to Marxist analysis than do, say, laws, since art is less purely 
ideological.
In this way Marxist interpretation sidesteps the accusation that it imposes a uniform pattern 
on all texts and that it negates the unique nature of some texts by means of historistic or 
economistic reduction.
7.3.2 Jonah in the light of Marxist approaches
Because Marxists hold that meaning emerges within a concrete historical and social context, 
a Marxist interpreter of the book of Jonah would ﬁ rst try to place the book historically. Th e 
following assumptions could serve as point of departure (Marxists would admit that such 
historical reconstructions are open to debate):
Th e book was written in the late Persian period or the early Greek period - while Israel was 
subject to colonial rule.
Th e author belonged to the educated upper layer of Judaean society and wrote primarily for 
this class. Note that the class position of the historical Jonah (or of the Jonah of the text) is not 
necessarily important.
Th e author was inﬂ uenced by the wisdom tradition which was prevalent in Ancient Israel, but 
was not necessarily a wisdom teacher himself.
At the surface at least, the book deals with the relationship between Jew and pagan.
Th ese assumptions are not arbitrary, nor are they the products of speciﬁ cally Marxist analysis. 
In practice, Marxists use the results of historical-critical studies as points of departure in their 
reading of the Bible. Th ese assumptions make the following Marxist interpretations of the book 
of Jonah possible:
(a) A crude Marxist interpretation of the book Jonah
A very crude approach would be to take the apparent universalism of the book at face value and to 
identify it as a progressive tendency. God loves everybody, pagans are also human, reconciliation 
between people is possible, and so on. One could even point out that the last verse, with its 
emphasis on the “proletariat” of Nineveh (the “hundred and twenty thousand who cannot discern 
between their right hand and their left  hand”), breaks through the existing class structure. Even 
earlier (Jonah 3:5) all people “from the greatest to the least” were included in the act of repentance. 
Have excessive nationalism, racial hatred and the oppression of one people by another not always 
been favoured weapons in the arsenal of the ruling class? And isn’t it the dearest wish of the ruling 
class to direct the antagonism of the oppressed outward, turning class struggles into national 
struggles? And who but the small circle of rulers ever beneﬁ ts from imperialist wars? So: workers 
of Israel and Nineveh unite! Th ere is nothing to separate you. Th is reading turns Jonah into a 
prophetic book for Marxists as well, one that looks forward to the reconciliation of all people in 
the socialist order.
Th e problem with such a reading, one that does not deserve to be called “Marxist”, is that it has 
no secure moorings in text or context and oﬀ ers no proper analysis. Th e “solution” drops from 
heaven, yet partly it remains stuck in heaven, for the repentance of Nineveh remains a fantasy - if 
such a thing ever happened in Nineveh, it left  no historical traces. Class diﬀ erences are not really 
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eliminated; they are conﬁ rmed up to the last verse. “From the greatest to the least” (3:5) in this 
context means “everybody”, yet the expres sion reveals how the dominant ideology imposes itself 
in and through language. Th e author, who might be subjectively “innocent”, uses an expression 
that shows clearly how in this society a phrase for “everybody” presupposes class diﬀ erences. 
“Everybody” is diﬀ erentiated into “lesser” and “greater”. Th is is the dream of the advantaged 
classes: a harmony, a “peaceful coexistence” at a spiritual level, in which people still “know their 
place”. From this perspective the reference to the “simple souls” in the last verse is paternalistic 
rather than liberating.
(b) A vulgar Marxist interpretation of the book of Jonah 
Arguments such as these could form the basis of a somewhat better substantiated reading. Such 
a reading would at least use ﬁ ner distinctions and would anchor the text better historically. Th e 
question about the power base from which the book of Jonah was produced (in the late Persian or 
early Greek period) becomes crucial. Th e following deliberations bear on this issue:
Th e author of the book of Jonah probably did belong to the upper stratum of Judaean society, 
but in a situation in which their power and privileges were relativized by the overarching 
Persian (or Greek) rule. Th is stratum of the population experi enced a threat from above 
(rather than from below). In such a situation the local privileged classes had to compete for 
the favour of the real rulers. Th ey might also have been internally divided on how best to 
maintain and stabilize their position. Here there can be no question of a uniform dominant 
ideology. In such situations various elements of older ideological patterns are reactivated and 
reinterpreted according to the speciﬁ c interests of the diﬀ erent groups.
For instance, groups that faced a virtually complete loss of status and privilege might have 
sought the cooperation of the working class in order to regain political power through a 
"patriotic war". For such groups terms such as "own identity and culture" and "the pagan 
yoke" would have been signiﬁ cant ideological markers. We know of a Messianic-apocalyptic 
movement at that time that wanted to reinstate the David monarchy by force. Members of the 
David dynasty and their supporters would have felt at home here and would have appealed to 
some elements of the royal ideology (cf. Psalms 2 and 110) to bolster their claim.
Others who still had a power base (albeit diminished) would have striven to make their 
particular power base ideologically central. Th e priestly-theocratic movement with its power 
base in the temple service ﬁ ts here. Th is group (priests and their hangers-on) could have used 
the relative independence that Jews enjoyed in religious matters to turn the temple into a 
source of inﬂ uence and wealth for themselves.
Exclusivity would have served the interests of both these groups, whether as a stimulus to 
revolt against foreign rule or as conﬁ rmation that the “true identity” of Jews was bound up 
with their unique religion.
Th e author of Jonah ﬁ ts into neither of these groups; we have to look for other possibilities. No 
doubt there were people who beneﬁ ted from the situation because the existing relationships 
of power gave them freer play. For such people foreign rule would not have been a disaster. 
Th is group, a middle class between rulers and workers, might have contained merchants, 
oﬃ  cials, wisdom teachers and even some landowners. For various reasons these people would 
not necessarily have suﬀ ered under foreign rule, either economically or in status. Merchants, 
for instance, might have enjoyed better trading opportunities; oﬃ  cial who co-operated with 
the new rulers might have improved their status vis-à-vis the traditional ﬁ gures of authority. 
Th e professional ideology of wisdom teachers valued openness to the new, so they might have 
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found the more international atmosphere stimulating. Landowners would in any case not 
have welcomed a destructive war of liberation.
Although we cannot be sure, we may accept as a working hypothesis that the author of Jonah 
belonged to the bureaucratic class and that he (“she” is unlikely here) had been prepared for his 
task in the wisdom schools.
According to this analysis, the vaunted universalism and openness of the book of Jonah conceals 
a sordid little power struggle within the closed circle of the privileged. Behind the explicit theme 
of antagonism against non-Jews lurks the antagonisms among various privileged groups of Jews 
and the antagonism between workers and the rulers. Th e patience and grace of God conceal the 
concrete problems of the bureaucrat who has to keep everybody happy and cannot aﬀ ord to make 
enemies. No wonder the author leaves the Jonahs in his audience the option of “realizing” that the 
practice of openness and tolerance is the religio-ideologically correct thing. Th e readers have to 
be won over, not antagonized. Both Jonah and God appear as “classless beings”, yet a number of 
incidentally mentioned details reveal the reality that the text tries to conceal.
Apart from those mentioned above, note that:
it is accepted that Jonah is able to pay for a long voyage (1:3)
Jonah is approached by the captain, not by ordinary sailors (1:6)
it is assumed that the revolution in Nineveh can come only from above, "by the decree of the 
king and his nobles" (3:7)
"all" (4:11) ﬁ nally beneﬁ t, but the crucial decisions rest with the "great ones"
Because the ideological bondage of the book renders it incapable (it is not a matter of “unwilling”) 
of even seeing the central problem in the society, the solution remains unrealistic.
Th is reading is a better example of how Marxists would deal with a text. Th e specu lative element 
cannot be held against Marxism; in the circumstances (lack of data) all readings that take history 
seriously will include an element of speculation. Nevertheless, one could call this approach vulgar 
Marxism. Class position and ideol ogy are assumed to have such a direct correlation that ideology 
is a more or less clear reﬂ ec tion of economic and political interests. As a result the text is reduced 
to little more than an instance of a dynamic that might well have been identiﬁ ed without the text. 
Th e question of whether a workers’ revolution would have been a progressive (or even a possible) 
option under existing conditions is not examined. One could argue that the imperialist system 
was still able to contribute to the development of the possibilities of production (by spreading 
knowledge and technology) and that the alternative to imperialist oppression was simply a return 
to more stagnant local oppression. It is vulgar Marxism that invites the accusation that Marxism 
is economic determinism and that its application to literary products involves an unwarranted 
reduction.
(c) A more sophisticated Marxist interpretation of the book of Jonah
Th e objections raised above need not apply to a more theoretically sophisticated Marxist approach. 
Modern Marxist approaches recognize that ideological products bear a complex relationship to 
the dominant ideology and the economic base. Even at the time that Jonah was written, society 
had developed complicated ideological formations that functioned alongside one another 
virtually independently. Adequate interpretation demands that we account for much more than 
mere class interests.
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One should, for instance, recognize that the generalizing, “unrealistic” (even utopian) features of 
the book ﬁ t the speciﬁ c genre. Th e ferment within the wisdom tradition of the period (to which 
Job and Ecclesiastes bear witness) should be taken into consideration. Verses marked as central 
by the structure of the text deserve attention; so too the fact that it is an “open text”. Th us the 
details of the text that disappeared in the vulgar Marxist interpretation come into their own again. 
Without challenging all aspects of the vulgar Marxist analysis (the class analysis may be allowed 
to stand), such an analysis may reach quite diﬀ erent conclusions.
Since such a reading would be complex, only the barest outline can be indicated here:
First, it should be noted that the opposition Jew/pagan is codetermined by the opposition 
oppressor/oppressed from the outset. It is because he has to go to the "blood city", Nineveh, 
that Jonah tries to ﬂ ee to Tarshish (equally foreign). Th e opposition is presented schematically 
as a result of the genre.
Secondly, it can be argued that the opposition oppressor/oppressed is not "lift ed" in any 
idealistic way. Although the representation is schematic, it is clear that only a revolution in 
Nineveh's praxis, an about-turn that explicitly involves the rejection of oppression (hamas), 
saves the day. Th is is not a universalism that “accepts” everything, oppression included; 
changed practice is the condition for reconciliation.
Th e rhetorical turns in the text also show that this is no simplistic plea for tolerance. Th e 
opposition Jew/pagan, implicitly present from the ﬁ rst verses, is also undermined from the 
very ﬁ rst verses by the opposition good/evil. Th e latter opposition is explicitly kept before 
the eyes of the readers throughout the text by means of word play. Not only is there no direct 
correlation between good/evil and Jew/pagan; the former is not a static opposition. Th rough 
transforming action, evil can turn into good and vice versa.
In the narrative pagans are willing to engage in transforming action. In chapter 3 a series of 
actions by the people of Nineveh (3:5-9) is followed by the key verse 3:10, which uses forms 
of ‘asah (do, make) three times to emphasize the actuality of the change. Similarly, in 1:5-
16 a series of actions by the crew ﬁ nally changes their lives. Although the actions may be 
misplaced (in the eyes of the reader) to start with, it is only in and through the dynamics of 
their actions that progression becomes possible.
By way of contrast, Jonah is astoundingly passive from the start. Even his "activity" in chapter 
1 is ﬂ ight, an attempt to avoid engagement. On two occasions (1:9 and 3:3-4) he does act 
and with great consequence too, but in both cases one has the impres sion that he becomes 
involved only when he has no other option. For the rest he prefers the spectator role or the 
role of the one to whom things happen. He lies asleep during the storm (1:5), he is questioned 
(1:8,10), he is cast into the sea (1:15), he is swallowed and vomited out again (2:1,11), he 
becomes angry (4:1), he sits down "to see what will happen" (4:5), he becomes glad (4:6), he 
feels faint (4:8). No fewer than three times he chooses to die - the height of apathy.
Th e result of this passivity is that his experience of salvation does not bring any thorough 
transformation - as do the actions of the people of Nineveh. He is a victim even of his 
salvation.
God, however, is constantly active and set on change. Th is becomes abundantly clear in 4:1 
where God's word and Jonah's word are contrasted. Jonah's word simply recognizes a ﬁ xed 
state of aﬀ airs. Th e translation "is this not what I thought?" (literally: Was this not my word?) 
typiﬁ es Jonah's word as a mere idea, one that does not even have to be expressed. Such a word 
remains without eﬀ ect. Jonah knows certain things (cf 1:12), but his reaction is to throw in the 
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towel. God's word steps into the ring to become engaged in the dialectic that brings change. 
For this very reason God's word is not a static, unchanging word (4:10). God's word is neither 
the (theoretical) denial of oppression nor the (theoretical) recognition of oppression; it is the 
negation of oppression that enters into the histori cal process to “lift /cancel” oppression, and 
that is in this process necessarily itself “lift ed/cancelled”.
Jonah's resignation is not, however, an ahistorical personality trait. It belongs to the situation 
of being oppressed. Something of this becomes visible in the play on the forms of yara’ (fear, 
respect) in chapter 1. No reason is given for Jonah’s ﬂ ight, but readers can easily supply one. 
Who wants to fall foul of the mighty Nineveh? Jonah, as representative of the oppressed, is 
intimidated by the apparently overwhelming superiority of Nineveh, so that his fear (yara’) of 
Nineveh renders his respect (yara’) for God inoperative. His ﬂ ight is a ﬂ ight into the inactivity 
of theory, the theory he later (4:1) holds up as the reason for his ﬂ ight. Of Jonah yara’ is used 
once only: in the key verse 1:9 where he says of himself that he serves (respects) Yahweh. 
Th ese words ring hollow, just as Jonah as the centre of the narrative remains a hollow centre. 
His unspoken fear of Nineveh gives his spoken respect for God the lie.
Transforming action takes place around the hollow centre. Th e sailors are also afraid (1:5), 
but their fear spurs them on to positive action to save lives and by this route leads them on 
to respect for God (1:16). In this sphere of respect lies their marked respect for Jonah's life 
(1:13,14). On the other hand, by 4:8 one feels that Jonah has lost all self-respect. Whereas 
the crew conquers fear, Jonah is conquered and dehumanized by fear. Th e fear syndrome 
of the oppressed brings a knowledge (1:12, 4:2) of hopeless passivity. Th is can be countered 
by a "perhaps" (1:6) or a "who knows?" (3:10), which spurs on to action and leaves room for 
change.
Th e open ending suits this. Th e reader is invited to abandon the spectator role and take an 
active part in writing the story. Instead of a fear-reaction that would impose a closed ending 
on the readers, the author, out of respect for the readers, risks leaving the decision to them.
Such a “Christian-Marxist” reading would probably be acceptable to Marxist atheists should 
“God” in the text be seen as a symbol of human potential. Marxists, Christian or not, would 
obviously want to say more. What made such a text possible at that time? Each individual text 
is born of the convergence of many lines - economic, political, and ideological. One can only 
surmise that the process by which the middle class was beginning to establish itself as a relatively 
independent and active class played a major role in the origin of Jonah. Th is would help to explain 
why this text can be reactivated today - by a new rising class.
Readers are also referred to Terry Eagleton’s interpretation of Jonah, “J.L. Austin and Jonah” (1989). 
Eagleton, a Marxist literary critic, also regards the question of eﬀ ective action to be central to the 
book, but he approaches the matter diﬀ erently. His purpose is not to give a “standard” Marxist 
interpretation, but to enter into a debate with critics of the deconstruction school (for example 
De Man and Hillis Miller) about the possibility of meaningful action. Th e result is a provocative 
reading that is in many ways an inverted mirror image of traditional readings. Nevertheless, he 
touches on a problem deeply rooted in both the Marxist and the Christian tradition: how can a 
call to eﬀ ective action be reconciled with the consciousness that action is never independent, but 
always determined by forces that control the individual?
7.3.3 Observations and evaluation
As the examples show, there is no standard "Marxist method" of interpretation (just as there 
is no "Christian method"). A reading by a Marxist (or from a Marxist perspective) cannot be 
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constructed solely by the tools of Marxist theory. Marxist readings regularly use a number 
of reading strategies that are not speciﬁ cally Marxist. Th ey sometimes focus on particular 
features of a text (as Eagleton does), without thereby pretending to say all that can be said 
about the text from a Marxist perspective.
Th ematically, Marxism introduces certain concepts that, although not exclusively Marxist, 
oft en receive insuﬃ  cient attention outside Marxist circles: ideology, production, classes, and 
so on. In Marxist interpretation these concepts are system atically employed; they are seen 
in their interrelatedness according to Marxist theory. Nevertheless, caution is taken to avoid 
thoughtless schematicism; the interac tion of the elements must be placed within historically 
changing frames.
Methodologically dialectical analysis typiﬁ es Marxist interpretation. Dialectics may, however, 
operate at various levels. Th e contradictions and oppositions explicitly presented in the text 
cannot provide adequate data for dialectical analysis. Correctly used, dialectical analysis is not 
a way of reducing texts to schematic abstractions, but rather a way of exposing the historical 
concreteness of each text, its determinate (in both senses) nature or materiality.
Marxist interpretation is engaged (committed) interpretation. Th is means that the interpreter 
interprets on the basis of a particular commitment, but also that interpretation is itself a form 
of engagement, an active theoretical practice with determined and determining results.
Th e Marxist emphasis on concreteness and commitment in interpretation cannot be ignored by 
Christians simply because Marx and most early Marxists were atheists. Biblical interpretation 
that yields only abstract truths and that ignores the biblical call to action and commitment 
is as useless to Christians as it would be to Marxists. It is not surprising that theologies of 
liberation oft en follow Marxist models in their interpretative practice.
One problem remains to dog Marxist approaches (and all approaches that employ a 
hermeneutics of suspicion). If texts cannot be trusted to speak for themselves, it can only 
mean that the interpreter "knows better". What is the source of this superior insight? Th e vast 
majority of Marxist theorists stem from the class blinded by false consciousness - according 
to their own theory. But even those who may claim to have reached their insights through 
their "own experience of oppression" face a question: Does a systematic suspicion not exclude 
the possibility that a text may say something to shake the conﬁ dence in that experience? Must 
Marx and one's own experience not be read with suspicion as well? A person who approaches 
everything with suspicion is well protected against deceit, but may also be shut oﬀ  from 
surprising new insights.
7.4 Feminist approaches
7.4.1 Background and theory
Among reader-centred hermeneutic approaches to the Bible, feminist hermeneutics draws diverse 
and oft en extremely emotional responses. Th ese reactions oft en cloud reasonable evaluations of 
the nature and content of the ﬁ eld, as many people cannot discard their own emotional reactions 
to the mere word, feminism. To a certain extent, this is understandable, because feminism has a 
complex and diverse history - broader than biblical hermeneutics. 
So, what is feminist hermeneutics? Does it imply some of the above-mentioned ideas or none at 
all? To deﬁ ne feminism is no easy task, as it is an extremely diverse concept. Even self-proclaimed 
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feminists sometimes disagree on the nature and implications of feminism. Broadly speaking, 
feminism hinges on one assumption: the assumption of equality.
(a) Th e assumption of equality
A feminist broadly speaking, is one who seeks justice and equality for all people and who is 
especially concerned for the fate of women – all women – in the midst of “all people.” Such a 
deﬁ nition means that issues pertinent to racism, classism, and ecology, as well as peacemaking, 
are part of the purview of feminism. Yet the perspectives are extremely varied, even when the 
focal subject matter is limited to the Bible and theology. – Katharine Doob Sakenfeld
In its core, feminism is convinced that men and women have equal intrinsic value. One may 
respond to this by saying: So what? What is the problem with this statement? Is anyone still 
arguing that women have less value than men? Feminism indeed argues, with strong statistics 
to support it, that women are (still) treated as though inferior to men in many respects; a shared 
experience of oppression reveals this assumption of equality. Th ere is the argument in studies 
of gender relations that an imbalance in power sharing can be identiﬁ ed in various cultural 
contexts. 
Th is imbalance is also identiﬁ able in various ﬁ elds of study, such as hermeneutics. Christianity, 
Islam, Judaism, and African traditional religions, as well as most other religions that study ancient 
(oral or written) texts central to their religious praxis, all have long patriarchal histories. Th e 
same is true of the history of academic study. Scholars of feminist hermeneutics argue that these 
authoritative, sacred texts have been interpreted in such a way as to marginalize women and to, 
thus, conﬁ rm their inferiority in comparison with men. Th is leads to yet another curious debate 
in the ﬁ eld of hermeneutics that is central to the feminist argument. In this debate, the central 
question is whether objective scholarship is at all possible.
(b) Th e problem of objectivity
One’s social location or rhetorical context is decisive of how one sees the world, constructs 
reality, or interprets biblical texts. – Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza
As a major model of socio-critical or contextual hermeneutics, feminist hermeneutics regards 
objective study as impossible. No person, whether male or female, black or white, can read any 
text, or study any object or phenomenon, as though lacking personal experience, context or 
conviction prior to such a study. At the outset, your context or interests determine your chosen 
subject matter or ﬁ eld of study, and your scholarly background determines your method of study. 
Your personal loyalties determine the desired result or outcome of your studies; you go to great 
lengths to accomplish your goals, if they are at all reasonably possible. 
Consequently, that which, over several centuries, was considered as “objective” study has now 
been exposed as androcentric (male-centered, European) subjective scholarship. Together 
with this realization, further questions must be asked: Did hermeneutic scholars use speciﬁ c 
texts, consciously or unconsciously, to validate their own domination of others? Did they use 
selected passages as instruments of power, domination and social control? In this sense, feminist 
hermeneutics has strong liberation tendencies, seeking to expose so-called objective scholarship 
as ([un]intentional) self-validation and legitimizing the subordination of people from contexts 
other than their own. 
It is important to note that feminist hermeneutics not only denies the objectivity of orthodox/
traditional scholarship, but also that of its own. Th e idea is not to promote an atmosphere 
within which any interpretation is deemed equally acceptable on the grounds that no person 
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can be objective, but new questions and criteria are brought to the table on the basis of which 
diﬀ erent interpretations can be evaluated. Schüssler Fiorenza, for instance, advocates an ethic of 
responsibility towards the historical and rhetorical contexts of biblical texts, as well as an ethic 
of accountability pertaining to the ethical consequences of one’s interpretation. Since feminist 
hermeneutics is so diverse, all feminist scholars do not necessarily accept these criteria. Such 
diversity plays a major role in the further discussion of the topic. Let us now more closely examine 
some of the possible positions within feminism. 
(c) A multitude of feminist perspectives
As we have seen, the viewpoint of feminism is not easy to describe precisely, because it consists 
of so many diﬀ erent aspects. Th erefore, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of major trends 
within feminist thinking. In the next section I will describe four such possibilities, focusing on 
each position’s strong and weak points. 
Liberal feminism
Basically, liberal feminism accepts the political and economic status quo, but advocates and 
promotes a ﬁ xed idea of equal access for qualiﬁ ed women to its ranks. Th is is the kind of 
feminism that had its peak in the 1960s. It still retains the Enlightenment's conﬁ dence in 
democracy and humanity's (reasonable) thinking. Liberal feminism is a thoroughly white 
middle-class movement that advocates individual autonomy. A mature adult is a ﬁ nancially 
independent working person with (what is mainly seen as) traditional male characteristics. 
Th erefore, for these liberal feminists, a human utopia could best be envisaged as a state in 
which men and women, psychologically and behaviourally, are the same – tough, or soft , 
when needs be, and no longer the slaves of sex-role stereotyping.
Yet, liberal feminism has played an important role in women's coming of age, helping them 
take responsibility for their own lives, and exposing apparently neutral patterns of thinking 
as largely androgynous (white, male, middle-class). Although liberal feminism rightly 
emphasizes the common humanity of men and women, it tends to underrate the distinctions 
between the genders and still tends to rank traditional male values higher than female 
values. It underestimates the depth at which patriarchy (the assumption that regards male 
as normative) operates in society and over-estimates the ease with which rational discourse 
could bring justice for women.
Socialist/Marxist feminism
At its heart, Marxism is a social theory of conﬂ ict. It considers the whole of society to be 
corrupt. For Marxists, class conﬂ ict is primary in the battle of the sexes. Following this model, 
Marxists view the oppression of women largely in terms of class. Th erefore, the emphasis 
is on economic oppression, injustice and little else. Marxists regard a mature person as a 
revolutionary who strives to hasten the birth pangs of a new socialist state, even if this entails 
violent behaviour. Even among liberal believers, few would probably conform to this violent 
position. 
Th eir strong point would be that they regard the depth of corruption in society extremely 
seriously, although they blame this mainly on the class system inherent to capitalism.
Radical feminism
Radical feminism is easy to stereotype, but diﬃ  cult to deﬁ ne. Th is is because it emphasizes a 
large number of diﬀ erent elements, and its followers are oft en spread among various divergent 
groups, including liberal and Marxist feminists. Th ese women speak out actively against 
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their experiences of male abuse in order to reclaim their own humanity. By this criterion, 
a great many radical feminists would never consciously refer to themselves as feminists. 
Quite a number of these women still belong to congregations in which male leaders still 
proudly proclaim a so-called biblical view of gender roles. Radical feminism diﬀ ers from 
Marxist feminism in that it views the latter as naïve by reducing women’s oppression to class 
oppression. Th e basic dividing line is not between capitalists and workers, but between men 
and women as members of diﬀ erent sexual groups. Patriarchy, not capitalism, is to blame for 
societies’ problems. Radical feminism, then, reminds us of the seriousness of the oppression 
of women. 
At a theological level, however, women’s own inherent sinfulness is not regarded seriously, 
and it may be understood as saying that, generally, men sin more against women/men than 
women sin against men/women. However, their emphasis on the abuse of women is an eye-
opening reality that cannot be ignored.
Post-radical or "diﬀ erentiating" feminism
Th is relatively new element of feminism chooses to celebrate female uniqueness, rather than 
advocate traditional male values. It does not approve of aggression and prefers interdependence 
to independence. Th erefore, it rejects any ﬁ xed idea that maturity in either sex is constituted 
by traditional male values. Th e emphasis is on valuing each other's uniqueness, rather than 
conforming to some unilateral blueprint obsession of how a mature person should look and 
act. 
Th e special value that post-radical feminists give to traditional female qualities truly is a 
strong point. However, it runs the risk of creating a new way of stereotyping the sexes when 
diﬀ erentiating between them. It would appear as though the notion of the uniqueness of one 
sex compared to the other leaves little room for individual female uniqueness. Th erefore, it 
misses the important point made by liberal feminists that no person conforms precisely to 
only traditional feminine, or masculine, values. 
Th ese four are not the only strands of feminism, and, in fact, few feminists are ever solely one 
type. Most feminists combine some of these aspects to best suit their situation. Of course, this 
poses the diﬃ  cult question: How does feminist hermeneutics view the Bible and other religious 
texts from a patriarchal background?
(d) Th e authority of religious texts in diﬀ erent feminist perspectives
As is the case with feminist thinking in general, diversity is the key word when viewing religious 
texts in feminist theology. I shall, therefore, brieﬂ y list some of the possibilities, without discussing 
them in detail. Th e Bible, as Christianity’s primary authoritative text, will serve as a case study. 
Th ere are some feminists who view the Bible as irretrievably patriarchal and even useless for 
the liberation of women. Th ey regard it as nothing more than a weapon for the oppression of 
women. Th erefore, they hold a rejectionist view toward it and, quite oft en, against religion in 
general. To discuss this view is relatively pointless; these women seldom participate in biblical 
hermeneutics. 
Th ere are also feminists who recognize the formative value of religious texts, although they 
are not blind to the patriarchal bias in these texts. Th ey may choose a revisionist stand on the 
subject, acknowledging the religious importance of these texts, while rejecting those sections 
of the texts that they believe cannot be remedied by rereading them in order to liberate women 
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from oppression. Th is approach is partly to rewrite the oppressive parts in order to diminish this 
aspect.
Loyalism is another important option for feminist hermeneutics. Loyalists still hold the Bible 
as an authoritative text and optimistically believe in it as the Word of God, if it is interpreted 
‘correctly.’ A correct interpretation will thus be one that speciﬁ cally meets with their approval! 
Reformists distinguish between the patriarchal dimension of the text and its theological value, 
choosing to view the latter, not the former, as authoritative. 
Liberation feminists, along the same lines, choose to focus their attention on justice for the poor 
and oppressed in the text, and they use the Bible as an instrument of liberation.
When examining feminist viewpoints on the Bible’s authority, it is important to note that no 
feminist hermeneutic is only a feminist hermeneutic. Th ey all have diﬀ erent denominational 
backgrounds, which also inﬂ uence their view on the subject.
(e) Diverse hermeneutic perspectives
Just as feminist scholars integrate their own diverse denominational backgrounds into their 
approaches, they also have diverse hermeneutic perspectives, depending largely on their scholarly 
background. Th ey, therefore, use well-known hermeneutic models, but ask uniquely feminist 
questions from within these models. 
In historical criticism, for example, feminists examine alternative historical constructions so as 
to include the work of women in the establishment of early Christianity. Focusing, for example, 
on the women, whom Paul praised for their leadership within the church (cf. Romans 16), 
exposes the bias in traditional historical criticism that ignores these accounts in their historical 
constructions. Hebrew Bible scholars, such as Athalya Brenner and Carol Myers, also apply this 
constructive technique. 
In literary criticism, the following two major trends have developed among feminists: narrative 
criticism and reader-response criticism. In narrative criticism, the construction, characterization, 
portrayal and image of women are revealed to indicate how ideological rhetoric functions.
In these diﬀ erent criticisms, feminists make use of semiotics and structuralism (Mieke Bal), 
archaeology (Carol Myers), ideological criticism (Renita Weems), and virtually all other 
interpretive tools used by biblical scholars in general.
(f) Feminist hermeneutic reading strategies
What then constitutes a reading as feminist? What do feminist scholars do to distinguish their 
readings from androcentric readings? In the next section, I shall explain how feminists use feminist 
reading strategies when reading religious texts. I shall again use the Bible as a case study.
Rereading classic texts to deny the subordination of women
Dealing with those texts that have been used throughout the history of the church to sanction 
the subordination of women is one of the most essential functions of feminist reading strategies. 
Th ey do this by rereading these texts in order to deny the sanctioning of the subordination 
of women.
Reading a contra-text, to show the equal value of men and women
Th e balancing of texts that seem to aﬃ  rm the subordination of women, by refocusing on texts 
that deny this subordination, is an important strategy for feminist readers. For instance: when 
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reading Ephesians 5:23 that seemingly subordinates women, they also read Galatians 3:28 that 
explicitly states that we are equals through the work of Christ, regardless of our social status 
or gender: 
“Th ere is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ 
Jesus” (Galatians 3:28 – NIV).
Reading for liberating theological themes
Th is strategy simply entails using broader theological themes and applying these to women's 
issues. For instance, the prophetic call for justice for the poor, especially for widows and 
orphans, is also regarded as an appeal for justice for women, because women comprise the 
greatest statistical number of what today is called the poorest of the poor. (See Jonah below 
for a further example.)
Pointing out discriminatory translations
Biblical translations are not unbiased in relation to women's issues. For instance, for many 
centuries Phoebe was regarded as a deaconess, rather than as a deacon as she is called in 
the Greek (Romans 16:1), because translators were uncomfortable about giving her such 
authority in the church!
Feminist hermeneutics as ongoing retranslation
In fact, the whole process of feminist hermeneutics is that of retranslation, which entails all 
the elements that encompass feminist hermeneutics. 
When asked what feminist hermeneutics involves, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza responded by 
saying that it comprises four types of hermeneutic tasks:
A hermeneutic task of suspicion, because white males mostly generated the knowledge, 
inherited from other hermeneutics.
A hermeneutic task of remembrance in the construction of women’s roles in our religious 
traditions, throughout history.
A hermeneutic task of proclamation where this inclusively constructed past links up with 
our present context to form new creeds.
A hermeneutic task of imagination is also called for, so that contemporary women can 
express their empowering traditions that relate to ritual, prayer and other creative forms.
7.4.2 Jonah, read through feminist eyes
Th roughout this text, we have explored the book of Jonah as an example of various hermeneutic 
strategies and viewpoints, we shall now also do so, pertaining to feminist hermeneutics.
Th e absence of women in the book of Jonah would seem to make it virtually impossible to 
construct any feminist reading of the book. As this book has hardly ever been read to explain 
or dictate gender relations, it seems to be of little interest from a purely feminist perspective. 
However, as pointed out above, no feminist hermeneutic is ever purely feminist. Depending on 
their scholarly background and denominational viewpoint, feminist readers may still read the 
book of Jonah due to other interests. When focusing on broader theological themes within the 
book of Jonah, it seems that the book carries a very important message of hope, which could also 
beneﬁ t feminist readers.
Th e story of Jonah tells of a prophet who was sent to an evil, wicked city. It was so bad that the 
prophet had no hope that the city would ever listen to his call for repentance. Th erefore, the 
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prophet tried to ﬂ ee from God. God used the prophet’s disobedience to also convince a group 
of sailors that God is the supreme Being, Creator and Lord of land and sea. When the prophet 
realized that he could ﬂ ee from neither God, nor his calling, he attempted the impossible: to 
convince Nineveh of its sinfulness and to call it to repentance. A true miracle then happened - 
this entire evil city indeed repented. Even the animals were dressed in sackcloth and cried out to 
God, who responded with compassion and forgiveness.
But, the prophet was greatly displeased. He knew from the outset that God is a God of mercy and 
that God would forgive the city. Nevertheless, to Jonah, this seemed unjust. Could any repentance 
ever equal the injustices committed by this city? So, God put Jonah to shame by the wilting of the 
plant under which he rested. Jonah was humiliated because he pitied himself and wished mercy 
only for himself.
From a feminist perspective, this is a story of hope, proclaiming that even the most cruel, 
merciless transgressors against God’s divine justice can repent. Feminist prophets do not work in 
vain; there is hope - even rapists, wife-beaters and paedophiles can repent! With God, even the 
seemingly impossible becomes possible. 
For most feminist scholars, identifying with Jonah across gender has further implications than 
only hope for the seemingly impossible repentance of transgressors. When identifying with Jonah 
in his divine mission, we must also identify with him when examining our own expectations. Are 
we willing to share divine mercy and forgiveness with those who trespass against us, or do we 
regard such mercy as unjust? Do we claim God’s mercy and forgiveness only for ourselves, or are 
we willing to share it?
Th us, by examining its broader theological themes, the book of Jonah attains meaning, encourages 
hope and self-critique among feminist readers, in spite of the book’s lack of female characters and 
gender relations. 
7.4.3 Observations and evaluation
Th e underlying principle for a critical feminist hermeneutic is that women are fully human 
and are to be valued as such - Denise Ackermann
Th is is the bottom line that underscores all feminist readings. As explained above, this implies that 
all people are equal, regardless of race, class or gender. Th erefore, these readings strive to promote 
equality and representing this in the available options when people need to make choices. Indeed, 
gender, race or class should not be the determining factors that deny one certain choices.
Due to the diversity within feminism, it is diﬃ  cult to evaluate the hermeneutic movement much 
further than the evaluation in the above discussion. Th erefore, each reading must be assessed 
according to its own merits. Th e question now remains: How can one determine the merit of a 
reading? What are the criteria for judging a reading?
From a feminist perspective Schüssler Fiorenza’s above-mentioned criteria make sense; that is, 
to advocate an ethic of responsibility towards the historical and rhetorical contexts of a text, 
as well as an ethic of accountability relating to the ethical consequences of one’s interpretation. 
Furthermore, any reading should create or edit meaning in the life of its readers or audiences. Th e 
proof of the pudding lies in the eating. 
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7.5 African hermeneutics
7.5.1 Background and theory
Perhaps the ﬁ rst thing to say about African biblical hermeneutics is that “it” is not one thing and 
that it is in the process of being deﬁ ned. In fact, readers of this book must face up to the task 
of characterizing African biblical hermeneutics. While there is a vast body of African biblical 
and theological scholarship, and while there has been some attempt to prescribe what African 
hermeneutics should be about, there has been little interest in analytically describing the reality of 
African biblical interpretation.
Th e Bible is now an African book, though few Africans forget that the Bible was brought among 
us by missionary and colonial agents and was oft en used against African culture and religion. And 
even when black South Africans had embraced the Bible, they found their white South African 
brothers and sisters using the Bible against them in the guise of apartheid.
Th e postcolonial context is thus the background to all African biblical hermeneutics, though 
I accept that South Africa is postcolonial in a particular kind of way. Another more positive 
way of saying this would be to say the dominant strand in African biblical hermeneutics is to 
use the Bible to reclaim what missionary and colonial forces have denigrated and destroyed. 
Th is is the broad context, I would suggest, against which we must reﬂ ect on the methodological 
impulses that characterize African biblical hermeneutics. In this chapter we shall begin with these 
methodological impulses and then we shall consider how they apply to the book of Jonah.
(a) Methodological impulses in African biblical hermeneutics
I have deliberately used the word “impulses” rather than a more deﬁ nite term like “models.” Again, 
African biblical hermeneutics has not been self-conscious. Th e legacy of colonial struggles and 
our postcolonial contexts probably contributes to this lack of self-conscious reﬂ ection on method 
and theory. Most Africans have been too busy engaging with the Bible in concrete situations of 
the struggle for survival, liberation and life, whether they wanted to or not, and so opportunities 
for reﬂ ection have been few.
Furthermore, African biblical hermeneutics is inseparable from African theological hermeneutics, 
and so most African biblical scholars have found themselves being drawn into theological 
reﬂ ection before they have had time to process what they are doing with the Bible. Our African 
contexts have demanded that the Bible be of some use, and this is the realm of theology. African 
biblical scholars have not been able to seclude themselves in their universities and seminaries; 
ordinary African Christians have dragged them from the corridors of the academy, willingly or 
not, into the streets of the real world and demanded that they serve them with their academic 
skills and resources.
One must remember too that the Bible came to most of Africa not that long ago. While the Bible 
has been present in the Northern parts of Africa throughout its formation, Western, Eastern, and 
Southern Africa have only had the Bible for about three to four hundred years (see Sundkler & 
Steed 2000). Unfortunately, the forms of African biblical hermeneutics developed in the Northern 
regions of Africa, particularly modern day Egypt and Ethiopia, have had little impact on the rest 
of the continent (see Loubser 2000). Th ose of us living south of the Sahara have had to forge our 
own biblical hermeneutics, and the ingredients which have gone to make our forms of biblical 
hermeneutics have yet to be adequately explored. Here I shall attempt a preliminary analysis.
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Ambiguous presence
As I have already indicated, the Bible is an ambiguous presence in most of Africa. Th e legacy 
of its partnership with colonialism lives on. And yet from the very earliest encounters of 
indigenous Africans with the Bible, the Bible was perceived as “an object of strange power” 
that might be potentially useful for Africans if they could control it. Some African scholars 
have emphasized the damage done by the Bible’s presence in Africa (see, for example, the 
analyses of Maluleke and Mosala), while others have emphasized its potential to recover and 
revitalize what has been damaged by colonialism and even to correct destructive aspects of 
traditional culture (see, for example, the analyses of Bediako and Sanneh).
In terms of a general hermeneutical orientation to the Bible, African hermeneutics in South 
Africa and its immediate southern African neighbours is characterised by a hermeneutics of 
suspicion, while in Africa further north of the Limpopo River there is a hermeneutics of trust 
(see also below).
Text and icon
Th e Bible, we must remember, was brought among oral peoples. Most African societies had no 
textual tradition, and so the Bible was initially perceived as one more object among the many 
that missionaries, traders, explorers, settlers and colonial oﬃ  cials carried with them. Like so 
many of the objects associated with whites, the Bible, like the compass, gun, watch, telescope, 
etc. was seen to be an object of “strange power” (see Comaroﬀ  & Comaroﬀ ). Th e Bible, in other 
words, was not initially a text, but an object with power, in the eyes of indigenous peoples.
Th is appropriation of the Bible by Africans, as an object of power, persists into the present. As 
Tinyiko Maluleke (2000) reminds us in an essay:
“In some parts of Africa, the dead are buried with the Bible on their chests, and the Bible is 
buried into the concrete foundations on which new houses are to be built. In many African 
Independent Churches it is the physical contact between the sick and the Bible that is believed 
to hasten healing.”
But the Bible is also text, and as text the Bible is read and interpreted by African Christians in 
a variety of ways, as we shall see below.
Translated 'text'
Any historical account of African biblical hermeneutics would need to recognise that when 
the Bible came to be known to Africans, it was introduced orally and only partially. Th e 
ﬁ rst bits of text would have been heard rather than read, and certain portions of the Bible 
would have been preferred by the missionaries over others. What impact this oral and partial 
engagement with the Bible had for Africans requires further research. Th ere are two related 
aspects to this research. First, we need to analyse how missionaries interacted with the Bible 
and what texts they chose to read and proclaim as they moved amongst indigenous Africans. 
Such analysis would help us to understand why certain parts of the Bible were translated into 
local African languages before others. Indeed, the whole process of Bible translation deserves 
careful attention in any study of African biblical hermeneutics, because every translation of 
the Bible into an African language (or for that matter, into any language) is an interpretative 
act. Fortunately, the history of Bible translation in Africa is well documented (see, for example, 
the descriptions of Schaaf 1994, Wendland & Hachibamba 2000, and Mojola 2000), indeed, it 
could be argued that Bible translation is the dominant form of African biblical hermeneutics 
– I shall say more about this below.
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Second, we need also to analyse what indigenous hermeneutical resources there were for 
working with text, whether oral or literary. Africans, of course, had their own rich oral 
tradition and their own interpretative resources for working with this tradition. Th ey would 
have brought these resources to their interpretation of the oral and textual Bible.
Africans would also have watched the missionaries very carefully, noting how the missionaries 
used the Bible, and so in addition to their own indigenous resources, they would have learned 
and appropriated some of the interpretative strategies of the missionaries. Th ese emerging 
"neo-indigenous" hermeneutic strategies also require further research.
So there is much we do not know about African biblical hermeneutics in its earlier stages. 
But we can document more fully recent developments in African biblical hermeneutics, 
particularly the ways in which African biblical hermeneutics is manifested in African biblical 
scholarship.
Textual interpretation
It is useful here to introduce an important distinction in hermeneutics. Any act of interpretation 
that has to do with text has at least two related (but distinct) components. All interpreters come 
to the Bible (or any text) with two sets of interests, what may be called interpretative interests 
and life interests (see Fowl 1990). Interpretative interests are those dimensions of the text that 
are of interest to the interpreter, while life interests are those concerns and commitments that 
drive or motivate the interpreter to come to the text. Concern for the environment or women 
or race or class or culture would be good examples of what I have called life interests. Life 
interests come from our experience of the world and from our commitment to the world. 
With such interests we come to the Bible to hear what it has to say concerning these things.
Interpretative interests are diﬀ erent, and speciﬁ cally concern those dimensions of the text 
that interest us as readers. So, for example, some of us are interested in the historical and 
sociological dimensions of texts, others are interested in the literary dimensions of texts, and 
still others are interested in the thematic or symbolic dimensions of texts. While there is no 
necessary relationship between interpretative interests and life interests, some scholars have 
insisted that certain life interests are best served by having certain interpretative interests. So, 
for example, Itumeleng Mosala has argued that concerns for racial and economic liberation in 
South Africa require attention to the sociological and historical dimensions of the biblical text. 
In my response to Mosala, I have argued that other interpretative interests can also address 
these life interests (see West 1995). Th is is not the place to debate the connection between 
interpretative interests and life interests; I simply want to point to this useful distinction.
I point to this distinction because it helps us to properly identify the characteristics of African 
biblical hermeneutics. With respect to interpretative interests, interests to do with the diﬀ erent 
dimensions of the text, African biblical hermeneutics has been dominated by historical and 
sociological concerns. African biblical scholarship has been strongly shaped by the historical-
critical interests of western biblical scholarship, and this includes the full array of historical-
critical methodology: text criticism, form criticism, source criticism, and redaction criticism. 
African biblical hermeneutics has also, more recently, embraced sociological forms of analysis. 
In other words, the socio-historical dimensions of the biblical text have generated the most 
interest among African biblical scholars.
Th e reason for this interest is probably due to two factors. First, most African biblical scholars 
have been trained in either Europe and/or America, where these interpretative interests 
have dominated biblical scholarship. Second, socio-historical interpretative interests give 
substantial attention to the religious and cultural contexts that lie behind the biblical text, 

Fishing for Jonah (Anew)
210
and it is these that resonate with the life interests of most African biblical scholars. By using 
socio-historical forms of analysis, African biblical scholars can have access to religio-cultural 
contexts in the biblical past that are similar to the religio-cultural contexts of the African 
present.
But socio-historical interpretative interests are not the only ones to be found in African biblical 
scholarship. With its strong alliances with African theology, African biblical hermeneutics 
does have a substantial interest in the thematic and symbolic dimensions of texts. Biblical 
themes of liberation and/or reconstruction, for example, have been particularly popular 
among African theologians (see Mugambi 1995). Literary interpretative interests too have a 
place in African biblical hermeneutics, especially in South Africa, with the most prominent 
examples coming from white Afrikaner structuralist interpretation.
To summarize then, African biblical hermeneutics has been dominated by socio-historical 
interpretative interests, though interest in the other dimensions of texts can be detected. 
Having said this, however, African biblical hermeneutics varies in how much weight it gives to 
the socio-historical realities of the text. In order to understand this aspect of African biblical 
hermeneutics we must move on to the African reader’s life interests and analyse the role they 
play in African biblical hermeneutics.
Th e African reader's life interests
In terms of interpretative interests, African biblical hermeneutics is much like biblical 
hermeneutics in any other scholarly context; it is dominated by the historical and sociological 
dimensions of the text (see the other chapters in this book). What makes African biblical 
hermeneutics distinctive are the life interests that African interpreters bring to the text and 
how these life interests interact with their (predominantly socio-historical) interpretative 
interests.
African life interests lie at the centre of academic African biblical hermeneutics. Th is is 
probably the case for all forms of biblical hermeneutics (see Schüssler Fiorenza 1989), but 
African biblical hermeneutics is more honest than most and declares its life interests openly. 
In fact, African biblical hermeneutics is signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uenced by an explicit methodological 
commitment that links life interests and interpretative interests. Th e most common way in 
which it does this is through what has been called a comparative approach. Comparative 
studies have been deﬁ ned by Knut Holter (2002):
“as studies whose major approach is a comparative methodology that facilitates a parallel 
interpretation of certain Old Testament [and New Testament] texts or motifs and 
supposed African parallels, letting the two illuminate one another. Traditional exegetical 
methodology is of course found here, too; however, the Old Testament [and/or New 
Testament] is approached from a perspective where African comparative material is the 
major dialogue partner and traditional exegetical methodology is subordinated to this 
perspective.” 
Comparative studies form the vast bulk of all academic African biblical hermeneutics, and can 
usefully be divided into three overlapping chronological phases. According to the chronology 
developed by the Nigerian biblical scholar Justin Ukpong (but in the words of Holter 2002), 
“an early reactive phase (1930s-1970s), which legitimized African religion and culture 
vis-à-vis the western tradition through comparative studies, was replaced by a reactive-
proactive phase (1970s-1990s), which more clearly made use of the African context as 
resource for biblical interpretation, and eventually by a proactive phase (1990s), which 
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makes the African context the explicit subject of biblical interpretation.”
In each of these phases, as Holter’s formulation above acknowledges, there is an explicit 
dialogue between the socio-historical dimensions of the biblical text and the religio-social 
realities of African life. African biblical hermeneutics is, therefore, part of a wider historical 
movement in scholarly research with its interest in the historical and sociological; however, 
African biblical hermeneutics is also distinctive in that it overtly operates within an African 
post-colonial and post-independence context. Eric Anum of Ghana is therefore right, 
says Holter (2002) “when he argues that the comparative approach arose as a response to 
the negative concepts of traditional African culture and religion prevalent in colonial and 
missionary circles”.
“In sum, the comparative method arose as a response to a colonial conception of African 
Traditional Religion and culture on the part of missionaries who believed that African 
cultures were satanic and pagan and needed to be totally abandoned if Christianity was to 
thrive in Africa. Th us, what African biblical scholars tried to do was to identify similarities 
between the biblical world and African religio-cultural practices and to use their scholarly 
and scientiﬁ c tools to show the relationship between African Traditional Religion and 
Christianity” (Anum 2000).
Th e dialogue between the socio-historical world of the biblical text and the religio-cultural 
world of African life is two-way. Th e comparative approach is not simply a strategy for 
validating anything and everything in the African religio-cultural world that shows some 
similarity with the socio-historical world of and behind the biblical text. Th e comparative 
approach is always evaluative. Ukpong (2000) identiﬁ es three types of evaluation:
“Th e ﬁ rst approach seeks to evaluate elements of African culture, religion, beliefs, concepts 
or practices in the light of the biblical witness, to arrive at a Christian understanding of 
them and bring out their value for Christian witness. Th e historical critical method is used 
in analysing the biblical text. Th e belief or practice is analysed in its diﬀ erent manifestations 
and its values and disvalues are pointed out against the background of biblical teaching. 
....
Th e second approach is concerned with what a biblical text or theme has to say in the 
critique of a particular issue in the society or in the church’s life, or what lessons may be 
drawn from a biblical text or theme for a particular context. It is similar to the ﬁ rst above 
but with the diﬀ erence that in the ﬁ rst approach the contextual realities studied are assumed 
to be values or at least to contain values whereas in this one they are presented as liabilities 
to be challenged with the biblical message. Th e study involves analysing the biblical text 
and pointing out the challenge it issues to the context or drawing its implications for the 
context. Generally, historical critical tools are used for the study. ....
In the third approach biblical themes or texts are interpreted against the background of 
African culture, religion and life experience. Th e aim is to arrive at a new understanding 
of the biblical text that would be informed by the African situation, and would be African 
and Christian. Historical critical tools are used in analysing the biblical text. Th e basis for 
this approach is the realization that any interpretation of a biblical text or theme is done 
from the socio-cultural perspective of the interpreter. Approaching a theme or text from 
an African perspective is therefore expected to oﬀ er some fresh insights into its meaning 
even though the tools of interpretation still remain Western.”
Ukpong here neatly captures many of the methodological impulses of African biblical 
hermeneutics I have referred to above. First, African biblical hermeneutics is predominantly 
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interested in the historical and sociological dimensions of the biblical text. Second, African 
life interests are consciously and explicitly a part of the interpretative process. Th ird, African 
biblical hermeneutics is always aware of the ambiguous history of the Bible’s arrival in Africa, 
and so is constantly attempting to assert itself over against the dominant discourses of western, 
colonial, and imperialistic forms of biblical scholarship.
Another feature of African biblical hermeneutics that is relevant, is that these life interests 
take slightly diﬀ erent forms north and south of the Limpopo. South of the Limpopo there 
has been an emphasis on socio-political life interests, while north of the Limpopo there has 
been an emphasis on religio-cultural life interests. However, aft er the liberation of South 
Africa there has been sustained dialogue and exchange across the Limpopo boundary, and so 
socio-political life interests are becoming more prominent in other parts of Africa and religio-
cultural life interests have become increasingly important in South Africa.
Clearly African life interests play a prominent role in African biblical hermeneutics. Noting 
this fact, it is not surprising that a related methodological impulse in African biblical 
hermeneutics (as Ukpong goes on to acknowledge) is the presence of ordinary, non-scholarly, 
African ‘readers’ of the Bible.
Ordinary African 'readers' of the Bible
In an article which argues that inclusivity is a key characteristic of African women’s biblical 
scholarship, Teresa Okure, a Nigerian biblical scholar, states that African women’s biblical 
scholarship “is inclusive of scholars and nonscholars” (1993). Th ough she does not elaborate, 
I shall oﬀ er an exegesis of this phrase, attempting to delineate more carefully in what ways 
ordinary African “nonscholars” are constitutive of African biblical scholarship.
Okure is not alone in making this claim, and the claim is not restricted to an African women’s
approach. Th e inclusion of ordinary African ‘readers’ (literate or illiterate) of the Bible in 
African biblical scholarship is acknowledged, whether implicitly or explicitly, by most African 
biblical scholars. But what exactly this inclusion includes is not clear. I do not think that this 
is merely a nostalgic or romantic yearning for a lost naiveté, as it is in western literary biblical 
scholarship, where the scholarly reader imagines his or her scholarly self in this ‘ordinary’ 
role. African biblical scholars take real ordinary African ‘readers’ of the Bible more seriously 
and certainly acknowledge their real existence and presence. In fact, it might be argued that in 
certain important respects ordinary African ‘readers’ of the Bible partially constitute African 
biblical scholarship.
Th e most minimal sense in which ordinary African Bible ‘readers’ might be said to be a part 
of African biblical scholarship are as receptors of Bible scholarship. Th is is not as trite as it 
sounds. Designing one’s biblical scholarship in such a way that it can be consumed by ordinary 
people is no small feat and takes considerable dedication and skill. While there are those, 
both African and others, who see their scholarship in this way, Okure is alluding to a form of 
engagement that is more mutual. Ordinary ‘readers’ of the Bible do not simply consume the 
product, they partially constitute both the process and the product.
A second way in which ordinary African Bible users might be said to be included in African 
biblical studies are as informers for biblical scholarship. In his discussion of ‘cultural exegesis’, 
Daniel Smith-Christopher (1995) delineates an area where ordinary ‘readers’ might have 
something to contribute to biblical scholarship. He notes that Latin American liberation 
theologians “have long talked about an ‘exegesis of the poor’”. He then comments that what 
Latin American liberation theologians “normally mean to suggest [by this phrase] is that the 
poor have a unique insight into the Bible ... because their socio-economic circumstances are 
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in some ways similar to the circumstances of those who draft ed the Bible, or those spoken 
about in large sections of the Bible”. But, he continues, most liberation theologians who use 
this and similar phrases turn out to be talking “about the use of the Bible for contemporary life 
and faith”, what he calls “applied theology or applications of the biblical message”.
Th e primary question for Smith-Christopher, however, “is whether the poor Brazilian peasants 
who read the Bible can give any insights into what the text means for others besides themselves, 
let alone whether their observations can actually guide a process of rethinking historical-
critical reconstructions of past events”. In other words, “Can the native American elder, the 
Indian or African student or scholar, give all of us new ideas about what the text historically 
meant?”. Th e answer of African biblical scholars would be a clear and resounding “Yes”. We 
have all had the experience of having ordinary African ‘readers’ of the Bible see things in and 
behind the text that we ourselves have not seen. And while the focus of Smith-Christopher 
and Ukpong may be on the historical dimensions of the text, where ordinary ‘readers’ do 
make a contribution, they also make contributions in their analysis of the text as text. To give 
an example of each, I have been in Bible study groups in which ordinary African ‘readers’ have 
alerted me to the socio-economic dimensions of the prayer Jesus taught to his disciples, where 
the ﬁ rst request Jesus teaches them to ask of God is for “the bread that is needed for that day” 
(Matthew 6:11) because, as these ‘readers’ recognised, Jesus understood the survival needs of 
the poor that he worked among; these same ‘readers’ have also taught me that the plot of the 
Joseph story (Genesis 37-50) is driven by the tensions of a polygamous household, where the 
action of the story is determined by who your mother is: Leah, Rachael, Bilhah or Zilpah (see 
West 1999).
While there is no doubt that ordinary African ‘readers’ of the Bible have furnished massive 
amounts of information of potential value to the biblical studies enterprise, this is a by-product 
of something more profound. Ordinary Africans are more than merely informants for African 
biblical scholarship. Again, I think that Okure is saying something more than this; ordinary 
indigenous African ‘readers’ of the Bible – most of whom are black, poor and marginalized 
– are constitutive of African biblical scholarship in some more profound sense. 
A third way, then, in which ordinary African users of the Bible might be said to be included 
in African biblical scholarship is to make them and their contexts, in the words of Ukpong, 
“the subject of interpretation of the Bible”. Th e biblical text is read for a particular people in 
a particular context, but it is not read on behalf of them, it is read with them. Here ordinary 
African ‘readers’ are integral to the scholars’ work. Biblical interpretation is done as a 
collaborative act between scholars and nonscholars in which “the resources of the people’s 
culture and historical life experience are used as complementary to conventional critical tools 
of biblical exegesis”. “Th e goal of interpretation is the actualization of the theological meaning 
of the text in today’s context so as to forge integration between faith and life, and engender 
commitment to personal and societal transformation”. 
Th ere is no doubt that the African socio-cultural context is the subject of much African biblical 
scholarship, and that the African socio-cultural context saturates the forms of engagement 
between the African biblical scholar and ordinary African users of the Bible in his/her 
community. Included within the African socio-cultural context are both the particulars of 
speciﬁ c African contexts, determined by careful phenomenological, socio-anthropological, 
historical, social and religious analysis, and general signiﬁ cant features that characterize the 
African world-view: a unitary view of reality, a divine origin of the universe and an integral 
connectedness between God, humanity and the cosmos, a sense of community in which 
people are because they are in relation to other people and an emphasis on the concrete and 
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pragmatic. Th ough not exhaustive, these features are common to most, if not all, African 
world-views (see Ukpong 1995). Th is third way makes the ordinary African ‘reader’ and her/
his (usually his) context the subject of interpretation and African biblical scholars do their 
scholarship in this context. 
In Ukpong’s analysis, however, the emphasis is diﬀ erent with respect to what each of the 
partners brings to the collaborative interpretative process. Ordinary ‘readers’ bring their 
reality and biblical scholars bring their interpretative tools. Th is division of labour may 
characterize much of African biblical scholarship, but the boundaries are not always this clear. 
Ukpong (1996) himself mentions the important presence of “popular approaches to the Bible” 
and makes it clear that the ordinary African context provides both “the critical resources for 
biblical interpretation and the subject of interpretation” (2000).
Ukpong includes not only the socio-cultural context of ordinary African ‘readers’ as deﬁ nitive 
of our (and African) scholarship, but also their “critical resources.” Th is then leads me to 
my fourth and (for now) ﬁ nal way in which ordinary African Bible users might be said to 
constitute African biblical scholarship – through their interpretative resources. But while 
we can and do characterize the African socio-cultural context we still have some way to go 
in properly characterizing nonscholarly African critical interpretative resources. To put it 
diﬀ erently, while ordinary African ‘readers’ of the Bible partially constitute African biblical 
scholarship in the ways reﬂ ected on above, what does this include by way of their dealings with 
the Bible as text? Th eir questions and experiences clearly do make a signiﬁ cant contribution, 
but what about their interpretative strategies with respect to the text, which is the scholar’s 
domain of training and expertise?
In my own work I have stressed that we ought to allow the interpretative interests and strategies 
of ordinary African ‘readers’ to constitute African biblical scholarship. Unfortunately, there is 
no precision in African biblical scholarship as to the interpretative interests of ordinary African 
‘readers’ of the Bible, though recent work is beginning to take up the task of characterizing 
their modes of reading (see Ukpong 2000 and Mijoga 2000). My own work in this area so far 
also makes an attempt, but succeeds only in sketching the domain of interpretative interests 
in rather broad strokes (see West 2002). I play with and explore a range of metaphors in an 
attempt to grasp some of the dimensions of ordinary Africans’ engagement with the biblical 
text, arguing that ordinary African ‘readers’ of the Bible ‘re-member’ a ‘dis-membered’ Bible, 
by means of “guerilla exegesis”, by reading with the nose, by a process of “engraf(ph)ting”, by 
“a looseness, even a playfulness” towards text, and, I would add, by “conjuring” with text and 
a hermeneutic of “strangeness”. All of this is wonderfully suggestive and provides a host of 
impulses for digging deeper and becoming more precise. And, as I have said, African biblical 
scholarship is not averse to these textual resources of ordinary African ‘readers’ of the Bible, 
particularly on the countless occasions when African biblical scholars and ordinary African 
‘readers’ of the Bible read together in the churches and communities.
But questions still remain. What explicit place do such interpretative interests and reading 
strategies have in the biblical studies context of the academy? Is there a place for the 
interpretative interests of ordinary African ‘readers’ of the Bible in the academy? It is for 
readers of this book to answer these questions.
Each of these methodological impulses contributes to the emerging ﬁ eld of African biblical 
hermeneutics. In the next section of the chapter we examine how these impulses impinge on 
African interpretations of the book of Jonah.
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7.5.2 African biblical hermeneutics and the book of Jonah
I have done a preliminary survey of African published work on the book of Jonah. I have 
found that Jonah has been used as an analogy in Egyptian Coptic scholarship for key historical 
ﬁ gures in the history of their church; that the ﬁ rst complete portion of Scripture published in 
Kimvita Swahili was the book of Jonah; that the ﬁ rst books of the Bible translated into Kiugunja 
Swahili were the books of Ruth and Jonah; that the book of Jonah has been used as a story with 
missiological implications by African scholars; that the book of Jonah has been used by those 
writing on African biblical translation as an example of stylistic matters in translation; and that 
ordinary ‘readers’ of the Bible in Port Harcourt, Nigeria indicated that ﬁ rst the Psalms and then 
Jonah were their favourite Old Testament texts.
I am not sure what to make of these scattered and preliminary ﬁ ndings. What is clear, however, 
is that the book of Jonah has been perceived by missionaries (and their African consultants?) to 
be an important book to translate into the vernacular and that at least some ordinary Africans 
surveyed have identiﬁ ed the book of Jonah as one of their favourite texts. We can also deduce 
from my cursory survey that African biblical scholarship has not written much on the book of 
Jonah, and where they have it has been in the areas of translation practice and missiology.
It might have been preferable to have based this section of my chapter on actual work that has 
been done by African biblical scholarship on the book of Jonah, but apart from the above I have 
not been able to ﬁ nd any. My comments on African biblical hermeneutics and the book of Jonah 
that follow are therefore suggestive rather than descriptive.
But I will begin by probing further my preliminary survey mentioned above. It would appear 
that both the missionaries that brought the Bible and those Africans who read the book of 
Jonah considered it to be signiﬁ cant. My guess is that their reasons would probably have been 
diﬀ erent.
(a) Jonah as post-missionary text
As I have emphasized, the Bible in Africa always carries connotations of its arrival in the hands of 
missionaries and colonial agents. What brought many missionaries to Africa was, of course, the 
desire to proclaim the gospel, though we cannot forget that for most of them this was intimately 
tied up with the proclamation of European civilisation. But, at least in part, they came with a 
missiological vision. Given this missiological vision it is not surprising that the book of Jonah 
would have been seen by some as an important book to be translated into African vernaculars, 
particularly when these vernaculars were lingua francas as is the case with Swahili. Languages 
spoken by more than one ethnic group more oft en are preferred for bible translation. 
Th is missionary understanding of the book of Jonah as a book about mission has obviously 
been appropriated, at least in part, by African readers of the Bible. Th is is my ﬁ rst point about 
African biblical hermeneutics and the book of Jonah: the legacy of missionary understanding 
of biblical books lives on. African biblical interpretation is oft en in dialogue with the legacy of 
missionary imparted interpretations, whether they be the legacy of actual foreign missionaries 
or the missionary churches they established. So the African voice is an emerging one, and in 
its scholarly form it usually looks back over its shoulder, in dialogue with Africa’s postcolonial 
biblical heritage. Ordinary African ‘readers’ of the Bible, as I have already indicated, are usually less 
constrained by the post-colonial legacy, particularly in African Independent/Initiated Churches, 
so it is perhaps here where we shall hear the African interpretative voice most clearly. In the next 
sub-section I shall consider why it might be that ordinary African ‘readers’ of the Bible in Nigeria 
have declared the book of Jonah to be one of their favourite Old Testament texts.
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(b) Jonah and African life-interests
It is easy to understand why many ordinary Nigerian ‘readers’ of the Bible would favour the book 
of Jonah. Jonah mirrors, in a mainly non-condemnatory way, elements of the African world-view. 
African life interests are embodied in the book of Jonah.
In Jonah 1:4 the wind and the sea are agents of God, sent by God with a message for Jonah. Th e 
sailors recognise this, and immediately “were afraid, and each cried to his god.” However, as in 
African communities, the message of God (or the gods or ancestors) is not always clear and has 
to be interpreted, and this is exactly what happens in this story. Th e sailors use their own eﬀ orts 
to try to save their ship, but as this does not help, they continue to look for a solution in the 
supernatural realm. Finding Jonah asleep, they rationally conclude that perhaps it is Jonah’s god 
who is causing the problem. So they urge Jonah, “Get up, call on your god! Perhaps the [or that] 
god will spare us a thought so that we do not perish” (1:6).
One can understand why ordinary Africans would ﬁ nd this text so appealing. Here is an 
acknowledgement of diﬀ erent people having diﬀ erent gods, and of diﬀ erent people showing 
respect for the gods of others, something the missionaries did not do but which was a feature of 
traditional African life.
As the story continues, it resonates more and more with African life interests. Local gods and 
ancestors were meant to protect the community; if they were not protecting the community 
then there must be a problem in the community that needed addressing. Th is is what the sailors 
now begin to determine: what is the problem that lies behind this storm? In order to discern 
the problem they “cast lots” to identify which person is the cause of the problem (1:7). Again, 
in accordance with African understanding of such practices (like the ‘throwing of bones’), they 
work! Th e casting of lots correctly identiﬁ es the problem. Jonah is now forced to explain the 
reason why he is the problem. Like the sailors, although they worship diﬀ erent gods, Jonah shares 
their world-view, and so accepts his “lot”, his responsibility for the storm. Th at his god is “the God 
[god] of heaven, who made the sea and land” (1:9), only conﬁ rms the sailors’ fears. A god who 
has control over the sea is surely a god to be appeased! So they respectfully ask Jonah what must 
be done, for it is his god that is behind the storm.
Once again we see remarkable respect for the gods and traditions of others here. Th e sailors do 
not want to anger this powerful god of Jonah’s, accepting the reality that their gods are not the 
only gods and that there may be other gods that must be acknowledged and appeased. And even 
when Jonah replies that the only remedy is that he be thrown into the sea “for I know it is because 
of me that this great storm has come upon us” (1:12), the sailors do not want to oﬀ end Jonah’s 
god, so they try to row for the shore in order to allow Jonah to disembark safely (1:13). Eventually, 
however, they are forced to recognise that Jonah’s god will not permit this option, so they cry out 
“Please, O Yahweh, we pray, do not let us perish on account of this man’s life. Do not make us 
guilty of innocent blood; for you, O Yahweh, have done as it pleased you” (1:14). (Th ough using 
the text of the NRSV in my quotations from the book of Jonah I have changed their “Lord” and 
“O Lord” to the Hebrew rendering, which, I would argue, more accurately reﬂ ects the naming of 
Jonah’s particular god by the sailors.)
When the sea immediately becomes calm, once they have thrown Jonah into it, “they oﬀ ered 
a sacriﬁ ce to Yahweh and made vows” (1:16). Here is a god of power that must be properly 
acknowledged by sacriﬁ ce and vows. For most Africans this makes perfect sense, and remains 
an important part of their lives, even if they are Christians (and even if they do their sacriﬁ ces 
‘by night’). Indeed, what is remarkable about this ﬁ rst chapter of Jonah is that there is no 
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condemnation whatsoever of people worshipping diﬀ erent gods and of oﬀ ering sacriﬁ ces to more 
than one god.
Th e African world-view continues to ﬁ nd resonances in the text of Jonah in the next chapter 
(in the Hebrew text), with God sending “a large ﬁ sh” to swallow Jonah (1:17). God and/or the 
ancestors/gods not only control elements like the sea and wind but also all creatures (including 
the large ﬁ sh here and the worm in the ﬁ nal chapter). Furthermore, that a large ﬁ sh could be 
commanded to swallow a human and that a human could survive in the belly of such a ﬁ sh 
is acceptable to most Africans. Unsullied and unconvinced by the scientiﬁ c world-view of the 
Enlightenment, Africans inhabit a world in which such things might and indeed do take place.
Th e shift  in chapter 2 to the prayer of Jonah reinforces the view of Africans that one of the primary 
purposes of God (and/or the ancestors) is protection. But this prayer would also highlight one 
of the major tensions in African Christianity, a tension between the missionary message that 
African gods/ancestors are, at best, worthless and, at worst, demonic and the experience of 
African Christians of the presence and importance of local gods/ancestors in their communities. 
Jonah’s prayer disparages those “who worship vain idols,” stating that they “forsake their true 
loyalty” (2:8). Many African Christians, particularly those coming from evangelical churches, 
would agree, and yet even among these African Christians there would sometimes be doubt as to 
whether their traditional gods/ancestors are entirely worthless.
Chapter 3 of the book of Jonah continues to resonate with the life interests of Africans, especially 
the centrality of “herds and ﬂ ocks” (3:7-8; see also 4:11) in the social and religious lives of the 
Ninevites. And all African Christians would rejoice that God is merciful to such people.
We can now see quite easily why the book of Jonah is one of the favourites of African readers 
(particularly in West Africa where religio-cultural life interests predominate). Like their other 
favourite, the book of Psalms, the book of Jonah speaks of a God who intervenes in human life, a 
God who guides and protects. Furthermore, the fact that neither the sailors nor the Ninevites are 
expected to abandon their religious activities would be welcome news to most African Christians. 
Having said this though, the tension in Jonah between the universalistic narrator and the more 
parochial perspective of Jonah himself would ﬁ nd resonances among many African Christians 
who ﬁ nd themselves torn between a respect for their inherited traditions and the legacy of the 
post-missionary missiological imperative to reject indigenous practices. Th ough these aspects of 
African Christian identity might at times be in tension – an as yet unresolved tension – they are 
both an integral part of who their practitioners are. Th e book of Jonah embodies and speaks to 
these tensions.
Th e work of Lamin Sanneh and Kwame Bediako, already referred to above, provides some 
understanding of how African Christians have been able to integrate this tension, and their 
analysis may shed some light on the book of Jonah as well.
(c) Translation as the revitalisation of culture 
Translation, in a technical sense, is a major enterprise on the African continent. Huge resources, 
both human and ﬁ nancial, are ploughed into this work and have been for many years. African 
translators, and their collaborators from other countries, are a signiﬁ cant pool of biblical expertise 
within African contexts. Many of them are highly trained biblical scholars and much of what they 
do is a form of biblical scholarship.
As already alluded to above, African scholars have argued that the Bible’s presence in Africa, 
despite its colonial trappings, has been of considerable value. Perhaps the most famous argument 
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for this view has come from Lamin Sanneh. In using the term “translation” Sanneh recognizes 
that he is taking translation “beyond the narrow, technical bounds of textual work.” He does this 
because, says Sanneh, “language is the intimate, articulate expression of culture,” particularly in 
those societies “that have been less broken up by technological change” and so “have a more 
integrated, holistic view of life”. Th e missionary adoption of the vernacular “was tantamount to 
adopting indigenous cultural criteria for the message, a piece of radical indigenization far greater 
than the standard portrayal of mission as Western cultural imperialism.”
In a detailed and wide-ranging argument, which roots itself in a theological exegesis of the Pauline 
mission to the Gentiles, Sanneh (1989) sees 
“translation as a fundamental concession to the vernacular, and an inevitable weakening of 
the forces of uniformity and centralization. Furthermore, I see translation as introducing a 
dynamic and pluralist factor into questions of the essence of the religion. Th us if we ask the 
question about the essence of Christianity, whatever the ﬁ nal answer, we would be forced to 
reckon with what the fresh medium reveals to us in feedback. It may thus happen that our 
own earlier understanding of the message will be challenged and even overturned by the 
force of the new experience. Translation would consequently help to bring us to new ways of 
viewing the world, commencing a process of revitalization that reaches into both the personal 
and cultural spheres.”
In short, and this is very short given Sanneh’s detailed and careful arguments, the inherent 
translatability of the Bible – in both a narrow technical sense and in a more profound theological 
sense – provides the potential for the revitalisation of both the biblical message and receptor 
culture.
So, if we follow Sanneh, the very act of translating the book of Jonah would be an aﬃ  rmation of 
much of African culture, as the previous sub-section suggests. In order to translate Jonah, African 
informants would have had to delve into their cultures to ﬁ nd words, concepts and experiences 
that matched the book of Jonah. My point here is twofold. First, existing and future African 
translations of the book of Jonah will embody rich resources for recovering aspects of African 
socio-cultural experience. Th e way in which, for example, “gods” in 1:5 is translated in a particular 
vernacular will say a great deal about the religio-cultural heritage of that African community. 
Second, African translations of the book of Jonah may provide fresh socio-historical and/or 
literary insights into the book of Jonah. Why, for example, does the book of Jonah end as it does 
with the awkward sentence (and this is a literal translation of the Hebrew)? “Yet should I not have 
compassion on Nineveh, that large city, which has more than one hundred and twenty thousand 
people, who do not know their right hand from their left  hand, and many cattle as well?” (4:11) 
Th e awkward grammatical construction could have been avoided, but clearly the placement of the 
phrase “and many cattle as well” at the end of the sentence, an indication in Hebrew of emphasis, 
is signiﬁ cant. But what is its signiﬁ cance? Perhaps African readers, particularly those from socio-
cultural contexts in which cattle play a central role, can comment.
Perhaps the most signiﬁ cant contribution of the book of Jonah to the recovery of African culture 
is its very strong anti-xenophobic stance. God refuses to be intimidated by or to give in to Jonah’s 
xenophobic attitudes. As I have argued, the book of Jonah assumes an attitude of respect towards 
“the other;” it is only Jonah’s prayer where the gods of others are denigrated. Fortunately, Jonah’s 
prayer, while being representative of Jonah’s own xenophobic position, is not representative of the 
book of Jonah as a whole. What a wonderful message this is for our African continent which is 
wracked by ethnic intolerance and conﬂ ict.
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7.5.3 Observations and evaluation: African contexts as the subject of interpretation
My discussion of the book of Jonah makes it clear that the contribution of African biblical 
hermeneutics is more at the meta-hermeneutical level. African scholars are as thorough as their 
western colleagues in working with the biblical text, employing the full array of biblical critical 
tools in analysing and interpreting the book of Jonah, though they would favour, I have argued, 
socio-historical interpretative tools. Th e main diﬀ erence of African biblical hermeneutics is the 
alliance between academically trained biblical scholars and ordinary African ‘readers’ of the Bible 
and the readiness with which African biblical hermeneutics relates the text to the African context. 
Exactly what the contribution of ordinary African Christians is to the analysis of text remains 
to be analysed, but clearly they would have much to contribute to a reading of Jonah from their 
religio-cultural contexts. As I have shown with reference to the book of Jonah, this dialogue 
between ancient text and contemporary context is not uncritical. Th e text can and does have a 
voice over against the African context, critiquing and judging it. But the text also conﬁ rms and 
aﬃ  rms the African context. Finally, the African context does, occasionally (and this happens 
more frequently south of the Limpopo than north of it) critique the biblical text, declaring it to be 
inherently damaging to African life interests.
7.6 An ecological hermeneutics
7.6.1 Background and theory
Since the 1960's scientists have been accumulating evidence of environmental destruction. 
Subsequently, a deep concern has been expressed - in the media and by scientists, poets and 
prophets from all over the world - regarding issues such as nuclear radiation, global warming, 
ozone depletion, population growth, acid rain, biodiversity, waste management, over-ﬁ shing, 
deforestation, soil erosion, desertiﬁ cation, etc. Th e root causes of these pervasive and insidious 
forms of environ mental destruction are economic. Th ey lie in the industrial revolution of 
the 19th century, the unprecedented economic growth that subsequently ensued and in the 
current global culture of consumerism. Unlimited economic growth is clearly not possible on 
a ﬁ nite planet. 
At the same time, economic structures are dialectically related to religious convictions, 
dominant ideologies and worldviews. Th e ideological roots of the environmental crisis have 
been the subject of numerous debates in philosophy, religion and theology. Th ese debates 
have led to a diﬀ use range of proposals for a more ecologically orientated worldview. Th e 
perspectives of Benedict ine stewardship, Franciscan friendship, the “new cosmology”, 
ecofeminism, “deep ecology”, the “Gaia-hypothesis”, indigenous wisdom, social ecology, the 
New Age movement and many others can only be mentioned here. 
One contribution to this debate on the ideological roots of environmental destruction requires 
more attention. In a famous article entitled “Th e historical roots of our ecological crisis”, 
published in 1967, the American historian Lynn White argued that the Christian tradition 
itself bears a huge burden of guilt for the worldview that has led to the present ecological crisis. 
White’s article placed the blame for the ecological crisis squarely upon Western Christianity. 
His thesis is a variation on Weber’s famous analysis of the relationship between Christianity 
and capitalism, i.e. that Protestantism has encouraged capitalism which, in turn, exploited 
nature. White argued that it is but a small step from the Christian notion of the dominion of 
man(!)kind over nature to the senseless exploitation of nature for human beneﬁ t. Compared 
to the emphasis on the sacredness of nature in most other religions, the Judeo-Christian 
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doctrine of creation has led to a “disenchantment of nature.” Biblical religion has expelled the 
gods from the forests and streams once and for all. Moreover, the notion of “dominion” over 
nature gave impetus to the rise of Western science by encouraging empirical investigations 
of the “book of nature”. White maintained that exploitative attitudes toward nature surfaced 
widely during the medieval period and that this was encouraged by the anthropocentrism 
of the dominant theology of the time. Christianity has given religious support to the notion 
that the world has been created primarily for the beneﬁ t of human beings. Modern science 
is an extrapolation of medieval natural theology while technology constitutes a realisation 
of the Christian notion of human mastery of nature. Th e Judeo-Christian tradition, and its 
typical vision of a better future, has had a lasting inﬂ uence on the Western world, also through 
variants of this tradition such as Marxism and secularism. White therefore concludes that: 
“Christianity bears a huge burden of guilt.”
White’s article soon led to a heated debate. Many have tried to refute his thesis by indicating 
some of its oversimpliﬁ cations. Despite the perceived shortcomings of White’s thesis, it almost 
single-handedly sparked the discussion of environmental issues in Christian theology. Since 
the early 1970’s this has led to a wealth of publications on almost every possible theological 
theme. Numerous studies have tried to defend Christianity against White’s accusations by 
retrieving the ecological wisdom in the Biblical roots of the Christian tradition and in its 
subsequent history, its doctrines and ethos, its forms of spirituality and praxis.
Until recently, the dominant approach of contributions to an ecological theology from 
within the ﬁ eld of Biblical Studies was shaped by two related factors. Many contributions 
were deliberately aimed at defending Christianity against the accusations of Lynn White and 
numerous other secular critics. Secondly, most contributions tried to retrieve some ecological 
wisdom from the Biblical texts. Th e assumption was therefore that the Bible can indeed oﬀ er 
profound ecological wisdom but that this has all too oft en remained hidden or implicit. Th e 
task of new exegetical studies is therefore to uncover such ecological wisdom.
In numerous contributions, Biblical scholars have oﬀ ered a broad overview of Old Testament 
and New Testament perspectives on the environment. Typically, such overviews focus on a 
few favourite texts such as Genesis 1-2, the theme of the covenant (e.g. Genesis 6-9), the 
Sabbatical laws (e.g. Leviticus 25), Job 37-39, some of the Psalms (8, 19, 24, 98, 104), some 
prophetic texts such as Isaiah 9-11, 40f, 65, Ezekiel 36, Joel, Amos, some of the sayings of Jesus 
(e.g. in Matthew 6:28-30, 10:29-31), Romans 8:18-23, Colossians 1 and Revelation 21-22. Th e 
selection of these texts is quite understandable since they deal explicitly with nature or with 
a theology of creation. 
Th e insights on ecological wisdom emerging from these contributions cannot be discussed 
in any detail. A few comments regarding the hermeneutical approach that is followed in this 
regard are important though:
Th e selection of some favourite texts may unintentionally reinforce the perception that 
ecology is indeed a marginal concern in the Bible. Th e focus may be far too narrow. It 
only relates to an aspect of creation theology or, more speciﬁ cally, to the relationship (of 
stewardship?) between human beings and nature. A concern for the environment is one 
aspect of a Christian ethos, but it does not really belong to the heart of the Christian 
gospel. By contrast, a retrieval of the ecological wisdom in the Biblical traditions has to 
be doctrinally comprehensive. Th is implies that texts dealing with creation, providence, 
humanity, sin, redemption, the church, the sacraments and eschatological consummation 
have to be retrieved from an ecological perspective.
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Another way of broadening the scope of such a retrieval of ecological wisdom is to trace 
the Bible for references to the earth, mountains, hills, air, waters, rivers, soil, trees, animals, 
birds, insects, etc. It is important to read the whole Bible through ecological spectacles. 
Th is soon leads to the discovery that the Bible, from Genesis to Revelation, is "ﬁ lled to the 
brim" with ecological overtones. Th e earth and all its creatures are intimately interwoven 
with God's loving care for humanity. 
At the same time, an ecological hermeneutics has to consider the suspicion that many 
Biblical texts do not escape from an anthropocentric bias. Together with liberation 
theologians and feminist theologians, ecological theologians have to come to terms with 
the discovery that the Bible itself does not necessarily support a particular cause, in this 
case, an ecological ethos. Many critics have argued that Biblical texts, more oft en than 
not, show a preoccupation with human well-being and that the interests of other creatures 
and the voice of the earth itself are as a result marginalized. Th is calls for a more critical 
hermeneutics in which it is not presupposed that the Bible must be "rescued" against 
environmental critics. All the evidence has to be taken into account for an investigation 
into the ecological thrust of a particular Biblical text. An ecological hermeneutics therefore 
has to operate not only with a hermeneutics of trust but also with one of suspicion.
A critical ecological hermeneutics is adopted most notably and most radically in the "Earth 
Bible" project initiated by the Australian Biblical scholar Norman Habel (the chief editor of 
the project). Th is important and ambitious project will become a ﬁ ve-volume series, published 
by Sheﬃ  eld Academic Press, in which an ecological hermeneutics is employed to interpret the 
Bible and to promote justice and healing for the earth. What does this imply?
In his introductory essay to the project, Habel explains that the widespread sense of 
environmental crisis has stimulated the emergence of a new "Earth consciousness". Th is is the 
awareness that humans are not in control of natural ecosystems but that all forms of life are 
interconnected and that we are deeply dependent on the complex web of relationships that 
allows life on Earth to ﬂ ourish. Th e term "Earth" suggests the "living system within which we 
humans live in a relationship of interdependence with other members of the Earth community" 
Moreover, the sense of Earth community calls for "Earth justice", the call to resist the violation 
of ecosystems in solidarity with all the marginalized and threatened species and specimens. 
Th is emerging Earth consciousness invites and challenges us to revisit our religious traditions 
(and sacred texts) from the perspective of the Earth community. In the words of Habel, "Th is 
new Earth consciousness invites us, as (sic) members of the Earth community, to return to the 
bible, and in dialogue with the text, ascertain whether a similar kinship with Earth is reﬂ ected 
here." We have to "interrogate the biblical heritage to ascertain whether Earth is silenced, 
oppressed or liberated in the Bible.
Th e focus of the Earth Bible project is not merely a renewed interest in creation theology 
and the Earth as part of creation, but in the voice of Earth in the text itself. Th e Earth is not 
so much a topic in the text but a voice or (oft en marginalized) presence in the text that has 
to be listened to. In this way, Earth becomes a subject (with a voice in its own right) and not 
so much an object in the Biblical texts. Th is calls for a reﬂ ecting with Earth and not so much 
about the Earth, in the same way that feminist Biblical scholars would want to read the Bible 
in solidarity with oppressed women and not for them. Habel explains this point of departure 
in his introductory essay to the project: 
“(Th is) involves a move away from searching the text to study the theme or topic of Earth, 
as part of a creation theology or any other theology. Rather, we are identifying, as far as 
possible, with Earth or the earth community, as we converse with the text. We no longer 
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consider ourselves readers within the hierarchy of creation, but fellow members within 
the community of Earth. We are no longer reading as stewards over creation, but as kin, 
relatives within the Earth community. We no longer see ourselves as pilgrims on Earth, 
but as a species in Earth, beneath a common protective skin called the atmosphere.”
Th e “Earth Bible” project therefore explores the Biblical texts from the perspective of the Earth, 
suspecting that the text and/or its interpreters may be anthropocentric and not geocentric. It 
asks whether there is a concern for Earth community in the text or whether Earth is being 
treated unjustly in the text. It attempts to retrieve alternative traditions that hear the voice 
of the earth and that value the earth more than as a human instrument. On this basis, the 
Earth Bible team have identiﬁ ed the following six guiding ecojustice principles for Biblical 
interpretation:
Th e principle of intrinsic worth: Th e universe, Earth and all its components have intrinsic 
worth;
Th e principle of interconnectedness: Earth is a community of interconnected living things 
that are mutually dependent on each other for life and survival;
Th e principle of voice: Earth is a subject capable of raising its voice in celebration and 
against injustice;
Th e principle of purpose: Th e universe, Earth and all its components, are part of a dynamic 
cosmic design within which each piece has a place in the overall goal of that design.
Th e principle of mutual custodianship: Earth is a balanced and diverse domain where 
responsible custodians can function as partners, rather than rulers, to sustain a balanced 
and diverse Earth community.
Th e principle of resistance: Earth and its components not only suﬀ er from injustices at the 
hands of humans, but actively resist them in the struggle for justice.
Th e articulation of these principles helps to pose new questions to the Biblical texts. Th is may 
lead to the discovery of new concepts insights and dimensions embedded in the text that may 
not have been seen before. Does this not fall into the trap of reading one’s own assumptions 
into the text? Th e Earth Bible team acknowledges this danger but argues that each interpreter 
approaches a text with a set of governing assumptions that oft en remain unarticulated and 
subconscious and that are therefore even more dangerous. Th e danger of reading into the 
text randomly may be avoided if the articulation of such ecojustice principles is done in 
conjunction with historical, literary and cultural modes of analysis.
Th e approach of the Earth Bible project may be clearly described in terms of a “hermeneutic 
of suspicion”. Together with the approaches to Biblical interpretation derived from psycho-
analytical theory, Marxism, feminist theology, liberation theology and indigenous theologies, 
a critical ecological hermeneutics articulates the suspicion that the Biblical texts and their 
interpretations have been distorted as a result of an anthropocentric bias that marginalizes 
other creatures and the voice of the Earth itself. It acknowledges that we as members of the 
human community have exploited, oppressed and endangered the existence of the Earth 
community. It therefore seeks to ascertain whether Earth and Earth community are silenced 
or liberated in particular Biblical texts. It wishes to allow the oft en marginalized voices of 
Earth to be heard again. And, as a “hermeneutic of retrieval”, it seeks to discern and retrieve 
alternative traditions that would allow Earth community to ﬂ ourish yet again. 
What, then, is an ecological hermeneutics? Th e use of the term "hermeneutics" in concepts 
such as a "feminist hermeneutics", a "liberation hermeneutics", or an "African hermeneutics" 
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is rather misleading. It is oft en simply used as a rough synonym for a particular form of 
theology. In this sense one may also speak of a "reformed hermeneutics", a "Lutheran hermeneu-
tics", an "evangelical hermeneutics" or a "Pentecostal hermeneutics". At best, this use of the 
concept "hermeneutics" seems to acknowledge that a particular theological position informs 
and shapes one's reading of the Bible. However, strictly speaking, the concept "hermeneutics" 
should be used in the sense of a theoretical reﬂ ection on and an analysis of the process of 
interpretation (see Angling for interpretation, chapter 3.2). Hermeneutics itself is not primarily 
an act of interpretation; it is a reﬂ ection on interpretation. To use an analogy: biology is a 
reﬂ ection on life (bios); it is not primarily a form of life (although doing biology is of course 
also a very speciﬁ c way of living).
Th e question is therefore whether proposals for an ecological hermeneutics have actually led 
to new methodological insights (i.e. at the level of hermeneutics) or whether this is simply a 
diﬀ erent way of reading the Bible (i.e. at the level of interpretation)? Perhaps it is too early to 
provide a clear answer to this question since there have been relatively few contributions on 
the nature of an ecological hermeneutics and (except for the Earth Bible project), these have 
been rather diﬀ use.
Nevertheless, one may argue that the emergence of an ecological hermeneutics promises to 
be hermeneutically comprehensive. Th is implies that it touches on every aspect of the process 
of interpretation. Following the seven guidelines for interpretation identiﬁ ed in Angling 
for interpretation, (Chapter 3.2) it is clear that new insights, also methodological insights, 
have emerged from attempts to reread the Bible from an ecological perspective. Th is may 
be illustrated with the following examples (focusing mostly on the famous text on human 
“dominion” in Genesis 1:27).
On the production of texts:
In his important work, Th e Yahwist landscape: Nature and religion in early Israel, Th eodore 
Hiebert argued that Israel’s nomadic desert origins and agricultural roots are reﬂ ected in 
the Yahwist motif of the desert oasis in the Garden of Eden (Genesis 2). By contrast, the 
creation narrative of Genesis 1 assumes the threat of alluvial ﬂ oods in Mesopotamia. It 
calls for order amidst the forces of chaos. Humans are to play a role in the establishment 
of such order (dominion). Hiebert’s work illustrates that the production of a text has to 
be understood not only against its social and historical background. Th e impact of the 
material landscape on the production of texts should also be taken into account. Th e 
importance of geography and topography to demography has to be recognised.
On a literary analysis of texts:
Perhaps the most important contribution to literary analysis from an ecological perspective 
is the way in which Earth is recognized as a distinct voice that has been inscribed (and 
oft en marginalized) within the text. In literary terms, Earth (or more concretely waters, 
mountains, rivers, plants, trees, insects, birds and animals) should not simply be understood 
as a way of describing the narrative scene or context. Non-human creatures are actors that 
play an active role in history and that are inﬂ uenced by human history. See the discussion 
of the Earth Bible project above.
On the history of reception of texts:
In his excellent book, Th e travail of nature, Paul Santmire analysed the "ambiguous 
ecological promise" of the Christian tradition. He counters both those critics who assume 
that the Christian tradition has little, if anything, to oﬀ er to ecological thinking, and those 



Fishing for Jonah (Anew)
224
who are overly eager to redeem the tradition. He shows that the history of interpretation 
of texts such as Genesis 1:27-28 is characterised by radical plurality and the impact of 
pervasive ideologies.
On the role of the contemporary context:
Larry Rasmussen's acclaimed work, Earth community Earth ethics, is one of the 
better theological assessments of the contemporary global context from an ecological 
perspective. Th e notion of "Earth community" has several connotations: a) it suggests 
that Earth is the common home for all religious traditions, b) it values the emphasis on 
community in the wisdom of indigenous cultures, c) it draws on the scientiﬁ c rediscovery 
that inter-connectedness structures galaxies, all forms of life, ecosystems and human 
societies, d) it responds to the threat of the fragmentation of local community life all 
over the world, e) it calls for the fostering of sustainable communities. If the Earth is our 
only home (oikos), the task of the steward (the oikonomos) is not one of domination 
but of responsible participation in the one community of life. Th is illustrates how an 
analysis of the contemporary context can shape the reinterpretation of a text such as 
Genesis 1:27-28.
On the rhetorical context:
Th eological responses to environmental destruction reﬂ ect the confusing and conﬂ icting 
diversity of contemporary Christian theologies. Subsequently, several scholars in the 
ﬁ eld have tried to identify the dominant types of ecological theology. In her book, Gaia 
and God: Ecofeminist theology of Earth healing, Catholic theologian Rosemary Ruether 
proposed that a covenantal tradition and a sacramental tradition of earthkeeping may 
be identiﬁ ed. Th e covenantal type is popular among Protestant Christians and draws 
inspiration from the Bible and the covenantal tradition to emphasise a commitment for 
right relationships within the earth community. Th e sacramental type draws on the Bible 
and on patristic and medieval mysticism to speak to the heart, to inspire a vision of the 
sacred and to express an ecstatic experience of communion within the earth community. 
Although Ruether argues that these two types of ecological theology can complement 
each other, it is clear that the rhetorical context (e.g. Protestant or Catholic) will inﬂ uence 
one's selection of appropriate texts, doctrinal keys and forms of spirituality to express an 
ecological ethos. In a rhetorical context with a strong sense of covenantal responsibilities, 
a theology of stewardship may ﬂ ourish while this may be less prominent in a context with 
strong sacramental sensibilities. 
On the inﬂ uence of pervasive ideologies:
Th e discussion of the "Earth Bible" project above provides an example of a sensitivity to 
pervasive ideologies in the Biblical texts and in their subsequent history of interpretation. 
Another version of such a hermeneutic of suspicion is that of ecological feminism. Here, 
the interlocking dualisms of culture/nature and male/female are subjected to critique. It 
is argued that the same logic that legitimized patriarchal domination of men over women 
has been extrapolated toward the exploitation of nature in the name of (patriarchal) 
culture. Th ese forms of domination are reﬂ ected in the Biblical texts. Th e assumed sacred 
authority of the Bible must therefore be questioned together with that of patriarchy.
On the spiral of interpretation:
How does interpretation actually take place? How do we manage to relate the message 
of the Bible with a particular context? Here the role of doctrinal keys has to be 
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emphasised. Doctrinal keys are comprehensive theological constructs that may be used 
to establish a relationship between the Biblical texts and a contemporary context. Th ey 
play a crucial role in the identiﬁ cation of similarities (amidst diﬀ erences) between the 
Biblical text and a contemporary context. Th ey have a double function in this regard. 
Th ey provide a key to unlock the meaning of both the contemporary context and the 
Biblical texts and simultaneously enable the interpreter to establish a link between text 
and contemporary context. Heuristic keys are not only employed to ﬁ nd similarities but to 
construct similarities, to make things similar (idem facio), if necessary. Th e scope of such 
interpretative keys is oft en quite comprehensive: they purport to provide a clue to the core 
meaning of the contemporary context as a whole and the Biblical text as a whole.
Such interpretative keys are usually derived from core Christian beliefs. Th e doctrinal key 
of "liberation" may serve as an example. Th e confession that "God is a Liberator" is used in 
liberation theology as a doctrinal key to link Biblical texts (stories on how God liberated 
people in the past) with particular contexts of oppression today. In this sense a new 
theology would indeed lead to a new form of hermeneutics because of the introduction of 
a diﬀ erent doctrinal key.
Th e controversial term "stewardship" illustrates the use of such doctrinal keys with 
reference to Genesis 1:27-28. Th e word stewardship does not appear in the text itself. 
Nevertheless, it has become a very common key to interpret the meaning of the Hebrew 
words kabash (“subdue”) and radah (“have dominion”). In his inﬂ uential study, Th e 
steward, a Biblical symbol come of age, Douglas John Hall (1990) develops a theology of 
stewardship that suggests that we human beings are responsible for the whole earth, that 
we are together responsible for the whole earth, that this responsibility includes the non-
human as well as the human world, that this responsibility must seek to express itself in 
just and merciful political forms and that this responsibility must be exercised in the light 
not only of the immediate situation but of the near and distant future as well. It is clear 
that “stewardship” functions here as a hermeneutical key to relate the Biblical text with 
ecological responsibility within the contemporary context. 
Th e many criticisms that have been raised against such a notion of stewardship (e.g. that 
it is too hierarchical, too managerial, too androcentric and that it portrays God as an 
absentee Landlord) suggest that doctrinal keys also have to be subjected to a hermeneutics 
of suspicion.
7.6.2 Jonah in the light of an ecological hermeneutics
Commentators on the book of Jonah are unanimous in their appreciation of the graphic nature 
of the narrative in Jonah. Th e weal and woes of the main character, Jonah, are closely tied up 
with elements from the world of non-human nature. Th e narrative is picturesque because of the 
abundant references to that which is earthly and concrete. Look at the following examples:
Cosmology: heaven (1:9), dry land (1:9, 2:10), earth (2:6), mountains (2:6), the sun (4:8);
Geography: Nineveh (1:1, 3:1f, 4:11), Tarsish (1:3, 4:2), Joppa (1:3), the temple in Jerusalem 
(2:4,7);
Forces of nature: the sea (1:4f, 9), the storm at sea (1:4f) and calm at sea (1:15), the scorching 
desert wind (4:8), sun and shade (4:5,8);
Food (3:7f) and drinking water (3:7);
Life cycles: three days and three nights (1:17), living and dying (2:6, 4:3,8f), dawn and dusk 
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(4:7,10), being asleep and being awake (1:5-6), eating and fasting (3:7f), sprouting and 
withering away (4:6-7);
Plants: sea weeds (2:5), the cucumber plant (4:6f); and
Animals: the big ﬁ sh (1:17, 2:1,10), the many domesticated animals in Nineveh (3:7, 4:11), the 
worm (4:7), and humans (sailors, citizens, the king and his counselors).
It can hardly be argued that these aspects have been neglected in interpretations of the book of 
Jonah. However, it may be said that the acts of human beings have been privileged and that the 
role of non-human creatures have oft en been reduced to that of merely providing the background 
or stage where the drama between God and human beings has played itself out. In terms of the 
principles identiﬁ ed by the Earth Bible project, the voice of Earth is suppressed in this way. Th e 
question is whether this suppression of the voice of Earth is evident in the text itself and not only 
in the interpretation of the text? 
Th e most obvious starting point for a retrieval of the ecological wisdom in the book of Jonah is 
the reference to Nineveh’s many animals in the rhetorical question that concludes the narrative. 
Th is question expresses God’s remarkable mercy that extends not only to human beings but also 
to their domestic animals. Th e animals and natural forces are indeed intimately involved and 
incorporated in the drama of creation, providence (the role of the ﬁ sh in 1:17, 2:10), human evil 
(1:2), divine judgement (the storm, the wind, the desert wind, also the role of the worm in 4:7), 
repentance (the animals that were expected in 3:7 to fast too) and the expected ﬁ nal restoration 
(4:11). God’s shalom is aimed at establishing a comprehensive sense of well-being that includes 
the whole community of creation. Jonah himself is reprimanded because he manifests a far too 
restricted understanding of God’s mercy, i.e. presumably a mercy that is targeted at the oppressed 
people of Israel only.
Th is emphasis on the inclusiveness of God’s mercy is clearly attractive to counter the many 
anthropocentric readings of the Jonah narrative. Th e question, though, is whether this inclusiveness 
is sustained in the narrative as a whole? Or are some of the non-human voices marginalized in the 
text? If so, how can these voices be retrieved for a contemporary vision of ecojustice?
It may be argued that the narrative use of motifs such as the big ﬁ sh, the cucumber plant and the 
worm is predominantly instrumentalist. Th ese motifs do not really introduce fully-ﬂ edged role 
players that are respected for their own integrity. Th eir roles in the narrative remain minor. Th ese 
motifs are merely used to make the story more picturesque, amusing and pedagogically eﬀ ective. 
One may also argue that only domesticated animals are mentioned. Does God’s mercy not also 
extend to the wild animals, even those that are dangerous to humans? And what about the fate 
of the many birds, insects, smaller mammals, trees and plants if Nineveh were to be destroyed? 
None of these voices is mentioned in the narrative. Th e only plant that is mentioned in the text is 
scorched in the process of God’s eﬀ ort to teach a lesson to his reluctant prophet. Finally, the sea is 
regarded as a dangerous threat in the book of Jonah. Th ere is little acknowledgement that the sea 
provided the habitat from which our forms of life originated.
Th ese observations are perhaps overly critical. Not everything can be spelled out within the 
space of a short narrative. Th e dominant thrust of the book of Jonah is one of inclusiveness. It 
counters an exclusivist preoccupation with the interests of one nation, one culture, one person, 
one species. Th e vision is one of God’s astonishing mercy that extends over the whole of creation. 
Th is mercy is perhaps epitomised in the motif of the great ﬁ sh that appeared to oﬀ er unexpected 
(if uncomfortable) safety and protection to Jonah in his deepest hour of need. Th is mercy is 
not manifested at a distance; it is one that enfolds Jonah like a mother’s womb. It is from this 
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nourishing and protective womb that Jonah emerged in order to meet the God of unfathomable 
mercy, again, in Nineveh.
7.6.3 Observations and evaluation
An ecological hermeneutics constitutes an important new manifestation of a hermeneutics of 
suspicion. It argues persuasively that anthropocentrism should be added to the well-known 
list of ideologies that may distort Biblical interpretation: sexism, racism, classism, elitism, 
and colonialism. Moreover, it maintains that these ideologies are structurally related to one 
another in what ecofeminists have called "interlocking dualisms".
At its best, an ecological hermeneutics oﬀ er an important new doctrinal key to understanding 
both the Biblical texts and the contemporary context, namely that of the ecological well-
being of the whole earth community. Such a doctrinal key will remain limited unless it 
can be integrated not only with creation but also with the other aspects of Christian faith, 
namely providence, the place of humanity in the earth community, sin, redemption, Christian 
vocations and eschatological consummation.
An ecological hermeneutics can indeed help to open our eyes to the role that Earth, mountains, 
hills, air, waters, rivers, soil, trees, animals, birds, insects, etc. play in the Biblical texts. Th ese 
categories do not simply sketch the scene within which the drama of human salvation takes 
place. Th ey are intimately involved in God's acts of salvation and liberation that touch the 
whole earth community.
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Where does this leave us?
8.1 Introduction
Th e great variety of exegetical methods dealt with in this book (and our list is by no means 
complete) indicate how scholars and learned Bible readers over the centuries tried to formalize 
their study of the biblical texts. As we said in chapter 1, these strategies have a critical function: 
they assist us in testing our initial understandings of biblical texts so that we might come to a 
more adequate interpretation.
But does a study of these methods really leave us with a better understanding of the Bible? Th e 
variety and complexity of the interpretative strategies seem to leave us with more questions than 
answers. Two sets of questions cannot be avoided:
Th e ﬁ rst concerns the choices we have to make. Should we use all these strategies or should we 
select only the “best” strategies? How do we know which strategies are the “best”? Or should 
we perhaps school ourselves in one method and apply that to all biblical texts?
Th e second concerns the possible negative eﬀ ects of hermeneutical theory on Christian 
practice. Do these methods equip us to understand the Bible as a guide to Christian faith 
and living or do they turn the Bible into a playground for experts? Can the Bible still address 
ordinary Christians aft er it has been dissected according to sophisticated theories?
Th e next sections will deal with these two sets of problems without – for the moment – oﬀ ering 
answers.
8.1.1 Th e problem of choosing an appropriate interpretive approach 
Th is book may create the impression that biblical interpreters face a menu from which they have 
to choose an item. For instance, if they choose to interpret a passage with the tools of historical 
criticism, they cannot employ the tools of structuralism. Actually, practical interpretation virtually 
always involves a mixture of methods. A feminist interpretation of a psalm may include references 
to the genre (form criticism) and structure (structuralism) of the psalm and the interpreter may 
draw on textual criticism and cultural anthropology to help solve certain problems. Moreover, 
the feminist interpreter would also want to say something about her response as a woman (reader 
response).
Such a mixing of methods is not only possible but necessary, because no single method can 
possibly provide answers to all the questions that may arise when a text is read. Narratology 
helps one to get to grips with the formal features of narratives; it does not enlighten one about 
the cultural practices to which a particular narrative refers or help one to determine its purpose. 
Rhetorical criticism oft en depends on the correct understanding of a Hebrew or Greek phrase, 
but rhetorical criticism does not teach us Hebrew or Greek. Each method has its own questions 
and its own strategies for answering them; it necessarily ignores other questions and has no way 
of dealing with them.
No reading of Jonah in this book depended solely on the “method” that was used. Although 
each reading had a particular focus, other presuppositions entered into the reading process. Th e 
particular approach determined what would be in the foreground, yet this foreground could not 
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appear without a background. Th at is why the readings, though very diﬀ erent on the surface, are 
in some ways remarkably similar. Some of the “strange” readings (deconstructive, Marxist and 
feminist ones) have as their background more “normal” readings. One could call them specialized 
perspectives on such normal readings.
One could, therefore, try to solve the problem of choice by saying that it matters little what 
approach we choose. John Barton, having noted how oft en diﬀ erent “methods” lead to similar 
conclusions, concludes that “methods” are not ways in which we discover meaning, but ways in 
which we defend insights we have already reached. 
Structural analysis has discovered the concentric structure in Jonah 1:4-16. Th e structure reveals 
that 1:9 is the focus of the passage and that one should compare the attitude of the sailors in verse 
5 to their changed attitude in verses 15 and 16. But an ordinary, intelligent reader who does not 
notice the concentric structure is not likely to miss these points. Verse 9 contains Jonah’s ﬁ rst 
words and is clearly important. Th e change in the sailors is hard to overlook. Similarly, a careful 
reader could conclude that the question at the end of the book is addressed to the audience 
without a theory of the implied reader. One could say the theory does not yield the conclusion, 
but merely explains it.
Sometimes all roads lead to Rome; sometimes diﬀ erent methods at least alert us to aspects that 
intelligent, attentive readers may overlook. Even readers with experience in analyzing modern 
literary texts may be baﬄ  ed by some passages in the Bible unless they are informed about the 
customs and beliefs of the people of ancient Palestine, about the historical circumstances and 
about the specialized meanings of some Hebrew and Greek words. One could then conclude that 
each method has something unique to oﬀ er and that the appropriate strategy would be to add all 
the methods together to get “the full picture”.
Unfortunately this does not work either, for sometimes diﬀ erent methods yield incompatible 
results. For instance, sometimes one has to decide whether a text is a compositional unit or, 
instead, composed of diﬀ erent, originally separate parts. In other cases one has to decide whether 
to amend a diﬃ  cult verse (using the tools of textual criticism), to read it as it stands (applying, 
perhaps, literary criteria) or to regard it as a late editorial addition (redaction criticism).
In Mark 2:10-11 there is a problem that can be solved in diﬀ erent ways. At the beginning of verse 
10 Jesus is talking to the scribes and says “But so that you may know that the Son of Man has 
power on earth to forgive sins.” Th e sentence is not completed; instead, Jesus turns to the lame 
man and tells him to get up, take up his bed and go home.
One explanation is that the passage (2:1-12) contains two separate parts (belonging to diﬀ erent 
genres) that have been joined (source and form criticism). A miracle story (1:1-5a and 10b-12) 
has been expanded by inserting into it a dispute story concerning Jesus’ authority to forgive sins 
(5b-10a). Th e joining of the two parts has left  awkward breaks.
But the problem can also be solved by literary means. Jesus deliberately traps the scribes by raising 
the issue of sins ﬁ rst. Th e common view was that all sorts of diseases were the result of a person’s 
sins. When the scribes question Jesus’ authority, He demonstrates it by healing the man. Th e 
completion of the unﬁ nished sentence in verse 10 is the act of healing. According to this view, the 
“awkwardness” is dramatically very eﬀ ective.
According to a third (reader-response) view, it is not Jesus speaking to the scribes in verse 10a, 
but the author of the gospel addressing the readers in an aside. Yet another explanation depends 
on Greek grammar. “So that you may know” could also mean “Know then” (imperative).
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Undoubtedly one has to use source criticism sometimes. When? Why, when a text is composed of 
diﬀ erent sources, of course! Th is argument is obviously circular, but such circular arguments cannot 
be avoided in practical interpretation. Th ey are inherent in what some call the hermeneutical circle 
or the hermeneutical spiral. 
Lacking absolute certainty, we try to give intelligent and informed answers to questions that arise 
when we read a book and, on basis of the better or worse answers we give, we oﬀ er interpretations 
of the book. Our interpretations are tested against interpretations oﬀ ered by others. We may learn 
from those who have seen what we have overlooked or who are in some areas better informed 
than we are. Th ey, in turn, may learn from us. Th e result is never absolute certainty, but it is oft en 
better informed interpreters – even when “better informed” means “less certain”. In the end the 
circle comes back to me, requiring me to make decisions for which I and I alone have to take 
responsibility.
Th e problem of choosing among the available methods is made more diﬃ  cult by the suspicion 
that complicated scholarly interpretations based on hermeneutical theories are beyond the reach 
of ordinary Christians and have very little relevance to their lives.
8.1.2 Th e dangers of academic theories of interpretation 
Hermeneutical reﬂ ection on interpretation has for long been - mainly if not exclusively - an 
academic enterprise. Has this academic enterprise been of any use to “ordinary people” who 
strive to understand the Bible (and other texts) better? A typical academic answer would be 
that theoretical reﬂ ection on our practices helps us to improve our practical performance. For 
instance, in recent years we have become far more alert to the role of ideology in texts and their 
interpretations. Someone who has taken note of (for instance) feminist, Marxist and post-colonial 
theories will deﬁ nitely be in a position to oﬀ er more balanced and rounded interpretations.
But the academic world has its own interests and ideological biases, although these are not oft en 
mentioned in academic writing. As a result, the works of academics are sometimes useless to 
outsiders precisely when they are most useful to the academic authors. In particular, academic 
interests and ideology may be at odds with the needs of Christian communities, for the following 
reasons:
Academics strive for novelty; faith communities need continuity. Academics are rewarded 
for producing “novelties” – new theories, new interpretations, new vocabularies. Christian 
communities do not always welcome interpretative novelties. How can we know what to do or 
believe if the Bible, our guide in such matters, is given a new meaning every few years?
Academics prize creativity; faith communities need cohesion. In the search for knowledge 
academics explore all available avenues, even if many of these turn out to be dead-end streets. 
Th ey regard any “diﬀ erent” slant on a problem as potentially useful; therefore they tolerate 
a multiplicity of clashing views. Christian communities ﬁ nd the multiplicity of radically 
diﬀ erent interpretations problematic. How can we stand united in faith and action if each 
individual can pick the interpretation of the Bible that best suits her or him? 
Academics privilege criticism; faith communities have to be loyal to a calling. Academics need 
the freedom to question all authorities (texts, authors, other scholars) critically. Without 
persistent, open-ended questioning, academic life would stagnate. By following authorities, 
we simply arrive where the authorities had arrived before us – we get no further. Christian 
communities should not be completely uncritical, yet they cannot pretend that they open 
everything to critical questioning. Th ey are called to serve, not to judge, and their service 
involves a measure of unquestioning loyalty.
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Academics speak to experts; faith communities have to address the world. Academics demonstrate 
their expertise by mastering and using the technical terminology of their discipline. In doing so, 
they communicate eﬀ ectively with other experts. In Christian communities the interpretation 
of the Bible cannot be restricted to a small circle of experts. Even if one argues that ordinary 
Christians should accept the guidance of trained teachers, the trained teachers still have 
to communicate with untrained Christians. Moreover, ordinary ministers or pastors, who 
also have to be trained in other theological disciplines, can hardly master all the specialized 
disciplines within biblical interpretation. Th e exclusivity of expertise that marks academic 
debates endangers eﬀ ective communication within the community of faith.
(Technical terminology endangers fruitful academic debate as well. In this book we have 
expressed reservations about the esoteric jargons of certain methods. Complex jargons all too 
frequently fence oﬀ  the “private property” of small groups of initiates.)
Academics seek theoretical understanding; faith communities seek guidance for life. Academics 
are paid to seek theoretical understanding on the assumption that better understanding 
will lead to better practice. But when academic theories remain contested, theorizing gets 
a momentum of its own in a “spiral of theory” that leads academics further and further 
away from any application. In their dialogue with other theorists, academic theorists lose 
all contact with practice. While hermeneutical theorists rightly stress that they can oﬀ er no 
ﬁ nal answers, Christian communities cannot postpone Christian living. Although Christians 
should certainly not assume that they have all the answers, their need for practical guidance 
is understandable.
Academics defer to reason; faith communities live by faith. Academics oﬀ er, as best they can, 
reasoned theories of interpretation; they are neither expected nor able to deal with what goes 
beyond reason. Th erefore they cannot, either as scholars or as Christians, supply theories of 
divine inspiration or the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Christian communities, living by faith, 
have to go beyond the strictly rational. Th eir very interest in the Bible arises from the faith 
that, in whatever way, God speaks to them through the Bible.
Th e diﬀ erent interests and needs of academic interpreters and interpreters within Christian 
communities sometimes lead to open hostility. Academics accuse ordinary Christians of being 
wilfully ignorant or naïve and Christians accuse academic interpreters of deliberately undermining 
their faith. But even those on both sides who sincerely wish to be academically responsible and to 
serve the church in their interpretation of the Bible ﬁ nd it hard to do justice to both sides.
8.1.3 Th e escape into various forms of exclusivism
Th e problems discussed above are not readily solved. Faced by a host of conﬂ icting interpretations 
and aware of the hidden pitfalls in the interpretation process, ordinary Christians and even 
academics oft en feel powerless. Hermeneutical reﬂ ection held out a promise of deeper 
understanding and a wealth of meaning, but in practice it sometimes robs people of the sense of 
meaning they had before.
Some deal with this problem by retreating into a “safe” position of academic scepticism. Th ey 
maintain a critical distance from all interpretations, even the ones they oﬀ er themselves, arguing 
that we should give up on the idea that we can ever understand any text adequately. Unfortunately, 
this apparently “humble” position cripples further thought and provides no guidance for action. 
It may even lead to a sterile cynicism.
Many others try to escape the problems by adopting a form of exclusivism. Although such people 
are (generally) aware of diﬀ erent interpretations and interpretative strategies, they close their eyes 
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to “otherness” in interpretation and stick doggedly to whatever line they have chosen. Convinced 
that they already have the infallible “magic key” to biblical interpretation, they refuse to listen to 
anyone who disagrees with them.
Certain magic keys mark speciﬁ c Church communities. In some it is the particular church’s 
tradition: the Bible “obviously” says what the tradition has always said. In other churches the 
key is the inspired (prophetic, visionary) leader, whose interpretation of the Bible is accepted 
without question. In other cases the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the life of the individual 
believer provides all the answers – strange as these answers may sometimes seem to outsiders. In 
all these cases the possibility that elements of the truth may be found outside the restricted circle 
is ruled out. Why listen to the “worldly” theories of academics or the heretical opinions of other 
Christians who have not received the Spirit (do not keep the proper Sabbath, do not acknowledge 
the authority of the Pope, have the wrong view of Scriptural authority, etc)?
Academics are no less guilty. One sometimes still hears the claim that a particular method is the 
only “scientiﬁ c” one, the only one that yields “objective” results or the only one that “conforms 
to the evidence”. More oft en academics claim that their method is at least the best one or the one 
most in line with “current thinking”; other methods are “one-sided” or “dated”. And even among 
academics some would say, more or less blatantly, that only those interpretations are worthy of 
attention that serve the particular cause to which they have committed themselves. Although 
academics are professionally required to take note of the views of other scholars, the cavalier way 
in which rival views are sometimes dismissed is disturbing. One gets the impression that crude 
labelling occasionally takes the place of reasoned debate.
Exclusivism is not the logical consequence of “being a church community” or of “being an 
academic community”, but in both communities there are psychological reasons for embracing a 
form of exclusivism. Churches require a reasonably secure basis for their faith and practice and 
frequently ﬁ nd it in their own tradition or their existing practice. Th is natural reaction becomes 
exclusivist when the door is closed on all other voices. Academics cannot possibly make a detailed 
study of all the conﬂ icting theories about and methods of interpretation. To some extent they are 
forced to specialize. Unfortunately, the temptation to exaggerate the importance of the “speciality” 
in which you have invested much of your working life is hard to resist. In “perfecting” your 
own method, you begin to neglect and later to dismiss other methods. What has implicitly been 
excluded as a natural result of specialization is later explicitly excluded as worthless, mistaken 
or inferior. Of course, academic debates continue, but they are restricted to the small circle of 
experts.
In the previous chapters we have indicated that schools of interpretation oft en diverge on the issue 
of meaning and its location. Th e methods discussed in chapter 4 share the view that meaning is 
a function of the origin of texts. Th ose presented in chapter 5 regard meaning as a function of the 
relationships among linguistic elements within the text. In chapter 6 we presented methods that 
see meaning as a function of the interaction between text and reader. All the methods in chapter 
7, divergent as they are, are based on the view that meaning is a function of hidden ideological 
(or psychological) constraints. Th ese diﬀ erent perspectives on meaning may be regarded as the 
kernels around which exclusivist groups (in the academic world) cluster.
Two theoretical constructs support the idea that these diﬀ erent perspectives on meaning are 
in essence mutually exclusive. Th omas Kuhn spoke about “paradigm shift s” to indicate the 
revolutionary changes that take place in the natural sciences from time to time. A paradigm is 
more than simply a theory; it is a way of seeing reality. When a paradigm shift  occurs, scientists 
working in the new paradigm are, as it were, no longer dealing with the same world that older 
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scientists had dealt with. Paradigms are incommensurable, that is, they cannot be compared within 
the same theoretical framework. Kuhn himself says that to move from one paradigm to another 
is a process resembling a religious conversion – it happens to you. Th ose who talk of diﬀ erent 
perspectives on meaning as diﬀ erent paradigms are therefore inclined to say that it serves no 
purpose to debate with those whose paradigm diﬀ ers from your own one. Th ey would simply fail 
to understand you.
A similar construct is that of “turns”. According to some scholars, the hermeneutical debates over 
the past centuries have been marked by certain “turns”. During the modern era, scholars turned 
to the world behind the text and found meaning in the processes of origination (the historical 
methods). Later scholars turned to the world of the text itself and found meaning in texts as 
networks of relationships between textual elements. Still later a turn was made to the world in 
front of the text and meaning was located in the process of reception. Others, however, turned to 
what we call the world beneath the text, that is, the hidden world of psychological and ideological 
constraints. 
In our earlier book we used the terminology of “turns” ourselves. Th ere are, however, disadvantages 
to it. First, the impression is sometimes created that “turns” are natural events that one simply has 
to accept. If one has not made the latest turn, one is condemned to living in the past. Moreover, 
it is oft en subtly suggested that the latest is “naturally” the best. Secondly, it is oft en accepted that 
each turn is to a complete, self-suﬃ  cient “world”. Th ose who turn to the world behind the text and 
those who turn to the world of the text (for instance) are like people exploring diﬀ erent planets. 
Th eir respective ﬁ ndings cannot converge, either in a complementary or in a critical way. Instead, 
each “world” is the private property of those who have chosen to explore it.
We question the assumption that diﬀ erent perspectives on meaning necessarily have to lead to 
exclusive, privatized practices of theorizing and interpreting. It is certainly true that speciﬁ c 
perspectives have dominated certain historical eras, but we do not believe that either natural or 
historical determinism fully explains this. At all times there have been dissenting voices. Our 
essentially historical presentation in this book is not based on a belief that paradigms followed 
each other in neat succession or that the latest is invariably the best. It is also true that in academic 
practice the temptation to regard a particular perspective as absolute is great, but we are convinced 
that in their everyday lives people (including academics) employ diﬀ erent perspectives when they 
interpret. A theory that fails to account for the presuppositions on which people habitually act 
cannot be a fully adequate theory, even if it yields some brilliant new insights.
8.1.4 Where does this leave us as editors and authors?
It is easy to criticize and diﬃ  cult to formulate constructive proposals. Having rejected the view 
that the diﬀ erent methods of interpretation in this book should be seen as mutually exclusive, we 
have to say what we believe their status is. We have acknowledged that theories of interpretation 
are inﬂ uenced by reigning academic fashions and by broader climates of thought at diﬀ erent 
times. Moreover, traditions, interests and ideologies play a role in shaping fashions and patterns 
of thought. Th is cannot, however, be the last word.
Th eories, however much they are inﬂ uenced by other factors, respond to existing practices. 
Th eories of interpretation are formalized accounts of the experiences and intuitions we have 
when we interpret actual texts. Methods develop from the reading process, and not the other 
way round. When we read biblical texts, certain questions arise and we deal with them as best 
we can. Later we formulate a theory to explain how we managed to answer certain questions 
or why we failed to answer others. On the basis of the formalized theory we adopt a particular 
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“method”, believing that it will ensure a greater measure of success in our future practice. First 
comes the insight or experience mediated by a more or less informed decision made in response 
to a problem: I understood this problematic passage better when I placed the text in its historical 
context. Th en we can formulate this insight into a theoretical construct: the meaning of a text 
is a function of the historical circumstances in which it was produced. Finally, this theoretical 
construct becomes an operative part of a method: whenever one reads a text, one should try to 
determine the history of its origin.
Th is view implies that methods of interpretation never precede the reading and appropriation of 
biblical texts. Long before scholarly methods are developed, people read the Bible and appropriate 
it as a meaningful part of their lives. When a method directs the attention to a speciﬁ c aspect of 
a text (for instance, the historical context), it is because the practice of interpretation drew the 
attention to problems of historical distance. Of course, each reader does not go through the whole 
process of having a particular insight, formalizing it in a theory and applying it in an interpretive 
method. New generations of readers oft en simply take over the theories and methods formulated 
by earlier readers. Th is does not change the status of the methods; they remain the end products 
of a practice and not the necessary starting points without which no successful interpretation is 
possible. It is the need to appropriate (respond to) the biblical text that calls forth critical debates 
on method. 
If this is so, there is no warrant for interpretive exclusivism, either in churches or in academic 
“schools”. Our plea for open, critical debate on interpretation, one which does not automatically 
rule out of court some dimensions or aspects of the interpretive process, is based on the assumption 
that our practice may be better than our theories and that our existing practices already involve 
us in various dialogues with others. Th e search for a shared understanding requires openness, 
but does not exclude critical engagement. All hermeneutical theories and all interpretations are 
not equal, though even the worst ones are not simply bad. Instead, they are bad for very complex 
reasons that can be explored only in critical debate. In the next section we suggest that a form of 
multidimensional exegesis is needed to do justice to the complexity of both the biblical text and 
the interpretive situation.
8.2 Towards multidimensional interpretation
Multidimensional interpretation is neither a new method that replaces previous ones, nor a super 
method that attempts to integrate all the good points of other methods. It is, rather, an alternative 
attitude to exegesis. It can be called an approach to interpretation provided that one distinguishes 
between two meanings of the term “approach”. An approach may be both a theoretical framework 
and the interpretive techniques to which it gives rise. Th e emphasis then falls on the theory and 
techniques that give us access to the meaning of texts. An approach may also be a perspective 
on texts, theories of textuality and techniques of interpretation. Th e emphasis then falls on 
the attitude with which the interpreter regards texts and the process of interpretation, on the 
communal human practice of gaining meaning from texts. Multidimensional interpretation is an 
approach in the second sense.
8.2.1 What is a multidimensional approach all about?
A multidimensional approach does not render existing exegetical methods superﬂ uous, but 
requires a speciﬁ c perspective on the variety of methods. Th is perspective may be summarized 
as follows: 
Methods are not seen as indispensable keys without which texts would remain meaningless 
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to us. Instead, they are seen as more or less useful formalizations of techniques we all apply 
in our daily practice.
Th is does not mean that we can dispense with specialized methods. Some texts, biblical texts 
for instance, are so complex that we need an array of methods, sometimes highly specialized 
ones, if we wish to do justice to them.
Moreover, the process of interpretation involves so many dimensions that no single theoretical 
construct can describe it adequately. A plurality of hermeneutical theories is fostered to 
remind us that we have no secure theoretical starting point.
Neither methods nor theories come into existence in isolation from human communicative 
practices. Interpretation and the reﬂ ection on it should therefore be practised with an attitude 
of communality and openness to dialogue.
In categorizing the various interpretive approaches in the diﬀ erent chapters, we have suggested 
one possible way of reﬂ ecting on the variety of possibilities available to interpreters. We have 
indicated that there are methods focusing on the production of texts, others focusing on the texts 
themselves, others focusing on the reception of texts and others focusing on unconscious psychic 
and ideological factors. Our categories indicate what the diﬀ erent presuppositions and foci of the 
diﬀ erent methods are, but they do not force us to choose one approach to the exclusion of others. 
Instead, they suggest the diﬀ erent ways in which texts may be said to be “meaningful” and thus 
show us what type of contribution each method can make to biblical interpretation.
We do not claim that our proposed categorization is “better” than other possible ones or that our 
approach brings us closer to “ﬁ nal” results in biblical interpretation. We are, however, convinced 
that a multidimensional approach helps us to avoid both exclusivistic claims and attempts to 
construct a vast integrative scheme that pretends to cover the whole ﬁ eld. It fosters an awareness 
of the interplay of forces in the process of biblical interpretation, an interplay that we cannot 
fully master “methodically”. Because we possess no “hermeneutic key” or “master theory”, we are 
compelled to enter into dialogue with others, admitting that the search for meaning is always a 
communal enterprise.
8.2.2 What view of biblical texts is implied in a multidimensional approach?
Since a multidimensional approach tries to respect the complexity of biblical texts, it has to take 
into account the following:
Biblical texts are ancient texts. Th e Bible was not written by a single author at a speciﬁ c time 
in the past. It is, far rather, a whole library of books testifying to an ongoing conversation 
spanning some 1500 years. Even the separate books of the Bible are not all monolithic – 
they were composed from diﬀ erent pre-existing oral and written sources, and underwent 
redactional changes through the centuries. To treat these texts as if they were written in our 
day and addressed to us is to disrespect the communities of faith and their members who 
composed these books as meaningful contributions to their debates and struggles.
We need a historical consciousness in our interpretation of the Bible, an awareness of a past as 
“another country” where “they do things diﬀ erently”. Although biblical texts were not written 
for us in the ﬁ rst place, the “pastness” of the Bible can become part of our present interpretive 
endeavours. We can enter into “dialogues with the dead” (Domnick LaCapra), thereby 
gaining some insight into their reﬂ ections on and struggles with God at diﬀ erent times and in 
diﬀ erent circumstances. To do so, however, we need methods that help us to come to terms 
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with the “pastness” of the Bible, that help us to describe this “pastness” without dissolving it. 
We cannot, therefore, dispense with historical methods.
Biblical texts are literary texts. Th ey reach us in a textual form, and therefore we cannot 
appropriate them in any way without coming to grips with their textual features: the languages 
in which they were written (Biblical Hebrew, Aramaic, Koine Greek), their literary forms 
and structures, the literary conventions embedded in them, and so on. Th ese texts do not 
communicate “ideas” or “content” except in and through their literary embodiment. 
We need a literary consciousness in our biblical interpretation, an awareness of the ways in 
which the resources of language can be deployed to achieve a variety of “meaning eﬀ ects”. 
We thus have to study the conventions and rules that operate at diﬀ erent levels in the biblical 
texts: the linguistic and grammatical, the generic, the rhetorical, the structural and the 
aesthetic. We treat these texts with respect only by reading them against the background of 
these conventions. We therefore need exegetical methods that help us to describe the textual 
and literary features of biblical texts.
Biblical texts are religious texts. Th ese texts are the embodiment of the religious convictions 
and beliefs of the ancient faith communities that wrote them. Th ey express the reﬂ ections of 
believers of many centuries on who God is and how God relates to human beings. Whatever 
the precise circumstances were that led to the writing of each individual text, the biblical 
texts collectively gained the function of conveying confessions of faith about God to later 
generations. When, during the continuing process of interpretation and reinterpretation, 
these texts were canonized, they became authoritative for the communities that adapted 
them as canon. Th at is, they were accepted and passed on as a regulatory expression of who 
God is and how God wants to relate to people. In this sense they remain, for certain faith 
communities, normative for theological reﬂ ection and ethical decision-making today. Th e 
texts therefore also have a “present” character. Whenever faith communities appropriate the 
biblical texts, the theological “presentness” of the texts is taken for granted. Th us it is a central 
conviction of Christianity that the Bible is the “living” Word of God. 
We need a theological consciousness in biblical interpretation. Th is is obviously true for those 
who accept the Bible as their canon, but even those who hold diﬀ erent (religious or secular) 
convictions have to come to grips with the religio-ethical content of biblical texts. For instance, 
Christians and non-Christians have to take a stand on the ethical injunctions in the texts, 
respecting them as ethical injunctions. Christians, in particular, may expect that these texts 
should help them to formulate their own confessions of faith in God in that they embody 
God’s revelation. Christians therefore also need exegetical methods that can assist them in 
identifying the living Word of God in the Biblical texts.
Undoubtedly this schematic presentation is still too simplistic; each heading covers a complex 
collection of possibilities. A multidimensional approach reminds us that treating the biblical texts 
respectfully involves asking at least three questions: Where do these texts come from? How (in 
what form) do they reach us? What are they about? It does not suggest that there is ever a simple 
answer to any of these questions. Moreover, it is always possible to apply a tactical reduction. 
It is, for instance, possible to read a particular biblical text only as an ancient record, a literary 
masterpiece or a call to action in the present. A multidimensional approach does not condemn 
such limited endeavours as useless, but reminds us that they are - deliberately or inadvertently 
– limited. 
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8.2.3 How does a multidimensional approach view the process of interpretation?
As we have said before, interpretation is too complex to be viewed from a single perspective 
only. An interpretation is not the achievement of an individual armed with a set of technical 
instruments, but a part of an ongoing, interactive process. “Meaning for us” emerges as various 
dimensions of the process – of which our own interpretive eﬀ ort is one – interact. Biblical 
interpretation is an ongoing reading process. When I read now, my reading takes shape within the 
space marked out by previous readings, although not all the “dimensions” will always be used. For 
instance, if my reading of the Bible interacts only with the previous reading of a particular church 
tradition, it will appear rather “ﬂ at” or one-dimensional. A more “rounded” reading would take 
into account all the dimensions that are involved in the reading of ancient, theological texts. All 
these dimensions may be involved in the production of meaning, although some may exert a 
stronger inﬂ uence than others. Th e following dimensions (at least) need to be considered:
Th e texts we are reading: According to one (rather naïve) view, interpretation is simply the 
interpretation of “the text” as it appears before us. Although things are not that simple, an 
interpretation that is not anchored in the textual features of the text will hardly be persuasive. 
As we have indicated, we cannot read the Bible as if it were a modern text, written by a modern 
author for a modern audience. We have to acquaint ourselves with the ancient languages, 
genres and literary and rhetorical conventions that made the biblical texts meaningful to their 
ancient audiences. Only if we attune our reading of the text to these features can we get a 
feeling for and an understanding of the “literary worlds” created by the texts.
Th e contexts of origin or production of these texts: Texts themselves are interpretations of the 
world, therefore texts bear the marks of their times of origin. For instance, texts are marked by 
the values, world-views and religious convictions of those who wrote them. Th ey speak from a 
particular physical place (a geographical setting) and a socio-political location. When we read 
the Bible today, we enter into a conversation with the earlier interpretations that constituted 
the texts. Unless we remain aware of the contexts that gave rise to these interpretations, we 
lose the thread of the conversation.
Th e reception of these texts in ancient times: We are not the ﬁ rst readers of the biblical texts. 
Th ese texts reached their present form over a period of roughly 1500 years. During this 
time, the faith communities by whom and for whom the texts were written were already in a 
conversation with the traditions, written and oral, that came to constitute the Bible. Because 
the whole of the Bible was not available to ancient readers at once, each new generation 
interpreted and re-interpreted the oral traditions and texts that were available and regarded 
as authoritative at that time.
Th ese interpretations were inﬂ uenced by the changing contexts of the readers, just as the earlier 
traditions were. Th is process gave rise to new texts based on previous texts and traditions and 
to the editing of the existing texts to make them suitable for new circumstances. Th us, for 
instance, the corpus of historical material found from Joshua to 2 Kings is, in part, a collection 
and adaptation of older oral and written sources. Th is corpus itself was then “rewritten” some 
centuries later in 1 and 2 Chronicles. Th e writers of Chronicles used the earlier corpus, but 
they re-interpreted it from the perspective of their own time. Th e re-interpretation of Old 
Testament traditions in the books of the New Testament provides another, more drastic, 
example of the way in which biblical texts are in part the products of an interpretation of 
earlier texts.
When we read biblical texts today, we are, wittingly or unwittingly, inﬂ uenced by these 
earlier processes of rewriting and re-interpretation. We receive 1 and 2 Chronicles as a re-
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interpretation of a previous interpretation. Th e meaning of these books does not simply lie “in 
them”, but also in their relationship of similarity to and diﬀ erence from the earlier tradition.
Th e impact of the canonization process: Over time the ancient faith communities came to 
regard certain texts as authoritative for their faith and passed them on to next generations as 
such. Th is resulted in the formation of an authoritative canon, which included some texts and 
excluded others. For the Old Testament this process was more or less completed by 100 CE 
and for the New Testament by around 400 CE.
Th e closing of the canon had two consequences for interpretation. First, the process of re-
interpretation, which did not stop, no longer led to the editing of existing texts or to the 
formation of new texts that could be added to the collection of biblical writings. A line was 
drawn between the ﬁ xed texts of the Bible and the various forms of interpretation of and 
commentary on the texts. Although new texts on the Bible are written practically every 
day, there can be no new texts of the Bible. Secondly, the biblical texts are now received (in 
Christian communities) with a presumption that they are authoritative. Th is presumption 
of authority consciously or unconsciously inﬂ uences interpretation, even among those who 
challenge biblical authority. In brief, the question of biblical authority has become part of the 
interpretation process.
Diﬀ erent traditions of interpretation: Since the canonization of the Old Testament (by the 
Jewish faith community) and the New Testament (by the early Christian church), various 
traditions of interpretation have developed. (Some of these have been described in chapter 
2 of this book.) Already in the early centuries, there were two distinct approaches to biblical 
interpretation within the Christian church, the Antiochian and the Alexandrian approaches. 
Th e various schisms and splits within the Christian church further stimulated the development 
of diﬀ erent interpretive traditions. For instance, two signiﬁ cant splits, that between the 
Roman Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church in 1054 CE and the split from the 
Roman Catholic Church during the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century, led to distinct 
traditions of biblical interpretation. (We have outlined some of these developments in chapter 
3 of this book.) But these are merely examples; essentially each Christian denomination 
developed its own approach, oft en depending on what the particular denomination regards 
as crucial to the message of the Bible as a whole.
When we interpret the Bible today, we cannot just ignore these developments. All readers 
of the Bible, even those who are not Christians, are inﬂ uenced by one or more of the many 
traditions of interpretation. Th ese traditions still “speak” to us (whether we are aware of it or 
not) when we engage in biblical interpretation.
Th e reception of these texts in contemporary contexts: Interpreters of the Bible today, like their 
ancient counterparts who produced the Bible and who read the Bible before them, read the 
Bible in a speciﬁ c context, not in a vacuum. Not only traditions from the past, but also current 
social, political, economic, and religious conditions inﬂ uence them when they interpret the 
Bible. (We have dealt with some of these inﬂ uences in chapter 7.) For instance, an academic 
interpretation today is not merely an interpretation of a text, but also a response to other 
interpretations current in academic debates of our time.
It is obvious from the above that no single exegetical method can get to grips with all the voices 
that make themselves heard when we interpret the biblical texts. Each individual method oﬀ ers 
a description of one of these dimensions but necessarily neglects others. Th e complexity of the 
interpretive process absolutely requires the use of diﬀ erent perspectives and methods. Th is does 
not mean that biblical interpretation is an undisciplined process in which everything goes. 
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Although a multidimensional approach seeks to avoid those claims of truth and certainty that 
mark exclusivist interpretation, it does not imply that all interpretations are equal. Within each 
dimension there are criteria according to which interpretations may be adjudged. Using such 
criteria one could say, for instance, that a particular historical interpretation is fanciful, better 
than another or badly informed. Moreover, the interaction of the diﬀ erent dimensions provides 
further criteria for determining how adequate an interpretation is. Meaning, it may be said, is 
seen as a function of the interaction of all these diﬀ erent dimensions of interpretation. Meaning 
is not a “thing” located within one of the dimensions; it is the understanding and insight that 
emerges as we engage in an ongoing process of conversation in which each approach adds its 
voice. For instance, meaning should not seen as “my own understanding of the text”, as if readers 
create meaning in isolation, or as “what is already in the text”, as if texts in isolation are packages 
of meaning to be unwrapped. Instead, both readers and texts are complex entities, formed to a 
large extent by their relationships to what lies outside them. Derrida’s notion of a network of 
“traces” is one way of describing this relational complexity.
If this is so, we cannot lightly dismiss any of the specialist theoretical constructs and methods 
described in this book, although they are not all equally useful in all cases and although we 
cannot integrate them in an overarching theory and method. We suggest, however, that these 
theories and methods should not be regarded as neutral tools but as voices that engage in a 
conversation. When we interpret the Bible, we are always already part of the conversation with 
others. In section 8.3 below we shall suggest that we need to read with others in a conscious and 
deliberate manner.
8.2.4 Reading biblical texts in a multidimensional way
We have stressed that the multidimensional approach is not a method but an attitude – what 
some may call a meta-critical attitude. Nevertheless, in our practical reading of biblical texts we 
need some rules of thumb. Where should we start? Some points of entry may undermine the 
multidimensional approach by tacitly eliminating some of the dimensions of the process and 
others may foster it. Without suggesting a set recipe, we suggest that interpretation according to 
the following model would keep interpreters aware of complexities:
Get acquainted with the textual dimension: 
It cannot be denied that our primary interface in the interpretation process is the texts 
themselves. One cannot interpret, multidimensionally or otherwise, without reading the texts 
(preferably in the original languages)! Furthermore, our access to other dimensions of the 
interpretation process is mediated by the texts themselves: we cannot talk about the “context 
of origin”, for instance, unless we apply this to a particular text. As some scholars put it, the 
synchronic (that is, the features of the texts themselves) is logically prior to the diachronic 
(that is, the history of origin of the texts) in interpretation. Our ﬁ rst task is therefore to get 
acquainted with the texts and their textual features – their grammar, syntactical structures, 
genres, and so on. At this stage we need those specialized methods (mainly discussed in chapter 
5) that deal with aspects of textuality. Insights from narratology, stylistics, literary criticism, 
form criticism, structuralism, and other related ﬁ elds help us to appreciate the richness of the 
textual dimension. Th ese methods cannot be used mechanically, but may further illuminate 
our existing understanding of the textual dimension. Th us narratology is useful only if we 
have already identiﬁ ed a text as a narrative. In this way we pay due respect to the fact that the 
Bible came to us as text.
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Get acquainted with the intertextual dynamics of the biblical texts: 
We have indicated above that biblical texts were produced in a long process of interpretation 
and re-interpretation. In this process new texts were based on older texts and traditions and 
existing texts were adapted and supplemented, thereby producing testimonies of faith and 
expressions of people’s experiences with God in their own times. Th e biblical texts are therefore 
not monolithic; they reﬂ ect dynamic theological-religious discourses within the ancient faith 
communities over many centuries. In these discourses a rich diversity of both themes and 
voices became interwoven with one another. If we believe that we encounter God’s Word 
in these texts, we have to accept that God’s voice is revealed precisely in and through these 
intertextual dynamics.
Because biblical texts are not one-dimensional or “ﬂ at” entities, we need the results of those 
methods that explore the historical dimension of the Bible - the diachronic dimension of 
the texts. Methods such as tradition and redaction criticism, canonical criticism and social-
anthropological criticism (discussed mainly in chapter 4) assist us in this regard. But we also 
need methods that help us to explore the persuasive, appealing character of the biblical texts, 
the ways in which texts respond to, modify or oppose other texts. In this respect rhetorical 
criticism can be of great help. Biblical texts as expressions of faith were produced and passed 
on to later generations in a context of contestation; they set up choices and seek to win over 
an audience for a particular option. In examining the appeal function of biblical texts, we pay 
due respect to those faith communities who address us through the texts, calling on us to join 
them in their decisions and choices.
Extrapolate the intertextual dynamics of the biblical texts via the traditions of interpretation to 
the contemporary contexts of interpretation:
Th e multi-faceted intertextual discourse found within the Bible can become the model for our 
interpretations of the texts for our own times. When we interpret the Bible not merely in our 
time but for our time, there is a temptation to apply the ancient texts directly to our situation. 
But this is neither possible nor wise. We are not the ﬁ rst to interpret these texts and, whether 
we know it or not, we are inﬂ uenced by the long tradition of interpretation that precedes us. 
We should, consciously and explicitly, pay due respect to those fathers and mothers who read 
the Bible before us and appropriated it as God’s Word to them. 
By following this route, we also become aware of the complex pattern of continuity and change, 
re-aﬃ  rmation and reformation, which is woven into the history of interpretation of which we 
are the heirs. We may, for example, note how the ancient translators of the Hebrew Bible 
and the Qumran community appropriated the biblical traditions for their own times and the 
Christian authors of the New Testament both appropriated and expanded these traditions to 
express their faith in Jesus Christ. We may also note what methods the early church and the 
Reformers (for instance) used to ﬁ nd meaning in the Bible for their respective times. Such an 
overview of the history of interpretation of biblical texts makes us aware of the part we have 
in the long process of extrapolating the inner and intertextual dynamics of the biblical texts 
themselves.
We should not, however, forget that our world diﬀ ers greatly from the world in which the 
Bible originated and from the diﬀ erent worlds of our fathers and mothers who interpreted 
the Bible before us. We should, therefore, make full use of those methods that focus on the 
dynamics of textual reception (discussed mainly in chapters 6 and 7). We need to know what 
happens when readers read texts, how diﬀ erent perspectives or ideological stances inﬂ uence 
interpretation. Th ese insights help us to appropriate the biblical texts critically in a dual sense: 
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we learn to accept and negotiate the critical distance between our contexts and the original 
contexts of the biblical texts and we learn to subject to critical scrutiny our own impulses to 
appropriate (or reject) a certain interpretation.
A multidimensional approach that includes these phases helps us to escape the danger of 
exclusivism. It also helps us to respect to the texts themselves, the faith communities that produced 
the texts and interpreted them before us and the faith communities in our own times that seek to 
orientate their lives and serve God according to these texts.
Certainly, we do not claim that this approach guarantees “correct” interpretation, nor that it makes 
either guidance or hard thought superﬂ uous. But we are convinced that it does some justice to 
the complex conversation that is always tacitly present when we interpret by reminding us of the 
plurality of voices within this conversation. Christian interpreters of the Bible may wish to go 
further to say we see in this conversation the working of God’s Spirit through the ages – during 
the diﬀ erent phases of the production of the Bible, through all the earlier stages of interpretation 
and re-appropriation of the Bible, until today when we read these scriptures as the Word of the 
living God.
8.3 Bridging the gap between academic and non-academic readings
We have argued that the interpretation process is a complex conversation in which academic 
and non-academic voices, voices of faith and voices of doubt, are always tacitly present. We 
have also suggested that this “reading in conversation with others” that is now oft en implicit 
and unconscious should become a deliberate and explicit strategy. We recognize, however, that 
bridging the gaps between (for instance) academic and non-academic readers, academic readers of 
diﬀ erent schools and readers from diﬀ erent church traditions is no easy matter. Powerful interests 
will always seek to make biblical interpretation the domain of a selected band of scholarly experts 
or of a particular church hierarchy. What we oﬀ er here can therefore be no more than preliminary 
suggestions, focused mainly on the gaps between academic and non-academic readers.
In asking scholarly readers and (non-academic) Christian readers of the Bible to read in closer co-
operation with one another, we do not expect either group to sacriﬁ ce its principles completely. 
It is, however, fair to ask both groups to consider their practices critically and to make a rough 
distinction between those principles that are fundamental to their existence and the tendencies 
that arise from unexamined pressures within their environments. Academic readers may, for 
instance, consider whether their commitment to rationality and open-ended enquiry must 
produce an endless stream of ephemeral novelties. Similarly, church communities may consider 
that precisely the principles that lie at the heart of the Christian faith include an awareness of 
human limitations and fallibility and that the story central to the Christian Bible is a potent 
warning against dismissing strange-sounding voices without a hearing. 
If academic interpreters of the Bible have a right to be heard within Christian communities, they 
also have a duty to make themselves heard. If, as we have argued, interpretative theories arise 
from a practice in which we all engage every day, it must be possible to trace even the most exotic 
blossoms of theory back to their earthly roots. Th e task indeed is arduous, but surely not beyond 
the trained minds of scholars. If scholars were to think through their theories, not towards ever 
more sophisticated ones, but back to their roots in human practices, they might discover how 
oft en they are guilty of uncritical traditionalism in that they have absorbed from the academic 
environment ways of thinking and writing that make little sense.
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Church communities have a right to state their needs, but they would do well to check how 
serious they are about these needs. Th e belief that guidance for Christian living can always take 
the form of simplistic recipes is based on a theoretical construct that is fully as unrealistic as the 
most absurd academic theory. If ordinary Christians really want to understand the Bible, they 
should be prepared to take the necessary time and make the necessary eﬀ ort. If, however, they 
want quick and easy solutions so that they may devote more time to their other jobs and hobbies, 
they are setting a demand that is both unreasonable and uncharitable. Indeed, when Christians 
demand magic keys to biblical interpretation, they merely strengthen the false impression that 
scholars of the Bible are technologists engaged in producing labour-saving devices.
We do not suggest any form of “reading with others” is easy to accomplish or will yield 
spectacular results. Th e obstacles are formidable. Nevertheless, a determined eﬀ ort should at least 
help ordinary Christians to see that when they read the Bible they are, wittingly or unwittingly, 
students and scholars. And it will help academic interpreters to see that, in spite of their training 
and knowledge, they are in many respects ordinary people trying to make sense of their world. 
Surely this is what enabled Gerhard von Rad, probably the greatest Old Testament scholar of his 
day, to communicate his insights to a broad public and Cornelis Miskotte, an “ordinary” minister, 
to pack his popular meditations with acute scholarly observations.
What we have said about scholarly and “ordinary” readers may also be applied to other adversarial 
groupings: diﬀ erent academic schools, diﬀ erent church traditions and diﬀ erent cultural groups. 
Th e attitude implied in a multidimensional approach does not lead to an indiscriminate blurring 
of all boundaries; it does involve a rejection of notions of identity based purely on exclusion. 
In the conversation about interpretation one has to make choices and these may amount to 
contradicting other partners in the conversation. What we regard as dangerous exclusivism 
actually circumvents the possibility of contradiction, because those “outside the fold” are never 
allowed a say. But once others are allowed a say, they may also be gainsaid.
Th us the attitude of non-exclusion has as its positive counterpart a willingness to interact with 
others, with the presupposition that true interaction, as opposed to purely formal “exchanges 
of views”, has a critical edge. Th is critical edge comes to the fore in what some call empirical 
hermeneutics, that is, interpretive practices that issue in decisions about how to act on the basis of 
an understanding of a biblical text. In empirical hermeneutics the emphasis is neither on scholarly 
inventiveness nor on the maintenance or subversion of church tradition, but on the practical 
consequences of an interpretation. At this level both exclusivism and free-wheeling pluralism are 
ruled out.
How wide should we spread our net? Much as we advocate an attitude of non-exclusion and a 
willingness to interact, we caution against the idea that our practices can ever be all-inclusive or 
comprehensive. Our interpretive practices may include intercultural or ecumenical readings of 
the Bible, but “the whole picture” will continue to evade us. No human being or human group 
can enter into conversation with all other interpreters, past and present. For this reason we 
advocate “reading with others” not as the basis for a more complete theory, but as a reminder of 
the permanent inadequacy of our theories.
8.4 Where this book meets its boundaries 
In this ﬁ nal chapter we have already moved beyond the promise of the book’s title. Having dealt 
with “approaches to biblical interpretation” in the previous chapters, we have here touched on 
aspects of hermeneutical theory that pose diﬀ erent questions: What is the status of these diﬀ erent 
approaches? How do our interpretive practices aﬀ ect our daily decisions? What attitude should 
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we adopt towards “interpreting the Bible”? In particular, we have, fairly hesitantly, touched on the 
issue of biblical interpretation within Christian churches. What do or should Christians expect 
when they read the Bible and what eﬀ ect do these expectations have on speciﬁ cally Christian 
practices?
In the pure world of theory these questions do not belong in biblical studies but in philosophical 
and theological hermeneutics. In the messy world of practice such distinctions are hard, even 
impossible, to maintain. Several of the “approaches” we have described (structuralism and 
deconstruction, for instance) are wedded to positions at the level of philosophical hermeneutics. 
Others, although they appear to be neutral instruments, have implications that cannot be ignored 
in philosophical and theological hermeneutics. Yet we have also advocated a conversation in 
which diﬀ erent expert voices are given a turn to speak, each according to its own competence. 
Th erefore our suggestions in this chapter are like the ﬁ rst steps of an incomplete staircase: they 
point in a direction without quite reaching a destination. Th ey stand on the blurred boundary 
where one project has to end and another has to start.
Yet our incomplete staircase points in a certain direction. In the absence of other reliable resources, 
we regard three qualities as indispensible to any interpreter who wishes to do justice to biblical or 
other texts. Because they spur us on to broaden our range of understanding and foster a critical 
openness, they are prior to other theoretical and practical considerations and to innate talents. 
Th ey are: 
A fundamental trust in the ability of the word to communicate eﬀ ectively in spite of the many 
and obvious derailments of our actual communicative practices;
A sense of humour in the face of the incongruities and tragedies of our communicative 
situation;
Above, all, a respect for and empathy with those who speak to us through texts and whom we 
address through our interpretations.
Th ese qualities in themselves will not necessarily produce the cleverest, the best informed or 
the most creative interpretations. Th ey will, however, provide a guard against interpretations 
smacking of either the assertive arrogance born of hubris, cocksure theorizing and excessive 
reliance on a supposedly infallible method and the dismissive arrogance born of resignation, 
fatalism and tawdry cynicism. Th ey point, instead, towards a questioning that is not less humble 
for being persistent and not less persistent for being humble.
Most readers will, we hope, notice that in formulating the desirable qualities we have translated 
into a somewhat secular idiom Paul’s saying that only faith, hope and love remain – and that of 
these three love is the greatest. Indeed, the Christian formulation is some ways superior to the 
secular one. It involves less, not more, mystiﬁ cation. For instance, it does not clothe “language” 
in borrowed garments of divinity, but allows us to see our words, with their power, as the distant 
descendents of the divine Word. What is more, faith, hope and love were never counted among 
the virtues, those “strengths of character” that one can acquire through habituation. Th ey were 
always justly termed “theological graces” – qualities to which we have no natural right or access 
and that come to us as gift s outright.
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Exercise 1 (Classical strategies of interpretation – see Chapter 2)
Read the parable of the prodigal son in Luke 15:11-31 and try to answer the following:
Do you think there is a "deeper" or "more spiritual" meaning to each of the following elements 
in the story? What might the following elements in the story represent in terms of a "spiritual" 
allegory? 
the father;
the youngest son;
the oldest son;
the property;
the far land;
the bean pods the pigs ate;
the robe;
the ring;
the shoes;
the calf;
the music and dancing;
the servant.
Do you think that any of the characters in the story is a "type" of God/Jesus Christ?
What point do you think did Jesus want to make by telling this story?
Exercise 2 (A modern era emerges – see Chapter 3)
Many modern-day debates on the Bible can be analyzed according to the criteria of the approaches 
discussed in this chapter. Although people debate the interpretation of the Bible in the 21st
century, the structure of many participants’ arguments in these debates can be traced back to the 
developments discussed here.
Apart from Jonah, the following biblical texts spark intense debates:
the creation accounts;
the Noah story;
the resurrection of Jesus Christ.
Try now to construct interpretations for each of these biblical themes, according to the three 
approaches discussed in this chapter.
Exercise 3 (Historical-critical approaches – see Chapter 4.2)
Suppose that you are an archaeologists digging up Tell Ikapa on the southern tip of the African 
continent in the year 4980. One day you make an exciting discovery of a paper manuscript that 
was miraculously preserved through the years. Th e manuscript consists of a few loose pages, as 
well as a carton cover on which you can only ﬁ gure out the word “Hansard” as well as the date “… 
June 2004”. Two of the other pages have consecutive page numbers. Unfortunately some parts of 
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those pages are damaged. You can make out the following text on these pages (with the damaged 
parts indicated in square brackets):
“[…….] a great scandal. With all the corruption going on in this country, we cannot aﬀ ord 
this. International investors will deﬁ nitely not take the risk of pumping money into a country 
where the government is known […………………..] themselves.
But let me come to the latest scandal, Madam Speaker. How on earth can […………………] 
deny that they received any gift s for pushing through this weapon contract? Listen to what 
Th e […………] Town Times reports today: ‘New evidence came to the light in the weapon 
scandal yesterday. Mr. Xolani Mtolo, senior executive oﬃ  cial of the prestigious motor 
[…………………] of South Africa, has presented the following document to Th e Cape Town 
Times: Dear Mr. Mtolo, We hereby order 7 […………………..] to be delivered to each of the 
following government oﬃ  cials: Mr. Peter Smith, Dr. Zandisile Mtata, Mrs. Evelyn Richards, 
Mr. Cyril Mangope, Mr. Adriaan van Reenen, Mrs. Th oko Mokaba, Mr. Eric Ramafatula. Our 
company can be billed for the expenses. Yours sincerely. Dr. James Edwards (Senior Executive 
Oﬃ  cial, Armoury International).’ Mr. Mtolo said that he wants to clear his company’s name 
by presenting this document to the public. According to him his company treated this order 
as a normal transaction in which the recipients of the motor cars were clearly stated, as well 
as the billing address.’ Madam Speaker, not only do the names correspond to those implicated 
in the scandal, but it also provides evidence for the involvement of Armoury International in 
this whole deal. Th is is certainly clear evidence that this story was not made up by some of the 
opposition members who want to score political points. It shows [……………..]”
In another part of the tell you also discovered one page of a Xhosa manuscript. Th is page was also 
damaged. Aft er you have found somebody to translate the readable text on this page into English, 
you discovered that it corresponds to a part of the other manuscript that you have found.
Now try to answer the following questions:
How can the Xhosa manuscript help you to reconstruct some of the damaged parts in the 
English manuscript?
Do you think that the text existed as a unity from the start, or can you identify smaller units? 
If yes, is it possible to make an informed guess as to which part originated ﬁ rst, and second, 
and so forth?
You have consulted people who have made extensive studies of the English usage of that 
period in history. Do you think that they would be able to identify certain typical features of 
language that can assist you in determining the diﬀ erent literary forms involved in this text?
What were the typical life situations in which these literary forms presumably functioned?
How, do you think, did these diﬀ erent parts grow into a textual unity?
Do you think that you would be able to understand this text without knowing anything about 
its socio-economic or political context? 
See whether you can determine with which aspects of historical criticism (discussed in section 
4.2) you were dealing when you answered each of these six questions.
Exercise 4 (Historical-critical approaches – see Chapter 4.2.3)
Compare the creation accounts in Genesis 1 and 2 respectively. Are any parts of the story told 
twice? Make a list of these repetitions. What diﬀ erences in representation do you notice?
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How many animals of each kind was Noah ordered to take into the ark? Compare Genesis 
6:19-20 with Genesis 7:2-3.
Th e ﬁ rst three gospels, Matthew, Mark and Luke, are oft en called the synoptic gospels. Th is 
name derives from the practice of putting these gospels alongside each other in order to 
determine their similarities and diﬀ erences. Biblical scholars have indicated (and it is even 
quite obvious for lay readers too) that many sections in these gospels are exactly the same. Try 
to ﬁ gure out the history of development of these gospels by taking into account the following 
observations:
Matthew, Mark and Luke share many passages.
Matthew shares certain passages with Mark, but not with Luke.
Luke shares certain passages with Mark, but not with Matthew.
Matthew has certain passages that occur neither in Mark, nor in Luke.
Luke has certain passages that occur neither in Mark, nor in Matthew.
Exercise 5 (Historical-critical approaches – see Chapter 4.2.4)
Choose at random any ten psalms from the biblical book of Psalms (preferably some of the shorter 
psalms!). Read and examine them to see whether you can identify the Gattung of each psalm. Use 
some of the categories that were listed in section 4.2.4 above.
Exercise 6 (Canonical criticism – see Chapter 4.3)
Try to ﬁ nd out how many books are included in the canon of each of the following religious 
communities:
Judaism
Coptic Christianity
Roman Catholic Christianity
Eastern Orthodox Christianity
Protestant Christianity.
Why would you think these diﬀ erences occur?
What implications do these diﬀ erences have for a canonical interpretation of the Bible?
Exercise 7 (Cultural-anthropological approaches – see Chapter 4.4)
Th e following diagram (taken over from Angling for interpretation) contains two sets of values 
presented in random order. Th e one set of values is typical of a modern, industrialized, urban 
world while the other set of values is typical of the ﬁ rst century (and of many traditional societies). 
Compare these two sets of values. Indicate in each case which of the two views is typical of the 
ﬁ rst century and which of the views is typical of the community in which you grew up. (Th is 
exercise should preferably be done in a multicultural group.)
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1. When my 
partner and I 
reach retirement, 
it is our wish that 
...
All our children and their 
husbands and wives and 
all our grandchildren must 
live with us in our home, so 
that they can look aft er us 
in our old age. We can think 
of nothing worse than to be 
alone in our old age.
All our children must be established 
in their own careers and they must 
each have their own homes. We can 
think of nothing worse than that 
our children should remain totally 
dependent on us and that they are 
unable to look aft er themselves.
2. When we reﬂ ect 
on what we regard 
as important in 
society, we would 
put the emphasis 
on …
A person’s family background, 
pedigree and origins are 
crucial. Th ese determine 
our status in society. Th e 
community must care for one 
another as a group and ensure 
that the group interests are 
given priority over and above 
the interest of any particular 
individual.
Each person’s own achievements, 
progress in life and personal qualities 
are important, regardless of his family 
pedigree. It is the responsibility of 
each individual to care for and pursue 
her own interests, and society should 
be organized in such a way that she 
can actualize her full potential.
3. We regard the 
following virtues 
as important ...
Stability of character, capacity 
to persevere, due respect 
of status, concern for the 
well-being of family, friends 
and neighbours; skill in 
warfare and courage in battle; 
satisfaction and fulﬁ llment 
where everyone’s personal 
position is respected and their 
rightful standing in the group 
is maintained.
Self-suﬃ  ciency, personal happiness, 
business and entrepreneurial 
competence, success and material 
aﬄ  uence, fulﬁ llment of oneself and 
one’s ideals.
4. Society must be 
structured on the 
basis of ...
Our drive to manage people 
and circumstances in such a 
way as to ensure the end result 
of maximal personal happiness 
for us all.
Our drive to maintain our family and 
our community and to ensure that 
we do nothing that would disgrace 
us in the eyes of our family and 
community.
5. Ethical decision 
making should 
be based on the 
following:
It is ethically unacceptable and 
morally wrong to question the 
right of our leaders to exercise 
control over our whole lives, to 
think for us and to make our 
decisions for us and to ensure 
that we live exactly as they 
want us to.
It is ethically unacceptable and 
morally wrong to question the right 
of any person to think for herself, and 
to make her own decisions on how 
to live. 
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6. Our view on 
politics are that ...
Political parties should be 
organized by people who 
share similar convictions 
and uphold the same ideals; 
everyone is free to join or 
leave such a political party 
by his own self- determined 
choice.
Politics is only intended for the 
most important people and the most 
prominent families; it is they that 
must decide what they want and 
the rest should fall in line. Ordinary 
people view politics essentially as a 
conﬂ ict between diﬀ erent groupings, 
each of which is concerned only with 
its own particular interests.
7. I feel that 
wealth and power 
...
Derives directly from my 
family’s status and where we 
come from. If we happen to 
belong to a rich and important 
family it is taken for granted 
that this position should be 
maintained for centuries. 
Anyone else who wants to try 
to become rich is attempting 
to undermine my family’s 
prestige and position, and 
must therefore be kept in their 
place. All people are not equal. 
Certain categories of people 
are more important than 
others.
Are a result of my own hard 
work, eﬃ  ciency, ingenuity and 
resourcefulness. I have to make 
progress by myself in the tough 
competitiveness of the open market. 
If anyone is unfairly precluded from 
competing on an equal footing 
through discrimination, we regard 
it as immoral and unjust. Everyone 
must have equal opportunity.
8. When I 
have ﬁ nancial 
problems, trauma, 
serious illness or 
disappointments ...
I do not want my personal 
aﬀ airs to be public knowledge. 
I share my problems and 
deepest pain with a few close 
friends. Others must respect 
my privacy.
I feel that everyone in the village 
should know about it. Th ey should 
visit me in my home regularly and 
discuss the matter with me and with 
one another.
9. Where 
friendship and 
social life are 
concerned ...
We have close personal 
relationships with the people 
in our local community. We 
tend to develop strong bonds 
of friendship with our next-
door neighbours.
We choose our friends carefully. 
We tend to have social contact 
with personal friends living a 
few kilometers from us and not 
necessarily with our next-door 
neighbours.
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10. Where religion 
is concerned, we 
believe that ...
Religion, family life and local 
politics go hand in hand. 
Th e head of the family (the 
father or the eldest brother) 
determines the religious 
allegiance of the whole 
family. One would not even 
consider joining another 
religious group. Religion is a 
public matter. It is regulated 
by important ﬁ gures in 
the community in order to 
ensure the good order of the 
community.
Religion is a matter of personal 
commitment. Each person is free to 
choose the group he or she wishes 
to belong to. Religion is important 
to ensure the moral standing of 
each individual. Religion is a private 
matter. It cannot be regulated or 
prescribed by politicians or the state.
Exercise 8 (Approaches focusing on the production of texts – see Chapter 4)
In section 4.4.1(a) above a table was provided in which historical criticism was compared to 
social-scientiﬁ c criticism. Add two columns to that table, and try to summarize “Canonical 
criticism” and “Socio-rhetorical criticism” accordingly.
Exercise 9 (Feminist approaches – see Chapter 7.4)
What images jump to your mind when you hear the word feminist? Study the following list of 
descriptions and mark those that you associate with the idea of feminism:
Women taking part in a protest march to demand the legalization of abortion.
Women working in the corporate sector, wearing masculine suits and clumsy shoes. 
Women who dislike men.
Women who study speciﬁ c gender characteristics of both males and females.
Women who distrust men, and oft en have a history of abuse by men.
Women who spend most of their time working for groups, such as People against women and 
child abuse.
Women who understand and evaluate their own experience of oppression, and work to change 
the world in which women share such experiences.
Superwomen who believe that they are entitled to top-notch careers, successful children, a 
perfect marriage and family life, and who strive towards these (un)realistic goals.
Ask yourself whether your associations between the above perceptions and the word feminism
portray speciﬁ c people whom you either like or dislike. Th is exercise is important in so far as 
it reminds us that our preconceived ideas play a major role in our interpretation of new ideas. 
Perhaps you have reacted emotionally to a subject or point of view of which the basic principles 
have not yet been discussed. Nevertheless, do not allow your emotions to prohibit you from 
studying the content of this approach with an open mind. At the end of this section, we hope to 
have a more informed moral opinion on the subject.
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Exercise 10 (Feminist approaches – see Chapter 7.4)
Genesis 2:4–25 contains the creation epic which is supposed to justify the traditional argument 
that women were created subordinate to men. Woman was created last, whereas man was created 
ﬁ rst; furthermore, she was called his “helper.” Do these two facts, if indeed they are facts, support 
the argument that women were created to be less than men?
Study this story carefully before examining the following questions:
In the ﬁ rst creation epic (Genesis 1) the order of God’s creation of the animals and people diﬀ ers 
from the account in Genesis 2. Does the fact that people were created last (Genesis 1) mean that 
they have the least value of all the creatures that God created?
Th en, on the grounds that it seems as though woman was created second, can we determine the 
value or importance of women in relation to men? Or does the fact that the creation of humans 
is mentioned right at the beginning and again right at the end of creation in Genesis 2, indeed, 
imply the same as it is traditionally seen to imply in Genesis 1, namely that the creation of humans 
is the focus of God’s creation, as well as its completion?
When someone helps you, does that necessarily imply that the person in question is subordinate 
to you?
Th e Psalms oft en refer to God as “our helper.” Does this mean that God is subordinate to us? Th en 
why should the same word imply subordination when used in respect of women?
Th e objective of this exercise is to indicate that a preconceived notion about the subordination of 
women leads to the traditional reading of Genesis 2, which conﬁ rms this subordination. Th e text 
itself does not imply that women are inferior to men. It is only a ﬁ xed idea that lives in the mind 
of its readers that causes this text to be read as such. Aft er the creation of woman, man rejoices in 
the fact that she is similar to him, not that she is diﬀ erent from him. Th is then aﬃ  rms the opposite 
of subordination, namely co-operative equality.
Exercise 11 (Feminist approaches – see Chapter 7.4)
In the same way, let us re-examine the creation story by reading the ﬁ rst creation epic and 
focusing on Genesis 1:27. On studying the word ha-adam a serious question arises: Does this 
word indicate man or humankind? 
If humankind is accepted as the meaning, it is clear that the text intends to say that men and 
women were created in the image of God. Th en this would be a valuable contra-text to any text 
applied for the subordination of women. Furthermore, a text that prohibits women from speaking 
the word of God in a congregation, such as 1 Timothy 2:11, can be read with Judges 4 and 5, 
in which Deborah acts as God’s prophet. How would you handle this apparent contradiction? 
Which text would you choose to be the most authoritative, and why?
Also, read Joel 2:28-29 and Acts 2:17-18. Do you think it is important that, when the Spirit of God 
is poured out, that both “sons” and “daughters” will prophesy? What is the relation between the 
sons and the daughters in these passages?
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Because we oﬀ er this book as a textbook for undergraduate studies, we wished to avoid appending 
a massive bibliography. Our intention was to restrict ourselves to a few entries for each chapter, 
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individual sections cited certain works, we obviously had to include these as well. As a result, the 
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under a particular heading, it reﬂ ects the fact that the authors of these sections referred to many 
works in their contributions.
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